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FOREWORD 
Inspiration for the preparation of this volume came from 
reading two sections of Volume I of the four-volumes published 
in 1942 entitled, The University of Michigan-An Encyclopedic 
Survey. One section by E. Blythe Stason, Dean Emeritus of the 
University's Law School, is captioned "The Constitutional Sta-
tus of the University of Michigan." The other section captioned 
"The Organization, Powers and Personnel of the Board of 
Regents" was prepared by the Dean and the late Wilfred B. 
Shaw, long connected with the University in important adminis-
trative capacities and intimately acquainted with its history. 
The material here presented duplicates in part that con-
tained in these two sections. It is intended to be more specific 
and, in some respects, it is much more expansive. Moreover, it 
speaks of developments since the year 1942 when the survey 
was published. 
If occasionally it has value to those charged with adminis-
tering the affairs of the University and educational institutions 
of similar constitutional posture, the efforts in publishing this 
volume will be well rewarded. 
Subjects not treated in this volume are as follows: 
(a) Federal laws, such as those granting financial aid and 
other assistance, under which the federal government assists uni-
versities and colleges alone or in connection with other govern-
mental units, and state aid and assistance laws. 
(b) Statutes of Michigan appropriating funds for the sup-
port and maintenance of the University. 
(c) Statutes known as "millage tax laws," the first of which 
was enacted in 1867. This form of financial support for the Uni-
versity is no longer employed. When used there was imposed on 
property in the State, subject to ad valorem taxes, a millage tax 
in varying amounts based on assessed valuation. 
(d) General laws of the State of Michigan applicable to all 
citizens. 
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(e) Proceedings involving the University of Michigan before 
state and local boards and commissions, and before municipal 
and justices courts. 
The legislative history of the University is extremely inter-
esting. It begins with the territorial laws enacted in 181 7 and con-
tinues to date. Michigan was admitted to the Union in 1837 and 
thereafter a legislature as constituted by the Constitution of the 
State, adopted in 183 5 and re-adopted in 183 7, enacted the laws. 
There was a revision of the State statutes in 183 7 and 
1846. Since then pursuant to law, from time to time compila-
tions of statutes have been prepared. The generally recognized 
compilations were made in the years 1857, 1871, 1882, 1890, 
1897, 1912, 1915, 1929 and 1948. 
In this volume the general history of significant laws 
enacted by the Territorial Council and by the State Legislature 
for each year from 1817 are considered and sufficiently treated 
in the Stason and Price articles contained in this volume (Chap-
ters I & V) and in Chapter III which discusses current statutes 
pertaining to the University and their history. 
It appears that no significant statutes enacted since 1817 
have been enacted and then repealed, save perhaps the "millage" 
tax laws. Inconsequential laws were passed and repealed. A sum-
mary of all important statutes in force at this time is set forth. 
A university has many gleaming facets: governing board, 
administrative officers, faculty, students, alumni and, yes, many 
friends. The story of great institutions can be revealed in diverse 
ways, through the means of various media such as histories, arti-
cles and other writings. Surprisingly, perhaps, given antiquity of 
a sort, such institutions sooner or later are bound to become en-
meshed in law for one reason or another. This is particularly 
true of entities which are public institutions, such as the Univer-
sity of Michigan. Given this age, these laws, whether expressed 
in decisions or statutes, often tell much of interest as to the his-
tory, traditions, growth, rights and responsibilities of such 
bodies. The history and drama is slowly and haphazardly un-
folded, but for the reader it is there. 
WILLIAM B. CUDLIP 
June, 1969 
CAPSULE HISTORY OF UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
With the thought that some perspective concerning the 
University's general history may be useful to one examining this 
volume, it seems desirable to mention in chronological order 
some of the main happenings in the one and one-half centuries 
of the life of this great educational institution. 
Year Event 
1787 Congress adopted the Ordinance of 1787 provid-
ing for the government of the Northwest terri-
tories and the implanting of educational facilities 
therein. 
1805 Territory of Michigan was organized and lands 
granted for educational purposes. 
1817 Organization of a supervisory body known as the 
Catholepistemiad of Michigania in Detroit, Mich-
igan. Initiation of Fort Meigs treaty by Terri-
torial Governor Cass with Indians providing, 
among other things, for three sections of land 
for support of a territorial institution of higher 
learning. 
1821 Congressional act setting aside two townships for 
use and support of a University within the Terri-
tory of Michigan. Creation of "University of 
Michigan" with changes in 1817 law. The new 
act provided for state-wide branches of the Uni-
versity. 
1835 State Constitution adopted with recognition of 
the University and means for its support. 
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Year Event 
1836 Opening of building on Bates Street, Detroit, for 
admission of first students. 
1837 Michigan admitted to Union as a State. Univer-
sity moved from Detroit to Ann Arbor. 
1841 
1850 
1852 
1860 
1861-65 
1863 
1867 
1869 
Forty-eight thousand acres of land given by 
United States to State of Michigan in trust for 
support of schools. 
Enactment by legislature of organic act of the 
University. 
Opening of University at Ann Arbor. Completion 
of first buildings. The first class held in Mason 
Hall consisted of seven students. There were two 
facu1ty members. 
Effective date of new state Constitution which 
created new and independent status for the Uni-
versity. Opening of Department of Medicine and 
Surgery. 
Appointment of President Henry Philip Tappan. 
Opening of Law Department. 
Interruptive Civil War and thereafter vigorous 
growth of institution. 
Appointment of President Erastus Otis Haven. 
Inauguration by legislature of the novel device of 
a millage tax for University support. 
Appointment of Henry Simmons Frieze as Act-
ing President. 
Year 
1869-70 
1871 
1908 
1909 
1917-18 
1920 
CAPSULE HISTORY xi 
Event 
Beginning of Douglas-Rose controversy 
Appointment of James Burrill Angell as Presi-
dent. Beginning of stable growth of the Univer-
sity. 
Effective date of new state Constitution which 
retained 1850 constitutional posture of Univer-
sity. 
Appointment of Harry Bums Hutchins as Presi-
dent. 
World War I, again followed by period of stimu-
lus to all aspects of University life. 
Appointment of Marion LeRoy Burton as Presi-
dent. 
Huge and much-needed building program was 
commenced. 
1925 Appointment of Clarence Cook Little as Presi-
dent. 
1929 Appointment of Alexander Grant Ruthven as 
President. 
1941-45 
1951 
Beginning of additional building program of large 
dimensions. 
World War II, followed by marked growth in 
student body and research and educational ef-
forts. 
Appointment of Harlan Henthorn Hatcher as 
President. 
xii 
Year 
1951 
CAPSULE HISTORY 
Event 
Vast increase in student body and continued ex~ 
pansion of facilities for educational and research 
purposes. 
1964 Effective date of new state Constitution which 
retains 1850 and 1908 constitutional posture of 
University. 
1968 Appointment of Robben W. Fleming as Presi~ 
dent. 
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Part One 
The Legal History of the University of Michigan; 
Development of the Autonomous Constitutional 
Corporation. 
CHAPTER I 
THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY 
AND SUBSEQUENT CHANGES MADE BY 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Dean Stason's article on the Constitutional Status of the 
University of Michigan is-as stated in the Foreword-the inspi-
ration for this book. This first chapter contains generous ex-
cerpts from that article and its appendices which review the 
early legal history of the University and the constitutional pro-
visions under which it is governed. These excerpts are followed 
by a brief comment describing the changes brought forth since 
the Stason article by the new constitution adopted in 1963. The 
essence of the case of the Regents v. Board of Education of City 
of Detroit is included in this chapter for its definitive review of 
the early legal history of the University. 
E. Blythe Stason, THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE 
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
1 The University of Michigan-An Encyclopedic Survey 116 
(1942), University of Michigan Press. · 
The foundations of the constitutional status of the University 
of Michigan were laid long prior to the writing of specific provisions 
into the constitution of the state. The roots of those provisions are 
to be found in the early history of the Northwest Territory and in 
the early efforts to establish education as one of the necessary func-
tions of government .... 
On May 20, 1785, the Congress adopted "an ordinance for 
ascertaining the mode of disposing oflands in the western country," 
establishing a system of rectangular land surveys for the new coun-
try. The ordinance contained the forward looking provision that 
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"there shall be reserved the lot No. 16 of every township for the 
maintenance of public schools within the said township." The sig-
nificance of this early provision can scarcely be overestimated. It 
gives evidence of a recognition by the central government of its obli-
gation and duty to provide at government expense for education 
within the Northwest Territory-this in a day when public schools 
were almost an unknown phenomenon, even in the states already 
established. 
Two years later, on July 13, 1787, the Congress adopted the 
measure, known as the Ordinance of 1787, entitled "An Ordinance 
for the Government of the Territory of the United States Northwest 
of the River Ohio," and on July 23 of the same year a supplemen-
tary measure was adopted, entitled "Powers to the Board of Treas-
ury to Contract for the Sale of Western Territory." These two enact-
ments were a part of the same general plan, and each of them con-
tained important provisions concerning education. The earlier of the 
two, i.e., the ordinance, contained the often quoted general declara-
tion: "Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good 
government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of 
education shall forever be encouraged" (Northwest Ordinance, 
Art. 3). 
The supplementary measure of July 23 was more specific. It 
reiterated the grant of 1785 allocating lot No. 16 in each township 
"to be given perpetually for the purpose of maintenance of the public 
schools within the township," and, more importantly so far as the 
University is concerned, it added: 
[Not more than two complete townships] shall be given per-
petually for the purpose of a university, to be laid off by the pur-
chaser or purchasers as near the centre as may be, so that the same 
shall be of good land, to be applied to the intended object by the 
legislature of the state. 
These three measures, adopted by the Congress of the Con-
federation and, in effect, made a part of the fundamental law of the 
Northwest Territory, established a unique and valuable policy with 
respect to the encouragement and support of both elementary and 
higher education. Furthermore, it was a policy of remarkable vitality, 
as is amply attested by the fact that it has ever since been reflected 
to a greater or less extent in the fundamental law of the part of the 
Territory carved out in 1837 to form the state of Michigan. 
In 181 7 the predecessor of the University, the Ca tholepiste-
miad, was established by a territorial act (II Terr. Laws, 1817, p. 
104), and in 1821, by a new enactment, the University itself was 
created as a "body politic and corporate" (I Terr. Laws, 1821, p. 
879). 
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In pursuance of the policy established by the ordinances of 
1785 and 1787, the Congress on May 20, 1826, passed the following 
measure: 
[The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized] to set 
apart and reserve from sale out of any of the public lands within the 
Territory of Michigan to which the Indian title has been extinguished 
a quantity of land not exceeding two entire townships for the use 
and support of a university. (4 U.S. Stat. L. 180.) 
The grant was early accepted by the state (Laws, 1835-36, p. 
149), and the Congress confirmed the selection oflands (5 U.S. Stat. 
L. 59). The superintendent of public instruction was directed to sell 
not to exceed five hundred thousand dollars' worth of these lands 
and to deposit the proceeds to the credit of a University interest fund 
(Laws, 1837, p. 209). The fund thus established, together with in-
come in the form of fees and miscellaneous gifts, constituted the 
principal source of fmancial support of the University of Michigan 
until1867. In that ;Year additional financial aid was sought and ob-
tained from the state legislature. The interest fund even today 
amounts to a considerable sum-about $38,000 per year .... 
This federal territorial policy of providing both encouragement 
and continuing fiscal support for the University was subsequently 
carried on by the state in a wise and generous way. On the fiscal 
side, after the interest fund became insufficient to care for the needs 
of the growing institution, the "mill-tax" laws were passed to pro-
vide the necessary funds. The first of these laws, passed in 1867, con-
sisted of an appropriation for the support of the University of a sum 
equal to one-twentieth of a mill on each dollar of taxable property 
in the state. Perhaps the most valuable and certainly the unique fea-
ture of this measure and its successors was their continuing nature, 
i.e., instead of being biennial appropriations, they were in reality per-
manent laws continuing from year to year until changed by subse-
quent affirmative legislative enactment. They thus approximated the 
permanence of the federal land endowment for the University. They 
gave the institution the stability enjoyed by the large privately en-
dowed schools of the East. With some variations the policy of this 
mill-tax law of 1867 has been continued until the present day, and, 
although it is a statutory rather than a constitutional device, it has 
become so thoroughly a part of the accepted legislative practice and 
of the tradition of the state as virtually to share the permanent status 
of fundamental law. (See Appendix A, ... for a list of the mill-tax 
acts.) It constitutes one of the major reasons for the fact that the 
University of Michigan has attained a first place among the state uni-
versities of the country. 
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THE CONSTITUTION OF 1835.-When Michigan adopted its 
first constitution, in 1835, two express provisions were written into 
the fundamental law concerning higher education. (See Appendix B, 
... for full text of provisions for University and public-school sup-
port in the Constitution of 1835.) One of these, section 2 of Article 
X, was general and followed the style set by the similar declaration 
in the Ordinance of 1787. It stipulated that "the legislature shall en-
courage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, 
and agricultural improvement." The other provision was more spe-
cific. In section 5 of Article X was the requirement: 
.... the legislature shall take measures for the protection and 
improvement or other disposition of such lands as have been or may 
hereafter be reserved or granted by the United States to this state for 
the support of a university; and the funds accruing from the rents or 
sale of such lands or from any other source for the purpose aforesaid 
shall be and remain a permanent fund for the support of said univer-
sity. 
These provisions were written into the constitution in an ef-
fort to pursue the policy established by the national government 
during territorial days. They were good so far as they went; how-
ever, they left full power in the legislature to manage the affairs of 
the University, to regulate the appointment of the Regents, to es-
tablish or abolish departments, to regulate the appointment of pro-
fessors, and to control expenditures from the University funds. In 
short, they left the internal administration of the University fully 
subject to the changing desires of the political arena at the state 
Capitol, then in Detroit. 
In spite of early efforts to build the University into a strong 
institution, success and prosperity were not achieved in the period 
between 1835 and the revision of the constitution in 1850. The 
more thoughtful public men of the time felt that one of the reasons 
for the failure of the University to develop rapidly was the fact that 
its functioning was dependent upon and subject to the changing poli-
cies of the legislature. They felt that under such conditions the Uni-
versity could not attain the degree of stability, permanence, inde-
pendence, and strength enjoyed by the denominational and endowed 
colleges of the East. The shortcomings were functional rather than 
fiscal. 
In 1840 a select committee was appointed by the legislature to 
inquire into the condition of the University. A part of the report of 
the committee indicates clearly the consensus of contemporary opin-
ion concerning higher education in the state. 
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"No State institution in America has prospered as well as inde-
pendent colleges with equal, and often with less, means. Why they 
have not may be ascribed, in part, to the following causes: They 
have not been guided by that oneness of purpose and singleness of 
aim (essential to their prosperity) that others have whose trustees 
are a permanent body,-men chosen for their supposed fitness for 
that very office, and who, having become acquainted with their 
duties, can and are disposed to pursue a steady course, which in-
spires confidence and insures success, to the extent of their limited 
means. State institutions, on the contrary, have fallen into the hands 
of the several legislatures, fluctuating bodies of men, chosen with 
reference to their supposed qualifications for other duties than 
cherishing literary institutions. When legislatures have legislated di-
rectly for colleges, their measures have been as fluctuating as the 
changing materials of which the legislatures were composed. When 
they have acted through a board of trustees, under the show of giving 
a representation to all, they have appointed men of such dissimilar 
and discordant characters and views that they never could act in 
concert; so that, whilst supposed to act for and represent everybody, 
they, in fact, have not and could not act for anybody. 
Again, legislatures, wishing to retain all the power of the State 
in their own hands, as if they alone were competent or disposed to 
act for the general good, have not been willing to appoint trustees for 
a length of time sufficient for them to become acquainted with their 
duties, to become interested in the cause which they were appointed 
to watch over, and feel the deep responsibility of the trust committed 
to them. A new board of trustees, like a legislature of new members, 
not knowing well what to do, generally begins by undoing and dis-
organizing all that has been done before. At first they dig up the seed 
a few times, to see that it is going to come up; and, after it appears 
above the surface, they must pull it up, to see that the roots are 
sound; and they must pull it up again, to see if there is sufficient root 
to support so vigorous branches; then lop off the branches, for fear 
they will exhaust the root; and then pull it up again, to see why it 
looks so sickly and pining, and finally to see if they can discover 
what made it die. And, as these several operations are performed by 
successive hands, no one can be charged with the guilt of destroying 
the valuable tree. Whilst State institutions have been, through the 
jealousy of State legislatures, thus sacrificed to the impatience and 
petulance of a heterogeneous and changeable board of trustees, 
whose term of office is so short that they have not time to discover 
their mistakes, retrace their steps, and correct their errors, it is not 
surprising that State universities have hitherto, almost without excep-
tion, failed to accomplish, in proportion to their means, the amount 
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of good that was expected from them, and much less than colleges in 
their neighborhood, patronized by the religious public, watched over 
by a board of trustees of similar qualifications for duty, and holding 
the office permanently, that they may profit by experience. 
The argument by which legislatures have hitherto convinced 
themselves that it was their duty to legislate universities to death is 
this: "It is a State institution, and we are the direct representatives 
of the people, and therefore it is expected of us; it is our right. The 
people have an interest in this thing, and we must attend to it." As 
if, because a university belongs to the people, that were reason why 
it should be dosed to death for fear it would be sick, if left to be 
nursed, like other institutions, by its immediate guardians. Thus has 
State after State, in this American Union, endowed universities, and 
then, by repeated contradictory and over legislation, torn them to 
pieces with the same facility as they do the statute book, and for the 
same reason, because they have the right." (2H. Doc., 1840, p. 470.) 
THE CONSTITUTION OF 1850.-Such was the condition of 
affairs when the constitutional convention of 1850 met. Any reader 
of the debates of that convention will be impressed with the attitude 
of the delegates toward higher education. They recognized the need 
of removing the University from changing political influences and yet 
keeping it directly responsible and amenable to the people (Debates, 
pp. 782-85,804, 846). 
As a result of the work of the convention, provisions were 
therefore written into the Constitution of 1850 (Art. XIII) to estab-
lish the University as an independent constitutional corporation 
under the control of a Board of Regents elected directly by the peo-
ple. The Board was made a body corporate, to be known by the 
name and title of "The Regents of the University of Michigan." Then 
followed the all-important clause: "The Board of Regents shall have 
the general supervision of the University and the direction and con-
trol of all expenditures from the University interest fund." By virtue 
of these provisions a quasi-independent constitutional corporation 
was substituted for the prior dependent statutory agency, and a 
permanent and stable educational plan for the University of Michigan 
was brought into being. Responsibility directly to the people of the 
state was substituted for responsibility to the state legislature. (For 
the full text of University provisions in the amended Constitution of 
1850, see Appendix C .... ) 
* * * 
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THE CONSTITUTION OF 1908.-... The provisions of [the 
Constitution of 1908] were similar to those of the Constitution of 
1850 insofar as the University was concerned. Section 5 of Article XI 
stipulated that "the Board of Regents shall have the general supervi-
sion of the University and the direction and control of all expendi-
tures from the University funds." (The full text of University provi-
sions in the Constitution of 1908 is given in Appendix D ... ) The 
word "interest," which had followed the word "University" in the 
Constitution of 1850, was omitted, and the word "fund" was changed 
to "funds," thus placing all University funds-the University interest 
fund, legislative appropriations, and funds from other sources-under 
the exclusive control of the Board of Regents. 
* * * 
By the Constitution of 1908 the State Board of Agriculture 
[was] vested with the power of government of the Michigan Agri-
cultural College, and the constitutional convention was so well satis-
fied with the functioning of the University under the provisions of 
the Constitution of 1850 that a similar constitutional status was con-
ferred upon the college. In Article XI, section 8, the new constitu-
tion stipulated that "the Board [State Board of Agriculture] shall 
have general supervision of the College and the direction and con-
trol of all Agricultural College funds" -a clause practically identical 
with the corresponding University clause. 
APPENDIX A* 
MILL-TAX ACTS.-The various mill-tax acts of the state of Michigan 
are as follows: 
Laws, 1867, No. 59, p. 86: 1/20 of a mill. 
Laws, 1869, No. 14, p. 19: $15,000. 
Laws, 1873, No. 32, p. 32: 1/20 of a mill. 
P.A., 1893, No. 19, p. 19: 1/6 of a mill. 
P.A., 1893, No. 53, p. 56: 1/6 of a mill. 
P.A., 1899, No. 102, p. 146: 1/4 of a mill. 
P.A., 1907, No. 303, p. 398: 3/8 of a mill. 
P.A., 1921, No. 247, p. 46: 6/10 of a mill. 
*Information on more recent state support for the University is found in 
Chapter V. 
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P.A., 1923, No. 252, p. 400: 6/10 of a mill. 
P.A., 1925, No. 324, p. 476: 6/10 of a mill; total not to exceed 
$3,700,000. 
P.A., 1927, No. 404, p. 953: 6/10 of a mill. 
P.A., 1931, No. 319, p. 545: 6/10 of a mill; total not to exceed 
$4,928,852.55. 
P.A., 1935, No. 11, p. 23: repeal of act of 1873. 
P.A., 1935, No. 112, p. 180: appropriation of a sum equal to 73/100 
of a mill. 
P.A., 1937, No. 147, p. 230: appropriation of a sum equal to 83/100 
of a mill but not to exceed $4,673,253.58. 
APPENDIXB 
SCHOOL AND UNIVERSITY PROVISIONS IN THE CONSTITU-
TION OF 1835.-The full text of sections 2 and 5 of Article X of the Con-
stitution of 1835 is as follows: 
Perpetual fund for support of schools. 2. The legislature shall encour-
age. by all suitable means, the promotion of intellectual, scientifical and 
agricultural improvement. The proceeds of all lands that have been or here-
after may be granted by the United States to this state, for the support of 
schools, which shall hereafter be sold or disposed of, shall be and remain a 
perpetual fund; the interest of which, together with the rents of all such 
unsold lands, shall be inviolably appropriated to the support of schools 
throughout the state .... 
University fund. 5. The legislature shall take measures for the protec-
tion, improvement or other disposition of such lands as have been or may 
hereafter be reserved or granted by the United States to this state for the 
support of a university; and the funds accruing from the rents or sale of 
such lands, or from any other source for the purpose aforesaid, shall be 
and remain a permanent fund for the support of said university, with such 
branches as the public convenience may hereafter demand for the promo-
tion of literature, the arts and sciences, and as may be authorized by the 
terms of such grant; and it shall be the duty of the legislature, as soon as 
may be, to provide effectual means for the improvement and permanent 
security of the funds of said university. 
APPENDIXC 
UNIVERSITY PROVISIONS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1850.-
As amended in 1862, the full text ofthe provisions of the Constitution of 
1850 relating to the University is as follows: 
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School fund. Sec. 2. The proceeds from the sales of all lands that 
have been or hereafter may be granted by the United States to the state 
for educational purposes, and the proceeds of all lands or other property 
given by individuals or appropriated by the state for like purposes, shall 
be and remain a perpetual fund, the interest and income of which, to-
gether with the rents of all such lands as may remain unsold, shall be in-
violably appropriated and annually applied to the specific objects of the 
original gift, grant, or appropriation .... 
Regents of university; election. Sec. 6. There shall be elected in the 
year eighteen hundred and sixty-three, at the time of the election of a 
justice of the supreme court, eight regents of the university, two of whom 
shall hold their office for two years, two for four years, two for six years, 
and two for eight years. They shall enter upon the duties of their office on 
the first of January next succeeding their election. At every regular elec-
tion of a justice of the supreme court thereafter there shall be elected two 
regents whose term of office shall be eight years. When a vacancy shall oc-
cur in the office of regent, it shall be filled by appointment of the gov-
ernor. The regents thus elected shall constitute the board of regents of the 
University of Michigan. 
Same; body corporate. Sec. 7. The regents of the university and their 
successors in office shall continue to constitute the body corporate, 
known by the name and title of "The Regents of the University of Michi-
gan." 
President of university; supervision by regents. Sec. 8. The regents of 
the university shall, at their first annual meeting, or as soon thereafter as 
may be, elect a president of the university, who shall be ex officio a mem-
ber of their board, with the privilege of speaking but not of voting. He 
shall preside at the meetings of the regents and be the principal executive 
officer of the university. The board of regents shall have the general super-
vision of the university, and the direction and control of all expenditures 
from the university interest fund .... 
Agricultural school; appropriation; transfer to university. Sec. 11. 
The legislature shall encourage the promotion of intellectual scientific and 
agricultural improvement; and shall, as soon as practicable, provide for the 
establishment of an agricultural school. The legislature may appropriate 
the twenty-two sections of salt spring lands now unappropriated, or the 
money arising from the sale of the same, where such lands have been al-
ready sold, .and any land which may hereafter be granted or appropriated 
for such purpose for the support and maintenance of such school, and may 
make the same a branch of the university, for instruction in agriculture and 
the natural sciences connected therewith, and place the same under the su-
pervision of the regents of the university. 
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APPENDIXD 
UNIVERSITY PROVISIONS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1908.-
The full text of the provisions of the Constitution of 1908 which relate to 
the University is as follows: 
ARTICLE XI 
Encouragement of education. Section 1. Religion, morality, and 
knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of man-
kind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged. 
Regents of university; election, term, vacancy. Sec. 3. There shall be 
a board of regents of the university, consisting of eight members, who shall 
hold the office for eight years. There shall be elected at each regular biennial 
spring election two members of such board. When a vacancy shall occur in 
the office of the regent it shall be filled by appointment of the governor. 
Same; name. Sec. 4. The regents of the university and their successors 
in office shall continue to constitute the body corporate known as "The 
Regents of the University of Michigan." 
University; president; supervision. Sec. 5. The regents of the univer-
sity shall, as often as necessary, elect a president of the university. The 
president of the university and the superintendent of public instruction 
shall be ex officio members of the board of regents, with the privilege of 
speaking but not of voting. The president shall preside at the meetings of 
the board and be the principal executive officer of the university. The 
board of regents shall have the general supervision of the university and 
the direction and control of all expenditures from the university funds. 
Educational institutions; maintenance. Sec. 10. The legislature shall 
maintain the university, the college of mines, the state agricultural college, 
the state normal college and such state normal schools and other educa-
tional institutions as may be established by law. 
Proceeds of school land. Sec. 11. The proceeds from the sales of all 
lands that have been or hereafter may be granted by the United States to 
the state for educational purposes and the proceeds of all lands or other 
property given by individuals or appropriated by the state for like pur-
poses shall be and remain a perpetual fund, the interest and income of 
which, together with the rents of all such lands as may remain unsold, shall 
be inviolably appropriated and annually applied to the specific objects of 
the original gift, grant or appropriation. 
ARTICLE XIII 
Regents of university; power of eminent domain. Sec. 4. The regents 
of the university of Michigan shall have power to take private property for 
the use of the university in the manner prescribed by law. 
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2. CHANGES MADE BY THE CONSTITUTION OF 1963 
The constitution adopted in 1963 (for text see pp. 14) 
reconfirmed the constitutional status of the University of Michi-
gan. The changes which the constitutional convention did make 
in the provisions for state-supported institutions of higher edu-
cation demonstrated the convention's high regard for the form 
of government previously established for the University of Mich-
igan. 
The major change made in the Education Article of the 
constitution was the extension of the constitutional status for-
merly enjoyed only by the University of Michigan, Michigan 
State University, and Wayne State University, ail created by 
constitution, to other state-assisted institutions created by sta-
tute. The University of Michigan was a creature of statute until 
the adoption of the Constitution of 1850. 
The new constitution uses the same language for each of 
the state's "Big Three" universities-the University of Michigan, 
Michigan State University, and Wayne State University. AU other 
state institutions which may grant bachelor's degrees have been 
given a substantially equivalent form of government. Their gov-
erning boards have the same rights and powers as the boards of 
the Big Three except that instead of being elected by the people 
of the state, their members are appointed by the Governor 
with the consent of the senate. Practically speaking, popular 
election of such a large number of officials is not a possible 
alternative. 
The new constitution also creates a new eight-member state 
board of education. The old four-member board which had con-
trolled four state universities created by legislative acts and for-
merly known as Normal schools was abolished. Along with other 
duties, the new board is made "the general planning and coorcli-
nating body for all public education, including higher educa-
tion." (Article 8, Section 3.) The board is also instructed to "ad-
vise the legislature as to the financial requirements" of public 
education. However, the last sentence of the section makes clear 
that the functions of the new board were not meant to restrict 
the indep.endence of the autonomous universities. "The power 
of the boards of institutions of higher education provided in 
this constitution to supervise their respective institutions and 
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direct the expenditure of the institutions' funds shall not be 
limited by this section." 
Three other significant, though relatively minor, changes 
were made in the new constitution which affect the universities. 
Section 4 of Article 8 requires that formal sessions of the gov-
erning boards be open to the public. The same section requires 
that an annual accounting of all income and expenditures by 
each educational institution be given to the legislature. Finally, 
the composition of the governing boards of the major state uni-
versities is changed by dropping the Superintendent of Public 
Instruction from ex officio membership. 
MICHIGAN CONSTITUTION (1963) Article VIII. Education. 
* * * 
Sec. 3. Leadership and general supervision over all public edu-
cation, including adult education and instructional programs in state 
institutions, except as to institutions of higher education granting 
baccalaureate degrees, is vested in a state board of education. It shall 
serve as the general planning and coordinating body for all public 
education, including higher education, and shall advise the legislature 
as to the financial requirements in connection therewith. 
The state board of education shall appoint a superintendent of 
public instruction whose term of office shall be determined by the 
board. He shall be the chairman of the board without the right to 
vote, and shall be responsible for the execution of its policies. He 
shall be the principal executive officer of a state department of edu-
cation which shall have powers and duties provided by law. 
The state board of education shall consist of eight members 
who shall be nominated by party conventions and elected at large for 
terms of eight years as prescribed by law. The governor shall fill any 
vacancy by appointment for the unexpired term. The governor shall 
be ex-officio a member of the state board of education without the 
right to vote. 
The power of the boards of institutions of higher education 
provided in this constitution to supervise their respective institutions 
and control and direct the expenditure of the institutions' funds 
shall not be limited by this section. 
Sec. 4. The legislature shall appropriate moneys to maintain 
the University of Michigan, Michigan State University, Wayne State 
University, Eastern Michigan University, Michigan College of Science 
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and Technology, Central Michigan University, Northern Michigan 
University, Western Michigan University, Ferris Institute, Grand Val-
ley State College, by whatever names such institutions may hereafter 
be known, and other institutions of higher education established by 
law. The legislature shall be given an annual accounting of all income 
and expenditures by each of these educational institutions. Formal 
sessions of governing boards of such institutions shall be open to the 
public. 
Sec. 5. The regents of the University of Michigan and their suc-
cessors in office shall constitute a body corporate known as the 
Regents of the University of Michigan; the trustees of Michigan 
State University and their successors in office shall constitute a body 
corporate known as the Board of Trustees of Michigan State Uni-
versity; the governors of Wayne State University and their successors 
in office shall constitute a body corporate known as the Board of 
Governors of Wayne State University. Each board shall have general 
supervision of its institution and the control and direction of all ex-
penditures from the institution's funds. Each board shall, as often as 
necessary, elect a president of the institution under its supervision. 
He shall be the principal executive officer of the institution, be ex-
officio a member of the board without the right to vote and preside 
at meetings of the board. The board of each institution shall consist 
of eight members who shall hold office for terms of eight years and 
who shall be elected as provided by law. The governor shall fill board 
vacancies by appointment. Each appointee shall hold office until a 
successor has been nominated and elected as provided by law. 
Sec. 6. Other institutions of higher education established by 
law having authority to grant baccalaureate degrees shall each be gov-
erned by a board of control which shall be a body corporate. The 
board shall have general supervision of the institution and the con-
trol and direction of all expenditures from the institution's funds. It 
shall, as often as necessary, elect a president of the institution under 
its supervision. He shall be the principal executive officer of the in-
sti~tion and be ex-officio a member of the board without the right 
to vote. The board may elect one of its members or may designate 
the president, to preside at board meetings. Each board of control 
shall consist of eight members who shall hold office for terms of 
eight years, not more than two of which shall expire in the same 
year, and who shall be appointed by the governor by and with the 
advice and consent of the senate. Vacancies shall be filled in like 
manner. 
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3. THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN v. THE 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF DETROIT 
The Supreme Court of Michigan; 4 Mich. 213, 221-29 (1856) 
GREEN,J. 
* * * 
[W] e conclude ... that the Governor and Judges had power to 
execute the deed. This power was assumed to have existed, and does 
not appear to have been questioned, in the case of Scott vs. the De-
troit Young Men's Society's Lessee. (1 Doug. Mich. R., 1 i9.) 
2. Are the plaintiffs the "successors" of the grantees named in 
the deed? 
The consideration of this question requires a somewhat ex-
tended examination of the Territorial and State legislation in regard 
to the University of Michigan. The first Act for the establishment of 
such an institution, was made and adopted by the Governor and 
Judges of the Territory, on the 26th of August, 1817, and was en-
titled, "An Act to establish the Catholepistemiad, or University of 
Michigan." This law provided for the appointment of a President, 
and the creation of thirteen didaxia, or Professorships; and the Presi-
dent and didactors, or Professors, were invested with power to regu-
late all the concerns of the institution, and to enact laws for that 
purpose; to sue, and to be sued; to acquire, hold, and alien property, 
real, mixed and personal; to make, use, and alter a seal; to establish 
Colleges, Academies, Schools, libraries, Museums, Atheneums, Bo-
tanic gardens, Laboratories, and other useful literary and scientific 
institutions, consonant to the laws of the United States, and of Mich-
igan; and to appoint officers, instructors, and instructii, in, among 
and throughout the various counties, cities, towns, townships, and 
other geographical divisions of Michigan. Their name and style as a 
corporation, was to be "The Catholepistemiad, or University of 
Michigan," and the great institution whose affairs were thus con-
fided to the management of this magnificent legal entity, was to bear 
the same classical name. The didactors, or Professors, were to be ap-
pointed and commissioned by the Governor, and were to receive 
from the public Treasury an annual salary, to be from time to time 
ascertained by law. The funds for supporting the University were to 
be derived from taxes and other public sources, and the Treasurer 
was required to keep a separate account of the University fund. 
(Shearman's System of Pub. Inst., p. 4.) 
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The principal features of this Act, which demand notice as 
connected with the question involved in this case, are its compre-
hensiveness as indicated by its style, the broad scope of its objects, 
and that it was to be supported by a public fund; all showing that it 
was intended to be a great public institution, embracing the whole 
Territory, and such an one as would not admit of the existence of 
any other, similar in its character and purposes. Whether any organi-
zation was ever had of the Corporation thus provided for, does not 
very distinctly appear, and the Act itself was repealed by a law 
adopted April 30, 1821, entitled, "An Act for the establishment of 
a University." See Code of Laws compiled in 1827, page 448. 
By this latter Act certain persons therein named were created 
a body politic and corporate, by the name, style, and title of the 
"Trustees of the University of Michigan," and as such they, and their 
successors to be appointed by the Legislature, were made capable of 
suing and being sued, holding property, real, personal and mixed, 
and of buying and selling and otherwise lawfully disposing of proper-
ty. 
They were authorized to establish such Colleges, Academies 
and schools, depending upon the said University, as they might think 
proper, and as the friends of the Corporation would permit; and to 
apply such parts of their estate and funds in such a manner as they 
might think most conducive to the promotion of literature, and the 
advancement of useful knowledge within the Territory; and to elect 
a President of the University, who should be, ex officio, a member 
of such Corporation. This institution was to be established in the 
City of Detroit, and to this Corporation was committed the control 
and management of the township of land which had been granted to 
Michigan by Congress, for the use of a Seminary of learning, and the 
three sections granted to the College of Detroit, by the treaty of 
Fort Meigs, concluded September 29th, 1817, were vested in the 
said Trustees, subject to the uses, trusts and purposes for which the 
same were granted. All the property, rights and credits belonging to 
the Corporation, established by the Act of the 26th of August, 1817, 
were vested in the new Corporation, subject to the uses, trusts and 
purposes for which the same property was granted, given, conveyed 
or promised. 
By Section 9, it is provided that this law or any part thereof 
may be repealed or modified by the Legislative power, provided that 
such-power of repeal should not extend to divert to any other pur-
pose than those expressed in the grant thereof to the Corporation, 
any property granted to them. To this Corporation was the land in 
question conveyed by the Governor and Judges "to the use of the 
University of Michigan." 
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No institution corresponding to the idea of a University, as 
contemplated by the Acts above mentioned, having been organized, 
the State Legislature in 1837 passed an Act entitled, "An Act to pro-
vide for the organization and government of the University of Michi-
gan." (Laws of 1837, p. 102.) This Act provided that there should be 
established in this State an institution under the name and style of 
"The University of Michigan;" that the objects of the University 
should be to provide the inhabitants of the State with the means of 
acquiring a thorough knowledge of the various branches of litera-
ture, science and the arts; and that its government should be vested 
in a Board of Regents, who, with their successors in office, were to 
constitute a body corporate, with the name and title of the Regents 
of the University of Michigan. This act, without material modifica-
tion, was incorporated into and re-enacted in the Revised Statutes of 
1838 (p. 234, etc.), and also in the Revised Statutes of 1846 (p. 216, 
etc.). Under its provisions "The University of Michigan" was estab-
lished and went into operation; and the same institution, under the 
supervision and management of the present Board of Regents, con-
tinues to exist, and is successfully accomplishing the great objects of 
its creation. The new Constitution, after providing for the election of 
Regents and the University, declares that the Regents thus elected 
shall constitute the Board of Regents fo. the University of Michigan, 
and that they, and their successors in office, shall constitute the 
body corporate, known by the name and title of "The Regents of the 
University of Michigan," and as such they have committed to them 
"the general supervision of the University, and the direction and con-
trol of all expenditures from the University Interest Fund." 
That fund embraces the interest upon all moneys arising from 
the sale or disposition of the lands which have been granted by Con-
gress for the support of a University, College or Seminary of learning 
in the Territory or State of Michigan, or acquired from any other 
source for the like purpose. 
That the Corporation having charge of the University, since the 
organization of the Board of Regents, under the law of 1837, is a 
public Corporation, created for public purposes alone, cannot be 
doubted. 
The institution was erected and has been supported by a public 
fund, and the Corporators have no private interest whatever, con-
nected with their corporate character. (Trustees, etc., vs. Winston, 5 
Stew. & Port., !?;Dartmouth Coil vs. Woodward, 4 Wheat. R., 629, 
660, et seq.) But it is insisted, that "the Trustees of the University of 
Michigan," to whom the land in question was granted, was a private 
Corporation, and that their charter constituted a contract between 
the Legislature and the Corporators, which the Legislature could not 
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abrogate without the consent of the Corporation. To this it may be 
replied, that the Act of 1821, creating that Corporation, expressly 
reserves to the Legislature the power to repeal or modify it. This is a 
part of the contract itself, if the Act is to be regarded as a contract, 
and this, as well as every other provision of the charters received the 
assent of the Corporators when they accepted it. If not strictly a 
public Corporation, it partook largely of that character. The Trustees 
were to continue in place during the pleasure of the Legislature only, 
and all the vacancies were to be supplied by the Legislature. It did 
not, therefore, possess within itself the power of perpetuating its 
existence. It might at any time have been dissolved by the removal of 
the several Trustees, and the omission by the Legislature to appoint 
their successors. A large amount of public property was devoted to 
the support of the institution; but the Trustees were also made cap-
able of holding property, real, personal and mixed: and of buying 
and selling, or otherwise lawfully disposing of property. Assuming, 
therefore, that they were a private Corporation in a legal sense, it be-
came necessary to inquire whether their charter was repealed or modi-
fied by the Act of 1837, and if so, what was the effect of such repeal 
or modification, in reference to the property in controversy in this 
suit. In order to determine this question, we must first consider 
whether the Legislature of 1837 intended to create another and dis-
tinct institution from that contemplated by the Act of 1821, or to 
organize and put in operation the same. An examination of all the 
legislation relating to a University in Mi9higan, leaves no doubt upon 
this question. In every Act it is styled the "University of Michigan," 
and its objects are the same in all, though expressed in different 
language. Each of them appropriated all the public property at the 
disposal of the Legislature, which had been donated or set apart for 
the support of such an institution, to its support. Its name imports 
the existence of but one, and it seems clear that the Legislature had 
in view the establishment of but one. The Act of 183 7, which created 
a Board of Regents for the government of the University, by its own 
force removed the then existing Trustees, and substituted in their 
place other Trustees by the name of "The Regents of the University," 
as their successors in office. 
It is true, that the Act of 1837 makes no express reference to 
that of 1821, but it legislates upon the same subject, and the quota-
tion of the words, "University of Michigan," in its title, is not with-
out some significance, if it were otherwise doubtful, as indicating 
what institution was intended to be organized in pursuance of its 
provisions. 
The fact that the location of the University was fixed by the 
law of 1821 at Detroit, and that by subsequent legislation it was 
20 CONSTITUTIONAL CORPORATION 
changed to Ann Arbor, affords no ground of argument against this 
conclusion. This, and the other changes which were made in the de-
tails of its organization, were modifications of the former law of 
such a character as the Act itself authorized. No injustice is thereby 
done to the original Corporators, or their successors, for, as we have 
already seen, they continued in place only during the pleasure of the 
Legislature, and were severally subject to removal at any time; and 
upon such removal, any rights or interests which they might have 
claimed in connection with the Corporation must have terminated. 
The Corporation was created for the purpose of administering a great 
public trust, and the present plaintiffs are but Trustees for the same 
great purpose, and are as truly the lawful successors of the original 
Corporation as if they had been appointed by the Legislature under 
the Act of 1821. 
The lands in controversy are not diverted from the use de-
clared by the grant, but are still devoted to the same identical pur-
pose. They were conveyed for the use, etc., of "The University of 
Michigan," and from that use they have not been, and cannot be di-
verted. The grant must be presumed to have been made with a full 
knowledge of the power reserved to the Legislature, either to modify 
or repeal the charter by which the Trustees of the University existed, 
and it was made in such a manner as to secure the application of the 
property to the object for which it was granted, without particular 
regard to the person or persons who should execute the trust. 
On the argument of this cause, the counsel for the defendants 
read a very able and elaborate report from a Committee of the 
Regents to the board, in March, 1838, in pursuance of a resolution 
adopted in November, 1837, requiring such Committee "to take into 
consideration the legal rights of the Trustees of the University of 
Michigan, and how far it is practicable to alter, by Legislative enact-
ment, the organization of that board, so as to constitute the Board 
of Regents of the University of Michigan the Trustees of the Univer-
sity of Michigan. After discussing the various questions supposed to 
be involved, this report brings to our notice an important fact. Mter 
showing a non-user of their franchises for a long period, and de-
ducing certain conclusions therefrom, it states that, "so satisfied are 
the Trustees of the old board of the absolute dissolution of the Cor-
poration, that, by a Committee of their body, they have placed upon 
the journal of the Board of Regents, and the books of the Treasurer 
of that board, their surrender of the proceeds of the land mentioned 
in the eighth section of their charter; and also yielded up the control 
and occupancy of the real estate in the City of Detroit. This shows 
that the Trustees practically gave the same construction to the Act 
of 1837 which we have given to it. They regarded their own powers 
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as ended, and the Regents of the University as their successors, and 
as such, entitled to the possession and control of all the effects re-
maining in their hands for the use of the University. They did not 
doubt that the institution which was to be organized under the last 
mentioned Act, was the same which was contemplated by the Act 
which gave them a corporate existence; and they seem to have ac-
quiesced, without hesitation, in that legislation which modified their 
charter, and provided for the appointment of their successors; and it 
is not improbable that this view of the legislation referred to was 
finally adopted by those who were immediately concerned in the 
question involved; for we did not learn that any active measures 
were ever taken in pursuance of the recommendations of the Com-
mittee, in order to place the Regents in the full and rightful posses-
sion of the corporate property. 
But it is claimed on behalf of the defendants, that if the old 
Corporation has been dissolved by a repeal or modification of its 
charter, pursuant to the provisions of the ninth section, the lands re-
verted to the grantors, and were vested in the Mayor, etc., of the 
City of Detroit, by the supplementary Act of Congress of the 29th 
of August, 1842. If the views which we have already expressed be 
correct, and the plaintiffs are the lawful successors of the grantees, 
they are the persons indicated in the grant as Trustees of the prop-
erty, and there can be no reversion until the cestui que trust, or bene-
ficial object of the grant, shall cease to exist in contemplation of law. 
Another point was made by the counsel for the defendants, 
which we do not now deem it necessary to discuss at length. It is as-
sumed that the Legislative Council of the late Territory of Michigan 
had no power to create such a Corporation, and that the grant to the 
Trustees, etc., was void. The decision of this question in the case of 
the Bank of Michigan vs. Williams, 5 Wend. R., 478, and 7 lb., 539, 
has been affirmed by this Court, and must be regarded as settled. 
(Detroit Young Men's Society's Lessee vs. Scott, 1 Doug. Mich R., 
119;Swan vs. Williams, 2 Mich R., 427.) 
It must be certified to the Circuit Court for the County of 
Wayne, as the opinion of this Court, that the plaintiffs are entitled 
to recover the premises in controversy in this suit. 
Present and concurring, COPELAND, PRATT, BACON, WING, 
JOHNSON and MARTIN, J. J. 
DOUGLASS, J., dissented. 
CHAPTER II 
HOMEOPATHY AND THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 
OF THE 1850 CONSTITUTION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Michigan Constitution of 1850 established an inde-
pendent corporation to govern the University thus protecting 
the University from political control by the legislature. Only 
five years after the adoption of that new constitution, however, 
the legislature enacted a law requiring the Board of Regents to 
appoint a professor of homeopathy in the Department of Medi-
cine. 
The background of this new statute was as follows: At 
that time, the medical profession was divided into two factions. 
The smaller group of physicians adhered to the theories of 
"homeopathy," which, in general postulated that the sick should 
be treated with medicines which, if administered to a normal 
healthy person, would produce symptoms similar to those of 
the patient being treated. These theories of homeopathy were 
somewhat disdainfully rejected by the orthodox doctors of the 
day-the "allopaths," and there was much hard feeling between 
the two groups. 
As it happened, the orthodox allopaths were already fully 
established on the faculty of the University's Medical Depart-
ment, and, since even in that age, the Board of Regents was 
highly unlikely to make a new faculty appointment which would 
disrupt the present faculty, the homeopaths turned to the legis-
lature for their support. And they obtained it. A long series of 
court cases ensued which, finally, resulted in the judicial recog-
nition of the constitutional autonomy of the University. 
The first case was an action by a private citizen, one Drake, 
in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for a writ of 
mandamus. He sought mandamus to compel the Board of Re-
gents to appoint the professor prescribed by statute. The 
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court denied the writ, giving two reasons: ( 1) Such an extraordi-
nary remedy as mandamus to the Regents could be sought only 
by the Attorney General of the state, not by a private citizen 
with no special rights involved in the case. (2) Even if the statute 
were valid (and the court seemed to have grave doubts), it had 
only been in effect for one year and the Regents were appar-
ently using their best efforts to find a candidate suitably quali-
fied for the professorship. Thus, the action was premature. 
Twelve years later the court decided the next case in this 
series. Procedurally, this case is the reverse of the Drake case. 
This time the Board of Regents applied for mandamus against 
the Auditor General. The state legislature had passed its first 
appropriation for the University, which formerly was supported 
almost solely by the proceeds of a federal land grant; but the 
Auditor General had refused to release the money because he 
thought that the University had not complied with the condi-
tions contained in the appropriation act-namely, that the Re-
gents obey the provisions of the 1855 legislation and appoint the 
professor of homeopathy. The Regents claimed that they had 
appointed such a professor, and the facts of the case were that 
they had, by resolution, established a School of Homeopathy to 
be legally within the Department of Medicine but physically out-
side Ann Arbor. The exact location not being specified in the 
resolution. They then appointed a professor to teach at this 
school and drew a warrant on the Auditor General for his salary 
under the appropriations act. 
With this set of facts, the four-man court was split on the 
issue as to whether the Regents had complied with the intent of 
the legislature. Two justices said "no," one said "yes," and the 
fourth was silent. The result was that the Regents were denied 
the writ. 
In the next two cases in 1869 and 187 4, the Attorney Gen-
eral applied for mandamus to force the appointment of the pro-
fessor by the Regents, but, in both cases, the court was still 
evenly divided resulting in denial of the writ. 
The issues were finally resolved in the Sterling case in which 
the authority of the Board of Regents was finally vindicated. By 
the time of the Weinberg case the legislature and the University 
had accommodated each other so that in return for increasing 
state appropriations, a separate Homeopathic Medical College 
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had been established on the Ann Arbor campus. This time, how-
ever, the legislature changed its mind, and enacted new legisla-
tion requiring the relocation of the Homeopathic College in 
Detroit. Again a private citizen brought suit, and again the Su-
preme Court decided that only the Attorney General could in-
stitute such an action. Like the Drake case, however, Sterling is 
not limited to procedural formalities. The court, without a sin-
gle dissent, went on to decide that under the constitution, the 
legislature had no authority to meddle with the University. The 
language of this case is often cited for the proposition that the 
Board of Regents, deriving its power from the same constitution 
as the three principal branches of government, is a fourth co-
ordinate branch of state government equal in dignity to the legis-
lative, executive, and judicial. Dean Stason in his article quoted 
in Chapter I considered talk of the fourth branch of government 
to be exaggerated. In any event, the Regents won the Sterling 
case. 
The history of homeopathy at Michigan was concluded in 
1925 when the Regents with the consent of the legislature, 
which deleted the requirement of maintaining the Homeopathic 
College from the appropriation acts, disbanded the college. 
2. JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
The People ex rel. Drake v. The Regents of the University of 
Michigan 
4 Mich. 98, 99-100, 101-06 (1856) 
This was an application by the relator, who was a private citi-
zen of this state, for an alternative mandamus against the regents of 
the university of Michigan, founded upon his affidavit, which set 
forth that he was a citizen of this state; that there was, at the time of 
filing his affidavit, no professor ofhomeopathy in the department of 
medicine of the university; that the regents, whose duty it was, had 
not only neglected and refused (although often requested thereto) to 
elect such professor, but still neglected and refused so to do. 
The law, upon which the application was founded (Sess. L. 
1856, p. 234), provides "that the regents shall have power to enact 
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ordinances, by-laws, and regulations for the government of the uni-
versity, to elect a president; to ftx, increase and reduce the regular 
number of professors, and tutors, and to appoint the same, and to 
determine the amount of their salaries; provided there shall always 
be at least one professor of homeopathy in the department of medi-
cine." 
At the time the affidavit was ftl.ed, and the court moved for an 
alternative mandamus, doubts were expressed by some of the judges 
whether the court was empowered to grant the application upon such 
a showing, in such a case. The court, however, yielded to the applica-
tion, upon the suggestion, to which the counsel for the relator as-
sented, that all questions might be reserved to the coming in of the 
answer of the respondents. The alternative writ was thereupon issued, 
which was returned with the answer of respondents thereto annexed, 
in which, before proceeding to answer the merits of the allegations 
contained in the writ and the relator's affidavit, they excepted: 1. To 
the right of *the relator to move for the action of the court in the 
[ 1 00] premises; 2. To the sufficiency of the showing of the relator; 
and, 3. To the jurisdiction of the court to interfere with the action 
of the respondents in the exercise of their constitutional discretion 
in the supervision of the university, and in the direction and control 
of expenditures from the university interest fund; all which excep-
tions they claimed and insisted upon in law. The return also sets 
forth that, while not admitting the right of the legislature to inter-
fere, the regents, out of respect to their expressed wishes, appointed 
a committee in March, 1855, to take the subject into consideration, 
and correspond with the various institutions in Europe and America, 
to ascertain the feasibility of uniting such a professorship with the 
existing college, and how, if feasible, it could best be done, and where 
the best man could be found, and that the committee had not con-
cluded their labors; that from the antagonism between the systems 
they could not act wisely in the matter, if they were bound to act at 
all, without full deliberation. To this return the relator demurred. 
* * * 
By the court, WING, J.: 
The ftrst objection is predicated upon the alleged incapacity of 
an individual citizen, who is only interested in common with 
all other citizens of the state in the subject matter of *com- [102] 
plaint, to institute a proceeding of this kind against a public 
corporation, sustaining the relations which the university of Michi-
gan does to this state. 
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It is alleged that where there is a cause of complaint against a 
public body or corporation, it is the duty of the attorney-general of 
the state to move against them, and that it would be peculiarly fit, in 
a matter of complaint of so grave a character as that presented by 
the affidavit of the relator, that it should be presented by, or be 
under the control and sanction of that officer, whose duty is to act 
in all such cases. To this it is answered by the counsel of the relator, 
in substance, that though true it is, the matter in question is one that 
interests the citizens generally, yet the right of every citizen of the 
state to move in the proper courts in a matter in which the citizens 
at large are concerned, and in respect to which there is ground of 
complaint against a public body or officers of this state, that they 
have neglected the performance. of some duty imposed upon them 
by law, is fully sustained both by principle and authority. 
Upon examination of the authorities cited by the counsel of 
the respective parties, we find no case decided by the English courts 
which sanctions this action of their courts on an application of this 
character, upon the sole motion of a private citizen of the realm. 
From this it is, we think, to be inferred that the practice was never 
sanctioned by their courts. 
On looking into the American authorities cited, we find that 
the Supreme Court of New York have taken the broad ground, in the 
case of The People v. Collier, 19 Wend., 64, and in 1 Denio, 618, 
that in all cases requiring redress, and involving a matter in which the 
interests of the public at large are concerned, and in respect to which 
a mandamus is the proper remedy, it is competent for their courts to 
act upon the relation and motion of a private citizen of the state. 
The doctrine of those cases was approved and followed by the 
[ 103] *Supreme Court of lllinois, in the case of the County of Pike 
v. The State, 11 Illinois, Rep., 202*. These are the only cases 
to which we have been cited, or which have fallen under our obser-
vation, which sanction the right claimed by the relator in this case. 
To these authorities, as we have said, are opposed the fact that 
the English courts, which have molded and formed the common law, 
transmitted it to us, and which governs both them and us, have not 
sustained a course of proceeding like this. The courts of Maine, 
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania have maintained a doctrine on this 
subject opposed to the New York and illinois cases, and have held 
that, to entitle an individual citizen to be heard as a relator and on 
his own motion, he must show that he has some individual interest in 
the subject matter of complaint which is not common to all the citi-
zens of the state; and whilst we do not intend to say that a case may 
not arise in which this court would allow an individual to file such a 
complaint, particularly if the attorney-general or prosecuting attorney 
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(as the case may be) were absent, or refused to act without good 
cause, we nevertheless express our conviction that this is a case in 
which the action of the attorney-general would have been proper and 
necessary. 
The views we have expressed would seem to make it unneces-
sary to decide the other questions presented, particularly the consti-
tutional question, but we have thought it would be proper to pass 
upon the questions presented by the answer and demurrer. We will, 
therefore, proceed to an examination of the answer. The facts being 
admitted, their sufficiency in law to defeat this proceeding is alone 
to be considered. 
The respondents state their belief that the law requiring them 
to appoint a homeopathic professor in the medical department of the 
university is unconstitutional. Yet, being desirous of treating with 
proper respect the expression of the legislative will in the sec-
tion quoted, they did, on the 30th *March last, appoint a [104] 
committee to enter into correspondence with other universi-
ties in Europe and in this country, to determine the feasibility of es-
tablishing such a professorship, and the most eligible person to rill 
such a chair when established, and that the committee has been 
actually engaged ever since in conducting such correspondence, and 
in gathering information from all sources, and are still engaged dili-
gently in the same work. 
The respondents are constitutional officers, to whom are con-
fided by the constitution (art. xiii, § 8) "the general supervision of 
the university, and the direction and control of all expenditures 
from the university interest fund." They are elected by the people. 
They come at short intervals fresh from the body of the people, and 
cannot be supposed to be influenced by sentiments not common to 
those they represent. To their judgment and discretion as a body is 
committed the supervision of the fmancial and all other interests of 
an institution in which all the people of this state have a very great 
interest. In the words of· the law in question, they are required to 
enact ordinances, by-laws and regulations for the government of the 
university; to reduce and increase the regular number of professors, 
and to appoint, the same, and to determine the amount of their 
salaries. To this body of men, possessing such powers, and upon 
whom such duties are incumbent, this proviso is directed. They had 
already provided professors for the medical department under a sys-
tem which had been in successful operation many years, and they 
were required to introduce a new and, as they say, an antagonistic 
element into that department, which in their judgment was likely to 
clash with the system already established, and produce embarrass-
ment to the board and the institution under their control not easily 
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to be surmounted, and which it required time and investigation to 
harmonize and adjust. They nevertheless entered upon the proper 
investigations, with a view to accomplish the duty devolved 
[105] upon *them by the law. They aver that in the month of 
March of last year, and before the law took effect, they en-
tered upon the active discharge of duties which must precede the 
actual appointment of the new professors; and though we have not 
been able to discover in their answer, or in any visible result of their 
labors, any clear evidence of their activity and zeal in the prosecu-
tion of their duty, neither are we able clearly to perceive, under all 
the circumstances of the case, that there has been any unnecessary 
delay or lack of good faith in their proceedings. They aver that they 
have acted in good faith, but at the same time under the influence of 
much uncertainty as to the constitutionality of the law, and we are 
compelled to recognize in this question what might well suggest 
doubts of the binding force of the law, and occasion some hesitation 
in their action. 
The relator suggests no pressing necessity for the immediate ac-
tion of the board, neither does he show that the rights of any indi-
vidual or class of persons is jeoparded or injuriously affected by the 
delay that has occurred in their action. All that is averred, or that 
can be inferred from the affidavit of the relator, is, that the board of 
regents have hitherto and unnecessarily neglected to obey the be-
hests of the law, which is claimed to be binding upon them, and 
which demands a more speedy obedience to its requirements than 
has been yielded to it by the respondents. The real question is one 
of time. The respondents have not refused to act, but they have 
acted tardily, and, as the relator suggests, in bad faith, if at all. We, 
however, are of the opinion, upon a full view of all the facts pre-
sented for our consideration, and which are admitted by the relator, 
that the case made out is not one which would authorize the further 
action of this court at this time. We admit that a mandamus, though 
a prerogative writ, is demandable of right in a proper case, yet it is 
only to be granted by this court in the exercise of a sound le-
gal discretion; and hence ought only to be invoked in cases *of [ 106] 
last necessity. This necessity we have been unable clearly to 
discover in this case. The board of regents have a sound discre-
tion to exercise, and until it is made apparent that they seek to evade 
the law, by unnecessary and willful delays, the exercise of our dis-
cretionary power cannot be called into action. 
Present, all the judges. 
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The People ex rei. The Regents of the University v. The Auditor 
General 
17 Mich. 161, 165-75, 185-92 (1868) 
CHRISTIANCY J.: 
The controversy in this case grows out of the conflict between 
two hostile schools or theories of medicine, both claiming the public 
patronage and the aid of the public funds for their promulgation in 
the medical department of the university. The adherents of the allo-
pathic theory, which is the oldest and most generally recognized, hav-
ing obtained a legal recognition from the regents in the establishment 
of the medical department, have continued to keep the exclusive 
control of it to the present time; while the adherents of the opposite 
or homeopathic school, claiming equal rights in an institution sup-
ported alike by the common funds of the whole people, have been 
unable to obtain any recognition from the board of regents, or, up 
to this time, any aid from the public funds for teaching their theory 
of medicine in this public institution. Fortunately, the pres-
ent case does not call upon us to determine the *merits of the [166] 
respective theories or systems about which the "doctors dis-
agree." 
But the question whether the homeopathic theory should be 
recognized and taught in the medical department of the university as 
well as the allopathic, and both thereby be placed upon substantial-
ly the same fair grounds of competition, and allowed to test by re-
sults their respective claims to popular patronage, has twice been 
presented to the legislature and deliberately considered and decided 
by them, so far as they have any power over the question, in a man-
ner which can leave no reasonable doubt of their intention. 
First, in 185 5, when the act of 1851, for the government of 
the university, was amended by adding at the end of the fifth section 
the following words: "Provided that there shall always be at least one 
professor of homeopathy in the department of medicine;" so that 
the section, when amended, should read as follows: "The regents 
shall have power to enact ordinances, by-laws and regulations for the 
government of the university, to elect a president, to fix, increase 
and reduce the regular number of professors and tutors, and to ap-
point the same, and to determine the amount of their salaries: Pro-
vided, that there shall always be at least one professor of homeopathy 
in the department of medicine:" Laws 1855, p. 232. This act was 
approved February 12, 1855. 
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At the January term of the late Supreme Court for 1856, the 
regents not having complied with the injunction of this act, to ap-
point a "professor of homeopathy in the department of medicine," 
one Drake, a private citizen, moved the court for a mandamus to 
compel the regents to perform this duty. To this the regents, after 
some preliminary objections, answered in substance that, owing to 
the antagonism between the two systems of medicine, they could 
not act wisely upon the subject without full deliberation; that they 
had, in the previous March, appointed a committee to take 
[167] the subject into consideration, and correspond *with the 
various institutions in Europe and America to ascertain the 
feasibility of uniting such a professorship with the existing college, 
and how, if possible, it could best be done, and where the best man 
could be found, and that this committee had not concluded its 
labors. 
To this the relator demurred. The majority of the court, after 
deciding that the proceedings for a mandamus could not be main-
tained at the instance of Drake, the relator (who showed no particu-
lar interest affected), without the action of the attorney-general or 
.the prosecuting attorney-a decision which disposed of the case and 
left nothing for adjudication-nevertheless proceeded to give their 
opinion upon the question raised by the demurrer; and after intimat-
ing that they could not "discover in the answer of the regents, or in 
the visible result of their labors, any clear evidence of activity or 
zeal in the prosecution of this duty," they declare that they can not, 
on the other hand, clearly perceive, under all the circumstances of 
the case, that there had been any unnecessary delay or lack of good 
faith in their proceedings. They further remark that the regents "aver 
that they have acted in good faith, but, at the same time, under the 
influence of much uncertainty as to the constitutionality of the 
law," "and we are compelled (say the majority of the court) to recog-
nize in this question what might well suggest doubts of the binding 
force of the law, and occasion some hesitation in their action." 
This remark seems to have been understood, and was probably 
intended as the intimation of a doubt of the constitutional power of 
the legislature to control the action of the regents in the manner at-
tempted in the act. Owing to the expression of this doubt; or to some 
other cause, .we hear nothing more of any attempt on the part of the 
regents for more than eleven years to carry the act into effect. Wheth-
er their committee ever made a report we are not informed. But 
probably the regents would not claim to have been endeavor-
ing in good faith to carry into *effect this statute for the [168] 
whole or any part of the eleven years succeeding; believing 
their duty to the university required them to disregard the act. After 
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that decision the probability is that no further effort was made to 
give it effect. And, owing probably to the same intimation of the 
court, no further attempt seems to have been made to compel their 
obedience by mandamus. 
But during the session of 1867 an application was made to the 
legislature for a grant of further pecuniary aid to the university 
beyond the income of the university fund. This legislature, like that 
of 1855, still determined that students in the medical department 
should have the opportunity and the option of studying medicine, 
as well upon the homeopathic as the allopathic system, were not 
willing to grant the pecuniary aid asked, unless they could at the 
same time secure this object. And seeing that the regents had disre-
garded their wishes as expressed in the act of 1855, and perhaps 
doubting their power to control the action of the regents in this mat-
ter by direct legislative injunction, they determined to grant them 
further pecuniary aid upon the condition precedent, that the regents 
should first carry into effect the act of 1855, before any of the 
money to be raised for this purpose should be paid to them; thus 
avoiding all question of constitutional power. To accomplish this 
purpose, the act of March, 1867, imposing a tax of one-twentieth of 
a mill upon the dollar of all taxable property in the state, was made 
subject to the express proviso, "that the regents of the university shall 
carry into effect the law which provides that there shall always be at 
least one professor of homeopathy in the department of medicine; 
and appoint said professor at the same salary as the other professors 
in this department; and the state treasurer shall not pay to the treas-
urer of the board of regents any part or all of the above tax, until the 
regents shall have carried into effect this proviso." 
[169] *Under this act of 1867 (even admitting the act of 1855 
not to have been obligatory upon the regents), it was for the 
regents to elect whether they would comply in good faith with the 
act of 1855, and this proviso in the act of 1867, according to the 
true intent and understanding of the legislature, or forego all ad-
vantages of this appropriation, which was only made them on this 
express condition. 
The regents claim thus to have complied with this condition 
by the adoption, on the 25th of March last, of the following resolu-
tions: 
"Resolved, That the board of regents accepts the aid proffered 
by the legislature of Michigan, by the act approved March 15, 1867, 
with the terms 'and conditions thereof. 
"Resolved, That in order to comply with the conditions im-
posed by said act, there be organized in the department of medicine 
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a school, to be called the "Michigan school of homeopathy," to be 
located at such place (suitable in the opinion of the board of regents), 
other than Ann Arbor, in the state of Michigan, as shall pledge to the 
board of regents, by June 20th, next, the greatest amount for the 
buildings and said endowment of school. 
"Resolved, That two professors be appointed for said school, 
one at this time, and another prior to the opening of said school, and 
others as may be necessary. 
"Resolved, That the sum of $3,000 be appropriated, besides 
the salaries of the professors, out of the state tax, so donated to the 
university, to be expended in establishing said school of homeopathy. 
"Resolved, That Dr. Chas. J. Hempel be appointedprofessorof 
the theory and practice of homeopathic medicine in the Michigan 
school of homeopathy, at the salary of $1,000 per annum, from this 
date, to be paid out of said fund so donated." 
Claiming that these resolutions constitute a full performance of 
the condition of the appropriation, the regents, by their treasurer, 
have applied to the auditor-general for his warrant upon the state 
treasurer for the money, or a part of it, raised by the act of 1867. 
The auditor-general, not satisfied that this action constitutes a per-
formance of the condition, has refused his warrant, and the regents 
now move for a mandamus, to compel him to issue it. 
*Whether this action of the regents constitutes a full (170] 
performance of the condition of the appropriation, is the 
only question necessary to the decision of this case. 
The power of the regents, independent of these acts of 1855 
and 1867, to establish such a professorship in the medical depart-
ment at Ann Arbor, where that department has from the first been 
established, and was in successful operation at the time Qf these acts, 
is not denied. On the other hand, the regents do not claim the power 
of establishing this, or any other professorship, as a part of the uni-
versity, at any other place, from either of these acts. But they claim 
that, under the general powers of supervision and control of the uni-
versity, by the constitution and the act of 1851, they have the right 
to establish professorships, as a part of any department of the uni-
versity, as well at any other place as at Ann Arbor; and hence that 
they are at liberty, under these acts of 1855 and 1867, to establish 
this particular professorship elsewhere, and that this will constitute 
performance of the condition upon which this appropriation was 
granted. 
While I do not concur in this view, but hold that the university 
having been located at Ann Arbor by the act of 1837 (Sess. L., p. 
1 02), however desirable it may be to establish a department or 
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professorship elsewhere, a legislative permission to that effect must 
first be obtained (see Underwood v. Waldron, 12 Mich., 73; People 
v. Trustees of Geneva College, 5 Wend, 211; People v. Oakland 
County Bank, 1 Doug. Mich., 282; Comp. L., § 2192), though, 
doubtless, the regents may perform their functions anywhere in the 
state, and all the powers of the several faculties are not necessarily 
confmed to that locality, yet I do not, for the purposes of this case, 
consider it necessary to discuss this question of power in any way, 
and shall, therefore, proceed to consider the question now before us, 
upon the assumed hypothesis that the regents, independent of these 
acts, had, prior to, and at the time of, their passage, an im-
[171] plied power to establish *professorships elsewhere than at 
Ann Arbor; and I proceed to inquire whether, upon this ad-
mission, these resolutions of the regents, looking to the establish-
ment of a Michigan school of homeopathy, at some place not yet de-
termined upon, other than Ann Arbor, constitutes a performance of 
the condition which the legislature intended to impose by the adop-
tion of the proviso. 
It is essential to the fair understanding of this question to bear 
in mind the circumstances under which the acts containing the con-
dition was passed. 
It must be recollected that at the time of the passage of both 
these acts of 1855 and 1867, the university, with all its departments 
and professorships, its buildings, libraries, cabinets, laboratories, ap-
paratus, and all the other conveniences and property of the institu-
tion, had been for years existing, in fact, upon the university grounds 
at Ann Arbor; where the medical department and that of literature, 
science and the arts had already, in 1855, been for years in success-
ful operation, and that these and the law department were all in still 
more successful operation at the same place in 1867; that the uni-
versity as a whole, had been by law located there for thirty years, 
and that none of the departments or professorships had, from its first 
establishment there, ever been located elsewhere. We must also recol-
lect that large and commodious buildings had for some years been 
erected upon the university grounds, at the same place, for the special 
use of, and occupied by the department of medicine; that in these 
buildings had been provided, at large public expense, such apparatus, 
furniture and conveniences as are essential to their use, in the attain-
ment of an education in the medical profession in all its branches. 
We must also bear in mind that in the acquisition of the scientific 
knowledge necessary alike to the profession under both theories of 
practice, the same preliminary studies are required, the same knowl-
edge of all cognate sciences; that in most branches of the sci-
ence of medicine itself-such as anatomy, *physiology, surgery, [172] 
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obstetrics, and even for the most part pathology-the course of in-
struction is the same, and the books and authorities the same; the 
two systems differing mainly in their theories of the principles upon 
which medicines are supposed to operate in the cure of diseases; that 
in fact four-fifths of the entire course of professional instruction are 
the same under both systems; and all the same apparatus, the ana-
tomical demonstrations, and surgical operations, the same material, 
collections of specimens and other conveniences for instruction, and 
therefore, most of the same professorships and lectures are required 
alike by the students of each system. 
Giving due weight to these considerations, which we must 
naturally suppose would operate upon the minds of legislators en-
dowed with plain common sense; bearing in mind the history of the 
conflict between the two systems in the legislature and in court; the 
persistence with which the legislature adhered to their determination 
to secure instruction in homeopathy in the department of medicine-
is it not most natural to infer that the legislature when they spoke of 
a "professor of homeopathy in the medical department," used the 
language in the ordinary popular sense, as intended to designate the 
medical department as it was already established and in operation at 
Ann Arbor, and that they intended such professorship to have a real 
and actual rather than a merely metaphysical and purely nominal 
connection with the department of medicine? Is it not reasonable to 
infer that they intended to give to the professorship of homeopathy 
the same essential advantages growing out of an immediate and real 
connection with the department of medicine, as already established, 
that were enjoyed by the other professorships in that department; 
that they intended to give to the students in that department, if they 
should so elect, an equal opportunity of studying the profession upon 
the homeopathic system, with the like substantial advantages 
[173] to be derived from the other professorships in *the depart-
ment, and the other advantages incident to a direct and inti-
mate connection with the department and with the university? 
Would it not, in fact, border upon absurdity, to undertake to 
account for the solicitude and persistency of the legislature in this 
manner, if, after all, they only intended to secure the establishment 
of a single professorship (for this is all that is required), at some place 
other than Ann Arbor, having no real connection with the university 
or the department of medicine, and none of the advantages to be 
derived from such a connection-no aid from the other professors-
when more than four-fifths of the studies essential even to the home-
opathic physician could not be pursued with any advantage in such a 
separate school of homeopathy alone? 
If this had been their purpose, why call upon the regents of the 
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university to help them accomplish it? For, upon this idea, the re-
gents might almost as well be called upon to mingle in the affairs of 
a railroad corporation, or any other institution having no real or nat-
ural connection with the university. 
The homeopathic theory constitutes but a small part of the 
study essential to the homeopathic physician. Did the legislature seek 
to confine all the students to the study of that theory alone, who 
should choose to study it at all? Was the purpose of this apparently 
careful and persistent course of legislation intended only as a solemn 
mockery-as a dismal practical joke? 
It seems to me very evident that the legislature could not 
have contemplated a separate school of homeopathy alone; and yet 
it is equally clear that if, as the regents seem to suppose, they con-
templated a separate school at all, they must have contemplated a 
school for the study of homeopathy alone; for they have no provi-
sion for giving instruction to such students in any other 
branch of *medical science, if the school is to be elsewhere [174] 
than in the medical department at Ann Arbor. 
It will be conceded that the legislature contemplated a profes-
sorship in which students might actually receive instruction; they 
must therefore have contemplated a professorship which should have 
a potential existence somewhere; so established, at some place, as to 
be able to enter upon the practical business of giving instruction to 
students. But these resolutions establish no such professorship any-
where. At most they look only to the future and contingent estab-
lishment of a "Michigan school of homeopathy," at such place other 
than Ann Arbor, as in the opinion of the regents shall be suitable, 
and "as shall by the twentieth day of June (then) next, pledge to the 
board of regents the greatest amount for buildings and endowments 
for said school." Now, it does not appear that any place has yet 
pledged any sum for those purposes; and certainly it can not be con-
clusively presumed that any place will do so. Until this is done, it is 
not to be established at any place, or rather, in plain English, it is not 
till then to be established at all, even in these paper resolutions. I am 
therefore inclined to think the regents are at least premature in this 
application; and that, under any view that can be taken, they ought 
to have waited until this professorship should be established as a 
practical entity, capable of vital action. 
Suppose a student wishes to resort to this "Michigan school of 
homeopathy" for instruction. Where will he fmd it? It is yet to be 
found only in the state at large, as much in one place as another; 
onmipresent except at Ann Arbor, but nowhere visible or palpable to 
the senses. Will he fmd it any the more readily by being told, in the 
language of this resolution, that it is "organized in the department 
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of medicine," not where the department is, but at some place not 
yet determined, outside of Ann Arbor? Can it be for a moment 
seriously contended that this was all that was contemplated by the 
legislature? 
[175] *Have the legislature at two separate sessions been making 
all this ado about a professorship of homeopathy, for no 
other purpose than to enable such professor to draw a salary, with-
out the performance of any duty? 
These considerations, with many others which might be urged, 
produce upon my mind a very strong conviction that the legislature 
intended to require, by this condition, that the professorship of 
homeopathy should be established practically, and in fact in the med-
ical department, where that department is already established and in 
operation, at Ann Arbor. 
Upon the policy or impolicy of attempting to establish it there, 
I express no opinion. It is not a question for this court. Of the good 
faith of the regents, however, and their desire to act as may be best 
for the interest of the university, there can be no reason to doubt. 
But I think they have mistaken the true intent of the condition 
upon which this appropriation was made, and that they have mistak-
en in some measure their constitutional powers. The mere power of 
"supervision" given by the constitution, whether subject to, or inde-
pendent of, legislative control, should not, I think, be confounded 
with the power to create or establish a university, or to change its lo-
cation, in whole or in part, as previously fixed by the legislature and 
recognized by the constitution. 
GRAVESJ.: 
* * * 
When the application was made to this court, in 1856, to co-
erce compliance with the act of 1855, it was not intimated by, or on 
behalf of, the regents, or supposed by the court, in so far as appears 
in the report, that the last named act could be complied with, except 
by the establishment of the professorship at Ann Arbor; while, on 
the contrary, the regents took the ground which was expressly no-
ticed in the opinion of the court, that the law required the introduc-
tion of a new and antagonistic element into the department of medi-
cine likely to clash with the system already established, and produce 
embarrassment to the board and the institution not easily to be sur-
mounted, and which it would require time and investigation to har-
monize and adjust. Indeed, it is very plain that some of the objections 
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were based on the tacit admission that the proviso required the pro-
fessorship to be at Ann Arbor. 
It does not appear to have occurred to the regents or the court, 
that the whole difficulty could be surmounted, and the law, at the 
same time, complied with, by the simple. expedient of establishing 
the new professorship at a distance from Ann Arbor; and it seems 
hardly possible to reconcile the views then expressed, with the sup-
position that those who expressed them did, at that time, imagine 
that the law could be thus executed. The court then said, "the real 
question is one of time," and no other place than Ann Arbor appears 
to have been thought of. 
The controversy attracted much attention, and the general 
public and the legislature must naturally have inferred, from 
the ground of opposition on the part of the regents, *and the [186] 
opinion of the court, that the law of 1855 was believed and 
understood to require the establishment of the new professorship at 
the place where the institution and all its professorships were estab-
lished, where were accumulated all the instruments of education, and 
where alone were to be found the buildings provided for the use of 
the college; and that the difficulty in the execution of the statute, in 
the view of the regents, consisted in its requiring that there should 
be brought together, in the same university, and at the same place, 
professors of opposing schools in the same department. 
The facts which have been mentioned, and the opinion of the 
court, which has been in part quoted, must have been present to the 
legislature when the act of 1867 was passed. And when we consider 
the nature of these facts, and the tenor of this opinion, is it not 
probable that the legislature then supposed the regents understood 
the alleged offer as requiring the specified professorship to be at 
Ann Arbor? 
Is it not probable that those who so persistently insisted upon 
the new professorship meant and apprehended that the regents under-
stood that the professorships before established, and that sought to 
be established, should be placed on terms of substantial equality, in 
respect to all advantages and opportunities depending upon location, 
and the instrumentalities of education; and that all students should 
have access, at all times, to all the sources of knowledge which either 
school should supply? When we consider all the circumstances, in-
cluding the representation of the regents in 1852, that all the facul-
ties ought to be collected at Ann Arbor, is it clear that the legisla-
ture, in 1855, intended, or supposed they were understood as 
intending, that the new professorship should be established at a dis-
tance from that place, and apart from the facilities there provided, 
even though such action should result in giving superior advantages 
to the new school? 
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[187] *It seems to me that these questions will not admit of 
an answer favorable to the views of the petitioners. Notwith-
standing that it was urged in 1856 that the new professorship, if in-
troduced, would be an antagonistic element in the university, the 
legislature, in 1867, insisted upon compliance with the first act, 
without any qualification. The regents at the former time seem to 
have understood, and I think that the legislature was authorized to 
infer, that they understood that the act of 1855 required the pro-
fessorship to be at Ann Arbor. 
If the thought of another location was not present to the legis-
lative mind, then the legislature could not have intended a location 
elsewhere, and if none was intended elsewhere, the design must have 
been that the professorship should be where the university, includ-
ing the department of medicine, was situated, since a location at 
some place was inevitably involved in the statutory requirement. 
Upon deliberate consideration I can discover nothing in the 
laws in question to indicate that any separation of professorships, in 
the department of medicine, was designed or thought of, but, on the 
contrary, the purpose appears to have been to supply a new element 
of instruction for the benefit of all who should attend the college as 
situated and established. 
Whether the action of the legislature in this regard was wise or 
unwise, whether, if consummated, it would be likely to result in in-
jury to the institution, is not our province to determine. The case is 
not one in which that question could be properly debated, if in any 
case it could be a proper topic for discussion in this court. The laws 
in question were enacted in due form; at all events that is not dis-
puted, and the present application is based upon an alleged compli-
ance with them, and not upon an excuse for non-compliance. That 
the eminent men to whom the people have confided the supervision 
of one of the noblest educational institutions of this or of any 
age, have faithfully *endeavored to execute their trust, I have [188] 
no doubt. But the question for our determination does not 
depend upon this consideration. We are asked by the petitioners to 
decide in substance that it is clear that they have accepted and acted 
upon the offer contained in the acts referred to in the same sense in 
which the legislature apprehended that the regents understood it, 
and such decision I can not concur in making. 
The legislature required the establishment of the new profes-
sorship at some place; and it is not only not clear, but quite unlikely, 
that they meant, or that they supposed the regents understood them 
as meaning, that it should be at a point distant from the seat of the 
university and all its appointments. 
I am, therefore, of opinion, upon the grounds stated, that the 
writ ought not to issue. 
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To avoid misapprehension, it is proper to say, that I am not 
prepared to admit that the regents have the power to establish a pro-
fessorship at a place other than Ann Arbor, but as the disposition of 
the present case does not require us to decide that question, I for-
bear to discuss it. 
CAMPBELLJ.: 
As a majority of the court have not been able to coincide in 
opinion upon the motion before us, I propose to indicate as briefly 
as I can the general views on which I think the relators are entitled 
to relief. 
As the money in dispute is a mere offer to the regents of that 
which would not otherwise belong to them, of course the donors 
may affix conditions to it. And the condition they have affixed to 
this grant is that "there shall be at least one professor of homeopathy 
in the department of medicine." This is a plain and simple provision, 
and leaves but a single question open to decision, which is whether 
any portion of the department of medicine can be established at a 
place outside of Ann Arbor. 
[189] *The university is divided into three departments, and 
those are extensive enough to include all branches of human 
inquiry relating to secular pursuits. There are in the collegiate de-
partment, and there may be in either of the others, many entirely 
different courses of study, which no student can pursue at the same 
time, and which may or may not occupy in part the same ground. In 
the various courses of instruction which are now, or which may be 
hereafter, devised for the teaching of specific arts or sciences, there 
must always be more or less divergence as students fit themselves for 
the laboratory, the forge, the mine, the farm, or other branches of 
business or professional pursuits. And it must always be left to the 
regents, as the only body which can lawfully carry on the administra-
tion of the university, to parcel out the studies as in their good judg-
ment seems best. Any student who enters the university, and selects 
his course, must confine himself to that course as they have arranged 
it, and they must decide what pursuits can profitably be allowed to 
go on together. 
If they should see fit to include in the medical department in-
struction in the theories and practice of any number of conflicting 
schools, or to provide courses for different special branches, as for 
dentistry, for diseases of the eye and ear, for nervous diseases, or for 
the treatment of insanity, it must be obvious that whether these 
should call for discordant teachings, or should merely require students 
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to follow select but harmonious courses, there must be some rule 
which would exclude one student from attempting to learn all at 
once. If he should attend one course, he must absent himself from 
others, and this must be regulated by the regents. 
Whether students of one system could profitably attend at the 
same time the teachings of two conflicting schools, or whether the 
professors could be wisely or harmoniously amalgamated into one 
body, is not a judicial question, but one of administration, to 
be settled by the authorities of *the university; and if stu- [190] 
dents of homeopathy were to pursue their studies at Ann 
Arbor, we have, as a court, no means of knowing whether they 
could or would profitably avail themselves of the teachings now es-
tablished there. Upon many branches of medical teaching it is very 
obvious that a lecturer must of necessity inculcate his views upon 
treatment and curative systems on which there would be radical dif-
ferences. To what extent these differences would separate students 
under the various professorships, it is not for us to determine. But it 
is at least quite possible that there should be a general, if not an en-
tire divergence. In other words, it is impossible for a court to assume 
that the location of a homeopathic professorship at Ann Arbor would 
be more desirable or profitable than elsewhere, or that the system 
could be introduced without an entire division of courses of lectures 
and other instruction. Such seems to be the conclusion of the re-
gents, who upon this subject have all the responsibility of determina-
tion. 
It can not be doubted that, where courses of study are differ-
ent, there is no necessity for conducting them in the same place. And 
unless there is some rule of law which confines the entire operations 
of the university to a single place, there can be no objection to the 
course taken by the regents in this case. 
The only reason given anywhere for denying their power is that 
under the law the university is located at Ann Arbor, and that any 
removal of its place, or any transaction of business away from its 
place, is unauthorized. 
It is beyond dispute that where, by its charter, the business of 
a corporation is localized, it must be done in the place prescribed. 
Our own decisions are full on this subject. But it is just as well settled 
that where the business is not localized no such rule exists. 
Thus, for example, we have many corporations where nothing 
is localized but the business offices. We have several mining 
[191] charters of this kind. Navigation companies *furnish another 
familiar instance. Insurance companies, companies for scien-
tific and exploring purposes, and many others, might be readily sug-
gested. 
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I think that the purposes expressed in the various provisions 
concerning the university, preclude the idea that all of its operations 
must be local. In its origin in 1817, it had no locality prescribed, and 
its functions were expected to be performed in many places. So when 
the modifying law of 1821 was passed, it was located in Detroit, but 
its functions were ubiquitous. While thus established, and after it had 
been directly recognized both by congress and the treaty-making 
power, its perpetuity was required by congress and stipulated for by 
the state upon its admission into the Union, and also fixed by the 
first state constitution. 
When a new law was passed, in 1837, which provided for its 
location in Ann Arbor, the language used was no_ broader than that 
which had before located it in Detroit. And, while some of its func-
tions were narrowed, it was expressly designed to cover the whole 
field of science, art and learning. Many branches of knowledge can 
be profitably taught only in favorable localities. It is not supposable 
that it was designed to prevent such teaching as should be profitable. 
Mining, surveying, geology and engineering require for their mastery 
some attendance, either temporary or permanent, at places where 
such work is being carried on. Medical teaching in its completeness 
avails itself of hospitals, and must in that case be partially given 
where hospitals are to be found. And when we consider that the uni-
versity is expected to furnish complete teachings, we must read all 
the charter provisions together, and assume that the reference to lo-
cality is not designed to localize all its doings. 
If the law of 1837 means any such thing, then it differs from 
the ordinary charters of which we have any account in the law books. 
It is the first law that ever fell under my own notice which 
confined a corporation not to a *municipality, but to a sin- [192) 
gle parcel of land, as it directs the buildings to be placed on a 
forty-acre lot, to be thereafter designated, and contains no other es-
tablishment of locality. If this law operates at all to confine the cor-
poration, it can never carry on its operations off of the quadrangle. 
The observatory lot, and any other premises which its growing 
needs might require, would all be outside of its legally ordained 
locality. 
It seems to me that the laws locating the university upon a 
specified tract of land, were not designed to localize all of its educa-
tional operations, but simply to make that the great center, as state 
buildings and county buildings, or corporation offices, are made cen-
ters for public or corporate purposes, while many functions may be 
performed elsewhere. Where the purposes of the university are so ex-
tensive as to require wider facilities for their complete fulfillment, I 
do not think such provisions require a construction which would 
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hamper them. And I think the regents in this case have not gone 
beyond the fair intent of the scheme of the university. 
I think the writ should issue. 
COOLEY CH. J. gave no opinion. 
The People v. The Regents of the University 
18 Mich. 469, 482-83 (1869) 
GRAVESJ.: 
The attorney-general having applied for a mandamus to require 
the regents to appoint a professor of homeopathy in the department 
of medicine in the university, pursuant to section 2187 of the Com-
plied Laws, and the usual order for showing cause against the motion 
having been made, the regents at the last January term made answer 
to the order, and alleged for cause against the application that the 
part of the section referred to, which provided there should always 
be at least one professor of homeopathy in the department of medi-
cine, was repugnant to the provisions of article 13 of the constitu-
tion, which confers upon the regents the power of general supervi-
sion of the university. The question thus presented was ably 
argued by counsel, and we have considered it with an *earnest [ 483] 
desire to reach a decisive result. But in this we are disap-
pointed by an equal division of opinion among the members of the 
court. As this circumstance would deprive our opinion of all force as 
judicial authority, we do not deem it expedient to superadd our 
reasonings to the elaborate arguments from the bar. It is seen that 
since the application cannot obtain the sanction of a majority of the 
court, the motion must fail. 
The other justices concurred. 
The People (on the relation of the Attorney-General) v. The 
Regents of the University 
30 Mich. 473 (1874) 
Application for mandamus. 
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This application was to require the respondents to appoint, in-
stall and maintain two professors of homeopathy in the department 
of medicine of the university, as provided by the act of 1873.-Sess. 
L. 1873, p. 73. 
PER CURIAM. 
The very able argument in this case has not brought any mem-
ber of the court to any different views from those heretofore suffi-
ciently expressed, and we therefore make no order. 
Sterling v. The Regents of the University of Michigan 
110 Mich. 369, 370-73, 374-76, 377-78, 379-84; 68 N.W. 253 
(1896) 
Mandamus by Charles F. Sterling to compel the Regents of 
the University of Michigan to comply with Act No. 257, Pub. Acts 
1895, providing for the removal of the homeopathic medical college 
from Ann Arbor to Detroit. Submitted May 5, 1896. Denied July 
28, 1896. 
In 1895 the legislature passed Act No. 257, Pub. Acts 1895, 
the material part of which reads as follows: 
"That the board of regents of the University of Michigan are 
hereby authorized and directed to establish a homeopathic medical 
college as a branch or department of said University, which shall be 
located in the city of Detroit, and the said board of regents are here-
by authorized and directed to discontinue the existing homeopathic 
medical college now maintained in the city of Ann Arbor as a branch 
of said University, and-to transfer the same to the city of Detroit." 
The title of the act is "An act to amend section one of an act 
entitled 'An act for the establishment of a homeopathic medical de-
partment of the University of Michigan,' approved April 27, 1875, 
being section 4932 of Howell's Annotated Statutes." The regents of 
the University declined to comply with said act. The relator thereupon 
presented this petition for the writ of mandamus to compel the re-
gents to comply with the act. The ground for such refusal is (1) that 
it was not, in their judgment, for the best interests of the University; 
(2) that the legislature has no constitutional right to interfere with 
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or dictate the management of the University. Among other things in 
their answer, they say: 
"A large part of the course of instruction required to be given 
in the other medical department of the University, and in the homeo-
pathic medical college, is common to the two schools. This fact has 
anabled the regents to provide for such common instruction at the 
expense, to that extent, of the support and maintenance of a single 
department; thus saving to the benefit of the University and to the 
people of the State a large sum of money annually, which otherwise 
would be required for the continuous support of two medical de-
partments, which would be wholly separate throughout their several 
courses of instruction in case both departments of medicine were not 
located at the city of Ann Arbor. It appears to the regents that great 
advantage arises to the University as a whole, and to the students in 
the various departments of the University, that all the branches of 
the University are located and maintained at the proper seat of the 
University, at Ann Arbor. It appears also to the regents that what-
ever suggestions may be made of the advantages to be derived to the 
homeopathic medical college, as a department of the University, by 
the removal of such department to a larger city, or to any other lo-
cality than the city of Ann Arbor, are suggestions which may, per-
haps, be used for the removal of the other medical department of the 
University and other departments of the University to some other 
locality than the city of Ann Arbor, by parties or interests desiring 
to secure such removal. It further appears to the regents that the re-
moval of one of the established departments of the University sug-
gests a movement for an entire change in that policy of concentration 
of the departments of the University at the proper seat of the Univer-
sity which has hitherto promoted the growth and advancement of 
the University to its present place among the great schools of the 
world. 
"The claim which is made under the application of the relator, 
that the provisions of Act No. 257 command the discontinuance and 
removal of the homeopathic medical department of the University 
by the regents, without any reference to their power of supervision 
of the University, suggests to the regents the question whether such 
provisions do not curtail and impair the power of supervision and 
control of the University which has been vested in the regents by the 
Constitution of the State. It is the purpose, as well as the plain duty, 
of the regents, to exercise, according to their best judgment, the su-
pervision and control of the University, which has been vested in 
them by the State Constitution, to promote both the interests of the 
University and the interests of the people of the State, which are 
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involved in the welfare of the University. The regents have not under-
taken to decide for themselves upon the wisdom or unwisdom of the 
purpose of the provisions of said Act No. 257, under which the rela-
tor's application is made. They have been advised that grave doubts 
exist in respect to the validity of said act. They have also been ad-
vised that to the extent that the provisions of the act are a founda-
tion for the application for a writ to compel action on the part of the 
regents, denying their right to exercise judgment, supervision, or 
control in relation to the subject of the discontinuance of an existing 
department of the University, there are grave doubts in respect to the 
validity of the act." 
GRANT, J. (after stating the facts). 1. The petitioner does not 
in his petition show any interest in the matter, or the right to ques-
tion the action of the board of regents. The attorney general is the 
proper party to move in such a case, and a private citizen does not 
possess the right, without permission of the court, to apply for this 
writ to compel a public board to perform an omitted duty. People 
v. Regents of University of Michigan, 4 Mich. 98. The petition in this 
case does not set forth that the petitioner is a citizen of the State, or 
that he is in any manner injured by the action of the board. This 
point is not raised in the ~riefs of counsel, probably because it is de~ 
sired to obtain a decision upon the merits. We think that such pro-
ceedings should be instituted by proper parties, and that relators 
should show themselves competent to bring them into court. Inas-
much, however, as the question has not been raised, we shall do as 
we have sometimes done before,-dispose of the case upon the main 
issue. 
* * * 
Under the Constitution of 1835, the legislature had the entire 
control and management of the University and the University fund. 
They could appoint regents and professors, and establish depart-
ments. The University was not a success under this supervision by the 
legislature, and, as some of the members of the constitutional con-
vention of 1850 said in their debates, "some of the denominational 
colleges had more students than did the University." Such was the 
condition of affairs when that convention met. It is apparent to any 
reader of the debates in this convention in regard to the constitution-
al provision for the University that they had in mind the idea of 
permanency of location, to place it beyond mere political influence, 
and to intrust it to those who should be directly responsible and 
amenable to the people. After these constitutional provisions, 
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substantially in their present form, had been presented to the con-
vention, and the question arose as to how they should be selected, 
whether by election or appointment, Mr. Whipple said: 
"If we select eight (and I should prefer twelve), your regents 
will be distributed over every part of the State, and the public will 
thus obtain a knowledge of this institution;for the convention will 
observe that the concerns of this University are to be placed in the 
hands of the regents. They will obtain very important knowledge in 
regard to this establishment, and the people among whom they live 
will become informed as to the nature of this institution, and will 
become interested in it." Convention Debates, 782. 
The public men of those times were greatly interested in the 
University. Methods for its management were discussed by governors 
in their messages, by reports of the board of regents to the legisla-
ture, and by committees of the legislature. The general consensus of 
opinion was that it should be under the control and management of 
a permanent board, who should be responsible for its management. 
The regents, in March, 1840, in obedience to a joint resolution of the 
legislature, reported that-
"The first change in the organic law deemed essential is the 
proper restriction of responsibility to the board of regents. At pres-
ent the responsibility is divided, and the board would be greatly 
facilitated in their action were such amendments made as would 
throw entire responsibility on them." 
In the same report they also urged that the trust and manage-
ment of the funds of the University should be placed in the regents. 
A select committee was appointed by the legislature in 1840 
to inquire into the condition of the University. No more forcible ar-
gument could well be made than is found in that report for placing 
the entire control of the University in the hands of a permanent 
board, and taking it away from the legislature. 2 House Documents 
1840, p. 470. I quote from that report as follows: 
[See pp. 6-8 for text of the report.] 
* * * 
All these reports and discussions were undoubtedly known to 
the members of the convention, and their action should be con-
strued in the light of such knowledge. I am unable to find a single 
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utterance by any member of that convention from which it could be 
inferred that the members believed or supposed that they were leav-
ing the control of that institution to the legislature. The result has 
proved their wisdom, for the University, which was before practically 
a failure, under the guidance of this constitutional body, known as 
the "Board of Regents," has grown to be one of the most successful, 
the most complete, and the best-known institutions of learning in 
the world. That such was the understanding of the meaning of the 
Constitution of 1850 is shown by the report of the superintendent 
of public instruction, published in 1852; in which he refers to "the 
additional and general interest created by a change of the organic 
law in 1850, in placing the University under the control of regents 
elected by the people." Report, Pub. Ins. 1852, p. 26. 
The provisions of the Constitution of 1850 in regard to the 
University are these (article 13): 
[See pp. 10-11 for text of these constitutional provisions.] 
* * * 
The board of regents, elected under the new Constitution, im-. 
mediately took control of the University, interpreted the Constitu-
tion in accordance with its plain provisions, denied the power of the 
legislature to interfere with its management or control, and for 46 
years have declined obedience to any and every act of the legislature 
which they, upon mature reflection and consideration, have deemed 
against the best interests of the institution. This court has sustained 
them in that position, and has on every occasion when asked denied 
its writ to interfere with their action. In January, 1856, in the case 
of People v. Regents of University of Michigan, 4 Mich. 98, this 
court, in denying the writ of mandamus to compel the regents to es-
tablish a professorship authorized by the legislature, said: 
"They [the regents] aver that they have acted in good faith, 
but at the same time under the influence of much uncertainty as to 
the constitutionality of the law, and we are compelled to recognize 
in this question what might well suggest doubt of the binding force 
of the law, and occasion some hesitation in their action." 
Obviously, it was not the intention of the framers of the Con-
stitution to take away from the people the government of this insti-
tution. On the contrary, they designed to, and did, provide for its 
management and control of a body of eight men elected by the peo-
ple at large. They recognized the necessity that it should be in charge 
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of men elected for long terms, and whose sole official duty it should 
be to look after its interests, and who should have the opportunity 
to investigate its needs, and carefully deliberate and determine what 
things would best promote its usefulness for the benefit of the peo-
ple. Some of the members of the convention of 1850 referred in the 
debates to two colleges (one in Virginia and the other in Massachu-
setts) which had been failures under the management by the State. It 
is obvious to every intelligent and reflecting mind that such an insti-
tution would be safer and more certain of permanent success in the 
control of such a body than in that o( the legislature, composed of 
132 members, elected every two years, many of whom would, of 
necessity, know but little of its needs, and would have little or no 
time to intelligently investigate and determine the policy essential 
for the success of a great university. 
Now, in the face of the facts that the regents have for 46 
years exercised such control, and openly asserted their exclusive 
right to do so; that the courts have refused to compel them to com-
ply with the acts of the legislature; that this court held in Weinberg 
v. Regents, 97 Mich. 246, that they were a constitutional body, 
upon whom was conferred this exclusive control; and in the face of 
this plain constitutional provision,-this court is now asked to hold 
that the regents are mere ministerial officers, endowed with the sole 
powers to register the will of the legislature, and to supervise such 
branches and departments as any legislature may see fit to provide 
for. By the power claimed, the legislature may completely dismem-
ber the University, and remove every vestige of it from the city of 
Ann Arbor. It is no argument to say that there is no danger of such a 
result. The question is one of power, and who shall say that such a 
result may not follow? The legislature did once enact that there 
should be a branch of the University in every judicial circuit. If the 
regents comply with the present act, the next legislature may repeal 
it, and restore that department to the University at Ann Arbor, or 
place it elsewhere. Some legislatures have attached conditions-and 
they have the undoubted right to do so-to appropriations for the 
support of the University, and a subsequent legislature has removed 
the conditions. Some legislatures have attached to appropriations the 
condition for the establishment of a homeopathic professorship in 
the old medical department. Other legislatures have refused to attach 
any such condition. What permanency would there be in an institu-
tion thus subject to the caprice and will of every legislature? Under 
this power, the legislature could remove the law department from 
the University at Ann Arbor to Detroit, and provide that the law li-
brary, to which one citizen of Michigan has donated $20,000, should 
also be removed. It might scatter its great library (to the collection of 
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which private citizens have contributed nearly or quite one-half), and 
also its great museums, laboratories, and mechanical appliances. 
Other results will readily suggest themselves. It appears to us impos-
sible that such a power was contemplated. 
Furthermore, it renders nugatory the express provision of the 
Constitution that "the regents shall have the direction and control 
of all expenditures from the University interest fund." It is significant 
that, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, this fund con-
stituted the sole support of the University, aside from fees which 
might be received from students. The State had made no appropria-
tions for its support, and there is nothing to indicate that any such 
appropriations were contemplated. It is unnecessary to argue that 
the above provision means what it says, and that it takes away from 
the legislature all control over the income from that fund. The pow-
er therein conferred would be without force or effect if the legisla-
ture could controlthese expenditures by dictating what departments 
of learning the regents shall establish, and in what places they shall 
be located. Neither does it need any argument to show that the pow-
er contended for would take away from the regents the control and 
direction of the expenditures from the fund. The power to control 
these expenditures cannot be exercised directly or indirectly by the 
legislature. It is vested in the board of regents in absolute and un-
qualified terms. This act, in express terms, prohibits the regents from 
using any of this fund to support a homeopathic department at the 
University at Ann Arbor, since it prohibits them from maintaining 
such a department there. 
This power cannot be sustained without overruling the case of 
Weinberg v. Regents. The basis of the majority opinion in that case 
is that the board of regents is a constitutional body, charged by the 
Constitution with the entire control of that institution. The result 
could not have been reached upon any other basis. It was held not 
to be a State institution under the control and management of the 
legislature, as were the other corporations enumerated in the statute 
then under discussion. We there said: "Under the Constitution, the 
State cannot control the action of the regents. It cannot add to or 
take away from its property without the consent of the regents." We 
might with propriety rest our decision upon that case, and should be 
disposed to do so were it not for the urgent contention of the coun-
sel on the part of the relator that that case does not apply. We are 
therefore constrained to state some further reasons to show that the 
legislature has no control over the University or the board of regents. 
(1) The board of regents and the legislature derive their power 
from the same supreme authority, namely, the Constitution. In so 
far as the powers of each are defined by that instrument, limitations 
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are imposed, and a direct power conferred upon one necessarily ex-
cludes its existence in the other, in the absence of language showing 
the contrary intent. Neither the University nor the board of regents 
is mentioned in article 4, which defmes the powers and duties of the 
legislature; nor in the article relating to the University and the board 
of regents is there any language which can be construed into confer-
ring upon or reserving any control over that institution in the legisla-
ture. They are separate and distinct constitutional bodies, with the 
powers of the regents defined. By no rule of construction can it be 
held that either can encroach upon or exercise the powers conferred 
upon the other. 
(2) The board of regents is the only corporation provided for 
in the Constitution whose powers are defmed therein. In every other 
corporation provided for in the Constitution it is expressly provided 
that its powers shall be such as the legislature shall give. In the case 
of townships (article 11, § 2), and in counties (article 10. § 1), and 
boards of supervisors (article 10, § 6), it is expressly provided that 
each corporation shall have such powers and immunities as shall be 
prescribed by law. The same is true of other officers, aside from the 
regents, provided for in the Constitution. Justices of the peace (arti-
cle 6, § 18), the sheriff, the county clerk, the county treasurer, the 
register of deeds, and prosecuting attorney (article 10, § 3), and 
township officers (article 11, § 1), can exercise such powers as shall 
be prescribed by law. 
(3) Let us apply another test. It is a rule of construction that 
where a general power over one subject is conferred upon one body 
in one clause of an instrument, without any restricting or qualifying 
language, and the like power over another subject is conferred upon 
another body in another clause of the same instrument, with restrict-
ing or qualifying language, the restrictions or qualifications of the 
second clause cannot be read into the first clause. On the contrary, 
they must be excluded. By article 13 § 1, the superintendent of 
public instruction is clothed with "the general supervision of public 
instruction;" but it is added, "His duties shall be prescribed by law." 
By article 13, § 9, the board of education is given "the general super-
vision of the State Normal School;" but it is added, "Their duties 
shall be prescribed by law." 
Thus, in every case except that of the regents, the Constitu-
tion carefully and expressly reposes in the legislature the power to 
legislate and to control and define the duties of those corporations 
and officers. Can it be held that the framers of the Constitution, and 
the people, in adopting it, had no purpose in conferring this power, 
viz., the "general supervision," upon the regents in the one instance, 
and in restricting it in the others? No other conclusion, in my 
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judgment, is possible than that the intention was to place this insti-
tution in the direct and exclusive control of the people themselves, 
through a constitutional body elected by them. As already shown, 
the maintenance of this power in the legislature would give to it the 
sole control and general supervision of the institution, and make the 
regents merely ministerial officers, with no other power than to carry 
into effect the general supervision which the legislature may see fit 
to exercise, or, in other words, to register its will. We do not think 
the Constitution can bear that construction. 
The writ is denied. 
LONG, C. J., MONTGOMERY and HOOKER, JJ., concurred 
with GRANT, J. MOORE, J., concurred in the result. 
CHAPTER III 
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY OF THE UNIVERSITY 
SINCE THE HOMEOPATHIC CASES 
1. CASES INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTIONAL SEPARATION OF 
UNIVERSITY AND STATE 
The University's autonomy is based upon a clause of the 
state constitution granting the Board of Regents the "general 
supervision" of the University. Since 1908 and 1956 respective-
ly, the governing boards of Michigan State University and Wayne 
State University have enjoyed a similar franchise. In the present 
state constitution, equal rights were given to all governing boards 
of state-assisted four-year institutions of higher learning granting 
baccalaureate degrees. 
Judicial interpretation of the "general supervision" clause 
could not end with the homeopathic cases, for clearly there are 
limits to the independence of universities1 from the rest of state 
government. While the "general supervision" clause grants the 
governing boards plenary power over all of the internal manage-
ment and affairs of the universities, no one would argue that the 
universities are completely exempt from all the general legisla-
tion affecting the rest of the state. The universities are not inde-
pendent city-states. There have, therefore, been recurring cases 
in which the courts are called upon to decide whether, in a par-
ticular situation, a statute applicable by its terms to a much 
larger group than the constitutional universities, is actually an 
unconstitutional interference in the internal affairs of the uni-
versities. 
The other recurring problem is the validity of particular 
conditions on appropriations the legislature makes to the state 
universities. On the one hand, the constitution makes it the duty 
of the legislature to support certain named institutions (Article 
8, Section 4), and, in general, the legislature has traditionally ad-
hered to the spirit of the constitution by making lump-sum 
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appropriations to the universities which may be used in any way 
at the discretion of the governing board (See Chapter V). How-
ever, the power of the legislature to appropriate money has been 
generally thought to include the power to prescribe reasonable 
conditions for the use of the appropriations provided they do 
not interfere with the constitutional mandates to the governing 
boards of the universities. Such a doctrine is implicit in the 
homeopathic case of the Regents v. Auditor General in which 
the University did not receive its first appropriation because it 
could not satisfy either the Auditor General, or a majority of 
the Supreme Court, that it had appointed a homeopathic profes-
sor as required. Needless to say, it would be easy for the legisla-
ture to defeat completely the intent of the constitution by 
attaching sweeping conditions to appropriations which are very 
necessary for the proper support of the universities. In the cases 
in this chapter, the court has, therefore, limited the permissible 
scope of these conditions on appropriations. 
The earliest case discussed in this chapter, Weinberg, was 
decided before the Sterling case. In Weinberg, subcontractors 
for the building of University Hospital sought to hold the Uni-
versity liable for failure to require the main contractors to post 
a bond to pay their subcontractors. A statute required all state 
agencies to obtain such bonds from their building contractors. 
In this case, the court was not required to decide the question 
of whether the statute could constitutionally be applied to the 
University. The more immediate issues were whether the statute 
should be interpreted as including the University, and, even if it 
did, whether the violation of the statute by a state officer was 
intended to give subcontractors a right to damages from the 
state agency. Since the court actually decided both these prior 
issues against the plaintiff, its ruling that the law was unconsti-
tutional as applied to the University is, technically, only dicta. 
This dicta, however, took on new significance when the court 
itself, in later cases, cites it as authority. 
A much more serious threat to University autonomy was 
presented in the next case in this series. The procedural frame-
work of this case, mandamus, was becoming familiar-Board of 
Regents v. Auditor General. This time, the Auditor General had 
inquired into the uses of University funds and had decided that 
it was not proper to spend such money for field trips by students, 
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for President Angell's traveling expenses in attending the in-
augurations of presidents of other universities, or for certain 
other purposes. This time the court had no trouble in unani-
mously voting to grant mandamus. The court ruled that "as 
against the discretion of the regents," the Auditor's function in 
this case is purely ministerial, that his judgment on the wisdom 
of University expenditures is irrelevant. 
The power of the legislature to control the curriculum at 
the "agricultural college" (now Michigan State University) was 
decided in the first case of the State Board of Agriculture v. 
Auditor General. The legislature had tried to force the school to 
abandon its Engineering Department by limiting expenditure in 
that department to $35,000. This limitation on the use of funds 
was part of an increasing state appropriations to the school, but 
it applied to funds from all sources. At that time the agricultural 
college was largely supported from the proceeds of federal land 
grants. 
In this case, the court ruled that "legislature exceeded its 
powers in attempting to deprive [the governing board] of its 
constitutional control of agricultural funds derived from the 
federal government." Since the whole act was declared void by 
the court, the former act which provided less state support for 
the college was declared to be still in effect. 
The conditional appropriation was the issue in the next 
case, which was brought by the State Board of Agriculture 
against the Auditor General. The condition attached to an ap-
propriation for the agricultural extension service of the then col-
lege had been interpreted by the Auditor General and the State 
Administrative Board, an agency of the executive branch of 
state government, to require the college's board to surrender 
complete control of the service to the State Administrative 
Board. The majority of the court ruled that such conditions 
were not constitutional. Since, in the majority's judgment, the 
legislature intended the appropriation itself to remain effective 
even though an unconstitutional condition were struck down, 
the court ordered the Auditor General to pay the full amount of 
the appropriation to the college. Three justices vigorously dis-
sented. 
The scope of the powers of the Board of Regents includes 
the power to sell or to lease land, even if the legislature has not 
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enacted specific enabling legislation. This was recognized in the 
1863 case of Regents v. Detroit Young Men's Society and the 
relatively recent 1911 case ofBauer v. State Board of Agricul-
ture. In effect, these cases hold that the constitutional provi-
sions themselves have empowered the boards to act, and that 
they need not be supplemented by statute. Statutes, neverthe-
less, purport to delegate certain powers to these constitutional 
boards.2 
Two workmen's compensation cases are included in this 
chapter because they raised constitutional questions. Both cases 
involve Michigan State University which resisted the application 
of workmen's compensation laws. The University of Michigan 
seems to have chosen to be covered because in two cases in-
volving its employees3 the University argued only the merits of 
each claim and did not claim exemption from the statute. In the 
first Michigan State case, Agler, the court interpreted the statute 
as then written not to cover the college without its consent. In 
Peters, decided in 1948, the court was equally divided. The 
amended statute now clearly included the college, and the dead-
lock in the high court resulted in sustaining an award in favor of 
an employee. 
In the Jackson Broadcasting and Television case, the court 
refused to interfere with an arrangement between Michigan State 
University and a private company to share facilities of a shared 
time television channel. This case is particularly interesting be-
cause it is so recent, and because of the delicate treatment 
afforded one of the presently heated issues of university auton-
omy-whether a condition in an appropriations bill is valid which 
requires that the universities must surrender to the central state 
government the right to plan and design new university buildings 
in order to qualify for appropriations to erect the buildings. 4 
At the present time, an unresolved question concerning 
constitutional autonomy is the validity of the amended Hutchin-
son Act as applied to the universities. The text of this legislation 
is included at the end of this chapter. Whether the broad author-
ity this statute invests in the State Labor Mediation Board, 
which extends far beyond traditional "mediation," encroaches 
on the constitutional prerogative of the Board of Regents to 
conduct its own internal affairs must be answered by the state's 
highest court. 5 
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Weinberg v. The Regents of the University of Michigan 
97 Mich. 246, 247-52, 252-53, 254-55; 56 N.W. 605 (1893) 
MONTGOMERY, J. The plaintiff brought suit against theRe-
gents of the University of Michigan, James B. Angell, James H. Wade, 
and Charles R. Whitman to recover the value of materials furnished 
to one Lucas, a subcontractor in the building of the University hos-
pital. The right of action is claimed under Act No. 94, Laws of 
1883, as amended by Act No. 45, Laws of 1885 (3 How. Stat. § 
8411a). The declaration avers: 
"That the Regents of the University of Michigan is a public 
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of 
Michigan, created for the government of the University of Michigan, 
which said institution belongs to and is the property of the State of 
Michigan, and is maintained at the expense of this State; that the de-
fendant James B. Angell is the president of the Regents of the Uni-
versity of Michigan, and the executive head of the University of 
Michigan; that the defendant James H. Wade is the secretary; that 
the defendant Charles R. Whitman is a member of the Regents of the 
University of Michigan; that on or about the months of July and 
August, A.D. 1890, the Regents of the University of Michigan ad-
vertised for proposals for the erection and completion of a hospital 
building for the University of Michigan, which said hospital building, 
so to be erected and completed, was to be and has been built at the 
expense of this State; that afterwards, to wit, on the first day of 
October, A.D. 1890, in pursuance to said advertisement and pro-
posals received, the bid of one William Biggs, of the city of Ann 
Arbor, was accepted, and on or about the date aforesaid the Regents 
of the University of Michigan entered into a contract with said Wil-
liam Biggs for the erection and completion of said hospital, in con-
sideration of the sum of, to wit, $78,556, which said contract was 
signed by the defendants James B. Angell, James H. Wade, president 
and secretary as aforesaid, and by said William Biggs; that the de-
fendant Charles R. Whitman was a member of the committee on 
buildings and grounds appointed by the Regents of the University of 
Michigan, which building committee was given full authority to act 
for the said Regents of the University of Michigan until otherwise 
ordered; that said Charles R. Whitman, as a member of said commit-
tee, was principally in charge of said undertaking of building said 
hospital; that afterwards the said William Biggs, by contract with one 
John Lucas, sublet a portion of the job for the building and erection 
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of said hospital; that the plaintiff, Julius Weinberg, is a laborer and 
material-man, engaged in the business of buying, selling, and furnish-
ing stone, sand, and other material to contractors and other persons 
engaged in building, and other business in which such materials are 
used; that after the contract so made as aforesaid by the Regents to 
said Biggs, and by Biggs with said John Lucas, said Lucas, subcon-
tractor as aforesaid, applied to the plaintiff to furnish stone for use 
in said hospital building, for which said Lucas agreed to pay plaintiff 
85 cents for every 16 feet in length by one foot thick and one foot 
high, as the same was laid in the wall of said building. 
"And the plaintiff further says that the defendants, the Re-
gents of the University of Michigan, James B. Angell, James H. Wade, 
and Charles R. Whitman, were the board, officers, and agents of the 
State of Michigan, and made and entered into the contract for the 
erection of said hospital for and on behalf of the State of Michigan, 
and had the same built at the expense of this State; that it was the 
duty of said defendants as aforesaid, under section 8411a, as amended 
by Act No. 45, Public Acts of 1885, and sections 8411b and 8411c, 
Howell's Annotated Statutes, to require sufficient security by bond 
for the payment by the contractor and all subcontractors for all labor 
performed and materials furnished in the erection, repairing, or orna-
menting of said hospital building." 
The declaration further avers that plaintiff furnished the ma-
terial in question, relying on such bond, and also avers that he has 
not received his pay, and concludes: 
"And plaintiff further says that said defendants, in disregard of 
their duty aforesaid, negligently and carelessly, and in disregard of 
the rights of the plaintiff, neglected to require of said contractor the 
bond aforesaid, and permitted the said contractor to enter into said 
contract for the erection of said hospital building, and to enter upon 
the performance thereof, without giving security, by bond or other-
wise, for the payment by said contractor and all subcontractors for 
the labor and materials furnished him or any subcontractor, as re-
quired by said statute." 
To this declaration the defendants demurred, and the plaintiff 
joined in demurrer. The demurrer was sustained as to the individual 
defendants, and overruled as to the Regents of the University, and 
the plaintiff was permitted to amend as to the individual defendants. 
The defendant the Regents of the University of Michigan brings error. 
The plaintiff has, however, amended his declaration as against both 
defendants, and it is requested by both parties that the question of 
liability be here determined. 
AUTONOMY IN THE 20TH CENTURY 59 
It is contended on behalf of the defendant that the statute 
does not apply to the Regents of the University of Michigan; that the 
University buildings are not built at the expense of the State, nor are 
they contracted for on behalf of the State, within the meaning of 
this statute; that they are constructed by a constitutional corpora-
tion, which may sue and be sued, and has power to take and hold 
real estate for any purpose which is calculated to promote the inter-
ests of the University. 
The section, as amended by Act No. 45, Laws of 1885, pro-
vides: 
"That when public buildings or other public works or improve-
ments are about to be built, repaired, or ornamented under contract, 
at the expense of this State, or of any county, city, village, township, 
or school-district thereof, it shall be the duty of the board of offi-
cers, or agents, contracting on behalf of the State, county, city, vil-
lage, township, or school-district, to require sufficient security by 
bond for the payment by the contractor and all subcontractors for 
all labor performed or materials furnished in the erection, repairing, 
or ornamenting of such building, works, 9r improvements." 
We think the statute sufficiently broad to cover the contract in 
question. Act No. 145, Laws of 1889, appropriated-
"For the purchase of a site for and the erection of a hospital, 
for the year 1889, the sum of $25,000, and for the year 1890 the sum 
of $25,000: Provided, however, that no part of the above-named ap-
propriations for the purchase of a site for and the erection of a hos-
pital shall be paid out of the treasury until the city of Ann Arbor 
shall have bound itself to contribute the sum of $25,000 for the 
same purpose." 
Section 2 provides for the assessment of taxes to pay this ap-
propriation. Certainly, then, the undertaking was at the expense of 
the State and of the city of Ann Arbor, the contribution of the city 
of Ann Arbor, however, becoming State property upon its appropri-
ation. We think it clear, also, that the Regents who acted in the mat-
ter were agents contracting on behalf of the State. They are officers 
elected by the voters of the State, whose duties relate to the control 
of public property. It is altogether too technical to say that the Re-
gents were contracting on behalf of the University; for, while this is 
in a sense true, it is also true that they, by the very contract in ques-
tion, provided for the expenditure of State money, and for the con-
struction of a building which it would, I think, be news to most 
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residents of Michigan to learn is not State property. This is as much 
so as in the case of a school-district. Auditor General v. Regents, 83 
Mich. 467. 
It is contended by the defendant that the liability for neglect 
to require this bond attaches to the individuals who represented the 
State, county, city, village, township, or school-district in the letting 
of the contract, and not to the State or county or corporation of 
which they are directly the officers or agents. We think the defend-
ant is right in this contention. In Owen v. Hill, 67 Mich. 43, and 
Plummer v. Kennedy, 72 ld. 295, the action was brought against the 
individuals composing the board. In Wells v. Board of Education, 78 
Mich. 260, it was held that the officers were personally liable for ma-
terials on failure to take the required bond. Our attention has not 
been called to any case in which the municipality, in the case of a 
township or school-district, or a public or quasi public corporation, 
has been held liable as such, and it seems to us that there are insuper-
able objections to so holding. The duty rests upon the officers of the 
State, as well as cities, counties, and school-districts. Can it be in-
tended that the State, which must act through its public officers, is 
to be held liable as for a tort for a mere neglect to take the bond re-
quired by this statute? It is true that it is urged that the Board of 
Regents is an agent of the State. This may be true in a certain sense, 
but we think the board, as a board, is not the agent contemplated by 
this statute, but that the officers who act directly are the ones who, 
as individuals, fall within the purview of the act. It may be doubtful 
to what extent the board of managers of a hospital which is a public 
institution, like the one in question, can be made liable for negli-
gence; as to which see McDonald v. Hospital, 120 Mass. 432; Glavin 
v. Hospital, 12 R. I. 411. We do not deem it necessary to decide 
whether, under such circumstances as are involved in those two cases, 
the board of managers of the hospital, as a corporation, may not be 
liable. In such a case it might well be contended that it has under-
taken to perform certain duties, and established relations towards 
the patients which impose upon the body in control certain duties. 
But the ground of the plaintiffs right to recover at all in this case is 
that this property is State property, and, further, that the building is 
being constructed at the expense of the State, and that the members 
of the board were acting for and on behalf of the State in making the 
contract. It could not be contemplated that the State or the public 
corporation is to be made liable. The individual guilty of the wrong 
or neglect of duty is the one against whom the action should be di-
rected. Cooley, Torts, 621. The wrong is in the nature of a tort con-
sisting of neglect of duty owing to the public generally, for which 
the public corporation as such is not liable, unless made so by statute. 
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It follows from the views expressed that the judgment should 
be reversed, and the case remanded, that the plaintiff may proceed 
against the individuals named in the amended declaration. 
McGRATH, J., concurred with MONTGOMERY, J. 
GRANT, J. I concur in the opinion of my Brother Montgomery 
that under Act No. 94, Laws of 1883, as amended by Act No. 45, 
Laws of 1885, the public corporation cannot be made liable, but 
only those officers or agents of such corporation to whom is com-
mitted the duty of letting contracts for the erection of public build-
ings or making public improvements. But I cannot concur in holding 
that the statute applies to the corporation known as "the Regents of 
the University of Michigan." The grounds, buildings, and other prop-
erty of all the other State institutions, penal, reformatory, charitable, 
and educational, belong to the State. These institutions are the crea-
tions of the Legislature. They are under the exclusive control and 
management of the State. The State, which created them, may at any 
time repeal the laws by which they were established, and sell the 
property. The public buildings, public works, and public improve-
ments mentioned in this statute mean those over which the State has 
control. This is evident from the language of the statute, which says: 
"It shall be the duty of the board of officers, or agents, con-
tracting on behalf of the State, * * * to require sufficient security 
by bond," etc. 
The Regents make no contracts on behalf of the State, but 
solely on behalf of and for the benefit of the University. All the 
other public corporations mentioned in the Constitution, which have 
occasion to erect public buildings or to make public improvements, 
are expressly included in this statute. Expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius. It expressly enumerates the State, counties, cities, villages, 
townships, and school-districts. If the University were under the con-
trol and management of the Legislature it would undoubtedly come 
within this statute, as do the Agricultural College, Normal School, 
State Public School, asylums, prisons, reform schools, houses of cor-
rection, etc. But the general supervision of the University is, by the 
Constitution, vested in the Regents. Const. art. 13, §§ 7, 8. 
* * * 
Under the Constitution, the State cannot control the action of 
the Regents. It cannot add to or take away from its property without 
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the consent of the Regents. In making appropriations for its support, 
the Legislature may attach any conditions it may deem expedient 
and wise, and the Regents cannot receive the appropriation without 
complying with the conditions. This has been done in several in-
stances. 
Property aggregating in value nearly or quite half a million of 
dollars has been donated to the University by private individuals. 
Such property is the property of the University. It is not under the 
control of the State when it acts through its executive or legislative 
departments, but of the Regents, who are directly responsible to the 
people for the execution of their trust. So, when the State appropri-
ates money to the University it passes to the Regents, and becomes 
the property of the University, to be expended under the exclusive 
direction of the Regents, and passes beyond the control of the State 
through its legislative department. 
The University and the school-district are both provided for in 
the same article of the Constitution. Why should the Legislature men-
tion the school-district in this statute, and leave out the University, if 
it was its intention to include the latter? The University is the prop-
erty of the people of the State, and in this sense is State property, so 
as to be exempt from taxation. Auditor General v. Regents, 83 Mich. 
467. But the people, who are the corporators of this institution of 
learning, have, by their Constitution, conferred the entire control 
and management of its affairs and property upon the corporation des-
ignated as "the Regents of the University of Michigan," and have 
thereby excluded all departments of the State government from any 
interference therewith. The fact that it is State property does not 
bring the Regents within the purview of the statute. The people may, 
by their Constitution, place any of its institutions or property be-
yond the control of the Legislature. 
This Court has refused to compel the Regents to comply with 
certain provisions of acts of the Legislature against their judgment 
that they were not for the best interests of the University. People v. 
Regents, 4 Mich. 104; People v. Regents, 18 Id. 469; People v. Re-
gents, 30 Id. 473. The Legislature was undoubtedly cognizant of the 
above decisions, for the questions involved were of considerable 
public interest. 
These considerations lead me to the conclusion that the Re~ 
gents are not included in this act, and that the judgment should be 
reversed, and judgment entered in this Court for the defendants. 
Judgment entered accordingly. 
HOOKER, C. J., and LONG, J., concurred with GRANT, J. 
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Board of Regents of the University of Michigan v. Auditor Gen-
eral 
167 Mich. 444, 445-52; 132 N. W. 1037 (1911) 
STEERE, J. In this proceeding the court is asked to decide 
whether the judgment of the auditor general or that of the board of 
regents shall prevail respecting the expenditure of moneys appropri-
ated for the use and maintenance of the University by Act No. 102, 
Pub. Acts 1899. On April 30, 1906, the treasurer of the University 
made requisition upon the respondent for monthly expenditures 
from the appropriation of the so-called quarter-mill tax, amounting 
to $39,452.50, for the payment of current expenses. In making this 
requisition he followed the usual practice, which was in harmony 
with the methods prescribed by the accounting laws. The auditor 
general refused to draw his warrant upon the State treasurer for the 
amount of such requisition, for the reason that certain vouchers 
made by the regents for prior expenditures, which in his opinion 
were unlawful, had not been audited and allowed by him. These prior 
expenditures, amounting to $557.54, were for traveling expenses of 
Dr. Angell, president of the University, in attending alumni meetings 
and inaugurations of presidents of other universities, and for traveling 
expenses of other members of the faculty and officers, acting under 
the authority of the president and tegents, in attending intercollegi-
ate meetings and conferences as delegates or representatives of the 
University, and for the expenses of instructors in accompanying stu-
dents in inspecting mechanical engineering plants, the same being a 
part of the prescribed course for certain engineering students. It was 
the opinion of the auditor general that such expenditures were not 
for the use and maintenance of the University, as contemplated by 
Act No. 102, Pub. Acts 1899, and consequently not for lawful pur-
poses under the accounting laws of this State. The petitioner claims 
it has exclusive direction and control of all University expenditures, 
and asks for a writ of mandamus to compel respondent to draw his 
warrant on the State treasurer for the amount of the requisition 
above mentioned. 
On behalf of the respondent it is urged that the writ should be 
denied for the following reasons: 
"First. Because the quarter-mill tax appropriation must be dis-
persed in accordance with the accounting and appropriation laws of 
this State, and in refusing to comply with the conditions therein ex-
pressed the board of regents has violated the conditions upon which 
the appropriation was made. 
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"Second. Because it is the judgment of the auditor general, 
whose determination is fmal and conclusive, that the disbursements 
represented by the vouchers in question are for unlawful purposes. 
·~Third. Because the auditor general is prohibited by law from 
drawing his warrant upon the State treasurer for future requisitions 
until the amounts represented by the vouchers in question are re-
turned to the institution treasury." 
The moneys available for support and maintenance of the Uni-
versity consist of, first, interest on the University fund so called, 
being a fund derived from the sale of lands donated by the general 
government; second, fees received from students; third, appropria-
tions made from time to time by the legislature of the State. 
The funds in question are of the latter class, being appropri-
ated by Act No. 102, Pub. Acts 1899, providing for a tax of one-
quarter mill upon the taxable property of the State. This act, which 
is an amendment of a former act of similar import, consists of but 
one section, and reads as follows: 
"SECTION 1. There shall be assessed upon the taxable prop-
erty of the State as fixed by the State board of equalization, in the 
year 1899 and in each year thereafter, for the use and maintenance 
of the University of Michigan, the sum of one-fourth of a mill on 
each dollar of said taxable property to be assessed and paid into the 
State treasury of the State in like manner as other State taxes are by 
law levied, assessed and paid; which tax, when collected, shall be paid 
by the State treasurer to the board of regents of the University in 
like manner as the interest on the university fund is paid to the treas-
urer of said board; and the regents of the University shall make an 
annual report to the governor of the State of all the receipts and ex-
penditures of the University: Provided, that the board of regents 
shall not authorize the building or the commencement of any addi-
tional building or buildings or other extraordinary repairs until the 
accumulation of savings from this fund shall be sufflcien t to com-
plete such building or other extraordinary expense. Also provided, 
that the board of regents of the University shall maintain at all times 
a sufficient corps of instructors in all the departments of said Univer-
sity as at present constituted, shall afford proper means and facilities 
for instruction and graduation in each department of said University, 
and shall make a fair and equitable division of the funds provided for 
the support of the University in accord with the wants and needs of 
said departments as they shall become apparent; said departments 
being known as the departments of literature, science and art, de-
partment of medicine and surgery, department of law, school of 
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pharmacy, homeopathic medical college and the department of den-
tal surgery. Should the board of regents fail to maintain any of said 
departments herein provided, then at such time shall only one-
twentieth of a mill be so assessed: Provided, further, that the State 
treasurer be and is hereby authorized and directed to pay to the re-
gents of the University, in the year 1899 and each year thereafter, in 
such manner as is now provided by law, upon the warrant of the 
auditor general, the amount of the mill tax provided for by this act; 
and that the State treasury be reimbursed out of the taxes annually 
received from said mill tax when collected; and said auditor general 
shall issue his warrants therefor as in the case of special appropria-
tions." 
Manifestly there cannot be a strict compliance with the two 
somewhat contradictory provisions as to time and manner of pay-
ment. In the enacting clause of the statute under consideration, the 
legislature provides for a quarter-mill tax, appropriates it to the use 
and maintenance of the University, and specifies that, when collected, 
it shall be paid to the regents in like manner as interest on the Uni-
versity fund is paid. It further requires that the regents shall annually 
make report of receipts and expenditures to the governor. Following 
this, in separate provisos, are two distinct conditions as to expendi-
ture of this appropriation. First, it prohibits the use of savings, ac-
cumulated from the appropriation, for any new buildings or extra-
ordinary repairs or expenses until such accumulations are sufficient 
to complete the same; second, the departments of the University are 
to be maintained in a certain manner, and by a fmal proviso the State 
treasurer is directed to each year advance from the State treasury the 
amount of the mill tax provided by the act, to be reimbursed from 
said tax when collected, and he is to pay the same "in such manner 
as is now provided by law." The respondent and his predecessors 
have construed this proviso as requiring payments to be made under 
the general accounting laws of the State, and have followed the pro-
cedure there pointed out, which course has been acquiesced in by 
the regents until this controversy arose over the authority of the 
auditor general to reject vouchers for expenditures authorized by the 
board when in his judgment they were not for lawful purposes. 
He claims such authority under sections 3 and 5 of the account-
ing laws, being sections 1207 and 1209, 1 Comp. Laws; the material 
portions reading as follows: 
"SEC. 3. Such account current, abstract, vouchers, and re-
ceipts, when received by the auditor general, shall be examined by 
him, and if found correct shall be so endorsed by him; and all 
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vouchers for expenditures, so far as the amount thereof shall appear 
to be for lawful purposes, he shall audit. * * * 
"SEC. 5. Money appropriated by any act of the legislature for 
the use or benefit of any State educational, charitable, reformatory 
or penal institution, or to be disbursed by any officer, may be drawn 
from the State treasury upon the warrant of the auditor general, as 
follows, viz.: Under appropriations for current expenses monthly for 
pro rata amounts: * * *Provided, that when appropriations are made 
for current expenses, or general purposes, where no itemized esti-
mates were furnished as a basis therefor, then the class of disburse-
ments shall be determined by the officer, or board of the institution 
making them, and if the same shall appear to the auditor general to 
be within the range of reasonable purposes he shall approve the 
account. * * * " 
In passing upon statutory provisions which are obscure or con-
flicting, the practical construction which State officials, with a duty 
to perform thereunder, have, during a long period adopted and fol-
lowed with reference to their meaning, and which has been acquiesced 
in all parties in interest, is entitled to weight, and has been favored by 
the courts when not manifestly in conflict with the intent and spirit 
of the act. In harmony with that rule of construction, we are dis-
posed to accept the interpretation of the law adopted and acted upon 
by respondent and relator as to the time and manner of payment; 
but, in the light of constitutional provisions, legislation, and decisions 
of this court touching the authority of the board of regents to con-
trol the affairs of the University, cannot hold that the judgment of 
the regents as to the legality and expendiency of expenditures for 
the use and maintenance of the institution is subordinate to that of 
the auditor general. 
The leading thought and clearly expressed object of the final 
proviso under consideration is the advancement during each year of 
this appropriation from the State treasury for current expenses, to be 
later replaced when the tax is collected. To that extent it clearly 
modifies the enacting clause, but words found in the body of the act, 
following the phraseology of previous acts of like nature, paralleling 
the appropriations made, with the University interest fund, have a 
significant bearing on the intent of the legislature. It is an elemen-
tary rule of construction that all words found in the act are presumed 
to be made use of for some purpose, and, so far as possible, effect 
must be given to every clause and sentence. 
The proper function of a proviso is to restrain, or in some man-
ner modify, the general provisions of an enacting clause. It is not to 
be extended or enlarged by inference, but strictly construed and 
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limited to the object plainly within its terms. 
By the provisions of the Constitution of 1850, repeated in the 
new Constitution of 1909, the board of regents is made the highest 
form of juristic person known to the law, a constitutional corpora-
tion of independent authority, which, within the scope of its func-
tions, is co-ordinate with and equal to that of the legislature. By the 
old Constitution it is given "direction and control of all expenditures 
from the University interest fund" (section 8, art. 13); and by the 
new Constitution "general supervision of the University, and the di-
rection and control of all expenditures from the University funds." 
Section 5, art. 11. That the board of regents has independent control 
of the affairs of the University by authority of these constitutional 
provisions is well settled by former decisions of this court. People v. 
Regents, 4 Mich. 98; Weinberg v. Regents, 97 Mich. 254 (56 N. W. 
605); Sterling v. Regents, 110 Mich. 382 (68 N. W. 253, 34 L. R. A. 
150); Bauer v. State Board of Agriculture, 164 Mich. 415 (129 N. W. 
713). Strong and unequivocal language is used in these decisions. 
"The respondents are constitutional officers to whom are con-
fided by the Constitution 'the general supervision of the University, 
and the direction and control of all expenditures from the University 
interest fund.' * * * To their judgment and discretion as a body is 
committed the supervision of the financial and all other interests of 
an institution in which all the people of this State have a very great 
interest." People v. Regents, supra. 
"But the general supervision of the University is by Constitu-
tion vested in the regents. * * * So, when the State appropriates 
money to the University it passes to the regents and becomes the 
property of the University, to be expended under the exclusive direc-
tion of the regents, and passes beyond the control of the State 
through its legislative department. * * * Under the Constitution, the 
State cannot control the action of the regents. * * * It cannot add to 
or take away from its property without the consent of the regents. 
In making appropriations for its support the legislature may attach 
any conditions it may deem expedient and wise, and the regents can-
not receive the appropriation without complying with the conditions. 
This has been done in several instances." Weinberg v. Regents, supra. 
The able and exhaustive opinion by Justice GRANT in Sterling 
v. Regents, supra, reviews the causes which led up to these former de-
cisions and reaffirms them. In the recent case of Bauer v. State Board 
of Agriculture, supra, the Sterling Case is cited with approval. 
That conditions may be attached by the legislature to appropri-
ations for the University is well settled. In such case the regents may 
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accept or reject such appropriation, as they see fit. If they accept, 
the conditions are binding upon them. In this act appropriating the 
quarter-mill tax, now three-eighths of a mill (Act No. 303, Pub. 
Acts 1907), are specific conditions as to reporting to the governor, 
maintaining the departments, and use of accumulations. With these 
the regents must comply. For a failure to maintain any of said de-
partments the penalty is a reduction of the tax to one-twentieth of a 
mill, but beyond that the money passes to the regents, and becomes 
the property of the University, to be expended under the exclusive 
direction of the regents. 
We cannot construe the language of the fmal proviso of the act 
in question as an intent on the part of the legislature to overthrow 
the public policy of over half a century, plainly deducible from the 
general course of legislation and adjudication relating thereto, or as a 
purpose on their part to refuse aid to the University, unless the re-
gents surrender their constitutional right to control the affairs and 
fmances of the institution, and submit their judgment as to the wis-
dom and expediency of detailed expenditures for current expenses 
to that of the auditor general. Neither in construing this proviso can 
we interpret it as an intent thus by indirection to enlarge the scope 
of the enacting clause and ingraft upon this appropriation all condi-
tions and restrictions found in the accounting laws of the State, to-
gether with any legislation which may be read in connection there-
with. 
No money is paid out of the State treasury except on the war-
rant of the auditor general. In this case, as in many others, his duties 
are purely ministerial. As against the discretion of the regents in ex-
penditure of the University funds he exercises no judicial functions. 
As to him, in the performance of his official duties, vouchers for ex-
penditures made within the amount of the appropriation, when 
authorized by the board of regents and properly authenticated by 
the duly constituted officials, are, within the meaning of the law, 
"for lawful purposes." 
A writ of mandamus will issue as prayed. 
OSTRANDER, C. J., and MOORE, McALVAY, BROOKE, 
BLAIR, and STONE, JJ., concurred. BIRD, J., did not sit. 
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State Board of Agriculture v. Auditor General 
180 Mich. 349, 350-61; 147 N. W. 529 (1914) 
Under the Constitution and laws of the State, money may be 
drawn from the State treasury only upon the warrant of the auditor 
general. On the 23d of March last the auditor general declined to 
draw warrants for certain sums asked for by the State board of agri-
culture, basing his action upon the legislative declaration found in 
Act No. 324 of the Public Acts of 1913, which appropriates and or-
ders to be levied for the use of the agricultural college, in the year 
1913 and thereafter, annually one-sixth of a mill on each dollar of 
the taxable property in the State, and concludes as follows: 
"SEC. 1 (a). No part of this or any other appropriation shall 
be available in case a sum in excess of thirty-five thousand dollars 
from any or all sources, shall be expended in any one fiscal year for 
all the maintenance of the mechanical and engineering department." 
When the warrants were refused, a sum in excess of the requi-
sitions stood credited to the agricultural college fund. Requisitions 
previously honored advised the auditor general that a sum in excess 
of $35,000 had been expended in maintaining the mechanical and 
engineering department of the college since June 30, 1913. 
The State board of agriculture flled its petition for an order re-
quiring the auditor general to draw the refused warrants and such 
others as it might be entitled to. The auditor general made answer, 
and, upon the petition and answer, there being no disputed facts, the 
matter has proceeded to a hearing. It is asserted, in concluding the 
petition, that, if the auditor general's construction of the act of 
1913 is the correct one, it prevents relator's performing duties im-
posed by the Federal statutes and those imposed upon it by the Con-
stitution of the State; that the appropriation, in view of the condi-
tion, is not one which it is free to accept or reject. It cannot reject 
the appropriation without disobeying constitutional mandates; it 
cannot accept it and perform the condition without denying itself 
the exercise of constitutional powers. The condition is not within 
the title of the act. The act may be construed to limit the expendi-
ture of moneys raised by taxation and appropriated by the act, in 
which case it has been complied with. If it may not be so construed, 
the condition is altogether unconstitutional, and relator is entitled 
to receive the appropriation. 
In behalf of the respondent auditor general the attorney gen-
eral contends that: 
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"An examination of the conditions found in section 1 (a) of 
the act under consideration demonstrates that the provisions are in 
no wise ambiguous, and there can be no serious question as to the 
purpose of the legislature in attaching this condition. Undoubtedly 
i1 was the same purpose that prompted the condition attached in the 
regents' case involving the homeopathy department. It is not a ques-
tion for this Court, we respectfully submit, nor is it a question for 
the administrative officers of the State, whether the agricultural col-
lege shall continue as a competitor against another institution main-
tained at State expense of over $200,000 per year; nor is it a ques-
tion for this Court or the administrative officers of the State whether 
this legislation is wise in policy or not; nor is it a question, we re-
spectfully submit, for relator board to determine. The money in the 
treasury of the State was the property of the State; none of it was 
the property of the agricultural college until appropriated by the 
legislative branch of the State government. That branch of the State 
government has the exclusive control of appropriations to State in-
stitutions, and may prescribe the amount and condition upon which 
any of the public institutions of the State can withdraw the same. If, 
in the wisdom of the legislature, it is inadvisable to continue two ap-
propriations to two institutions which are duplicating work in the 
State, neither the courts, the administrative officers, or administra-
tive boards can set aside such action. 
"Relator understood clearly the conditions under which this 
appropriation was made; it understood clearly that, if the act was 
valid, its engineering department must be curtailed; and, while pro-
testing against the power of the legislature to attack such conditions, 
it continued to make its requisitions upon the auditor general and to 
receive the money appropriated to it under this and other acts, and 
to use such money contrary to the conditions found in this act. The 
people, by the Constitution of 1908, gave to relator powers never 
before possessed by the controlling board of the agricultural college, 
the same powers exercised by the regents of the university, but they 
still reserved to their representatives chosen each two years the right 
to determine the appropriations to be made, not only to the other 
State institutions, but also to the university and the agricultural col-
lege. The respondent is but carrying out the conditions imposed un-
der the act in question. Relator's present position, if unfortunate, 
arises from its failure to recognize that the legislature, and the legis-
lature alone, holds the purse strings of the State." 
To understand and to dispose of the contention presented, it is 
necessary to refer to facts appearing in the pleadings of evidence by 
the Constitution of the State and Federal and State statutes. By the 
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Constitution of 1909 the State board of agriculture is made, what be-
fore it was not, a constitutional board and body corporate. It is given 
general supervision of the college and direction and control of "all 
agricultural college funds." Article 11, § 8. Sections 10 and 11 of 
article 11 read, respectively, as follows: 
"SEC. 10. The legislature shall maintain the university, the 
college of mines, the State agricultural college, the State normal col-
lege, and such State normal schools and other educational institu-
tions as may be established by law. 
"SEC. 11. The proceeds from the sales of all lands that have 
been or hereafter may be granted by the United States to the State 
for educational purposes and the proceeds of all lands or other prop-
erty given by individuals or appropriated by the State for like pur-
poses shall be and remain a perpetual fund, the interest and income 
of which, together with the rents of all such lands as may remain un-
sold, shall be inviolably appropriated and annually applied to the 
specific objects of the original gift, grant or appropriation." 
Agricultural college funds, when the Constitution was adopted, 
consisted of sums paid for tuition, receipts from sales of products of 
the institution, a grant of money by the Federal government, the in-
terest paid by the State upon money received from sales of land 
granted by the Federal government (the proceeds of the sales having 
been covered into the State treasury), and, lastly, the proceeds of a 
tax of one-tenth of a mill levied annually upon the valuation of tax-
able property of the State pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 232 
of the Public Acts of 1901 (4 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 9808). The con-
dition attached to the Federal grant oflands was: 
"That all moneys derived from the sale of the lands aforesaid 
by the States to which the lands are apportioned, and from the sales 
of land scrip hereinbefore provided for, shall be invested in stocks of 
the United States or of the States, or some other safe stocks, yielding 
not less than five per centum upon the par value of said stocks; and 
that the moneys so invested shall constitute a perpetual fund, the 
capital of which shall remain forever undiminished (except so far as 
may be provided in section fifth of this act), and the interest of 
which shall be inviolably appropriated, by each State which may 
take and claim the benefit of this act, to the endowment, support, 
and maintenance of at least one college, where the leading object 
shall be, without excluding other scientific and classical studies, and 
including military tactics, to teach such branches of learning as are 
related to agriculture and the mechanic arts, in such manner as the 
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legislature of the States may respectively prescribe, in order to pro-
mote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes in 
the several pursuits and professions in life." 
And the Federal grants of money were made to the State for 
the more complete endowment and maintenance of such agricultural 
college as had been or might be established in accordance with the 
original land grant act. Formal acceptances of the Federal bounty 
were made by the legislature (Acts Nos. 46 and 140, Session of 1863; 
Act No. 80, Session of 1891), and it was formally devoted to the 
maintenance of the agricultural college. Including the interest paid 
by the State, the proceeds of Federal bounty amount to more than 
$120,000 annually. Although one purpose of the Federal grants was 
the teaching of mechanic arts, and instruction was in some degree 
afforded in mechanic arts, it was more than 20 years after the first 
grant was made before a mechanical department was established at 
the college. Act No. 42, Public Acts 1885. Since it was established, 
the State board of agriculture has been repeatedly expressly charged 
with the maintenance of the department. Section 15 of Act No. 188, 
Public Acts of 1861, an act which reorganized the college, provides 
a course of instruction as follows: 
"The course of instruction shall embrace the English language 
and literature, mathematics, civil engineering, agricultural chemistry, 
animal and vegetable anatomy and physiology, the veterinary art, 
entomology, geology, and such other natural sciences as may be pre-
scribed, technology, political, rural and household economy, horti-
culture, moral philosophy, history, bookkeeping, and especially the 
application of science and the mechanic arts to practical agriculture 
in the field." 
To refer to no other instances, in Act No. 232, Public Acts of 
1901, is found the following condition: 
"The Michigan State board of agriculture shall maintain at all 
times a sufficient corps of instructors in all the courses of study of 
the agricultural college as at present constituted, * * * the same being 
known as the agricultural department, the mechanical department 
and the woman's department; * * * and shall make a fair and equita-
ble division of the funds provided by this act in accord with the 
wants and needs of said courses of study. * * * " 
And the concluding language of the section is: 
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"Should the State board of agriculture fail at any time to main-
tain any of said departments as herein provided, the terms of this act 
shall be suspended until further action by the legislature." 
The mechanical department has grown in importance until it 
now represents an investment of more than $227,000. To maintain it 
during the year ending June 30, 1913, there was expanded $27,000 
for supplies, machinery, and maintenance of buildings, and about 
$34,000 for salaries of professors and instructors. 
Following the enactment of the law in question here and be-
fore any money had been drawn under it, the State board of agricul-
ture made a statement in writing, copies of which were sent to the 
State officers, in which statement, after reviewing the history of the 
mechanical and engineering department of the college and the Fed-
eral and State legislation pertaining thereto, the following conclu-
sions are set forth: 
"The board is advised by reputable legal counsel, and it be-
lieves, that under the Constitution of the State, the legislature has no 
authority to enact the limiting provision hereinbefore first referred 
to, and especially that it had no power to limit or determine the use 
of the Federal funds. However, without in any manner accepting the 
provisions of said limitation, and without waiving our right to insist 
upon its invalidity, we respectfully make the following declaration 
of our intention in reference to said mechanical and engineering de-
partment: 
"(a) We shall continue that department as now conducted and 
as it may legitimately grow and develop. 
"(b) We shall limit the annual expenditure of State funds in 
this department to $35,000.00. 
"(c) For the remainder of the necessary expenditure we shall 
use a sufficient portion of the funds of the Federal government. 
"(d) The secretary is instructed to mail certified copies of this 
statement, and the action of the board in reference thereto, to the 
governor, the auditor general, the State treasurer, the attorney gen-
eral and to the president of the senate and the speaker of the house." 
As matter of bookkeeping, the auditor general credits the agri-
cultural college fund with all moneys belonging to it. During the fis-
cal year beginning July 1, 1913, and until the month of March, 1914, 
requisitions upon the fund were honored until a sum in excess of 
$400,000 had been paid upon the requests of the State board of 
agriculture, there remaining in the fund in March, 1914, when further 
demands were refused, a sum in excess of $190,000. 
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OSTRANDER, J. (after stating the facts). In attempting to 
fmd the meaning to be given to section 1 (a), it will be assllllled that 
the legislature knew that, independent of the immediate appropria-
tion, there was a fund already devoted to the needs of the college 
larger than any sum likely to be used to maintain the particular de-
partment. If the purpose was to limit the total sum which should be 
expended to maintain that department, it could not be accomplished 
by limiting the amount which might be taken from the immediate 
appropriation. If there was no purpose to limit the total amount 
which might be expended, the provision is wholly insensible. In any 
event, the words "from any and all sources" may not be disregarded. 
Section 1 (a) cannot be held as intended merely to place a limitation 
upon the amount to be taken from the immediate appropriation to 
be used in maintaining the mechanical and engineering department. 
While no reading and no analysis of the language employed 
leaves one entirely certain of the meaning of the provision, it seems 
most reasonable to say that the purpose was to limit expenditures 
for maintaining the particular department to $35,000 annually, and 
to make unavailable for the use of the college all of its funds in case 
the maximum thus fixed was exceeded. I do not overlook the lan-
guage, "No part of this or any other appropriation shall be available," 
nor the actual occurrence of a result which was inevitable; namely, 
that unless the declaration of the relator board was to be accepted 
for the fact some part of the immediate and of other appropriations 
would of necessity be available, if the college was to continue to 
exist, since it could not be known before the fact whether relator 
would or would not expend more than $35,000 in maintaining the 
particular department. Some question might be raised also about the 
meaning of the words "or any other appropriation." The reference 
might be to an unexpended appropriation or the term "appropria-
tion" used to designate, and not improperly, the earlier legislation 
which devoted the Federal gifts to the maintenance of the college. 
But I think we must say that the legislative purpose expressed in this 
statute is the one to which the respondent has given effect, and, as-
suming the law to be valid, respondent cannot be required to issue 
to relator further warrants for money. 
We must either say this, or else conclude that section 1 (a) was 
added to the act as an admonition, and not a command, or a condi-
tion; that it expresses the opinion of the legislature with respect to 
the manner in which the agricultural college funds shall be employed. 
If it was an admonition merely, the act could, of course, stand with-
out it. Because of the language employed in section 1 (a) I do not 
feel warranted in concluding that it is admonitory only. It is there-
fore necessary to determine whether the legislature has, as it is 
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claimed, exceeded its constitutional powers, and, if it has, then the 
state of the applicable law. 
If section 1 (a) be held to be valid, its effect would be legisla-
tive supervision of the college. To determine that a department of 
the college which has been maintained at a cost of $60,000 annually 
for instructors and supplies shall be from a given date maintained at 
a cost of $35,000 annually for instructors and supplies is to deter-
mine that it shall have fewer supplies, or fewer, or less capable, in-
structors, or both. It is something more than reducing a general ap-
propriation so that the expenses in some or in all departments of the 
college must be reduced, leaving the proper supervisors to determine 
how efficiency can be best maintained under new conditions. The 
Constitution has given to the relator the general supervision of the 
college and the direction and control of all agricultural college funds. 
So long as the relator employs them for the purposes intended by the 
grant, it is beyond the power of the legislature to control the relator's 
use of the funds received from the Federal government and long ago 
appropriated to the agricultural college. Undoubtedly the grant of 
funds was to the State, and the disposition of them wholly within 
the power of the State, acting through its legislature, in accordance 
with the conditions of the trust imposed. Montana, ex rel Haire, v. 
Rice, 204 U.S. 291 (27 Sup. Ct. 281); Wyoming, ex rei. Wyoming 
Agricultural College, v. Irvine, 206 U.S. 278 (27 Sup. Ct. 613). See, 
also, Massachusetts Agricultural College v. Marden, 156 Mass. 150 
(30 N. E. 555). I am called upon to neither affirm nor deny the 
proposition that the legislature may now appropriate the Federal 
fund, in whole or in part, to some other institution, withdrawing it, 
or some of it, from the agricultural college, so long as it keeps faith 
with the congress. The legislature has not withdrawn it from the col-
lege nor appropriated it, or any part of it, to another institution. It 
remains an agricultural college fund, within the meaning of the Con-
stitution, devoted, under the supervision and direction of the relator, 
to the college and to the purposes expressed in the grant, in State 
legislation, and, finally, in the Constitution of the State. It is re-
quired to be "annually applied to the specific objects of the original 
gift, grant or appropriation." Necessarily it must be so applied, cnder 
existing conditions, by the constitutional supervisors of the fund, 
and of the college, and not by the legislature. It follows that the 
legislature exceeded its powers in attempting to deprive the relator 
of its constitutional control of agricultural college funds derived 
from the Federal government. The constitutional powers of the State 
board of agriculture with respect to the college and its funds are the 
same as those of the board of regents of the university with respect 
to the university and its funds, and authority for the conclusion 
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stated may be found in Sterling v. Regents of the University, 110 
Mich. 369 (68 N. W. 253, 34 L. R. A. 150); Board of Regents v. 
Auditor General, 167 Mich. 444 (132 N. W. 1037), as well as in 
Bauer v. State Board of Agriculture, 164 Mich. 415 (129 N. W. 713). 
I assume that the legislature, in amending the original bill by 
adding section 1 (a) thereto, acted in good faith and with the highest 
motives. I am obliged to fmd that in doing so constitutional powers 
were exceeded. I am obliged to fmd, further, that the legislative in-
tent was to deprive the college of all funds, however derived, upon 
the contingency expressed in the act. This being so, the question is 
whether it can be said that the act would have passed without the 
condition. 
In deciding this question, we are not concerned with, do not 
inquire into, and cannot know the purpose and intent of legislators. 
We must look at the law itself and judicially ascertain the intent of 
the legislature. 
"If a statute attempts to accomplish two or more objects, and 
is void as to one, it may still be in every respect complete and valid 
as to the other. But if its purpose is to accomplish a single object 
only, and some of its provisions are void, the whole must fail unless 
sufficient remains to effect the object without the aid of the invalid 
portion. And if they are so mutually connected with and dependent 
on each other, as conditions, considerations, or compensations for 
each other, as to warrant the belief that the legislature intended 
them as a whole, and if all could not be carried into effect the legisla-
ture would not pass the residue independently, then if some parts 
are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, 
conditional, or connected must fall with them." Cooley's Constitu-
tional Limitations (6th Ed.), p. 211. 
There are some facts which we may and do know which aid us 
in this inquiry. We know that in the year 1901, and until the year 
1913, the State appropriation for the agricultural college was one-
tenth of a mill. In 1913, by the act in question here, this appropria-
tion was increased, upon condition, to one-sixth of a mill. The appro-
priation made in 1901 does not fail if the act of 1913 is held invalid. 
The college will still receive the proceeds of a tax of one-tenth of a 
mill upon the taxable property of the State, and it appears that upon 
this basis something remains in the treasury. It is contended that the 
decision of this court in Moreland v. Millen, 126 Mich. 381 (85 N. W. 
882), supports the ruling that the act may stand, notwithstanding the 
invalid condition, and that to hold otherwise is to overrule the deci-
sion in. that case. I have read the opinions delivered in that case with 
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care and with no disinclination to sustain the relator in this contro-
versy. The cases seem to me to be wholly unlike. For the purposes of 
the decision in that case, it was assumed in the majority opinion that 
the legislature, in the act there in question, sought to improve the 
method of administering public works in the city of Detroit. The act 
made radical changes in the existing law. It provided finally that a 
superintendent of public works should be appointed, for a desig-
nated, but short, period of time, by the governor of the State, and 
thereafter by the mayor of the city. It was held that the legislature 
exceeded its powers in providing for the provisional appointment, 
but that the whole law was not thereby made invalid. It was held 
further that, an office having been created by the act, the mayor 
might proceed at once to fill it by appointment. In that case the in-
valid portion of the act provided for a mere detail; in this case it is 
the condition upon which an increased appropriation is made. It is 
as though the legislature, in 1913, had for that year, and each suc-
ceeding year, provided a fund for the college, and for a further sum 
to be given it upon condition. 
The whole act must fail, and, this being so, the respondent 
should be advised (it is unlikely that a writ will be necessary) that the 
act of 1913 is void; that the act of 1901 is in force; that the fund de-
rived from the Federal government and a fund equal to the one 
created by that act are within the control of the relator. 
McALVAY, C. J., and BROOKE, KUHN, STONE, BIRD, 
MOORE, and STEERE, JJ., concurred. 
State Board of Agriculture v. Auditor General 
226 Mich. 417, 418-36; 197 N. W. 160 (1924) 
MOORE, J. The writ of mandamus is sought to compel the 
auditor general to issue his warrant on the State treasurer in favor of 
the Michigan Agricultural College for $75,000. The State admirl:stra-
tive board is made a party defendant for the reason that the auditor 
general refuses to issue said warrant because said board has directed 
him not to do so. 
This proceeding calls for a construction of Act No. 308, Pub. 
Acts 1923, which reads: 
"For carrying on the co-operative agricultural extension work 
under the provisions of an act of congress approved May eight, 
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nineteen hundred fourteen, entitled 'An act to provide for co-opera-
tive extension work between the agricultural colleges for the several 
States receiving the benefits of an act of congress approved July two, 
eighteen hundred sixty-two, and acts supplementary thereto, and 
the United States department of agriculture,' and such other exten-
sion work as the State board of agriculture may designate, the sum 
of 
For Fiscal For Fiscal 
Year Year 
1923-1924 1924-1925 
Annual appropriation for ex-
tension work ~ . . . . . . . . . $150,000.00 $150,000.00 
Special fund for research work . 35,000.00 35,000.00 
Horticultural building including 
green house and equipment . 200,000.00 200,000.00 
Extensions and additions to 
power house and equipment. 75,000.00 75,000.00 
Farm and miscellaneous build-
ings and incidental additions 
to buildings ........... 50,000.00 50,000.00 
Hospital ................ 50,000.00 
Totals ............ $560,000.00 $510,000.00 
"Each of said amounts shall be used solely for the specific pur-
poses herein stated, subject to the general supervisory control of the 
State administrative board." 
The act of congress mentioned is known as the Smith-Lever act 
(38 U.S. Stat. p. 372; 3 Fed. Stat. Ann. [2d Ed.] at page 108). By 
this act the Federal government appropriated moneys,-
"1. To aid in diffusing among the people of the United States 
useful and practical information on subjects relating to agriculture 
and home economics and to inaugurate in each State agricultural ex-
tension work to be carried on by the agricultural or land grant col-
leges, in co-operation with the United States department of agricul-
ture.*** 
"2. The contemplated co-operative extension work to consist 
of instruction and practical demonstrations in agriculture and home 
economics to persons not attending or residing in said colleges. This 
work to be carried on in such manner as may be mutually agreed 
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upon by the United States secretary of agriculture and the agricul-
tural college receiving the benefit of the act. * * * 
"3. Before any college receives its share of the Federal appro-
priation each year, plans for the work to be carried on under this act 
to be submitted by the proper officials of each college and approved 
by the secretary of agriculture. 
"4. With the exception of the $10,000 preliminary appropria-
tion above referred to, no payment to be made of Federal funds to 
any State until an equal sum has been appropriated for such year by 
the legislature of such State or until it has been provided by the 
State, county, college, local authority or from individual contribu-
tions within the State for the maintenance of the co-operative agri-
cultural extension work provided for in the act." 
By Act No. 65, Pub. Acts 1915 (1 Comp. Laws 1915, § 1272), 
the Michigan legislature accepted the offer made in the Smith-Lever 
act, "under the terms and conditions expressed in said act." 
Section 2 of said act provides: 
"The moneys derived by authority of said act shall be exclu-
sively used in support of co-operative agricultural extension work, to 
be carried on by Michigan Agricultural College, and the secretary of 
the State board of agriculture is hereby designated as the officer to 
whom such funds should be paid." 
An agreement was made between the Agricultural College and 
the United States department of agriculture regarding the conduct of 
said co-operative extension work. It will not be necessary to quote 
the details of this agreement. In it the parties mutually agreed: 
"(a) That all co-operative extension work be planned under 
the joint supervision of the director of extension work of the col-
lege, subject to the approval of the president of the college and the 
agriculturist in charge of demonstration work for the United States 
department of agriculture, and subject to the approval of the secre-
tary of agriculture or his representative, and that the approved plans 
for such extension work in Michigan should be executed through 
the extension division of said college in accordance with the terms of 
so-called individual projects agreements. 
"(b) That all co-operative extension work agents in Michigan, 
under this and subsequent agreements, be joint representatives of the 
college and the United States department of agriculture, unless other-
wise expressly provided, and that such co-operation be plainly set 
forth in all literature issued either by the college or said department 
of agriculture. 
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"(c) That the plans for use of Smith-Lever funds be made by 
the extension division of the college, but subject to the approval of 
the secretary of agriculture, and when so approved, be executed by 
the extension division of the college. 
"(d) That headquarters of the Michigan organization shall be 
the Michigan Agricultural College." 
A director was appointed by the plaintiff as director of exten-
sion work and his appointment was approved by the United States 
secretary of agriculture and he is now acting in that capacity. 
Differences arose between the plaintiff and the State adminis-
trative board, which resulted, as before stated, in the auditor general 
re,fusing to issue his warrant for any part of the $150,000 appropri-
ated by Act No. 308, Pub. Acts 1923. 
The refusal of the defendant to tum over the money is based 
upon the provision of Act No. 308, Pub. Acts 1923, which reads: 
"Each of said amounts shall be used solely for the specific pur-
poses herein stated, subject to the general supervisory control of the 
State administrative board." 
Article 11 of the Constitution of Michigan reads in part: 
"SEC. 7. * * * The members thus elected and their successors 
in office shall be a body corporate to be known as 'The State Board 
of Agriculture.' 
"SEC. 8. * * * The buard shall have the general supervision of 
the college, and the direction and control of all agricultural college 
funds.'' * * * 
Act No. 269, Pub: Acts 1909 (1 Comp. Laws 1915, § 1233 et 
seq.), reads in part: 
"SEC. 2. The government of the Michigan Agricultural College 
shall be vested in the State board of agriculture. 
"SEC. 6. * * * The State board of agriculture shall have the 
general supervision of the Michigan Agricultural College;** *of all 
appropriations made by the State or by congress for the support of 
said college, or for the support of the experiment station or any 
sub-station, or for any other purpose for which said college is 
created. * * * 
"SEC. 7. The board shall fix the salary of the president, pro-
fessors and other employees, and shall prescribe their respective 
duties.*** 
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"SEC. 9. The board shall direct the disposition of any moneys 
appropriated by the legislature or by congress for the Agricultural 
College." * * * 
These provisions of the Constitution and the statute of the 
State were in force when Act No. 308, Pub. Acts 1923, was enacted, 
and, it may be safely assumed, were known to the legislature. 
We deem it unnecessary to go into a discussion of the question 
of how far the legislature may go in granting authority to the admin-
istrative board to take part in the management of the affairs of the 
Agricultural College, in view of the constitutional provision we have 
quoted. Nor do we think we are called upon to say just what was 
meant by the use of the words "subject to the general supervisory 
control of the State administrative board." The legislature made a 
definite appropriation to carry out extension work under the provi-
sions of the Smith-Lever act, "and such other extension work as the 
State board of agriculture may designate." The language "subject to 
the general supervisory control of the State administrative board," 
given in the concluding portion of the act, did not give the board the 
right to withhold the appropriation. 
The writ will issue as prayed, but without costs. 
McDONALD, J. I am in entire disagreement with the conclu-
sions reached by Justice WIEST in reference to the powers and 
duties of the State board of agriculture. If his opinion is to prevail 
we will have completely overturned the well settled policy of the 
State relative to the management and control of the University and 
of the Agricultural College. These institutions of learning are very 
close to the hearts of the people of Michigan. They have made of 
them the most unique organizations known to the law, in this, that 
they are constitutional corporations created for the purpose of inde-
pendently discharging State functions. The people are themselves the 
incorporators; the boards that control them are responsible only to 
the people who elect them; they are independent of every other de-
partment of the State government. Exercising these functions in this 
manner, it was quite inevitable that they should come into conflict 
with the State administrative board to which the legislature has dele-
gated authority to intervene in the affairs and direct the policy of 
every State institution. Thus this controversy has arisen. 
As viewed by the plaintiff, the question involved is whether 
the State board of agriculture shall continue to exclusively manage 
the affairs of the college as provided by the Constitution, or surren-
der its rights to the State administrative board. As it appears to the 
defendant, the question is whether it may not exercise general 
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supervisory control over funds received by the college by way of ap-
propriations from the legislature without invading the constitutional 
rights of the State board of agriculture. 
The State board of agriculture stands on the same constitution-
al footing as the board of regents of the University. The progress 
which our University has made is due in large measure to the fact 
that the framers of the Constitution of 1850 wisely provided against 
legislative interference by placing its exclusive management in the 
hands of a constitutional board elected by the people. The underly-
ing idea was that the best results would be attained by centering the 
responsibility in one body independent of the legislature and answer-
able only to the people. See Sterling v. Regents of University, 110 
Mich. 382 (34 L. R. A. 150). For this reason the Constitution gave 
the regents the absolute management of the University, and the ex-
clusive control of all funds received for its use. This court has so de-
clared in numerous decisions. People v. Regents of University, 4 
Mich. 98; Weinberg v. Regents of University, 97 Mich. 254;Sterling 
v. Regents of University, supra; Regents of University v. Auditor 
General, 167 Mich. 444. 
The policy thus consistently upheld by the court has proven 
so satisfactory to the people that in the constitutional convention of 
1908 similar action was taken with reference to the Agricultural Col-
lege. The State board of agriculture was made a constitutional body; 
it was given the sole management of the affairs of the college and ex-
clusive control of all of its funds. At this time a part of the college 
funds was received by way of appropriations from the legislature. In 
providing that the State board of agriculture should have control of 
the affairs of the college and the funds devoted to its use, the Consti-
tution makes no exception as to funds from any particular source; it 
says, "All funds." But the contention of my Brother WIEST that 
moneys appropriated by the legislature are not college funds in the 
constitutional sense, is answered by Mr. Justice GRANT in Weinberg 
v. Regents of University, supra. 
"When the State appropriates money to the University it passes 
to the regents, and becomes the property of the University, to be ex-
pended under the exclusive direction of the regents, and passes be-
yond the control of the State through its legislative department." 
There is, however, a distinction between funds received by 
way of appropriations and other college funds. The appropriation 
may be upon condition that the money shall be used for a specific 
purpose, or upon any other condition that the legislature can lawful-
ly impose. The language used in some previous decisions of this court 
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in reference to this question seems to have been misunderstood. For 
instance, the following: 
"In making appropriations for its support, the legislature may 
attach any conditions it may deem expedient and wise, and the re-
gents cannot receive the appropriation without complying with the 
conditions." Weinberg v. Regents of University, 97 Mich. 246, 254. 
Clearly, in saying that the legislature can attach to an appro-
priation any condition which it may deem expedient and wise, the 
court had in mind only such a condition as the legislature had power 
to make. It did not mean that a condition could be imposed that 
would be an invasion of the constitutional rights and powers of the 
governing board of the college. It did not mean to say that, in order 
to avail itself of the money appropriated, the State board of agricul-
ture must turn over to the legislature management and control of the 
college, or of any of its activities. This logically leads us to a consider-
ation of the character of the condition attached to the appropriation 
involved in the instant case. Is it a condition that the legislature had 
power to make? The appropriation (Act No. 308, Pub. Acts 1923) is 
subject to two conditions, first, that the money appropriated shall be 
used for the specific purpose of carrying on co-operative agricultural 
extension work under the provisions of an act of congress, known as 
the "Smith-Lever act {38 U.S. Stat. p. 372)," and second, that it 
"shall be used * * * subject to the general supervisory control of the 
State administrative board." 
It is not an easy matter to separate a supervisory control of the 
expenditure of money for extension work from a control of the work 
itself. Whatever meaning the legislature intended the term "general 
supervisory control" to import, there is no question as to the inter-
pretation given to it by the State administrative board. It appears in 
the following resolution adopted on July 10, 1923: 
"1. That the general supervision of the extension work of the 
Michigan Agricultural College, together with the authority to hire 
county agents and all other employees and to prescribe their duties 
and ftx their salaries, be placed by the State board of agriculture by 
proper resolution, in the hands of the dean of agriculture of the col-
lege. 
"2. That county agents receive their entire salaries and ex-
penses from the Federal government, the State, or the several coun-
ties of the State, but from no other source. 
"3. That the dean of agriculture submit to this board immedi-
ately a revised budget of salaries and expenses based under the 
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Smith-Lever act, the United States department of agriculture, and 
the State and county appropriations, and if these funds are insuffi-
cient to carry on the work as outlined, the matter be referred to this 
board for further attention." 
From the above resolutions it will be noted that, exercising its 
legislative right to "general supervisory control," the State adminis-
trative board proposes to take the extension work entirely out of the 
hands of the board of agriculture and give it over to a dean of the col-
lege. In this the State administrative board is assuming to exercise 
authority vested by the Constitution solely in the board of agricul-
ture. It is not a question as to the wisdom of the method proposed 
by the administrative board. The business policy and management of 
all of the affairs of the college belongs to the State board of agricul-
ture. The people, speaking through their Constitution, have so de-
creed. It is also proposed to reject contributions from county farm 
bureaus, amounting to $191,489, on the theory that it is not only 
unlawful but a bad business policy to allow the bureaus to pay a 
part of the salaries of employees engaged in extension work. It may 
be so, but the right to accept or reject contributions to carry on any 
college activity is a matter to be determined exclusively by the State 
board of agriculture. The legislature cannot interfere nor can it dele-
gate any authority to the administrative board which it, itself, does 
not possess. My Brother WIEST justifies the delegation of such au-
thority by the legislature on the ground that it is a part of the 
present-day legislative policy in carrying out a modern system of 
State finance. The efficiency of the present system may well be con-
ceded, but it cannot be applied to the affairs of the University or the 
College, because the Constitution forbids it. The legislative enact-
ments quoted by my Brother, as giving the State administrative 
board the right to intervene in the affairs of State institutions and 
direct their expenditures, all relate to institutions over which the 
legislature has control. The Agricultural College and the University 
of Michigan are constitutionally immune from such legislation. The 
legislature has no control over them. 
General supervisory control was not a meaningless term with 
the legislature. As Justice WIEST points out, it had been applied in 
other appropriation acts of the same session. It was understood to 
mean that it conferred the right not only to control the expenditure 
of the money, but to direct the work for which the appropriation 
was made. It is evident that the legislature intended to confer just 
such power on the State administrative board as it assumed to exer-
cise in relation to this appropriation. In doing so, it exceeds its pow-
ers. This being true, the question arises, Does the unconstitutional 
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provision of the statute nullify the whole act? To hold that it does, 
we must assume that the legislature would not have made the appro-
priation except for the fact that the money was to be expended un-
der the general supervisory control of the State administrative board. 
The main purpose of the legislature was to grant an appropriation to 
the college to enable it to carry on its extension work in co-operation 
with the Federal authorities. A previous legislature had committed 
the State to that policy. The appropriation was made to support one 
of the most important activities of the college. In making it the legis-
lature was but obeying the mandate of the Constitution that it should 
grant appropriations for the support of the college and its various 
activities (Art. 11, § 10, Const. 1909). It had become a fixed habit 
with this legislature to confer upon the administrative board general 
supervisory control over all appropriations. As has been heretofore 
pointed out, this appears from the various acts enacted at this same 
session. It is not reasonable to assume, therefore, that it intended 
the appropriation to fail if for any reason the State administrative 
board could not exercise a general supervisory control over its ex-
penditure. As we have indicated, the appropriation was necessary to 
carry on the very important work of taking the college to the people. 
Its purpose was mainly to benefit those who could not reside at the 
college. The legislature did not want this work to fail; it knew that 
an appropriation was necessary if it were to be continued. The main 
purpose was the appropriation. The supervisory control was but in-
cidental, due to the legislative policy. In these circumstances, we 
think that the legislature did not intend the appropriation to fail 
and that the attempt to confer unconstitutional authority on the 
State administrative board did not nullify the balance of the act. 
See State Board of Agriculture v. Auditor General, 180 Mich. 349; 
Morelandv.Millen, 126 Mich. 381. 
It follows that the State board of agriculture is entitled to the 
appropriation subject to the condition that it shall be used for the 
purpose specified. It is the undoubted right of the administrative 
board to see that the condition is complied with. We understand 
that the plaintiff is willing to accept the appropriation on these 
terms. If so, the money should be paid. 
It has been suggested that only by following the fund into the 
hands of the board of agriculture can the administrative board com-
pel a compliance with the condition as to the manner of its expendi-
ture. As we have pointed out, when the money appropriated passes 
into the hands of the State board of agriculture, it becomes college 
property, and is thereafter under the exclusive control of that board, 
but must be used for the purpose for which it was granted. The 
proper method of compelling a compliance with the condition that 
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the money shall be expended for the purpose specified will readily 
suggest itself to the administrative board and its legal advisor. 
In view of some statements that have been made, we are led to 
say that in the action it has taken with reference to the affairs of the 
college, the State administrative board has been but following out the 
directions of the legislature in the belief that the greatest efficiency 
will follow the supervision by the State of all appropriations. But, as 
we have said, the system adopted, which has apparently produced 
most satisfactory results when applied to other State institutions, 
cannot be followed into the business management of the Agricul-
tural College. The Constitution forbids it. The history of the strug-
gles of the University of Michigan for this constitutional policy, 
under which it has attained its present high standing, may be read in 
Sterling v. Regents of University, supra, and cases there cited. The 
same policy has been adopted for the Agricultural College, and in up-
holding it we are consistently following the Constitution as inter-
preted by all of the previous decisions of this court. For these reasons 
I concur in the result reached by Mr. Justice MOORE. 
The writ of mandamus will issue to the auditor general, !but 
without costs. 
CLARK,. C. J., and SHARPE and STEERE, JJ., concurred with 
McDONALD, J. 
MOORE, J. I agree with Justice McDONALD in his construc-
tion of the constitutional provision he quotes and the limitation it 
puts upon the power of the legislature and the administrative board. 
WIEST, J. {dissenting). We are not in accord with the opinion 
prepared by Mr. Justice MOORE. 
The State board of agriculture is a constitutional body cor-
porate. It is the duty of the legislature to maintain the State Agricul-
tural College. Agricultural College funds, designated as such in the 
Constitution, are wholly under control of the State board of agricul-
ture. Biennial legislative appropriations are not agricultural funds 
designated as such in the Constitution. The constitutional mandate 
to the legislature to support the Agricultural College does not mean 
that, in the matter of appropriations, the legislature shall have no 
voice in the amounts and expenditure thereof. The Constitution 
ftxes no sum to be appropriated by the legislature for support of the 
Agricultural College, but leaves the subject to the legislature from 
session to session in recognition of the fact that the legislature con-
trols the public purse strings. The Constitution, in making the State 
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board of agriculture a body corporate, has not raised the board above 
the legislative power of the State in the matter of the expenditure of 
public funds. There is another mandate in the Constitution: 
"No money shall be paid out of the State treasury except in 
pursuance of appropriations made by law." Constitution, Art. 10, 
§ 16. 
Funds vested in the college by the Constitution are beyond 
legislative regulation or control. But what the legislature may grant, 
by way of an appropriation, goes only as given, may be upon condi-
tion, and provide for the intervention of a State supervising fmance 
agency with delegated power to be exercised respecting the expendi-
ture. To set aside money in the treasury for a specified purpose does 
not eo instante vest the same in any body. The system of State fi-
nance, payment of money and accounting therefor by disbursing of-
ficers forbids. The right to the money is measured by the terms of 
the legislative grant thereof and such terms may impress upon the 
grant the condition that it shall be devoted to a specific purpose 
and its expenditure made subject to the general supervisory control 
of the State administrative board. The right of the legislature to ap-
propriate, with or without condition, beyond general specification 
of object, is beyond question. If with condition attached, then the 
only question is the extent and nature of the condition. 
In the appropriation act the legislature invoked in comprehen-
sive language the powers theretofore granted the State administra-
tive board. This it had an undoubted right to do. The distinction be-
tween an appropriation and its disbursement must be kept in mind. 
Disbursement of necessity comes after appropriation; official acts 
intervene. The State administrative board is under legislative man-
date to exercise supervisory control over the disbursement of the 
appropriation in question. The legislature always has had power to 
ascertain whether an appropriation has been expended by an admin-
istrative body for the purpose for which it was made. The legislature 
also has power, and manifestly the duty, to fix the purpose for which 
an appropriation may be expended. Coupled with this power is the 
right to delegate to an administrative body the right of supervision 
over the acts of a disbursing body. The power to grant or withhold 
carries the power to grant on condition, specification of object, dele-
gation of power of supervisory control in a governmental agency and 
accounting for expenditures. 
There is come a time in State fmance when a central power, 
created for the purpose of exercising supervisory control over the 
expenditures of appropriations, is deemed advisable, and the vesting 
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of this power in the State administrative board, and the command 
that it be exercised, are not meaningless words. The administrative 
board was created to stand between appropriations and use thereof, 
when so invoked by the legislature. 
Act No. 2, Pub. Acts 1921 (Comp. Laws Supp. 1922, § 172 
[1-9] ), created the State administrative board to promote the effi-
ciency of the government of the State and vested in that board, 
among other things, the power and functions of the State budget 
commission created by Act No. 98, Pub. Acts 1919 (Comp. Laws 
Supp. 1922, § 277). The condition attached to the appropriation 
"subject to the general supervisory control of the State administra-
tive board," is not meaningless if we indulge in a little circumspec-
tion. Why designate the State administrative board and invoke its of~ 
flee between the grant of the appropriation and the expenditure 
thereof? The answer is in section 3 of the State administrative board 
act: 
"The State administrative board shall exercise general super-
visory control over the functions and activities of all administrative 
departments, boards, commissioners, and officers of the State, and 
of all State institutions. Said board may in its discretion intervene in 
any matter touching such functions and activities and may by resolu-
tion or order, advise or direct the department, board, commission, 
officer or institution concerned as to the manner in which the func-
tion or other activity shall be performed, and may order an inter-
change or transfer of employees between departments, boards, com-
missions and State institutions when necessary. It is hereby made the 
duty of each and every official and employee connected with any ad-
ministrative department, office or institution of the State to follow 
the direction or order so given; and to perform such services in the 
carrying out of the purposes and intent of this act as may be re-
quired by the board. Failure so to do shall be deemed to constitute 
malfeasance in office and shall be sufficient cause for removal. In no 
case shall any order issue under this act without the written approval 
of the governor." 
General supervisory control over the expenditure of the appro-
priation means something more than mere permission to look on 
without a frown. It means that the legislature invoked all the appli-
cable powers vested in the State administrative board in supervision 
and control of the expenditure of the appropriation, or it means ab-
solutely nothing. It is found in many other appropriation acts of the 
same session and indicates a pronounced legislative policy. It is in 
line with modern State finance and centers supervision, control and 
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responsibility, and notes a departure from the old idea of the suffi-
ciency of legislative disapproval of method of an expenditure of an 
appropriation disclosed only in an accounting. This is clearly demon-
strated in the act creating the State administrative board and in vest-
ing that board with the power and functions of the State budget 
commission. 
In creating the State budget commission the legislature de-
clared: 
"The term 'budget system,' established by this act, shall be 
construed to be a systematic plan of ascertaining and meeting the 
fmancial needs of the several departments, institutions, boards, com-
missions and offices of the State government, and of the controlling 
State funds." 
The legislature imposed a responsibility upon the administra-
tive board and this cannot be met if my Brother's opinion prevails. 
The power under the budget commission act gives the State adminis-
trative board recommendatory supervision over appropriations asked 
for, and the State administrative board act gives general supervisory 
control over the expenditure of the appropriation granted. 
The merits of the issue between the State board of agriculture 
and the State administrative board carmot be reviewed by this court. 
If the law vests in the State administrative board general supervisory 
control over the appropriation, and it has exercised such control, 
and the State agricultural board feels aggrieved thereby, the remedy 
is by appeal to the legislative and not to the judicial power. 
We have passed upon the law involved; we find the State ad-
ministrative board exercising power in the premises granted by the 
legislature. We cannot supervise the supervision exercised. 
The writ should be denied. 
BIRD and FELLOWS, JJ., concurred with WIEST, J. 
BIRD, J. (dissenting). I am in full accord with the opinion of 
Mr. Justice WIEST in this matter, but desire to say a word on the 
constitutional question raised since that opinion was written. I think 
every thoughtful man must concede that the legislature could have 
refused to make this particular appropriation and, if it had, no legal 
complaint could have been made. If, then, the legislature was in the 
position where it could give or withhold the appropriation as it saw 
fit, it was in no different position than a private donor might be who 
chooses to give the college a donation of like amount with the 
condition that the Detroit Trust Company should have supervisory 
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control to see that the terms of the donation were complied with. 
Had some public-spirited citizen made such a donation under the 
condition indicated, could it be said that the condition was uncon-
stitutional? The private citizen and the legislature stand in the same 
position, either could give or withhold. If this be so, then either had 
a right to annex a condition, and if the gift is accepted by the college 
it must take it subject to the condition and comply therewith. The 
only way the college could avoid compliance with the condition 
would be to refuse the gift. To reach any other conclusion, it must 
be said that the legislature was under obligation to make this particu-
lar donation without condition. 
It is argued that the legislature had a constitutional duty to 
support and maintain the college. Granting this to be so, does it fol-
low that, because it is under a constitutional obligation to maintain 
the college, it may not make a particular gift upon condition and ap-
point some agency to see that the condition is complied with? It is 
indeed a strange process of reasoning to say that the legislature may 
give or withhold but, if it does give upon condition, that the condi-
tion is unconstitutional. 
This proposition was very sensibly disposed of in Weinberg v. 
Regents of University, 97 Mich. 246, 254, where it was said: 
"In making appropriations for its support, the legislature may 
attach any conditions it may deem expedient and wise, and the re-
gents cannot receive the appropriation without complying with the 
conditions." 
Notwithstanding this court made that statement in the year 
1893, it is argued in 1924 that it is of no account, that the college 
may reach out and lay hold of an appropriation, given upon condi-
tion, and ignore the condition on the plea that it is unconstitutional. 
If this argument be sound, then it must be assumed that the legisla-
ture would have made the appropriation regardless of the condition. 
I do not believe this court is in a position to so hold. 
It was said in Warren v. Mayor, etc., of Charlestown, 2 Gray 
(Mass.), 84, where the question was discussed: 
"If they (the parts of the act) are so mutually connected with 
and dependent on each other, as conditions, considerations or com-
pensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature 
intended them as a whole and that, if all could not be carried into ef-
fect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, and 
some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus de-
pendent, conditional and connected must fall with them." 
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"If the void part of the act is the compensation for or the in-
ducement to the valid portion, so that, looking at the whole act, it is 
reasonably clear that the legislative body would not have enacted the 
valid portion alone, then the whole act will be held inoperative and 
void. It is not necessary that the invalid portion of an act of the legis-
lature should have operated as the sole inducement to the passage of 
the law to render the same void. It will have that effect if the void 
part to any extent influenced the legislature in passing the statute." 
1 Lewis' Sutherland on Statutory Construction (2d Ed.), § 303. 
See, also, Cooley's Constitutional limitations (6th Ed.), p. 211; 
People, ex rei. Attorney General, v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 197 
Mich. 532 (L. R. A. 1918A, 797). 
If it can be said, by any stretch of the imagination, that the 
condition annexed to the appropriation is void because unconstitu-
tional, then, I insist, the whole act must fail. 
FELLOWS, J., concurred with BIRD, J. 
Bauer v. State Board of Agriculture 
164 Mich 415, 416-19; 129 N. W. 713 (1911) 
BLAIR, J. Upon the petition of the relator an order to show 
cause was made by this court, directed to the respondent, the State 
board of agriculture, requiring it to show cause why the writ of 
mandamus should not issue to compel it to-
"Abrogate the contract heretofore made or attempted to be 
made with the United States government, whereby it, the said State 
board of agriculture, has agreed to furnish quarters for a United 
States post office at East Lansing, Mich. (b) That it cease from con-
struction and expending moneys for construction of quarters for a 
United States post office at East Lansing, Mich. (c) That it cease from 
furnishing quarters for a United States post office at East Lansing, 
Mich., within such reasonable time as to this court shall seem reason-
able and expedient." 
The interest of relator, as disclosed by the record, is that he is 
a citizen and a taxpayer of the county of Ingham, doing a mercantile 
business in the city of East Lansing in a building of which he has a 
lease to and including August 31, 1916; that there was an agreement 
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entered into with W. R. Hinman, assistant superintendent of the post 
office department at Washington, having charge of buildings and 
leases, to locate the post office at East Lansing in relator's leased 
building; that this agreement was not executed and delivered by the 
post office department because of the intervention of the respondent, 
through its secretary, which resulted in a contract between the re-
spondent and the post office department of the United States, where-
by the respondent agreed to furnish quarters and equipment for the 
said post office, to be located upon the college grounds, for an annual 
rental of $600. 
Relator contends: 
"The law creating the State agricultural college and the State 
board of agriculture contains no provision by which it can be in-
ferred that the State board of agriculture is clothed with power to 
engage in the business of building for and furnishing quarters to the 
United States for a post office any more than to a private individual 
for his private business, nor does such right arise by implication from 
any of the powers granted said board." 
We are of the opinion that this case is ruled by Sterling v. Re-
gents of University, 110 Mich. 369 (68 N. W. 253, 34 L. R. A. 150). 
In the Constitution of 1909 two new sections, 7 and 8, relative to the 
State board of agriculture, were added to article 11, the effect of 
which was to make the State board of agriculture a constitutional 
board elected by the people instead of a statutory board appointed 
by the governor, as it had existed since 1861, and to define the prin-
cipal powers and duties of the board in the Constitution itself. It is 
apparent from the debates in the constitutional convention, as well 
as from the language of sections 7 and 8, that it was the intention to 
place the State board of agriculture and the agricultural college upon 
the same footing as the board of regents and the university. Among 
other expressions of the delegates to the convention, we quote the 
following: 
"Mr. Gore: Mr. President, the last section of this proposal 
which was defeated yesterday, I have been informed, was defeated 
under some misapprehension. I know that I was laboring under an 
apprehension that there was very little, if any, demand for that por-
tion of the proposal as contained in the last paragraph. I am advised 
that the friends of the agricultural college all over this State are very 
much interested in that portion of the proposal becoming a part of 
the revised Constitution. It is obvious that the requirements of the 
agricultural college are on a par with the university so far as its 
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management is concerned. There is no doubt that the friends of that 
college, the particular friends I now refer to, all over the State, will 
take such an interest in its welfare that it can properly be intrusted 
to a board of regents in the same manner as the university is now 
conducted. I therefore trust that this proposal will meet with the 
favorable judgment of the convention." 
''Mr. W. E. Brown: The words 'members of the board' were 
stricken out of the tentative draft on page 53, line 82, and the words 
'State board of agriculture' were substituted in their place. And in the 
same line the words 'may be' were stricken out and the words 'often 
as' were substituted in their place, so that the section follows the 
wording of the section with reference to the regents. In line 86 of 
the tentative draft, the word 'State,' and in line 87, the words 'of 
agriculture' were stricken out, and at the end of the section these 
words were added, 'and shall perform such other duties as may be 
prescribed by law.' We ascertained after the section was passed that 
there were other duties besides these that the law prescribes to be 
performed by the board of agriculture, and we took it that it was 
your intention that the entire duties as prescribed by law should 
apply to this board until such time as its duties might be changed." 
The addition to the last clause of section 8 of the words, "and 
shall perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law,'' makes 
it clear that the duties to be prescribed by the legislature are other 
than "the general supervision of the college and the direction and 
control of all agricultural college funds," as to which, as we held in 
Sterling v. Regents of University, supra, the State board of agricul-
ture has exclusive supervision and control. We do not intend to hold 
that an act of the board might not be so subversive of the purposes 
for which the board was created as to warrant the intervention of the 
courts, but we do not think this record presents such a case, nor do 
we intend to hold that the legislature may not make appropriations 
for specific objects or attach conditions which would be binding 
upon the State board of agriculture in case they accepted the appro-
priations; but we do hold that as to the general funds appropriated 
for the general purposes of the agricultural college, the board has the 
exclusive control and direction, to the same extent that we held 
such power was possessed by the board of regents in the Sterling 
Case above referred to. 
The writ is denied, but without costs. 
OSTRANDER, C. J., and McALVAY, J., concurred with 
BLAIR,J. 
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MOORE, J. I concur in the result, but do not regard manda-
mus as the proper remedy. 
HOOKER, BROOKE, and STONE, JJ., concurred with 
MOORE,J. 
BIRD, J. I concur in the result on the sole ground that manda-
mus is not the proper remedy. 
Agler v. Michigan Agricultural College 
181 Mich. 559, 559-63; 148 N. W. 341 (1914) 
The applicant, who is a tinner and roofer by trade, was in-
jured, on April 18, 1913, by falling from a ladder while making re-
pairs on the buildings of the respondent. A claim was presented 
against the respondent under the workmen's compensation law of 
1912, and the case is brought here by certiorari to the industrial ac-
cident board to review an order affirming the award made to the ap-
plicant by an arbitration committee, in accordance with the provi-
sions of the act. Neither the Michigan Agricultural College nor the 
State board of agriculture, which has general supervision of the col-
lege and direction and control of all its funds, elected to come under 
the provisions of the workmen's compensation act. No mention is 
made in the act of either of the constitutional boards; the board of 
regents of the University and the State board of agriculture, and the 
question here is, Does the act bring arbitrarily under its provisions 
the State board of agriculture, which is a board created by the Con-
stitution (sections 7 and 8, art. 11, Const.)? This involves a consider-
ation of the following sections of the act: 
"PART 1. 
"SEC. 5. The following shall constitute employers subject to 
the provisions of this act: 
"1. The State and each county, city, township, incorporated 
village and school district therein; 
"2. Every person, firm and private corporation, including any 
public service corporation, who has any person in service under any 
contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, and who, at or 
prior to the time of the accident to the employee for which compen-
sation under this act may be claimed, shall in the manner provided in 
the next section, have elected to become subject to the provisions of 
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this act, and who shall not, prior to such accident, have effected a 
withdrawal of such election, in the manner provided in the next 
section. * * * 
"SEC. 7. The term 'employee' as used in this act shall be con-
strued to mean: 
"1. Every person in the service of the State, or of any county, 
city, township, incorporated village or school district therein, under 
any appointment, or contract of hire, express or implied, oral or 
written, except any official of the State, or of any county, city, 
township, incorporated village or school district therein: Provided, 
that one employed by a contractor who has contracted with a 
county, city, township, incorporated village, school district or the 
State, through its representatives, shall not be considered an em-
ployee of the State, county, city, township, incorporated village or 
school district which made the contract; 
"2. Every person in the service of another under any contract 
of hire, express or implied, oral or written, including aliens, and also 
including minors who are legally permitted to work under the laws 
of the State who, for the purposes of this act, shall be considered the 
same and have the same power to contract as adult employees, but 
not including any person whose employment is but casual or is not 
in the usual course of the trade, business, profession or occupation 
of his employer." 
In the stipulation filed in this case the following appears: 
"It is agreed that the draft of the workmen's compensation act 
as prepared by the commission and as presented to the legislature 
contained a period after the word 'contract' at the end of the frrst 
subdivision of paragraph 7 of part 1." 
KUHN, J. (after stating the facts). By virtue of the Constitu-
tion of 1909, the State board of agriculture was put on the same 
plane with the board of regents of the University of Michigan. It has 
been established beyond question by decisions of this court that 
neither the legislature nor any officer or board of this State may in-
terfere with the control and management of the affairs and property 
of the University, although in making appropriations for its support 
the legislature may attach any conditions it may deem expedient 
and wise, and the appropriation cannot be received without comply-
ing with the conditions. People, ex rel Drake, v. Regents, 4 Mich. 98; 
Weinberg v. Regents, 97 Mich. 246 (56 N. W. 605); Sterling v. Re-
gents, 110 Mich. 369 (68 N. W. 253; 34 L. R. A. 150); Bauer v. 
State Board of Agriculture, 164Mich.415 (129N. W. 713);Board of 
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Regents v. Auditor General, 167 Mich. 444 (132 N. W. 1037). 
Section 5, part 1, of the workmen's compensation law (2 How. 
Stat. [2d Ed.] § 3939), expressly enumerates the State and counties, 
cities and villages, townships and school districts. Neither of the con-
stitutional boards is mentioned. In the case of Weinberg v. Regents, 
supra, there was under consideration an act of the legislature which 
provided: 
"That when public buildings, or other public works or im-
provements are to be built, repaired or ornamented under contract, 
at the expense of this State, or of any county, city, village, township, 
or school district thereof, it shall be the duty of the board of officers 
or agents contracting on behalf of the State, county, city, village, 
township, or school district, to require sufficient security by bond, 
for the payment by the contractor, and all subcontractors, for all la-
bor performed, or materials furnished in the erection, repairing or 
ornamenting of such building, works or improvements." Act No. 45, 
Pub. Acts 1885. 
Mr. Justice GRANT, in writing the majority opinion said, 97 
Mich., at pages 253, 254 (56 N. W. 607): 
"The regents make no contracts on behalf of the State, but 
solely on behalf of and for the benefit of the Universify. All the 
other public corporations mentioned in the Constitution, which have 
occasion to erect public buildings or to make public improvements, 
are expressly included in this statute. 'Expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius. ' It expressly enumerates the State, counties, cities, villages, 
townships, and school districts. If the University were under the con-
trol and management of the legislature, it would undoubtedly come 
within this statute, as do the Agricultural College, Normal School, 
State Public School, asylums, prisons, reform schools, houses of cor-
rection, etc. But the general supervision of the University is, by the 
Constitution, vested in the regents. * * * 
"The University is the property of the people of the State, and 
in this sense is State property so as to be exempt from taxation. 
Auditor General v. Regents, 83 Mich. 467 [47 N. W. 440, 10 L. R. A. 
376]. But the people, who are the corporators of this institution of 
learning, have, by their Constitution, conferred the entire control 
and management of its affairs and property upon the corporation 
designated as 'the Regents of the University of Michigan,' and have 
thereby excluded all departments of the State government from any 
interference therewith. The fact that it is State property does not 
bring the regents within the purview of the statute. The people may, 
by their Constitution, place any of its institutions or property be-
yond the control of the legislature." 
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The contract of employment in the instant case was made with 
the State board of agriculture, not on behalf of the State, but pri-
marily for the benefit of the Agricultural College. For the reasons 
stated by Mr. Justice GRANT in the Weinberg Case, we must con-
clude that it cannot be said that the State board of agriculture or the 
regents of the University are brought under the workmen's compen-
sation act by virtue of said section 5 of part 1 of the act, and it can-
not be said that the applicant was an emp10yee of the State within 
the meaning of said law. The conclusion must therefore follow that 
the respondent was not within the list of employers who come under 
the provisions of the law of 1912 automatically; and, inasmuch as 
the respondent has made no election to come thereunder, the appli-
cant is not entitled to recover in this proceeding. 
Because of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to discuss the 
other interesting and well-argued questions raised in briefs of coun-
sel. The decision of the industrial accident board is reversed, and the 
claim of the applicant is disallowed. 
McALVAY, C. J., and BROOKE, STONE, OSTRANDER, 
BIRD, MOORE, and STEERE, JJ., concurred. 
Peters v. Michigan State College 
320 Mich. 243, 244-63; 30 N. W. 2d 854 (1948) 
REID, J. (for affirmance). On Apri123, 1946, plaintiff Robert 
W. Peters ftled an application for hearing and adjustment of claim as 
an employee of Michigan State College, which is under the control 
and general supervision of the State board of agriculture, which board 
is hereinafter referred to as defendant, alleging that he suffered a per-
sonal injury on February 12, 1946, which arose out of and in the 
course of his employment. 
On May 4, 1946, defendant ftled a motion to dismiss plain-
tiff's application for hearing and adjustment of claim on the ground 
that defendant, not having elected to become subject to the Michigan 
workmen's compensation act and amendments thereto, was not sub-
ject to the provisions of said act. A deputy commissioner entered an 
order denying the motion. 
On July 10, 1946, the defendant applied to the compensation 
commission of the department of labor and industry for review of 
claim. The commission on January 9, 1947, pursuant to opinion 
simultaneously ftled, entered its order denying the defendant's 
98 CONSTITUTIONAL CORPORATION 
motion, and remanded the case to a deputy commissioner to be heard 
on its merits. From this order (on leave being granted) defendant ap-
peals. 
The sole issue presented is whether the defendant, a constitu-
tional corporation, is subject to the provisions of the Michigan work-
men's compensation act, as amended. 
Part 1, § 2 of the act, 2 Comp. Laws 1929, § 8408, as amend-
ed by Act No. 245, Pub. Acts 1943 (Comp. Laws Supp. 1945, 
§ 8408, Stat. Ann. 1947 Cum. Supp. § 17.142), in part reads as fol-
lows: 
"SEC. 2. On and after the effective date of this section, every 
employer, public and private, and every employee, unless herein 
otherwise specifically provided, shall be subject to the provisions of 
this act and shall be bound thereby." 
Part 1, § 5, of the act, 2 Comp. Laws 1929, § 8411, as 
amended by Act No. 245, Pub. Acts 1943 (Comp. Laws Supp. 1945, 
§ 8411, Stat. Ann. 194 7 Cum. Supp. § 17 .145), reads as follows: 
"SEC. 5. The following shall constitute employers subject to 
the provisions of this act: 
"Public 1. The State, and each county, city, township, incor-
porated village and school district therein, and each incorporated 
public board or public commission in this State authorized by law to 
hold property and to sue or be sued generally; 
"Private 2. Every person, firm and private corporation, includ-
ing any public service corporation, who has any person in service 
under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written." 
The defendant is an "incorporated public board" within the 
meaning of section 5 above quoted. 
Sections 7 and 8, art. 11, State Constitution 1908, are as fol-
lows: 
"SEC. 7. There shall be elected on the first Monday in April, 
nineteen hundred nine, a State board of agriculture to consist of six 
members, two of whom shall hold the office for two years, two for 
four years and two for six years. At every regular biennial spring 
election thereafter, there shall be elected two members whose term 
of office shall be six years. The members thus elected and their suc-
cessors in office shall be a body corporate to be known as 'The State 
Board of Agriculture.' 
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''SEC. 8. The State board of agriculture shall, as often as neces-
sary, elect a president of the agricultural college, who shall be ex-
officio a member of the board with the privilege of speaking but not 
of voting. He shall preside at the meetings of the board and be the 
principal executive officer of the college. The board shall have the 
general supervision of the college, and the direction and control of 
all agricultural college funds; and shall perform such other duties as 
may be prescribed by law." 
We note that in section 7, above cited, the defendant is desig-
nated a body corporate, hence our conclusion that defendant is an 
incorporated public board. 
The sole remaining question is whether it is competent for the 
legislature to prescribe that the defendant shall be subject to the 
workmen's compensation act. 
Defendant claims that the provision in section 8, above cited, 
that the board (defendant) shall have the general supervision of the 
college and the direction and control of all agricultural college funds, 
prevents the legislature from requiring the board to expend any of 
the agricultural college funds for workmen's compensation. 
Defendant cites Robinson v. Washtenaw Circuit Judge, 228 
Mich. 225, which involved malpractice suits brought against the re-
gents of the University of Michigan and a surgeon employed in the 
university hospital. The suits had been dismissed in circuit court and 
plaintiffs in those suits brought mandamus to compel the circuit 
judge to set aside his orders of dismissal. The board of regents (de-
fendant in the original suits) had claimed immunity on the ground 
that the university hospital operated by the regents is a charitable in-
stitution. The opinion in the case says, page 227, that that ground is 
the only objection regarded as calling for serious consideration. How-
ever, at the conclusion of the opinion on page 230 we say, "On the 
case stated in plaintiffs' declarations we think denial of liability as to 
the regents could safely be rested on either ground," referring to the 
words, "State instrumentalities, as well as charities," in the immedi-
ately preceding excerpt quoted in that opinion. In other words, we 
held that the board of regents was immune both on the ground of 
being a State instrumentality and on the ground of their hospital 
being a charitable or eleemosynary institution. 
Immunity of defendant in the case at bar as a State governmen-
tal agency is not provided for in our State Constitution and the legis-
lature by force of the words, "incorporated public board" has in-
cluded defendant as an employer subject to the workmen's compen-
sation act, thus to that extent depriving defendant of its immunity as 
an instrumentality of government. See Benson v. State Hospital Com-
100 CONSTITUTIONAL CORPORATION 
The Robinson Case, supra, does not in any wise discuss the 
meaning and effect of the constitutional clause giving defendant con-
trol of the funds of the college and the decision in that case does not 
aid the defendant in the case at bar. 
Under the workmen's compensation act as originally enacted 
by Act Nb. 10, Pub. Acts 1912 (1st Ex. Sess.), the private employer 
was at liberty to accept or not to accept the provisions of the act, 
but the State and political subdivisions thereof in general (with cer-
tain exceptions) were included as subject to the act without their 
consent. 
In part 1, § 5, of the act, as amended by Act No. 50, Pub. 
Acts 1913, effective August 14, 1913 (2 Comp. Laws 1929, § 8411 
[Stat. Ann. § 17.145]), under the heading, "Public. 1.," incor-
porated public boards are made subject to the provisions of the act. 
Such incorporated public boards were not subject to nor mentioned 
in the act as originally enacted (Act No. 10, Pub. Acts 1912 [1st Ex. 
Sess.] ), above referred to. In the case of Agler v. Michigan Agricul-
tural- College, 181 Mich. 559 (5 N. C. C. A. 897), the employee was 
injured April18, 1913, which was before the act of 1913, supra, was 
effective; hence in the Agler Case we say, page 563, that "the re-
spondent was not within the list of employers who come under the 
provisions of the law of 1912 automatically." Defendant was not 
within such list at the time Agler received his injuries. The words just 
quoted must be construed to apply to the situation at the time of 
the occurrence of the supposed liability. The question before the 
Court in the case at bar was not decided in the Agler Case. 
The case of State Board of Agriculture v. Auditor General, 226 
Mich. 417, was brought in consequence of an effort on the part of 
the State administrative board to control the expenditures of the 
plaintiff State board of agriculture (the same board which is defend-
ant in the case at bar) under an act of the legislature granting the 
State administrative board such powers. If the administrative board 
had been upheld in its contention, it would have exercised control 
over the educational activities of the college. In that case we held 
that the State administrative board could exercise no control over the 
funds of the college, such control being given to plaintiff board under 
the provisions of the Constitution 1908, art. 11, § § 7, 8 (hereinbe-
fore cited in this opinion). However, the provision of the Constitu-
tion giving the State board of agriculture sole control of the funds of 
the college does not generally exempt the said board from the great 
body of general laws of this State. It is to be noted that section 8 of 
article 11 of the State Constitution above quoted closes with the 
words, referring to the State board of agriculture, "shall perform 
such other duties as may be prescribed by law." 
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We have heretofore had occasion to pass upon the constitu-
tionality of the workmen's compensation act as to some one or other 
of its various provisions in several cases, among which are the follow-
ing: Mackin v. Detroit-Timkin Axle Co., 187 Mich. 8; Wood v. City 
of Detroit, 188 Mich. 547 (L. R. A. 1916 C, 388); Grand Rapids 
Lumber Co. v. Blair, 190 Mich. 518; Wall v. Studebaker Corporation, 
219 Mich. 434; American Life Insurance Co. v. Balmer, 238 Mich. 
580. In none of these cases has the act been found unconstitutional 
as to any phase of the act brought under consideration therein. 
We have heretofore decided in the Mackin Case, supra, that the 
title of the act in question fairly expressed its purpose. 
The purpose of the workmen's compensation act partakes of 
the nature of the exercise of police power. It is aimed at promoting 
the welfare of the people of the State. See Wallace v. Regents of Uni-
versity of California, 75 Cal. App. 274 (242 Pac. 892); Casey v. Han-
sen, 238 Iowa, 62 (26 N. W. [2d] 50). 
"The sovereign power of the State includes protection of the 
safety, health, morals, prosperity, comfort, convenience and welfare 
of the public, or any substantial part of the public." (Italics sup-
plied.) Cady v. City of Detroit, 289 Mich. 499, 504, 505. 
The defendant corporation is not vested by the State Consti-
tution with any power of a police nature. Neither is the defendant 
corporation vested with any power to regulate the general welfare of 
the people of this State. It is for the legislature to exercise such 
powers. 
As amended in 1920, article 5, § 29, of the State Constitution 
provides as follows: 
"SEC. 29. The legislature shall have power to enact laws rela-
tive to the hours and conditions under which men, women and chil-
dren may be employed." 
Before the amendment of 1920 (which added the word "men" 
in the above section), we had decided in Wood v. City of Detroit, 
188 Mich. 547 (L. R. A. 1916C, 388), that the workmen's compen-
sation act was not violative of the State Constitution even as respects 
liability for death of an employee of a municipality through its public 
lighting commission, notwithstanding rights of local self -government 
given by the Constitution to municipalities. In that case we said, 
page 560, 
"Whether it [the workmen's compensation act] is or is not 
denominated a police regulation, municipal corporations are, for the 
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purpose of carrying out such a measure, subject to legislative con-
trol." 
We find that the workmen's compensation act is a valid con-
stitutional exercise of the power of the legislature even when it makes 
necessary the expenditure of agricultural college funds in the com-
pensation of employees under the terms and within the provisions of 
the workmen's compensation act. 
The act is approved as a piece of legislation aimed not at the 
defendant alone, nor against any of the activities of the defendant of 
a nature peculiar to defendant. The act is of a broad scope addressed 
to the subject of the liability of employers in broad fields of em-
ployment. The workmen's compensation act does not undertake to 
change or disturb the educational activities of the defendant board. 
The control of State college funds must be considered as given 
to defendant for the purposes of the particular and peculiar educa-
tional activities of the State college, not for the purpose of disturb-
ing the general relationship in this State of employer and employee, 
nor evading laws enacted to promote the general welfare of the peo-
ple of this State. Article 11, § 8, above cited, is not to be construed 
as withholding from the legislature the authority to make the de-
fendant board liable and subject to the entire workmen's compensa-
tion act in question. 
The order of the department remanding the claim for hearing 
on its merits is affirmed. No costs are allowed, a matter of public im-
portance being involved. 
BUTZEL, J. (concurring). I concur on the ground that the 
workmen's compensation act is a valid exercise of the police power. 
BUSHNELL, C. J., and SHARPE, J., concurred with BUTZEL, J. 
DETHMERS, J. (for reversal). My attitude toward the opinion 
of Mr. Justice REID is well expressed in the language employed by 
the majority of this Court in commenting on the dissenting opinion 
of Mr. Justice WIEST in State Board of Agriculture v. Auditor Gen-
eral, 226 Mich. 417, in which Mr. Justice McDONALD, speaking for 
the majority of the Court, said: 
"I am in entire disagreement with the conclusions reached by 
Mr. Justice WIEST in reference to the powers and duties of the State 
board of agriculture. If his opinion is to prevail we will have com-
pletely overturned the well settled policy of the State relative to the 
management and control of the university and of the agricultural 
college. These institutions of learning are very close to the hearts of 
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the people of Michigan. They have made of them the most unique 
organizations known to the law, in this, that they are constitutional 
corporations created for the purpose of independently discharging 
State functions. The people are themselves the incorporators; the 
boards that control them are responsible only to the people who 
elect them; they are independent of every other department of State 
government." 
To the statement contained in Mr. Justice REID's opinion that 
plaintiff suffered a personal injury which arose out of and in the 
course of his employment by defendant should be added the further 
fact that it is not disputed that such employment and the ,duties 
which plaintiff was performing at the time of his injury were within 
the scope and in furtherance of college operations. May the legisla-
ture, as relates to such employment, prescribe that the defendant 
shall be subject to the provisions of the workmen's compensation 
act? I think not. 
As stated in my Brother's opinion, the Michigan Constitution 
of 1908, art. 11, § 8, provides that the board "shall have the general 
supervision of the college, and the direction and control of all agri-
cultural college funds." Plaintiffs work, at the time he became in-
jured, was being performed squarely within the field over which the 
defendant board is given supervision. Furthermore, to require pay-
ment of compensation in such case directly affects the defendant's 
constitutionally-conferred power of direction and control over all 
agricultural college funds. The constitutional grant to defendant 
board of supervision, direction and control in these respects, must be 
deemed absolute to the exclusion therefrom of interference by the 
legislature. Sterling v. Regents of University of Michigan, 110 Mich. 
369 (34 L. R. A. 150); Weinberg v. Regents of University of Michi-
gan, 97 Mich. 246; Bauer v. State Board of Agriculture, 164 Mich. 
415; State Board of Agriculture v. Auditor General, supra. 
My Brother's opinion cites no decisions of this Court as author-
ity for the proposition that the legislature may exercise control di-
rectly or indirectly over those fields as to which the regents of the 
university or the State board of agriculture are given the powers of 
supervision by the Constitution. This is not because the question has 
not heretofore been considered by this Court. Our decisions on the 
subject are numerous, ranging from shortly after the grant of powers 
to the board of regents by the Constitution of 1850 until recent 
times. Through them all runs a uniform thread of authority to the ef-
fect that the fields over which the Constitution delegates supervisory 
powers to the regents or board of agriculture are not to be invaded 
by the legislature. A review of these cases is essential here. 
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In People, ex rel. Drake, v. Regents of the University, 4 Mich. 
98, this Court denied an application for mandamus to compel the 
regents to comply with a statute enacted by the legislature requiring 
appointment by the regents of a professor of homeopathy. In re-
sponse to the claim that the statute was unconstitutional because it 
constituted an invasion of the regents' constitutional powers, this 
Court said: 
"We are compelled to recognize in this question what might 
well suggest doubts of the binding force of the law." 
In People v. Regents of the University, 18 Mich. 469, like ap-
plication for mandamus was made as in the case reported in 4 Mich. 
98 and the application was not granted because a majority of the 
Court could not be convinced that "the legislature had power under 
the Constitution to exercise any such control over the regents, who 
are vested with the 'general supervision of the university, and the di-
rection and control of all expenditures of the university interest 
fund'" (syllabus). 
In People, ex rel Attorney General, v. Regents of the Univer-
sity, 30 Mich. 473, like application received like treatment because 
the Court, as stated in its opinion, had not changed its previous 
views (clearly a reference to the last above cited case). 
In Weinberg v. Regents of the University of Michigan, 97 
Mich. 246, plaintiff brought suit against the regents to recover the 
value of materials furnished to a subcontractor in building the uni-
versity hospital. Action was predicated upon a statute requiring pub-
lic boards, officers or agents making contracts for the construction of 
public buildings to require security by bond for payment by the con-
tractor and all subcontractors of all labor and material claims. The 
regents, in contracting for the building of the hospital, had required 
no such security by bond. A judgment for plaintiff in the court be-
low was reversed, a majority of this Court holding that the statute in 
question did not control the regents. The majority opinion, in so 
holding, alluded to the fact that this Court had refused to compel 
the regents to comply with certain legislative acts in the three last 
above cited cases. 
In Sterling v. Regents of University of Michigan, 110 Mich. 369 
(34 L. R. A. 150), mandamus was sought to compel the regents to 
comply with an act of the legislature providing for removal of the 
homeopathic medical college from Ann Arbor to Detroit. The writ 
was denied on the authority of the Weinberg Case for the expressed 
reason that "the legislature has no control over the university or the 
board of regents." The opinion in this case contains an extended 
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analysis of the entire general question before us, including the his-
tory of the constitutional grant of powers to the regents, the reasons 
therefor, construction of the constitutional language employed for 
that purpose, and a review of the decisions thereon. 
In Bauer v. State Board of Agriculture, 164 Mich. 415, wherein 
the power of the defendant board to expend funds of the college for 
the purpose of constructing a building for lease to the United States 
government for post office purposes was challenged, this Court, in 
upholding such power, held that the defendant board had exclusive 
control and direction of the general funds of the college appropriated 
for the general purposes of the college. 
In Board of Regents of the University of Michigan v. Auditor 
General, 167 Mich. 444, we granted a writ of mandamus to compel 
the auditor general to issue a warrant upon the State treasurer for 
certain university expenditures after the auditor general had refused 
to issue it because the university had expended moneys in violation 
of the accounting laws of this State. The writ was granted on the 
ground "that the board of regents has independent control of the af-
fairs of the university." 
In Agler v. Michigan Agricultural College, 181 Mich. 559 (5 
N. C. C. A. 897), discussed at greater length later in this opinion, we 
held that the defendant was not subject to the workmen's compen-
sation act for the reasons stated in Weinberg v. Regents of University 
of Michigan, supra. 
In People for use of Regents of the University of Michigan v. 
Brooks, 224 Mich. 45, involving condemnation proceedings for the 
use and benefit of the regents, we said: 
"The 'board of regents' is a separate entity, independent of the 
State as to the management and control of the University." 
State Board of Agriculture v. Auditor General, (syllabus 2) 
supra, reads as follows: 
"The condition attached by Act No. 308, Pub. Acts 1923, that 
the money thereby appropriated to the State board of agriculture for 
the purpose of carrying on agricultural extension work in co-opera-
tion with the United States department of agriculture should be sub-
ject to the general supervisory control of the State administrative 
board, held, beyond the power of the legislature to impose, being in 
conflict with the Constitution (Art. 11, § 8) giving to the State 
board of agriculture exclusive control of all of its funds." 
This concludes a summary review of all the Michigan decisions 
on the subject, disclosing the uniform position taken by this Court 
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over a period of almost 70 years, in unmistakably clear opposition to 
the views now expressed by Mr. Justice REID. 
In Agler v. Michigan Agricultural College, supra, we said: 
"By virtue of the Constitution of 1909 (1908), the State 
board of agriculture was put on the same plane with the board of re-
gents of the university of Michigan. It has been established beyond 
question by decisions of this Court that neither the legislature nor 
any officer or board of this State may interfere with the control and 
management of the affairs and property of the university." 
From this quotation it is clear that all which this Court has 
heretofore said concerning the independence of the board of regents 
of the university applies with equal force and effect to the State 
board of agriculture under its present constitutional powers. 
I am not in accord with my Brother's analysis of the Agler 
Case. In that case, we said, in part, as follows: 
"For the reasons stated by Mr. Justice GRANT in the Weinberg 
Case, we must conclude that it cannot be said that the State board 
of agriculture or the regents of the university are brought under the 
workmen's compensation act." 
The reasons stated by Mr. Justice GRANT in the Weinberg 
Case, and quoted in the Agler Case, are as follows: 
" 'If the university were under the control and management of 
the legislature, it would undoubtedly come within this statute, as do 
the agricultural college, normal school, State public school, asylums, 
prisons, reform schools, houses of correction, et cetera. But the gen-
eral supervision of the university is, by the Constitution, vested in 
the regents. * * * 
" 'The university is the property of the people of the State, and 
in this sense is State property so as to be exempt from taxation. 
Auditor General v. Regents of the University of Michigan, 83 Mich. 
467 (10 L. R. A. 376). But the people, who are the corporators of 
this institution of learning, have, by their Constitution, conferred 
the entire control and management of its affairs and property upon 
the corporation designated as "the Regents of the University of Mich-
igan," and have thereby excluded all departments of the State govern-
ment from any interference therewith. The fact that it is State prop-
erty does not bring the regents within the purview of the statute. The 
people may, by their Constitution, place any of its institutions or 
property beyond the control of the legislature.' " 
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Tiris language from the Weinberg Case I deem controlling here. 
In that case we also said "under the Constitution, the State cannot 
control the action of the regents." 
In Sterling v. Regents of University of Michigan, supra, in com-
menting on the Weinberg Case, we said: 
"We might with propriety rest our decision upon that case, and 
should be disposed to do so were it not for the urgent contention of 
the counsel on the part of the relator that that case does not apply. 
We are therefore constrained to state some further reasons to show 
that the legislature has no control over the university or the board of 
regents. 
"(1) The board of regents and the legislature derive their pow-
er from the same supreme authority, namely, the Constitution. In so 
far as the powers of each are defmed by that instrument, limitations 
are imposed, and a direct power conferred upon one necessarily ex-
cludes its existence in the other, in the absence of language showing 
the contrary intent. Neither the university nor the board of regents 
is mentioned in article 4, which defmes the powers and duties of the 
legislature; nor in the article relating to the university and the board 
of regents is there any language which can be construed into con-
ferring upon or reserving any control over that institution in the 
legislature. They are separate and distinct constitutional bodies, with 
the powers of the regents defmed. By no rule of construction can it 
be held that either can encroach upon or exercise the powers con-
ferred upon the other." 
In Board of Regents of the University v. Auditor General, 
supra, we said: 
"By the provisions of the Constitution of 1850, repeated in 
the new Constitution of 1909 (1908), the board of regents is made 
the highest form of juristic person known to the law, a constitutional 
corporation of independent authority, which, within the scope of its 
functions, is co-ordinate with and equal to that of the legislature. By 
the old Constitution it is given 'direction and control of all expendi-
tures from the university interest fund' (section 8, art. 13); a11d by 
the new Constitution 'general supervision of the university, and the 
direction and control of all expenditures from the university funds.' 
Section 5, art. 11. That the board of regents has independent control 
of the affairs of the university by authority of these constitutional 
provisions is well settled by former decisions of this Court." 
In State Board of Agriculture v. Auditor General, supra, 423, 
we also said: 
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"The State board of agriculture stands on the same constitu-
tional footing as the board of regents of the university. The progress 
which our university has made is due in large measure to the fact that 
the framers of the Constitution of 1850 wisely provided against legis-
lative interference by placing its exclusive management in the hands 
of a constitutional board elected by the people. The underlying idea 
was that the best results would be attained by centering the responsi-
bility in one body independent of the legislature and answerable 
only to the people. See Sterling v. Regents of University of Michigan, 
110 Mich. 369, 382 (34 L. R. A. 150). For this reason the Constitu-
tion gave the regents the absolute management of the university, and 
the exclusive control of all funds received for its use. This Court has 
so declared in numerous decisions. People, ex rei. Drake, v. Regents 
of the University, 4 Mich. 98; Weinberg v. Regents of the University 
of Michigan, 97 Mich. 246, 254; Sterling v. Regents of University of 
Michigan, supra; Board of Regents of the University v. Auditor Gen-
eral, 167 Mich. 444." 
Mr. Justice REID writes that the State Constitution does not 
provide for the "immunity of defendant * * * as a State governmen-
tal agency" and that the legislature by including defendant within 
the terms of the workmen's compensation act has deprived it of such 
immunity, citing Benson v. State Hospital Commission, 316 Mich. 
66. The Benson Case is not in point inasmuch as it involved an action 
brought against the State under the court of claims act, Act No. 135, 
Pub. Acts 1939 (Comp. Laws Supp. 1940, § 13862-1 et seq., Stat. 
Ann. 1940 Cum. Supp. § 27.3 548 [1] et seq.), and the construction 
of section 24 of that act as amended by Act No. 237, Pub. Acts 
1943 (Comp. Laws Supp. 1943, § 13862-24, Stat. Ann. 1944 Cum. 
Supp. § 27.3548[24] ), which waived the defense of governmental 
immunity in certain cases brought before the court of claims. That 
act never had application to claims for compensation brought before 
the compensation commission of the department of labor and indus-
try. See Rogers v. Kent Board of County Road Commissioners, 319 
Mich. 661, 668, decided on rehearing January 5, 1948. Furthermore, 
said section 24 of the act as thus amended in 1943 was expressly re-
pealed by Act No. 87, § 2, Pub. Acts 1945 (Stat. Ann. 1947 Cum. 
Supp. § 27.3548 [42] ), and was no longer in effect when the cause 
of action in the instant case, if any, arose. The matter of governmen-
tal immunity is irrelevant here, the question before us being whether 
the legislature may, constitutionally, apply the workmen's compensa-
tion act to employees of the State board of agriculture. 
Mr. Justice REID bases his conclusion that it is competent 
for the legislature to impose the provisions of the workmen's 
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compensation act upon the defendant on the theory that it consti-
tutes an exercise of the police power vested solely in the legislature. 
The people, through the State Constitution, may vest the powers of 
State government or limit them where and as they will, consistent 
with the guarantee contained in article 4, § 4, of the Constitution of 
the United States. As said in Clements v. McCabe, 210 Mich. 207: 
"It is beyond question that, when the people of this State 
adopted their Constitution, police power was placed in the legisla-
ture, except as distinctly reserved or conferred elsewhere." 
In the field of "general supervision of the college and the direc-
tion and control of all agricultural college funds," the people have 
"distinctly reserved or conferred elsewhere" than in the legislature 
the power to supervise, direct or control, and by the Constitution it-
self have barred legislative intrusion. 
Wood v. City of Detroit, 188 Mich. 547 (L. R A. 1916C, 388), 
relied upon by Mr. Justice REID, is distinguishable. There the de-
fendant city claimed that its constitutionally conferred powers of 
local self-government were invaded by the legislature's attempt to ap-
ply the workmen's compensation act to certain of the city's employ-
ees. The Court, referring to article 8, § 21, of the State Constitution 
authorizing cities and villages to adopt and amend charters and pass 
laws and ordinances "subject to the Constitution and general laws of 
this State," said: 
"The Constitution of 1909 [1908] has pointed out the extent 
of the local powers and capacities of cities and villages * * * thus re-
stricting the power of the legislature to grant or to deny to particular 
communities the enumerated capacities and powers, at will, but it 
has not * * * denied the power of the legislature to enact general 
laws applicable to cities." 
The situation in the instant case is different because the pow-
ers conferred upon the defendant board of agriculture by the Con-
stitution are not expressly declared to be subject to the general laws 
of this State. We do not overlook the concluding words in articl0 11, 
§ 8, that the defendant board "shall perform such other duties as 
may be prescribed by law." These words do not give the legislature 
the power to invade the field granted exclusively to the board of 
agriculture by the Constitution. As was said in Bauer v. Board of 
Agriculture, 164 Mich. 415: 
''The addition to the last clause of section 8 of the words, 'and 
shall perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law,' makes 
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it clear that the duties to be prescribed by the legislature are other 
than 'the general supervision of the college and the direction and 
control of all agricultural college funds,' as to which as we held in 
Sterling v. Regents of University of Michigan, supra, the State board 
of agriculture has exclusive supervision and control." 
Plaintiff is apprehensive as to certain suggested consequences 
were we to hold the defendant "immune from all legislation." Simi-
larly, Mr. Justice REID writes, "However, the provision ofthe Con-
stitution giving the State board of agriculture sole control of the 
funds of the college does not generally exempt the said board from 
the great body of general laws of this State." To ascribe such immuni-
ty to defendant or to hold it thus exempt is not necessary to deci-
sion for defendant on the facts before us. Suffice it to say that with-
in the confmes of the field of "general supervision of the college, 
and the direction and control of all agricultural college funds" it is 
the clear intent of the people, as expressed in the Constitution, that 
the defendant shall exercise exclusive authority therein without legis-
lative intrusion. 
I can only conclude that the employment of persons for the 
prosecution of college business, functions or operations is within de-
fendant's exclusive supervision; that the payment of compensation, 
from college funds, in the event of personal injury arising out of and 
in the course of such employment involves an act of direction and 
control of agricultural college funds which, again, is within the exclu-
sive power of the defendant board; that for these reasons it is not 
competent for the legislature to impose the workmen's compensa-
tion act on the defendant with respect to the type of employment 
here involved. 
The order of the department denying defendant's motion to 
dismiss and setting the case for hearing on its merits should be set 
aside and the cause remanded to the department for entry of an or-
der granting defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs application. 
No costs, a public question being involved. 
BOYLES, NORTH, and CARR, JJ., concurred with DETH-
MERS,J. 
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Jackson Broadcasting & Television Corp. v. State Board of Agri-
culture 
360 Mich. 481, 496-98, 499; 104 N. W. 2d 350 (1960) 
DETHMERS, C. J .... 
Plaintiffs bill seeks injunctive relief to prevent defendant from 
entering into a construction contract or expending any public funds 
for the erection of a television broadcasting station. It bases its 
claimed right to such relief on the grounds that defendant, in so 
doing, would be proceeding under and in furtherance of its written 
agreement with Television Corporation of Michigan, Inc., and that 
this would be unlawful in the following 2 respects: (1) that the con-
struction and operation of the television station under that agree-
ment would be a self-liquidating project within the meaning of P A 
1958, No. 224, § 11, under which such construction contract is pro-
hibited because approval thereof by the legislature was not first ob-
tained, and (2) the agreement with Television Corporation of Mich-
igan, Inc., constitutes an attempt on the part of defendant to grant 
the credit of the State to or in aid of that corporation in violation of 
Michigan Constitution of 1908, art 10, § 12. 
The trial court, fmding plaintiffs said 2 claims of illegality, as 
in its bill alleged, not well founded as a matter oflaw, dismissed the 
bill. We think he was correct and that the order dismissing, from 
which plaintiff appeals, should be affirmed. Our reasons follow: 
(1) No facts are alleged in the bill from which a conclusion 
may be drawn or a fmding may be made that the project in question 
is self-liquidating, as in the statute mentioned. That appellation ap-
pears in the bill as plaintiffs legal conclusion, without supporting 
averments. If its conclusion were to be accepted as correct, there are 
no allegations in the bill that moneys appropriated by Act No. 224 
on the supposed condition contained in its section 11 are to be ex-
pended on this project, warranting enjoining thereof. If section 11 of 
that act were to be construed as a general prohibition against the 
board of trustees of Michigan State University, without regard to the 
source of the funds to be used or involved, it would exceed legisla-
tive authroity. Michigan Constitution of 1908, art 11, § 8. * State 
Board of Agriculture v. Auditor General, 180 Mich. 349; State Board 
of Agriculture v. Auditor General, 226 Mich. 417; Weinberg v. Re-
gents of University, 97 Mich. 246. 
(2) Defendant's first sworn answer contained language tending 
to admit plaintiffs second charge of illegality of the agreement. 
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Thereafter defendant filed an amendment sworn answer, to which it 
attached as an exhibit a copy of the agreement referred to and relied 
on in plaintiffs bill of complaint. It shows by its express terms that 
defendant was not, thereunder, to advance credit to the other con-
tracting party but only to permit it use of the television studio and 
facilities on a time-sharing and rental basis. Plaintiff made and makes 
no denial of the correctness of the copy of the agreement attached 
to defendant's amended sworn answer. By the agreement's express 
terms plaintiffs second claim of invalidity collapses. 
Is defendant bound by its apparent admission in its first answer 
or may it stand on its amended sworn answer? That the latter is the 
rule is apparent from Carroll v. Palmer Manfg. Co., 181 Mich. 280, 
285, City of Lebanon v. DeBard, 110 Ind. App. 79, 82 (37 NE2d 
718); Staley v. Espenlaub, 128 Kan. 1, 2 (275 P 1095); Dahl v. 
Winter-Truesdell-Diercks Co., 62 ND 351 (243 NW 812); 71 CJS, 
Pleading, § 321, p 716. 
In the above view of the case plaintiffs bill stated no cause of 
action as a matter of law and was properly dismissed. 
* * * 
An important public project is here involved. It being obvious 
that plaintiff has no legal cause of action, we should not permit tech-
nicalities to stand in the way of our saying so and disposing of the 
case accordingly, without need for further fruitless proceedings. This 
is the more so in view of the well-known fact, not in the record but 
of which we may take judicial notice, that for over a year the enter-
ing into and performance of the contract for the erection of the tele-
vision station and facilities have been a fait accompli with the station 
and facilities fully constructed and in operation by defendant and its 
lessee, Television Corporation of Michigan, Inc., leaving the question 
of enjoining the entering into the contract by defendant and its ex-
pending money for the project moot. 
Affirmed. No costs. 
KELLY, SMITH, EDWARDS, and SOURIS, JJ., concurred 
with DETHMERS, C. J. 
KAVANAGH and BLACK, JJ., dissented. 
CARR, J., did not sit. 
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2.COMMENT 
Several important legal principles may be deduced from 
the cases in Chapters II and III. They may be summarized as fol-
lows: 
1. The Michigan Constitution vests in the Board of Re-
gents, as well as in the governing boards of other state institu-
tions of higher education, the "general supervision of its institu-
tion and the control and direction of all expenditures from the 
institution's funds." (Art. 8 § 5.) The words "general supervi-
sion" must be construed to mean complete authority over all 
the internal affairs of the University. 
2. On the other hand, the University is subject to the gen-
eral laws of the state concerning the public health, safety, mor-
als and welfare. A university campus cannot be an extraterri-
torial state within a state. 
3. Appropriations made by the legislature become the 
"property" of the University when the appropriations act be-
comes effective. Therefore, the legislature cannot subject Uni-
versity appropriations to change or to the control of state 
administrative officers. 
4. The legislature may attach conditions to its appropria-
tions for University support. However, a condition to an appro-
priation will be struck down as unconstitutional if its effect is to 
deprive the Board of Regents of any substantial part of its dis-
cretion over the educational policy or operation of the Univer-
sity. If such a condition is constitutional, the University must 
comply with it in order to be entitled to the appropriated 
money. 
Another important legal principle is set forth in the Michi-
gan Constitution (Art. 8 § 4) although it has not been involved 
in any of the cases in these chapters. To the end that higher edu-
cation may be maintained and encouraged, the constitution 
commands the legislature to provide financial support for the 
University of Michigan and other state institutions. Of course, 
the amount of this support must be consistent with the other 
needs and revenues of the state. Therefore, this provision of the 
constitution probably creates a moral obligation which cannot 
be enforced by a court of law. 
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The existence of these rules has guaranteed the independ-
ence of the Univeristy, and they are in large measure responsible 
for its pre-eminent status. 
3. OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL CONCERNING AUTO.. 
NOMY 
The University has been often protected in the preserva-
tion of its important constitutional powers by opinions of the 
state's chief legal officer, the Attorney General. 1 Of course, 
when the Attorney General makes a ruling adverse to the Uni-
versity, as he did in 1868 by deciding that the University was 
bound to have a homeopathic professor, he must go to court to 
enforce his opinion. As a legal corporation with the right to sue 
and to be sued in its own name, the University can hire its legal 
counsel, and, as the homeopathic cases make so obvious, the 
Attorney General does not always prevail. 
As respects the ordinary non-corporate state agency, how-
ever, the Attorney General has enhanced authority since it is he 
who by virtue of his office represents the agency in court and 
provides all legal advice. Thus, advice to such an agency very 
often takes the place of a court case. Attorneys General, how-
ever, seem to have much more freedom to change their minds 
than the courts do under the doctrine of stare decisis, and it 
seems that old opinions of the Attorneys General are almost 
never cited by the courts as authority, at least not in the cases 
with which this volume is concerned, although they probably 
very often reflect current legal doctrines which are taken too 
seriously to be challenged in court. 
Citations for all opinions here discussed appear at the end 
of these comments. Many opinions simply reiterate the clear 
doctrine of the case law to officials who are not familiar with it. 
For example, in 1922, citing Weinberg, the Attorney General 
ruled that the University was not required to obtain bonds from 
its construction contractors.2 On other occasions, however, the 
Attorney General may venture into controversies completely 
untouched by judicial opinion. In 1955, for example, the At-
torney General ruled as unconstitutional legislation forbidding 
the University of Michigan and Michigan State University from 
AUTONOMY IN THE 20TH CENTURY 115 
operating television stations and from self-liquidating projects 
without legislative consent.3 Seven years later, the television 
issue arose in the Jackson Broadcasting and Television case pre-
viously discussed. 4 
Cataloguing opinions of the Attorney General under the 
general heading of the University's freedom from legislative con-
trol in the conduct of its general operations, we find many rul-
ings. In 1898, the construction of an addition to the Law De-
partment was not governed by a general statute purporting to 
control construction at all state institutions. 5 In 1900, the 
Auditor General had to approve vouchers for the purchase of 
land by the University without regard to whether the funds 
came from the University interest fund or from the mill tax. 6 In 
1912, the Auditor General was informed that the University 
might buy its own fire insurance on its own buildings. 7 In 1924, 
the Board of Regents, with the consent of the State Administra-
tive Board, could obtain low-cost fire insurance within a system 
set up for state property only. 8 In 1927, a statute requiring the 
registration and supervision of laboratories within the state, ap-
plied to University laboratories only if they were in the business 
of selling laboratory products at a profit. 9 A tuberculosis unit 
built with state funds in 1930 as an addition to the University 
Hospital was outside the authority of the State Tuberculosis 
Commission. 10 In 1943, the University was not covered by a 
statute forbidding state institutions from serving oleomargarine. 11 
In 1953, the provisions of the School Building Code were in-
tended by the legislature to apply only to classroom buildings. 12 
In 1954 the question of whether the University was required to 
follow the State or City Plumbing Codes was not answered be-
cause of voluntary compliance by the University. 13 
In one of the most recent, and most significant opinions, 
the Attorney General ruled in 1965 that the 1963 Constitution 
did not permit the legislature to delegate authority over building 
programs at the ten constitutionally autonomous state colleges 
and universities to the State Administrative Board and the State 
Controller. 14 The device of appropriating money to the Control-
ler rather than to the governing boards could not be used to sub-
vert the constitutional status of the educational institutions. 
Another category of opinions concerns legislation which 
affects the governing board's control of its employees. In 1905, 
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before Michigan State College had achieved constitutional status, 
the Auditor General was supported in his refusal to pay for out-
of-state travel by a professor which could only "indirectly" re-
sult in improving performance of employee's duties. 15 However, 
in 1907 an act purporting to control salaries at all state institu-
tions did not apply to the University of Michigan. 16 Similarly, 
in 1932, Veterans Preference Laws did not apply to the then 
two constitutional schools, and neither did the Civil Service Law 
in 1937.17 In 1931, statutory delegation of the control over 
Michigan State's financial affairs could be upset by the govern-
ing State Board. 18 And, in 1955 the statutory delegation to the 
faculty of the control of students, laboratories, museums and 
libraries was overturned by constitutional provisions which, of 
course, placed the general supervision of everything in Michigan 
State in the State Board. 19 
Legislation purporting to affect students has also been dis-
regarded by the Attorney General. In 1901, and again in 1936 
and 1959, he ruled that only the constitutionally established 
governing boards, and not the legislature, could determine the 
tuition. 20 The statute forbidding tuition for Michigan residents 
is C.L. para. 390.13 and is reproduced in this volume on page 
119. Similarly the children of certain veterans who are residents 
are purportedly exempted from tuition by C.L. para. 35.111 
(see page 123 ). In 1911, an attempt by the legislature to set 
the entrance standards for the University of Michigan was re-
jected, 21 as was a statute enacted in 1949 which exempted mem-
bers of the Michigan National Guard from military instruction 
at Michigan State. 22 Complete control over intercollegiate ath-
letics was affirmed in opinions directed at legislators who, pro-
voked by the NCAA television blackout of football in 1951, 
were considering corrective legislation. 23 
Other rulings illustrate the wide diversity of issues on which 
the Attorney General has ruled. In 1919, and again in 19 58, con-
stitutional status was found to exempt academic publications 
from control by the State Board of Auditors and the statutory 
requirement of in-state printing. 24 In 193 9, the Attorney Gen-
eral ruled that the legislature had no authority to waive the 
sovereign immunity of the then Michigan State College and the 
University of Michigan. Compare this result with the Branum 
case in Chapter VII, page 239. The State Administrative Board 
therefore, could not be authorized to dispose of minor claims 
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against the universities. 25 In 1938 a legislator was advised that 
money could be appropriated to Michigan State on the condi-
tion that it be used solely to build and equip 4-H buildings at 
Chatham, Michigan.26 On the other hand, a 1962 opinion ad-
vised the legislature of the unconstitutionality of conditioning 
the whole appropriation for Michigan State University on the 
retention of a labor relations center.27 
4. STATE STATUTES RELATING TO UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
This section contains the basic statutes which purport to 
govern the University of Michigan. Although some of these sta-
tutes are relatively recent, many of them are very old. Because 
of the constitutional posture of the University, some of these 
statutes are of doubtful validity. Several of these statutes have 
even been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court or 
by the Attorney General, but they remain on the statute books 
unrepealed-for example, the provisions of statutes requiring the 
appointment of a homeopathic professor, and prohibiting tui-
tion charges for certain categories of students ( § § 390.5, 390.41, 
and 390.12, 390.13, 35.111). 
Other statutes, although perhaps not technically invalid 
have become completely obsolete-such as the elaborate provi-
sions for the use of interest on the University fund. This fund 
was at one time the principal support of the University, but to-
day it is insignificant. Moreover, the 1963 Constitution elimi-
nated all reference to the interest fund contained in Section 11 
Article XI of the 1908 Constitution. No payments of interest are 
now made to the University. 
P.A. 1851, No. 151 Eff. July 5 as amended by P.A. 1957, 
No. 87, § 1 Eff. Sept. 27. 
AN ACT to provide for the government of the state univer-
sity, and to repeal chapter 57 of the Revised Statutes of 1846. 
The People of the State of Michigan enact: 
390.1 University of Michigan 
Sec. 1. That the institution established in this state and known 
as the university of Michigan, is continued under the name and style 
heretofore used. 
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390.2 Same; object 
Sec. 2. The university shall provide the inhabitants of this state 
with the means of acquiring a thorough knowledge of the various 
branches of literature, science and arts. 
390.3 Same; government 
Sec. 3. The government of the University is vested in the board 
of regents. 
390.4 Board of regents; body corporate, suits, seal 
Sec. 4. The board of regents shall constitute the body corpor-
ate, with the right, as such, of suing and being sued, of making and 
using a common seal, and altering the same. 
390.5 Same; powers; professor of homeopathy 
Sec. 5. The regents shall have power to enact ordinances, by-
laws and regulations for the government of the university; to elect a 
president, to fix, increase and reduce the regular number of profes-
sors and tutors, and to appoint the same, and to determine the 
amount of their salaries: Provided, That there shall always be at least 
1 professor of homeopathy in the department of medicine. 
390.6 Same; removal power 
Sec. 6. They shall have power to remove the president, and any 
professor or tutor, when the interest of the university shall require it. 
390.7 Same; appointive power 
Sec. 7. They shall have power to appoint a secretary, librarian, 
treasurer, steward, and such other officers as the interests of the in-
stitution may require, who shall hold their offices at the pleasure of 
the board, and receive such compensation as the board may pre-
scribe. 
390.8 Departments of university 
Sec. 8. The university shall consist of at least 3 departments: 
1. A department of literature, science and the arts; 
2. A department of law; 
3. A department of medicine; 
4. Such other departments may be added as the regents shall 
deem necessary, and the state of the university fund shall allow. 
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390.9 Special courses 
Sec. 9. The regents shall provide for the arrangement and selec-
tion of a course or courses of study in the university, for such stu-
dents as may not desire to pursue the usual collegiate course, in the 
department of literature, science and the arts, embracing the ancient 
languages, and to provide for the admission of such students without 
previous examination, as to their attainments in said languages, and 
for granting such certificates at the expiration of such course or term 
of such students, as may be appropriate to their respective attain-
ments. 
390.10 Repealed. P.A. 1957, No. 87, § 1, Eff. Sept. 20 
390.11 Authority of regents, president and facnlty; degrees 
Sec. 11. The immediate government of the several departments 
shall be entrusted to the president and the respective faculties; but 
the regents shall have power to regulate the course of instruction, 
and prescribe, under the advice of the professorships, the books and 
authorities to be used in the several departments; and also to confer 
such degrees and grant such diplomas as are usually conferred and 
granted by other similar institutions. 
390.12 Fees and tuition; literary department; free courses 
Sec. 12. The fee of admission to the regular university course 
in the department of literature, science and the arts, shall not exceed 
10 dollars, but such course or courses of instruction as may be ar-
ranged under the provisions of section 9 of this act/ shall be open 
without fee to the citizens of this state. 
1 Section 390.9. 
390.13 Same; residents of state 
Sec. 13. The university shall be open to all persons resident of 
this state, without charge of tuition, under the regulations prescribed 
by the regents, and to all other persons, under such regulations and 
restrictions as the board may prescribe. 
390.14 Same; payment to treasurer; expenditure 
Sec. 14. The moneys received from such source shall be paid 
to the treasurer, and so much thereof as shall be necessary for the 
purpose, shall be expended by the regents in keeping the university 
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buildings in good condition and repair, and the balance shall be ap-
propriated for the increase of the library. 
390.15 Annual report of regents to superintendent of public in-
struction 
Sec. 15. The board of regents shall make an exhibit of the af-
fairs of the university, in each year, to the superintendent of public 
instruction, setting forth the condition of the university and its 
branches, the amount of receipts and expenditures, the number of 
professors, tutors, and other officers, and the compensation of each; 
the number of students in the several departments, and in the differ-
ent classes; the books of instruction used; an estimate of the ex-
penses for the ensuing year, together with such other information 
and suggestions as they may deem important, or the superintendent 
of public instruction may require, to embody in his report. 
390.16 Interest on university fund; use for erection of buildings 
Sec. 16. From the increase arising from the interest of the uni-
versity fund, the board of regents may erect, from time to time, such 
buildings as are necessary for the uses of the university, on the 
grounds set apart for the same; but no such buildings shall be erected 
until provisions shall be made for the payment of the existing indebt-
edness of the university, nor until1 branch of the university shall be 
established in each judicial circuit of the state. 
390.17 Same; use for improvement of grounds and purchase of ap-
paratus 
Sec. 17. The board of regents shall have power to expend so 
much of the interest arising from the university fund, as may be nec-
essary for the improving and ornamenting the university grounds, for 
the purchase of philosophical, chemical, meteorological, and other 
apparatus, and to keep the same in good condition. 
390.18 Branches of university; support 
Sec. 18. As soon as the income of the university interest fund 
will admit, it shall be the duty of the board of regents to organize 
and establish branches of the university, 1 at least, in each judicial 
circuit or district of the state, and to establish all needful rules and 
regulations for the government of the same. They shall not give to 
any such branch the right of conferring degrees, nor appropriate a 
sum exceeding 1,500 dollars, in any 1 year, for the support of any 
such branch. 
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390.19 Same; establishment 
Sec. 19. The regents may establish and organize a branch or 
branches, by the creation of a trusteeship for the local management 
of the same, or they may in their discretion select for a branch, un-
der the restrictions aforesaid, any chartered literary institution in the 
state. 
390.20 Meeting of regents; quorum 
Sec. 20. The meetings of the board may be called in such man-
ner as the regents shall prescribe; 5 of them shall constitute a quorum 
for the transaction of business, and a less number may adjourn from 
time to time. 
390.21 Repealed. P.A. 1957, No. 87, § 1, Eff. Sept. 27. 
390.22 Expenses of regents and board of visitors 
Sec. 22. The regents and visitors of the university shall each re-
ceive pay for the actual and necessary expenses incurred by them in 
the performance of their duties, which shall be paid out of the uni-
versity interest fund. 
390.23 Orders on treasurer; signatures 
Sec. 23. All orders on the treasurer shall be signed by the secre-
tary, and countersigned by the president. 
P.A. 1965, No. 245, Imd. Eff. July 21 
AN ACT to establish an institute of gerontology; to pre-
scribe its functions; and to make an appropriation for its op-
eration. 
The People of the State of Michigan enact: 
390.31 Institute of gerontology; authority to establish, purposes 
Sec. 1. There may be established by the university of Michigan 
and Wayne state university jointly, an institute of gerontology for 
the purpose of developing new and improved programs for helping 
older people in this state, for the training of persons skilled in work-
ing with the problems of the aged, for research related to the needs 
of our aging population, and for conducting community service pro-
grams in the field of aging. 
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390.32 Same; duties 
Sec. 2. The institute shall: 
( 1) In the field of training, 
(a) Stimulate and contribute to training in gerontology in the 
various schools and departments of the universities. 
(b) Offer specialized interdisciplinary training in gerontology at 
the graduate and postgraduate levels for those entering or already 
working in the field. 
(2) In the fields of research and publications, 
(a) Encourage, foster and conduct research in all important 
areas of gerontology. 
(b) Provide research support for university instructional staff 
and other investigators in gerontology. 
(3) In the field of community service, organize and promote 
programs of community education and services in the field of aging, 
and shall conduct courses and educational activities designed to serve 
those working with our older citizens. 
390.33 Same; establishment and government by boards 
Sec. 3. The institute shall be established by, and governed in 
accordance with the rules and regulations of the board of governors 
of Wayne state university and the board of regents of the university 
of Michigan. 
P.A. 1875, No. 128, Eff. Aug. 3 
AN ACT for the establishment of a homeopathic medical 
department of the university of Michigan. 
The People of the State of Michigan enact: 
390.41 Homeopathic medical department, authority of regents to 
establish 
Sec. 1. The board of regents of the university of Michigan are 
hereby authorized to establish a homeopathic medical college as a 
branch or department of said university, which shall be located at the 
city of Ann Arbor. 
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P.A. 1895, No. 36, Eff. Aug. 30 
AN ACT to enable the regents of the university to take and 
hold in perpetual trust land or other property. 
The People of the State of Michigan enact: 
390.51 Board of regents; holding property in trust 
Sec. 1. That it shall be competent for the regents of the uni-
versity to take, by gift, devise or bequest, and hold in perpetuity any 
land or other property in trust for any purpose not inconsistent with 
the objects and purposes of the university. 
P.A. 1935, No. 245, Eff. Sept. 21 as amended by P.A. 1963, 
No. 128, § 1 lmd. Eff. May 10 and P.A. 1965, 
No. 371, § 1, Eff. March31, 1966. 
AN ACT to provide educational opportunities for the chil-
dren of certain soldiers, sailors, marines and nurses. As amend-
ed P.A. 1937, No. 84, Imd. Eff. June 15; P.A. 1943, No. 38, 
Eff. July 30. 
The People of the State of Michigan enact: 
35.111 Children of deceased or disabled serviceman; educational aid 
Sec. 1. Any person not under 16 and not over 22 years of age 
who has been a resident of the state of Michigan for 12 months, who 
is a child of a member of the armed forces of the United States who 
was killed in action or died from other cause during any war or war 
condition in which the United States has been, is, or may hereafter 
be a participant, or who as a result of wartime service has since died 
or is totally disabled, shall be admitted to and may attend any state 
tax supported educational or training institution of a secondary or 
college grade. Such persons admitted to tax supported institutions 
shall not be required to pay any matriculation fee, athletic fee, tui-
tion or any other fee which takes the place of tuition charges during 
the time in which he is a student at said state institution. 
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FOOTNOTES 
Section 1 - Cases Interpreting the Constitution of Separation 
of University & State 
1. This term as used in this chapter shall include all educational institutions re-
ferred to in the 1963 Constitution authorized to grant baccalaureate degrees. 
2. The legislation relating to the University of Michigan has been included at the 
end of this chapter. 
3. Buehler and Draper, Chapter X. 
4. This issue is now before the Circuit Court for the County of Ingham. TheRe-
gents of the University of Michigan et aL v. The State of Michigan et al., Civil 
Case No. 7659-C. 
5. The Washtenaw County Circuit Court has ruled that the statute embraces the 
University. The Regents of the University of Michigan v. The Labor Mediation 
Board, Civil Action 1952. The decision has been appealed. 
Section 3 - Opinions of the Attorney General Concerning Autonomy 
1. The office of the Attorney General states that it has bound volumes containing 
opinions of the Attorney General from 1837 to date. Each volume is indexed, 
and there is a cumulative index in four volumes for all opinions rendered after 
July 1, 1913. 
2. 1920-22 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 289. 
3. 1955-56 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 262. 
4. Supra p. 111. 
5. 1898 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 88. 
6. 1901 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 75. 
7. 1912 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 212. 
8. 1925-26 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 13. 
9. 1927-28 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 467. 
10. 1930-32 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 25. 
11. 1943-44 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 364. 
12. 1952-54 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 440. 
13. Unpublished opinion, dated December 31, 1954. 
14. Opinion dated January 8, 1965. 
15. 1905 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 85. 
16. 1908 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 95. 
17. 1930-32 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 475; 1937-38 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 129. 
18. 1930-32 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 243. 
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19. 1955-56 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 721, vol. I. 
20. 1901 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 87. 1937-38 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 29; unpublished 
opinion, No. M-541, dated June 3, 1959. 
21. 1911 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 215. 
22. 1949-50 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 405. 
23. 1951-52 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 115; 1951-52 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 255; 1951-
52 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 433. 
24. 1920 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 106; 1957-58 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 26, vol. II. 
25. Unpublished opinion No. 11937, dated August 23, 1939. 
26. 1937-38 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 422. 
27. 1961-62 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 594. 
Part Two 
The University as a Part of State 
Government 
CHAPTER IV 
THE BOARD OF REGENTS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Each governing board of the three major state universities 
in Michigan is composed of eight elected members. The presi-
dent of each institution is ex officio, a member of the board 
without the right to vote. The members are popularly elected 
for overlapping terms of eight years. The statutes which pre-
scribe nomination of candidates by political party, and also such 
matters as qualifications for office, and the procedure for re-
moval from office, impeachment, resignation and recall, are re-
produced at the end of this chapter. 
Although the Attorney General has been called upon from 
time to time to pass on questions under the statutes, the only 
case which was litigated in the Supreme Court on these issues 
was Attorney General ex rei. Cook v. Burhans in which the 
court decided that the man who had received the most votes 
was disqualified from serving as a Regent because at the time of 
the election, he was a state senator. Legislators are not qualified 
to hold any other state office during their term as legislators. 
The majority of the court decided that the disqualification of an 
acting Regent created a vacancy to be filled by gubernatorial ap-
pointment. A vigorous dissent argued that if Burhans was not 
qualified, Cook who received the next largest number of votes 
had been legally elected a Regent; hence, there should be no 
vacancy to be filled. 
2. JUDICIAL DECISION 
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Attorney General ex rei. Cook v. Burhans 
304 Mich. 108, 109-20; 7 N.W. 2d 370 (1942) 
WIEST, J. The attorney general, ex rel. Franklin M. Cook, by 
information in the nature of quo warranto, seeks ouster of defendant 
from the office of regent of the University of Michigan on the 
ground that he has no legal right to the office and is a mere usurper 
therein and also asks the court to adjudicate that Franklin M. ·Cook 
is the regent. Defendant by answer asserts right to hold the office by 
valid election thereto. At the biennial State election in April, 1941, 
two regents of the University of Michigan were to be elected and de-
fendant was a candidate. At that time he was a member of the State 
senate and is still such officer. The board of State canvassers found 
that defendant received 410,767votes, Alfred B. Connable, 409,672, 
Franklin M. Cook, relator herein, 408,438, and some lesser votes for 
other candidates, and certified the election of defendant and Con-
nable to the secretary of State. Defendant filed his oath of office as 
regent and has since acted as such. 
Defendant is not a regent of the University of Michigan, for 
every vote cast for him at such election was void under article 5, 
§ 7, of the Michigan Constitution, which reads: 
"No person elected a member of the legislature shall receive 
any civil appointment within this State or to the senate of the United 
States from the governor, except notaries public, or from the gover-
nor and senate, from the legislature, or any other State authority, 
during the term for which he is elected. All such appointments and 
all votes given for any person so elected for any such office or ap-
pointment shall be void." 
This provision applies to elections and its mandate must be 
obeyed. Fyfe v. Kent County Clerk, 149 Mich. 349. 
Defendant having usurped the office of regent, in defiance of 
the mandate of the Constitution barring him under any circumstances 
from holding such office and rendering all votes cast for him void, it 
was proper for the attorney general to bring this proceeding in the 
nature of quo warranto to oust him from such office. The provision 
in the Constitution not only rendered defendant ineligible to the of-
fice but to prevent his intrusion therein rendered every vote cast for 
him void. Defendant received no votes capable of being recognized 
bylaw. 
Defendant contends that regents of the university are not State 
officers but only officers of the corporate body known as the board 
of regents of the university. 
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The university is a State institution, with obligation on the 
legislature to maintain it. The regents are State officers and, as the 
board of regents, constitute the body corporate known as the "Re-
gents of the University of Michigan"* and have the general supervi-
sion of the University and the direction and control of all expendi-
tures from the university funds. Const. 1908, art. 11, § 5. In People, 
for use of Regents of the University of Michigan, v. Brooks, 224 
Mich. 45, we held the board of regents is a department of the State 
government created by the Constitution to perform State functions. 
Defendant is a usurper in the office of regent and a writ of 
ouster will issue if necessary to remove him therefrom. This ouster 
creates a vacancy in the office of regent. 
The statute, 1 Comp.l.aws 1929, § 3350 (Stat. Ann. § 6.693), 
provides that: 
"Every office shall become vacant, on the happening of either 
of the following events, before the expiration of the term of such 
office: * * * 
"6. The decision of a competent tribunal, declaring void his 
election or appointment." 
The Constitution of 1908, art. 16, § 5, provides: 
"The legislature may provide by law the cases in which any of-
fice shall be deemed vacant and the manner of fllling vacancies, 
where no provision is made in this Constitution." 
The Constitution also provides in art. 11, § 3: 
"When a vacancy shall occur in the office of regent it shall be 
filled by appointment of the governor." 
The ouster of Mr. Burhans creates a vacancy to be filled by the 
governor. No costs. 
BOYLES, NORTH, BUTZEL, BUSHNELL, and SHARPE, JJ., 
concurred with WIEST, J. 
NORTH, J. (concurring.) I concur in the result reached by Mr. 
Justice WIEST; but to avoid a possible misconstruction of our hold-
ing, I think the following should be specifically noted. Defendant 
while holding the office of State senator sought the nomination and 
*See Const. 1908, art. 11, § 4.-REPORTER. 
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election as a regent of the University of Michigan for a term which 
began a year before the expiration of defendant's office as senator. 
Both offices are State offices and are incompatible. Under the con-
stitutional provisions (art. 5, § 7, art. 11, § 3) and the statute (1 
Comp. Laws 1929, § 3350 [Stat. Ann. § 6.693]) cited in my 
Brother's opinion defendant was ineligible to election as regent for a 
term which began prior to the expiration of defendant's term as sena-
tor and our decision herein creates a vacancy in the office of regent. 
See Fyfe v. Kent County Clerk, 149 Mich. 349, and Murtha v. Lind-
say, 187 Mich. 79. 
Under the cited constitutional provision (article 5, § 7) it can-
not be said that since the two offices are incompatible, when de-
fendant assumed the office of regent he vacated the office of sena-
tor. To so hold would be to circumvent the express provisions of the 
Constitution, and in effect to nullify its clear mandate. 
I am not in accord with the opinion written by Mr. Chief Jus-
tice CHANDLER wherein he holds that by our judgment in this case 
Mr. Cook should be installed in the office of regent of the university. 
To so hold would be in plain violation of the specific provision of 
article 11, § 3, of the Constitution and also of article 6, § 10, of the 
Constitution. Section 3, art. 11, contains the following explicit pro-
vision: "When a vacancy shall occur in the office of regent it shall be 
filled by appointment of the governor;" and section 10, art. 6, reads: 
"Whenever a vacancy shall occur in any of the State offices, the 
governor shall fill the same by appointment, by and with the advice 
and consent of the senate, if in session." The office of regent of the 
University of Michigan is a State office; and our decision herein 
creates a vacancy in that office. Regardless of any statutory provision 
which may be considered as in conflict with the two above-quoted 
constitutional provisions, I am unable to understand how it can be 
held that the statute controls instead of the constitutional provisions. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing would seem to be conclusive of 
the question under consideration, it may be pertinent to point out 
that the decisions upon which Mr. Chief Justice CHANDLER relies 
have no application to the instant case. First, it should be noted thai 
the statutory provisions quoted in my Brother's opinion (3 Comp. 
Laws 1929, §§ 15274-15276 [Stat. Ann. §§ 27.2318-27.2320]) 
have been a part of the statutory law of this State since the enact-
ment of the statutes of 1846. See Rev. Stat. 1846, chap. 136, § § 3, 
4, and 5. These provisions are still effective (in the absence of some 
other conflicting statutory or constitutional provision) provided the 
vacancy to be filled is not a State office. But they are not operative 
as to vacancies in State offices because subsequent to the enactment 
of the statute each of the above-quoted constitutional provisions was 
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embodied in the Constitution of 1850* and carried over into the 
Constitution of 1908. No provision will be found in the Constitution 
of 1835 which is comparable to either of the constitutional provi-
sions hereinbefore quoted. 
As noted above none of the cases cited in the opinion of Mr. 
Chief Justice CHANDLER tends to sustain his position because none 
of them ibvolves the filling of a vacancy in a State office. The follow-
ing are the cases upon which my Brother relies: People, ex rel 
Falkenburg, v. Miles, 2 Mich. 348, in which the office involved was 
that of county clerk; People, ex rel Wagenseil, v. Stephenson, 98 
Mich. 218, involved, as appears from the original records in this 
court, the office of city clerk of Port Huron; and Emmons v. Board 
of Supervisors, not reported but cited in the Stephenson Case, in-
volved the office of township supervisor, as also appears from the 
original records in this court. It would seem to go without saying 
that the decision in each of these cases in no way conflicts with the 
constitutional provision that: "Whenever a vacancy shall occur in 
any of the State offices the governor shall fill the same." And it is 
equally plain, in view of the quoted provisions of the Constitution, 
that this court in this proceeding is without power to fill the vacancy 
in the office of regent created by our decision herein. 
Chief Justice CHANDLER says: "We should not apply a por-
tion of one statute, which has remained on the books for almost 100 
years, and then utterly disregard its remaining provisions and apply 
those of another statute, even though of equal age and respect." I am 
in full accord with this statement, except where, as in my Brother's 
opinion, an attempt is made to apply a statutory provision in a man-
ner which is plainly violative of constitutional provisions. 
The conclusion reached by Mr. Justice WIEST should be the 
decision of this court herein; and if necessary a writ of ouster should 
issue. No costs allowed. 
BOYLES and BUTZEL, JJ., concurred with NORTH, J. 
CHANDLER, C. J. (dissenting.) We all agree that the votes cast 
for the defendant Burhans for the office of regent of the University 
of Michigan while he was a member of the State Senate are void, but 
we do not agree on the result of such holding. 
Mr. Justice WIEST holds that the ouster of the defendant 
creates a vacancy in the office of regent because of 1 Comp. Laws 
1929, § 3350 (Stat. Ann. § 6.693), and that the vacancy under the 
provision of article 11, § 3, of the Constitution, shall be filled by 
*Article 13, § 6, art. 8, § 3-Reporter. 
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appointment of the governor. Tills same provision is found in article 
13, § 6, of the Constitution of 1850, and the statute upon which Mr. 
Justice WIEST relies has remained unchanged since it was amended 
by Act. No. 172, Pub. Acts 1851. Relator Cook's information is 
based upon the quo warranto statutes, 3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 15271 
et seq. (Stat. Ann. § 27.2315 et seq.). Many decisions of this court 
have been based upon the use of this procedure, among these being 
People, ex rel. Falkenburg, v. Miles, 2 Mich. 348, decided in 1852, 
and People, ex reL Wagenseil, v. Stephenson, 98 Mich. 218, decided 
in 1893. In the Falkenburg Case Mr. Justice DOUGLASS said: 
"In a State like ours, where public officers are nearly all elec-
tive, and where public opinion must usually be an effective check 
upon all usurpations of office without some pretences of right, 
founded upon the suffrages of the people, it is obvious that the ques-
tion most frequently to be tried on informations like the present, 
will be whether the defendant received a majority of the votes cast 
at an election. If he did not, some one else must have received it. In 
such cases, and in others of like character, it is apparent that the right 
of some other person is necessarily involved in the issue between the 
people and the defendant, and being so involved, the statute permits 
the Court, when justice so requires, to adjudicate upon it. The aver-
ment in question seems designed merely to furnish some foundation 
in the record for this judgment. 
"It is not traversable by the defendant, for it is no concern of 
his who is entitled to the office if he is not. Of course it is not ad-
mitted by his omission to traverse it. There is no need that it should 
be special, because no issue can be formed upon it. The defendant is 
required to set forth the facts which constitute his own title specifi-
cally by plea. An issue of law or fact must generally be formed by the 
replication to this plea. This is the issue to be determined. If it is de-
termined against the defendant, and if it is a necessary inference 
from this judgment and the facts upon which it is based, that the per-
son alleged to be entitled to the office the defendant has usurped, in 
law and in fact is so, the Courts are authorized, from considerations 
of public policy quite apparent, to affirm his right by a direct adjudi-
cation." 
In the Wagenseil Case Mr. Justice MONTGOMERY said: 
"Upon a judgment of amotion from office, the party amoved 
is divested of all official authority; and excluded from office, so long 
as the judgment remains in force. High, Extraordinary Remedies, 
§ 756. And, when judgment is rendered in favor of a relator, he 
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needs no writ to invest him with the office. Under How. Stat. § 8639, 
he is entitled to take upon himself the execution of the office. Can 
this right be defeated or suspended by suing out a writ of error and 
giving a bond to stay execution? The statute (sections 8679, 8681) 
provides for a stay of execution by suing out a writ of error, but 
does not authorize a suspension of a judgment which requires no aid 
from process to give it effect. The practical result of permitting such 
a writ to suspend the judgment in quo warranto cases would in many 
cases be to defeat the relator of his remedy wholly. Such a construc-
tion is not to be indulged, except it be imperatively required by the 
terms, which we thirik is not the case here. This precise question 
was determined by the Court in the October term of 1886, in the un-
reported case of Emmons v. Board of Supervisors. See, also, Welch 
v. Cook, 7 How. Pr. (N.Y.) 282." 
I am unable to see how we can consider an information ftled 
under the quo warranto statutes and then deprive the relator of the 
benefit of those statutes. 
Sections 15274-15276, 3 Comp. Laws 1929 (Stat. Ann. 
§§ 27.2318-27.2320), read as follows: 
"SEC. 4. Whenever any such information shall be filed against 
any person for usurping any office, the attorney general, in addition 
to the other matters required to be set forth in the information, may 
also set forth therein the name of the person rightfully entitled to 
such office, with an averment of his right thereto. 
"SEC. 5. In every such case judgment shall be rendered upon 
the right of the defendant, and also upon the right of the party so 
entitled; or only upon the right of the defendant, as justice shall re-
quire. 
"SEC. 6. If judgment be rendered upon the right of the person 
so averred to be entitled, and the same be in favor of such person, he 
shall be entitled, after taking the oath of office, and executing any 
official bond which may be required by law, to take upon him the 
execution of the office; and it shall be his duty, immediately there-
after, to demand of the defendant in such information, all the books 
and papers in his custody or within his power, belonging to such 
office." 
We are required under these statutes, in the light of the aver-
ment of the information, to render judgment upon the right of de-
fendant, and also upon the right of the relator, or only upon the 
right of the defendant "as justice shall require." It does not seem to 
be justice to deny the relator the right to a judgment if the votes cast 
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for Senator Burhans are void. In the light of section 6 and the facts 
as stated by Mr. Justice WIEST, the relator is entitled, "after taking 
the oath of office, and executing any official bond which may be re-
quired by law," to take upon himself the execution of the office of 
regent. 
Mr. Connable received the highest number of countable votes 
and was duly elected. Relator Cook received the next highest num-
ber of countable votes and was also elected. The vacancy statute was 
obviously intended to cover a situation where no one other than the 
usurper has a claim to the office; and, unless the quo warranto sta-
tutes can be fully applied, I know of no other procedure whereby 
one lawfully elected to an office can gain possession of that office. 
We should not apply a portion of one statute, which has remained on 
the books for almost 100 years, and then utterly disregard its re-
maining provisions and apply those of another statute, even though 
of equal age and respect. Both of these statutes were on the books 
when the Constitution of 1850 was adopted and when Mr. Justice 
DOUGLASS wrote the Falkenbury Opinion in 1852. 
This is not a case of mere ineligibility to an office but one 
where the Constitution provides that all votes cast for one who is a 
member of the legislature were void. In point of law, defendant re-
ceived no votes for the office which may be considered for any pur-
pose. The ouster of defendant does not create a vacancy but only re-
moves a usurper who has kept relator out of office. 
In a democracy there is no higher authority by which a civil of-
ficer can receive an election or appointment than by the exercise of 
the elective franchise by qualified electors. This court said in Fyfe v. 
Kent County Clerk, 149 Mich. 349, cited in the opinion of Mr. Jus-
tice WIEST, that the terms "election" and "appointment" are syn-
onymous. See, also, McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (13 Sup. Ct. 
3, 36 L Ed. 869). 
Connable and relator had the highest number of valid votes 
that could be counted for the office of regents of the University of 
Michigan and were duly elected. To hold otherwise, by declaring 
that a vacancy exists by reason of certain statutory provisions, is a 
clear attempt to circumvent the express provisions of the Constitu-
tion and, in effect, nullify its clear mandate. 
No department of the State government, executive, legislative 
or judicial, has authority to disregard the letter or spirit of the Con-
stitution. 
Article 16, § 5, of the present Constitution, quoted by Mr. 
Justice WIEST, is not applicable to the instant case because article 5, 
§ 7, is controlling. 
It should therefore be determined that relator is entitled to the 
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office of regent of the University of Michigan by virtue of the 1941 
general election, upon compliance with the provisions of 3 Comp. 
Laws 1929, § 15276 (Stat. Ann. § 27.2320). 
A judgment should issue ousting defendant from the office of 
regent and entitling relator to that office upon his compliance with 
the statute. It should be so ordered. 
STARR, J., concurred with CHANDLER, C. J. 
3. OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Questions involving interpretation of election laws are of-
ten directed to the Attorney General. As early as 1894, an At-
torney General ruled that the Regent appointed by the Governor 
should serve the balance of the unexpired term. 1 A statute 
which would have limited the appointment to the period until 
the next election was void because of a conflict with the consti-
tution. The present statute conforms to the Attorney General's 
opinion, 2 but the present wording of the constitution would 
seem to permit the legislature to limit the term of an appointee: 
It reads, "Each appointee shall hold office until a successor has 
been nominated and elected as provided by law."3 
In 1907, a Federal District Judge sitting in Grand Rapids, 
was assured that he was qualified to serve as Judge and Regent 
at the same time, although he should disqualify himself from 
judging any case in his court to which the University was a 
party.4 
The Superintendent of Public Instruction, as ex officio Re-
gent, [changed under the 1963 Constitution] was assured of his 
rights to use the title of Regent, to speak and to enter discus-
sions at meetings of the board. He could not, however, vote, and 
thus his presence could not be counted in determining whether 
a quorum was present. 5 
In 1943, the Attorney General was called upon to deter-
mine the time at which a Governor's appointment took effect. 
He ruled that the appointment was complete when a document 
was signed by the Governor, even though the document had 
never been delivered to the Secretary of State. 6 
Miscellaneous rulings by the Attorney General's office have 
determined the funds from which the expenses of the Regents 
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should be paid, 7 approved the practice of holding closed meet-
ings of the governing boards8 (but, see Article 8, § 4 of the 
1963 Constitution), and have forbidden the delegation of the 
preparation of vouchers, in 1925, for the State Auditor. 9 
Recently the Attorney General's rulings involving conflicts 
of interest have had drastic effect. The Attorney General's office 
issued opinions in this area as early as 1907 when it held a con-
tract between the then Michigan State College and adjoining 
property owners to be void largely because the college secretary 
who signed the contract on behalf of the college had property 
interests in some of the affected lands. 10 In 1958, a Regent of 
the University of Michigan who was associated with University 
Microfilms Company, a concern which regularly took books 
from the University Library to make copies for other college 
libraries, requested an opinion from the Attorney General as to 
the conflict of interests law. At that time, the Regent was as-
sured of the propriety of his situation because such borrowing 
of library books involved no "contract" in the statutory sense 
of the word. 11 
After the adoption of the present state constitution, the 
Attorney General again made a landmark ruling on this question 
of conflict of interest. He issued a comprehensive opinion, the 
effect of which was to cause a large number of resignations by 
persons holding positions in businesses from their positions as 
officers or board members of universities, and vice versa. Ex-
tracts from this opinion appear at the end of this chapter. 
The Attorney General in 1968 issued rulings concerning 
three officers of Michigan State University and their activities 
which might have been held violative of the conflict of interest 
statute. President Hannah sold land adjoining the campus to a 
private party after acquiring it over the period of his tenure as a 
University official, 12 Vice President May had an interest in cor-
porations which did business with the University, 13 and Trustee 
Harlan had been employed by a corporation which did business 
with the University. 14 
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4. STATE ELECTION LAWS 
P.A. 1954, No. 116, Eff. June 1, 1955 (as amended by 
P.A. 1963, 2nd Ex. Sess., No.5, § 1) 
AN ACT to reorganize, consolidate and add to the election 
laws; to provide for election officials and prescribe their powers 
and duties; to provide for the nomination and election of candi-
dates for public office; to provide for the resignation, removal 
and recall of certain public officers; to provide for the filling of 
vacancies in public office; to provide for and regulate primaries 
and elections; to provide for the purity of elections; to guard 
against the abuse of the elective franchise; to define violations 
of this act; to prescribe the penalties therefore; and to repeal 
certain acts and all other acts inconsistent herewith. 
The People of the State of Michigan enact: 
* * * 
168.281 State board of education, board of regents, board of trus-
tees, board of governors; eligibility 
Sec. 281. No person shall be eligible to membership on the 
state board of education, the board of regents of the University of 
Michigan, the board of trustees of Michigan State University, or the 
board of governors of Wayne State University who is not a registered 
and qualified elector of this state. 
168.282 Board of regents, board of trustees, board of governors; 
nomination, time 
Sec. 282. At its fall state convention each political party may 
nominate 2 candidates for membership on the board of regents of 
the University of Michigan, 2 candidates for membership on the 
board of trustees of Michigan State University and 2 candidates for 
membership on the board of governors of Wayne State University. 
Nomination to membership on the board of regents of the University 
of Michigan shall occur in 1966 and every second year thereafter. 
Nomination to the board of trustees of Michigan State University and 
to the board of governors of Wayne State University shall occur in 
1964 and every second year thereafter. 
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168.282a State board of education; nomination, time 
Sec. 282a. At its fall state convention of 1964, each political 
party may nominate 8 candidates for membership on the state board 
of education. Two candidates shall be nominated for 2-year terms, 2 
for 4-year terms, 2 for 6-year terms and 2 for 8-year terms. At its fall 
state convention of 1966, and every 2 years thereafter, each political 
party may nominate 2 candidates for membership on the state board 
of education. 
168.283 State board of education, board of regents, board of trus-
tees, board of governors; certification of nominees; 
vignette 
Sec. 283. Not more than 24 hours after the conclusion of the 
fall state convention, the state central committee of each political 
party shall convene and canvass the proceedings of said convention 
and determine the nominees of said convention for membership on 
the state board of education, the board of regents of the University 
of Michigan, the board of trustees of Michigan State University, and 
the board of governors of Wayne State University. The chairman and 
secretary of said committee shall, within 24 hours after the conclu-
sion of the state convention, forward by registered or certified mail 
to the secretary of state and to the board of election commissioners 
of each county, in care of the county clerk at the county seat, a copy 
of the vignette adopted by said state central committee and the 
typewritten or printed names, together with residence, including the 
street address if known, of the candidates nominated at said conven-
tion for said offices. 
168.284 Same; withdrawal of nominee 
Sec. 284. Any person who has been certified by the state cen-
tral committee of any party as nominated for membership on the 
state board of education, the board of regents of the University of 
Michigan, the board of trustees of Michigan State University, or the 
board of governors of Wayne State University may withdraw by fil-
ing a written notice of withdrawal with the secretary of state or his 
duly authorized agent and a copy with the chairman and the secre-
tary of the state central committee of said party not later than 4 p.m. 
eastern standard time, of the thirty-third day preceding the election. 
168.285 Same; vacancy of nomination 
Sec. 285. Whenever a candidate of a political party, after hav-
ing been nominated to membership on the state board of education, 
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the board of regents of the University of Michigan, the board of 
trustees of Michigan State University, or the board of governors of 
Wayne State University, shall die, withdraw, remove from the state, 
or become disqualified for any reason, the state central committee of 
said party shall meet forthwith and, by a majority vote of the mem-
bers thereof, shall select a candidate to fill the vacancy thereby 
caused. The name of the candidate so selected shall be immediately 
certified by the chairman and the secretary of said committee to the 
secretary of state and to the board of election commissioners for each 
county, whose duty it is to prepare the official ballots, and said 
board shall cause to be printed or placed upon said ballots, in the 
proper place, the name of the candidate so selected to fill the va-
cancy. 
168.286 Board of regents, board of trustees, board of governors; 
election, time 
Sec. 286. Two members of the board of regents of the Univer-
sity of Michigan shall be elected at the general election in 1966 and 
in every general election thereafter. Two members of the board of 
trustees of Michigan State University and 2 members of the board of 
governors of Wayne State University shall be elected at the general 
election in 1964 and in every general election thereafter. 
Constitution 
Art. 2, § 5, provides: 
"Except for special elections to fill vacancies, or as otherwise 
provided in this constitution, all elections for national, state, county 
and township offices shall be held on the first Tuesday after the first 
Monday in November in each even-numbered year or on such other 
date as members of the congress of the United States are regularly 
elected." 
168.286a State board of education, election, time, terms 
Sec. 286a. Eight members of the state board of education shall 
be elected at the general election in 1964. Two members shall be 
elected for 2-year terms, 2 for 4-year terms, 2 for 6-year terms, and 
2 for 8-year terms. Two members of the state board of education 
shall be elected for 8-year terms at the general election in 1966 and 
in every general election thereafter. 
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168.287 State board of education, board of regents, board of trus-
tees, board of governors; certificate of determination by 
board of state canvassers. 
Sec. 287. The board of state canvassers shall determine which 
candidates for membership on the state board of education, the 
board of regents of the University of Michigan, the board of trustees 
of Michigan State University and the board of governors of Wayne 
State University have received the greatest number of votes and shall 
declare such candidates to be duly elected. The said board shall forth-
with make and subscribe on its statement of returns a certificate of 
such determination and deliver the same to the secretary of state. 
168.288 Same; certificate of election 
Sec. 288. The secretary of state shall me in his office and pre-
serve the original statement and determination of the board of state 
canvassers of the result of the election and shall forthwith execute 
and cause to be delivered to the persons thereby declared to be 
elected to membership on the state board of education, the board of 
regents of the University of Michigan, the board of trustees of Michi-
gan State University and the board of governors of Wayne State Uni-
versity a certificate of election, certified by him under the great seal 
of the state. 
168.289 Same; terms of office 
Sec. 289. Subject to section 286a, 1 the term of office of mem-
bers of the state board of education,, the board of regents of the Uni-
versity of Michigan, the board of trustees of Michigan State Universi-
ty, and the board of governors of Wayne State University shall be 8 
years and shall begin at 12 noon on January 1 next following their 
election. The terms of office of members of said boards shall con-
tinue until a successor is elected and qualified. 
1 Section 168.286a. 
168.290 Same; oath, deposit 
Sec. 290. Every person elected to membership on the state 
board of education, the board of regents of the University of Michi-
gan, the board of trustees of Michigan State University, or the board 
of governors of Wayne State University, before entering upon the 
duties of his office, shall take and subscribe to the oath as provided 
in section 1 of article 11 of the state constitution, and shall deposit 
said oath with the secretary of state. 
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Constitution 
Art. 11, § 1, provides: 
1
'All officers, legislative, executive and judicial, before entering 
upon the duties of their respective offices, shall take and subscribe 
the following oath or affirmation: I do solemnly swear (or affirm) 
that I will support the Constitution of the United States and the con-
stitution of this state, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties 
of the office of . . . according to the best of my ability. No other 
oath, affirmation, or any religious test shall be required as a qualifica-
tion for any office or public trust." 
168.291 Same; resignation, notice 
Sec. 291. Any person duly elected to membership on the state 
board of education, the board of regents of the University of Michi-
gan, the board of trustees of Michigan State University or the board 
of governors of Wayne State University, who desires to resign shall 
file a written notice containing the effective date of such resignation 
with the governor and a copy with the secretary of state. 
168.292 Same; vacancy, creation, notice 
Sec. 292. There shall be a vacancy on the state board of educa-
tion, the board of regents of the University of Michigan, the board of 
trustees of Michigan State University, or the board of governors of 
Wayne State University upon the happening of any of the following 
events: Death of the incumbent; his resignation; his removal from of-
fice for cause; his ceasing to be a resident of the state; his conviction 
of an infamous crime, or an offense involving the violation of his 
oath of office; the decision of a competent tribunal declaring his 
election or appointment void; or his neglect or refusal to take and 
subscribe to the constitutional oath of office and deposit the same in 
the manner and within the time prescribed by law. When a vacancy 
shall occur on any of the said boards, a notice of such vacancy and 
the reason why the same exists, shall, within 10 days after such va-
cancy occurs, be given in writing to the governor. Such notice shall 
be given by the secretary of state. 
168.293 Same; impeachment, removal from office; notice of charges 
Sec. 293. Any member of said boards may be removed from 
office upon conviction in impeachment proceedings for the reasons 
and in the manner set forth in section 7 of article 11 of the state 
constitution. The governor shall have the power and it shall be his 
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duty, except at such time as the legislature may be in session, to ex-
amine into the condition and administration of said boards and the 
acts of the members enumerated herein and to remove from office 
for gross neglect of duty or for corrupt conduct in office, or any 
other misfeasance or malfeasance therein, and report the causes of 
such removal to the legislature at its next session. Such person shall 
be served with a written notice of the charges against him and be af-
forded an opportunity for a public hearing conducted personally by 
the governor. 
Constitution 
Art. 5, § 10, provides: 
The governor shall have the power and it shall be his duty to 
inquire into the condition and administration of any public office 
and the acts of any public officer, elective or appointive. He may re-
move or suspend from office for gross neglect of duty or for corrupt 
conduct in office, or for any other misfeasance or malfeasance there-
in, any elective or appointive state officer, except legislative or judi-
cial, and shall report the reasons for such removal or suspension to 
the legislature. 
Art. 11, § 7, provides: 
"The house of representatives shall have the sole power of im-
peaching civil officers for corrupt conduct in office or for crimes or 
misdemeanors, but a majority of the members elected thereto and 
serving therein shall be necessary to direct an impeachment." 
168.294 Same; appointment to fill vacancy 
Sec. 294. Whenever a vacancy shall occur on the state board of 
education, the board of regents of the University of Michigan, the 
board of trustees of Michigan State University, or the board of gov-
ernors of Wayne State University, the governor shall appoint a succes-
sor to fill such vacancy, and the person so appointed shall take the 
oath of office and shall hold office for the remainder of the unex-
pired term and until his successor is elected and qualified. A candi-
date receiving the highest number of votes for membership on any of 
said boards and who has subscribed to the constitutional oath shall 
be deemed to be elected and qualified even though a vacancy oc-
curs prior to the time he shall have entered upon the duties of his 
office. 
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168.295 Same; recount 
Sec. 295. The votes cast for any candidate for membership on 
the state board of education, the board of regents of the University 
of Michigan, the board of trustees of Michigan State University and 
the board of governors of Wayne State University at any election 
shall be subject to recount as provided in chapter 33 of this act. 
168.296 Same; recall 
Sec. 296. Any person elected to membership on the state board 
of education, the board of regents of the University of Michigan, the 
board of trustees of Michigan State University, or the board of gov-
ernors of Wayne State University shall be subject to recall as pro-
vided in chapter 36 of this act. 
Constitution 
Art. 2, § 8, provides: 
"Laws shall be enacted to provide for the recall of all elective 
officers except judges of courts of record upon petition of electors 
equal in number to 25 percent of the number of persons voting in 
the last preceding election for the office of governor in the electoral 
district of the officer sought to be recalled. The sufficiency of any 
statement of reasons or grounds procedurally required shall be a po-
litical rather than a judicial question." 
5. EXCERPTS FROM OPINION OF ATTORNEY GENERAL (NO. 4587) 
dated Sept. 1967, relating to conflict of interest 
Representative Faxon submitted to me several questions, 
phrased in general terms, relative to possible conflicts of interest by 
members of governing boards and officers of state institutions of 
higher education. These questions may be condensed to read as fol-
lows: 
1. Would a member of a governing board or an officer of an in-
stitution of higher education that enjoys constitutional status under 
Article VIII of the Michigan Constitution of 1963 be in violation of 
Article N, Section 10 of the Constitution and/or Act 317, PA 1966 
if such person were to serve simultaneously as an officer or director 
of a bank, or any other enterprise for profit, that does business with 
the educational institution that he is serving? 
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2. If any violation does exist, what legal consequences could 
ensue? 
The Purpose and Meaning of Conflict of Interest 
Article IV. Section 10 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963 
provides: 
"No member of the Legislature nor any state officer shall be 
interested directly or indirectly in any contract with the state or any 
political subdivision thereof which shall cause a substantial conflict 
of interest. The Legislature shall further implement this provision by 
appropriate legislation." 
As a statement of the basis and public policy upon which this 
statement prohibiting conflicts of interest now embedded in our 
Constitution rests, it would be difficult to improve upon the lan-
guage of Justices Manning and Christiancy in The People, ex rel 
Albert Plugger, et al v. The Township Board of Overyssel, 11 Mich. 
222 (1863). Speaking for the court, Justice Manning said: 
" ... All public officers are agents, and their official powers 
are fiduciary. They are trusted with public functions for the good of 
the public; to protect, advance and promote its interests, and not 
their own. And, a greater necessity exists in private life for removing 
from them every inducement to abuse the trust reposed in them, as 
the temptations to which they are sometimes exposed and stronger, 
and the risk of detection and exposure is less .... " (p. 225) 
To which Justice Christiancy added in his concurring opinion: 
"The public were entitled to their best judgment, unbiased by 
their private interests, and by accepting the office they became 
bound to exercise such judgment, and to use their best exertions for 
the public good, regardless of their own. They had no right, while 
they continued in office, to place themselves in a position where 
their own interests would be hostile to those of the public .... And, 
though these contractors may, as members of the board, have acted 
honestly, and solely with reference to the public interest, yet if they 
acted otherwise, they occupy a position which puts it in their power 
to conceal the evidence of the facts, and to defy detection." (pp. 
226, 227) 
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Private Corporation 
Since the constitutional provision establishes the pattern, the 
answer to the first question as rephrased requires only a determina-
tion of whether the facts described, or rather the circumstances de-
ducible from the facts described, fall comfortably within this pat-
tern. If it be determined that members of governing boards and offi-
cers of institutions of higher education enjoying constitutional status 
are "state officers" within the ambit of Article IV, Section 10 of the 
Constitution, supra, then there can be no doubt that their simultane-
ous service as officer or director of a bank, or any other enterprise 
for profit, which enters into contractual relationship with their edu-
cational institution is prohibited by the aforesaid section of the Con-
stitution. 
Service as an officer or director of a private corporation is per 
sea substantial interest in that entity. See Opinion No. 4555 of April 
12, 1967. 
Directors of a corporation must safeguard, care for and pro-
mote the corporation's interest, Wiseman v. United Dairies, Inc., 324 
Mich. 473 (1949), and they must exercise the same degree of fidelity 
and care which an ordinarily careful man would use in his own af-
fairs of like magnitude and importance, Trembert v. Mott, 271 Mich. 
683 (1935). The conclusion that the interest a director has in the 
corporation he is serving must be "substantial" is therefore inescap-
able; any other conclusion would derogate from the degree of dedi-
cation and fidelity that he must devote towards the corporation. 
Insofar as officers of private corporations are concerned, it is 
equally clear that, although such officers generally derive their au-
thority to represent the corporation from the board of directors, the 
corporate functions must be performed by corporate officers or 
agents. And, as in the case of directors, corporate officers have a 
duty to serve their corporation with fidelity. 
While it is conceivable that, in some rare instance, a corporate 
officer may hold a title devoid of any apparent substantial interest 
to himself, the title itself must be deemed to have been conferred for 
the mutual benefit of the corporation and the officer in question. 
Were only a trivial benefit running to the officer to exist, it would be 
advisable for any state officer holding such an empty title to divest 
himself of it if a prohibited contractual relationship is present-such 
a gesture could hardly be viewed as too great a sacrifice for the op-
portunity to engage in public service. This would be necessary since 
any title as officer of a corporation must be presumed to carry with 
it commensurate obligation to serve the interest of that corpora-
tion. 
148 THE UNIVERSITY AND STATE GOVERNMENT 
With the exception of the colleges and universities that are 
newly formed, the decision of a college or university to avail itself of 
a particular public utility service is a matter of history and based up-
on such decision the college or university and the public utility com-
pany have undertaken financial obligations to insure proper service. 
Thus it must be held that any conflict of interest that may result 
from a person serving as a university governing board member or offi-
cer and also as an officer or director of a public utility furnishing 
service to a college or university is unsubstantial as it relates to a 
public utility service rendered to the university. 
Employe of Labor Organization 
Representative Hampton advises me that Don Stevens, a mem-
ber of the Michigan State University Board of Trustees, is employed 
by the Michigan AFL-CIO. Several months ago he voted favorably 
upon a resolution requiring Michigan State University to purchase 
printing services only from unionized printing shops. Subsequently, 
this resolution of the Board of Trustees was modified so as to permit 
non-union shops to provide such services if they certified that they 
are observing union standards. 
Representative Hampton asked my opinion on the following 
question: 
"Whether Don Stevens, a member of the Michigan State Uni-
versity Board of Trustees, is engaged in a similar, or any, conflict of 
interest with MSU." 
Article N, Section 10 of the Michigan Constitution provides 
in pertinent part: 
"No member of the Legislature nor any state officer shall be 
interested directly or indirectly in any contract with the state or any 
political subdivision thereof which shall cause a substantial conflict 
of interest." 
Mr. Don Stevens occupies neither an executive office nor is a 
member of the Executive Board of the Michigan AFL-CIO. Instead 
he is employed as education director of that organization by virtue 
of appointment of the president and approval of the Executive 
Board. 
. . . A substantial conflict exists where a state officer accepts 
other employment or engages in a business of professional activity 
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which would require him to disclose confidential information ac-
quired by him in the course of his official duties. There appears to be 
no foundation for any conclusion that Mr. Stevens, by virtue of his 
position as educational director of the Michigan AFL-CIO, is re-
quired to disclose confidential information acquired by him in the 
course of his duties as a member of the Board of Trustees of Michi-
gan State University. 
Are Officers and Board Members 'State Officers'? 
Having established that directors and officers of private cor-
porations must be deemed to have a substantial interest in the busi-
ness affairs of such corporations, the proper answer to the first ques-
tion stated above requires only determination of whether persons 
serving as members of governing boards of state institutions of higher 
education or as officers thereof are "state officers" within the mean-
ing of Article N, Section 10. 
Governing boards of state institutions of higher education hav-
ing authority to grant baccalaureate degrees owe their existence to 
provisions of the Constitution .... It has been pointed out that state 
universities are corporations created for public purposes. Regents of 
the University of Michigan v. Board of Education of Detroit, 4 Mich. 
213 (1856) and, under Article VIII, Section 4 of the Constitution of 
1963, the Legislature is required to appropriate money to maintain 
these institutions and must be given an annual accounting of all in-
come and expenditures by each of them. Thus, despite their inde-
pendent constitutional status, state institutions of higher education 
retain a part of the state government. Branum vs. Board of Regents 
of University of Michigan, Mich. App. 134 (1966). 
Members of the governing boards of such state colleges and 
universities are either elected by the people or appointed by the gov-
enor. In either case the governor is empowered to fill board vacancies 
by appointment. Michigan Constitution of 1963, Article III, Sections 
5 and 6. 
Thus, as stated in OAG No. 0092, March 10, 1966, "There can 
be no question but that members of the Board of Regents of the 
University of Michigan are state officers." Attorney General, ex rei 
Book v. Burhans, 304 Mich. 108, 1942). And the same would be true 
of other state institutions of higher education. 
Turning to officers of the state colleges and universities it is 
clear that, while their duties and responsibilities do not encompass 
the establishment of broad policy reserved to the governing board, 
they actually have greater involvement in the negotiation, execution 
150 THE UNIVERSITY AND STATE GOVERNMENT 
and administration of contracts entered into by the institution. For 
example, the board may select a bank in which to deposit its funds, 
but it is the officers that have direct and regular contact with offi-
cials and employes of the bank. Disputes regarding interpretation of 
terms of deposit, time of deposit, amount of deposit or bank charges 
are generally resolved by the institution's officials and not by the 
governing board unless the dispute assumes major proportions. Also, 
while board members serve part time devoting the major portion of 
their activities to other matters, the officers of the institution are 
normally required to devote their full time and attention to the uni-
versity's affairs. It would be an anomalous quirk of the law indeed 
were board members of an institution prohibited from having a con-
flicting interest in a state contract while no such prohibition applied 
to its officers. Thus, if the policy upon which the constitutional pro-
hibition against conflict of interest rests is to be meaningful, it must 
be applicable to the very state officials who might be in a position to 
violate it. 
Therefore, since establishment and maintenance of state insti-
tutions is an exercise of the sovereign functions of the state pursuant 
to its constitution and, since officers of such institutions are engaged 
in the implementation of this exercise of sovereign power, it is clear 
that they are state officers within the contemplation of Article N. 
Section 10 of the State Constitution. 
The specific officers of the subject educational institutions so 
included are its president, secretary, treasurer and vice-presidents. 
The president is designated in Article VIII, Sections 5 and 6, as 
the principal executive officer of the institution and is ex-officio a 
member of the board so that there is no doubt of his status as a 
public officer. 
While not specifically designated in the Constitution, the dele-
gation to the other officers of universities and colleges of a portion 
of the sovereign power in which the public is concerned contains the 
requisite elements to bring them within the ambit of the constitu-
tional prohibition against conflicts of interests. 
Consequences of Conflict 
Turning next to your question as to the consequences that 
could ensue where a state officer is found to be in conflict of inter-
est, the constitutional provision, Article IV, Section 10, supra, while 
self-executing insofar as the prescribed standard of conduct is con-
cerned, also provides that the Legislature shall further implement 
this provision by appropriate legislation. Consequently there is no 
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doubt that the following provision of the Michigan Penal Code, Sec-
tion 122 of Act 328 PA 1931; MSA 1962 Rev Vol §28.317; CL 
1948 §750.122, is valid and enforceable: 
"No trustee, inspector, regent, superintendent, agent, officer or 
member of any board or commission having control or charge of any 
educational, charitable, penal, pauper, or reformatory public institu-
tion of this state, or of any municipality thereof, shall be personally, 
directly or indirectly, interested in any contract, purchase or sale 
made for, or on account, or in behalf of any such institution, and all 
such contracts, purchases or sales shall be held null and void; nor 
shall any such officer corruptly accept any bribe, gift or gratuity 
whatever from any persons interested in such contract; and it is here-
by made the duty of the governor or other appointing power, upon 
proof satisfactory of a violation of the provisions of this section, to 
immediately remove the officer or employe offending as aforesaid; 
and the offender shall be guilty of a felony." 
This section of the Penal Code, it will be noted, refers to three 
consequences that can ensue where it can be established that a con-
flict of interest is present. First, the contract itself is declared to be 
"null and void"; secondly, the officer is subject to removal from of-
fice, and thirdly, upon conviction thereof, the officer is guilty of a 
felony. 
It is recommended, however, that any prosecuting authority 
before whom such complaint may be brought take into consideration 
the fact that this problem has been awaiting formal legal clarifica-
tion, and that until the issuance of this opinion there has been con-
siderable uncertainty as to whether the described activities amount 
to a conflict of interest. 
Section 2 of Act 317, PA 1966; MSA Cur Mat §4.1700(2), al-
so prohibits any state officer from having any interest in a contract 
with the state or any of its political subdivisions which is in substan-
tial conflict with the proper discharge of his duties in the public in-
terest. And this statute left undisturbed the second and third of the 
consequences flowing from a violation of Section 122 of the Michi-
gan Penal Code, supra, by providing, as it does in Section 7 thereof, 
MSA Cur Mat §4.700(7), that: 
"The failure of a state officer or government employe to com-
ply with this act subjects him to appropriate disciplinary action or 
civil action." 
In addition, it should be noted, under Article V, Section 10 of 
the Michigan Constitution of 1963 the governor has the power and 
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the duty to remove or suspend from office any public officer, elec-
tive or appointive, "for gross neglect of duty or for corrupt conduct 
in office, or for any other misfeasance or malfeasance therein." 
There can be no doubt that any public officer who has an interest in 
any contract which is prohibited by Article N, Section 10 of the 
constitution is subject to such removal or suspension by the governor. 
However, Section 5 of Act 317 states that: 
"If the attorney general fmds that a contract contains a direct 
or indirect interest that causes a substantial conflict of interest, the 
contract is not void but is voidable by the state or political subdivi-
sion. A party who entered into a voided contract in good faith and 
without knowledge of the existence of a prohibited interest therein 
may recover from the state or political subdivision the reasonable 
value of any benefits conferred upon the state or political subdivision 
in good faith reliance upon the contract." (MSA Cur Mat §4.170(5)) 
Thus, with respect to the status of the contract, there appears 
to be an irreconcilable conflict between Section 122 of the Penal 
Code as to the officers and institutions covered therein, and Section 
5 of Act 317, PA 1966. A contract cannot be "null and void" and 
be "not void but voidable by the state or political subdivision" at 
the very same instant. Applying the proper rule to statutory con-
struction reserved to such circumstances, City of Detroit v. Michi-
gan Bell Telephone Company, 374 Mich. 543 (1965), it is my opin-
ion that Act 317, being a later expression of the Legislature is 
controlling despite the absence of a repealing clause. The contract 
would thus be voidable. 
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CHAPTERV 
STATE FINANCIAL SUPPORT 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A most important connection between a state government 
and a state university has become the dependence of the univer-
sity upon legislative appropriations. Although the state constitu-
tion has provided each university with an independent governing 
board with its own separate corporate existence, the constitu-
tion presently provides no university with a separate independent 
source of funds. 
The constitutional issues relating to conditions the legisla-
ture may attach to appropriations for university use are con-
sidered in Chapters II and III. This chapter is descriptive. The 
first article from a monograph by Richard Price tells the story 
of University of Michigan support from the time of its founding 
until the 1920's. The.article by Mr. Lederle describes the modern 
administrative problems involved in formulating the executive 
budget and controlling expenditures. Mr. Lederle viewed these 
problems from an interesting perspective. After being a profes-
sor, he was appointed State Controller, and, by the time he wrote 
the article, he had returned to academic service at the University 
of Michigan. At present, he serves as the distinguished president 
of the University of Massachusetts. 
The one case in this chapter, Regents of the University of 
Michigan v. Turner, Auditor General, has some historical inter-
est. It certainly reveals the favorable inclinations of the Supreme 
Court toward the University. The case holds that the interest 
payable to the University from the proceeds of the original fed-
eral land grant should not be decreased by the lowering of the 
legal rate of interest even though no other rate was ever spe-
cifically prescribed. 
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2. OPINIONS OF AITORNEY GENERAL 
Not only are the universities directly supported by legisla-
tive appropriations, but they may also qualify for benefits un-
der many other programs of the state and federal governments. 
State support under these auxiliary programs usually is based 
upon opinions of the Attorney General, there being no judicial 
decisions in this area. 
Because of the status of the University of Michigan as a 
"political subdivision of a state," the Attorney General ruled 
that the salaries paid its employees were not subject to federal 
income tax under the provisions in force in 1914. 1 In 19 56 the 
same qualifying status as a "political subdivision" entitled the 
University to qualify for state airport money for the operation 
of Willow Run. 2 
The "War Tax" of 1915 imposed on deeds, telephone and 
telegraph messages, and the like was ruled as not applicable to 
the University in 1915,3 but in 1960 the University failed to 
qualify for exemption from a similar tax on telephone and tele-
graph service under a much more restrictive exemption clause.4 
In the year 1924 three rulings were issued which benefited 
the universities. Goods imported into the country for the use of 
a university were not subject to federal tax, under the opinions 
of the U.S. Supreme Court. 5 A university, if it elected, could 
avail itself of the benefits of the low-cost State Fire Insurance 
Fund. 6 And, corporate stock given to the then College of Mines 
at Houghton to be used to finance student loans was not subject 
to the personal property tax. 7 
In more recent rulings the Attorney General has issued 
opinions that Michigan Stadium Bonds, although not supported 
by the full faith and credit of the state, were nonetheless exempt 
from the state intangibles tax;8 that the constitutionally ear-
marked gasoline taxes could be used for access roads for state 
institutions;9 and that, under certain restrictions, university em-
ployees may participate in the State Employees Retirement 
Fund. 10 
In a 1957 opinion, it was ruled that students employed at 
state colleges were not covered by the federal Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act, which embraced provisions for the payment of a mini-
mum wage, because the colleges were not engaged in commerce 
and because a state college is a political subdivision of a state. 11 
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3. EXCERPTS FROM THE FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF THE UNIVERSI-
TY OF MICHIGAN: ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT, by Richard 
R. Price (Harvard Bulletins in Education, No. 8, 1923, pp. 26-45. )1 
PART II 
ANALYSIS OF THE FINANCIAL SUPPORT 
OF THE UNIVERSITY 
CHAPTER III 
THE ORIGINAL UNITED STATES LAND GRANT 
IT will be remembered that the university endowment consisted first 
of a township of land, afterwards increased to two townships, and of 
three sections of land granted by the Indians in the Treaty of Fort 
Meigs. The federal grant of two townships amounted to 72 sections, 
or 46,080 acres. This, of course, has no connection with the 
240,000 acres subsequently granted to the state by the federal gov-
ernment for the purpose of an Agricultural College. In Michigan the 
Agricultural College and the State University are separate institutions. 
The acreage of land granted to the several states by the federal gov-
ernment for educational and various other purposes may be verified 
by consulting a mimeographed document issued by the General 
Land Office, Department of the Interior, entitled "Land and Scrip 
Granted to States and Territories for Educational and Other Pur-
poses." 
Before taking up the history of the university federal land 
grant, let us dispose, in passing, of the matter of the Fort Meigs Indi-
an land. The trustees of the 1821 university sold these three sections, 
and the proceeds, together with some additional gifts and subscrip-
tions, can be traced fmally to a lot and building on Bates Street in 
Detroit. This property passed into the hands of the Board of Educa-
tion of Detroit. In 1858 the Board of Regents of the University re-
covered the property by a Supreme Court decision and subsequently 
sold it for $22,010. This amount, with perhaps four or five thousand 
dollars of gifts and subscriptions, would then represent the fmal value 
of the Indians' gift. This money, at least up to 1875, was kept sep-
arately as a reserve fund for the use of the University library. 1 Later 
1Ten Brook, op. cit., p. 138. See also Hinsdale, op. cit., p. 24. 
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it was all spent for other purposes considered then more pressing. 
A typical instance of poor management in the disposal of uni-
versity lands is to be found in the matter of the Toledo lots. The 
trustees of the university of 1821 in 1827located six "river lots" at 
the confluence of Swan Creek and the Maumee River, then in Michi-
gan, now in Ohio. This land is now in the heart of the city of Toledo. 
The lots contained 916 acres, which the trustees accepted as 1280, 
or two sections, as they were required to locate not less than one sec-
tion in any one piece. In 1830 the Board exchanged the most valu-
able of these lots, those numbered One and Two, for other less valu-
able land in the immediate neighborhood. Four years later the Board 
sold this land received in exchange to the former owner for $5000. 
The remaining 621 acres at Toledo were sold between 1849 and 
1855 at an average of nineteen dollars an acre. "The Toledo lands, 
which might have brought the university some millions altogether, 
brought about $17,000."1 
The Board of 1821located twenty-three sections of the univer-
sity land. The remaining sections were chosen by the Board of 1837. 
This land was scattered through most of the counties of the state that 
had been organized up to 1844. The locations were generally ad-
vantageous. 2 
The two townships of land conveyed by Congress to Michigan 
as an endowment for a university, when compared with the amounts 
since granted to other states, were by no means exceptional in quan-
tity. On the contrary, very many of the states now occupying the 
place of the old Northwest Territory have received much larger ap-
propriations for the same purpose. If the grant to Michigan has been 
productive of exceptional results, it is owing to the fact that lands 
were selected of exceptional value. With so much wisdom, indeed, 
had the lands been chosen, that in ten years from the time the grant 
had been made, they were estimated by the Superintendent of 
Public Instruction to have attained an average value of $20 per 
acre. 3 As a matter of comparison, it may be stated that of the twenty-
seven public land states, nineteen received each two townships of 
land for university purposes; while of the remaining eight, Alabama, 
Florida, Wisconsin, and Minnesota each received four townships; 
Mississippi and Ohio three townships apiece, Tennessee 100,000 
acres, and Utah 200,000 acres.4 
In the first Report of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, 
January, 1837, he estimated the value of the university land at not 
1Ten Brook, op. cit., p. 109. 
~Ibid. See also Hinsdale, op. cit., p. 21. 
C. K. Adams, as quoted by McLaughlin, op. cit., p. 22. 
4 Hinsdale, op. cit., p. 19. 
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less than $15 an acre, or $691,200, with an annual income of 
$48,384; or more probably $20 an acre, or $921,000, with annual 
interest of $64,912. He added his opinion that in any event it could 
not fall short of his lowest estimate and believed that it would ex-
ceed his highest computation. 1 The event showed, however, that he 
had not taken into account the fact that the control of the land was 
vested in a political body-the state legislature. 
In March, 1837, the legislature authorized the Superintendent 
of Public Instruction to sell at auction so much of the university 
lands as should amount to the sum of $500,000, with the proviso, 
however, that none of the land was to be sold at a price lower than 
$20 an acre. In pursuance of this enactment, during that year sales 
amounting to more than $150,000 were made, and the land brought 
an average price of $22.85 per acre. Now came a series of persistent 
assaults on the university property and a period of rather discredita-
ble yielding on the part of the legislature to self-seeking public pres-
sure. When in 1837 the Superintendent came to sell the university 
land, he found much of it in the possession of squatters. These per-
sons had no shadow of a legal right or claim, but some had been in 
possession for years and had craftily made improvements. Naturally, 
since the university land had been well chosen, these were choice 
pieces of property. On an attempt being made to oust these squat-
ters they raised such a clamor that the legislature yielded and in 
March, 1838, released 10,240 acres of university land that had been 
located in 1830. Although the University was allowed to take in ex-
change as good lands elsewhere, it suffered a double loss: it lost eight 
years in which the best lands in the state went off the market, and it 
lost the appreciation in value of its own lands for the eight years. In 
1839 the legislature went a step further and authorized the sale at 
$1.25 an acre of large quantity of the university lands that had been 
occupied by settlers. Fortunately the Governor vetoed this Act. In 
1838 and 1839 the legislature passed a comparatively innocuous 
measure extending the time of payment to purchasers of university 
lands. In 1840 hard times struck the new state and the legislature 
authorized the sale of nearly 5000 acres of this land at an average 
price of $6.21 per acre. This brought to the University some $65,000 
less than would have been realized at the minimum price of 1837. 
This act was passed as relief for persons who had settled on university 
lands. In 1841 the minimum price was reduced to $15 an acre, and 
in 1842 to $12 an acre. But as a fmal blow, this last act was made 
retroactive. It granted new appraisals of land already sold and repay-
ment of overcharges. In 1843, $34,651 had been either returned or 
1 Ten Brook, op. cit., p. 116. 
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credited to purchasers. The total sales up to this time had been about 
$220,000. All these relief and retrospective acts reduced the amount 
realized for the University to about $137,000, which is some $83,000 
less than the amount for which the lands had been actually sold. 
This does not include the reduction in the price of the land made in 
1841 and 1842! Mter this recital of legislative acts it would seem 
that little commentary is called for as to the wisdom of vesting con-
trol of lands or similar property for educational endowment in a po-
litical body like a legislature,-a body which in all history has been 
prone to succumb to the political pressure of the moment, without 
too much thought of the future, ultimate, and permanent conse-
quences of its immediate acts. A body such as a board of trustees or 
regents, whose interests and concern were solely in the guardianship 
of the real welfare and prosperity of the university, would, perhaps, 
as a matter of expediency, considering the circumstances of the pop-
ulation, have yielded merely to the extent of prolonging the times of 
payments on the university land. This would have done the Univer-
sity no harm, for it did not need all the money at that time, and in 
due course of events, as the state recovered its prosperity, the full 
value of the land would have been realized for the university endow-
ment. 
In the ways sketched above the so-called "permanent endow-
ment" of the University of Michigan was established and continues 
even unto this day. It is a fund inviolable and not to be diminished, 
the interest of which only is available for university expenses. In 
1882, when all the university lands except 287 acres had been sold, 
the fund amounted to $543,317.66. The average price per acre re-
ceived for the entire quantity sold up to that time was $11.87, or 
more than twice that received for any other educational grant in the 
Northwest Territory.2 
On June 30, 1920, the endowment fund amounted to $547,-
489.40 and the annual interest was $38,428.89. This is probably the 
ultimate status of the endowment fund and of the annual interest. It 
should be noted that the annual interest includes not only the 
amount paid by the state, but also interest on unpaid balances paid 
by purchasers of university land. 3 
An interesting question may be raised here, and that is, what 
has actually become of the money thus paid into the state treasury 
to form the university permanent endowment. In 1853 the legisla-
ture directed the proper officer to pay to the University at stated 
1 Report of State Superintendent of Public Instruction, 1880, pp. 354-
356. 
2 Knight, op. cit., p. 144. 
3 Financial Report, University of Michigan, 1920, pp. 8, 34. 
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intervals, "the entire amount of interest that may hereafter accrue 
upon the whole amount of University lands sold or that may be here-
after sold." This act was limited in its effect to two years, but it was 
repeated with the same limitations in 1855, 1857, and 1859. In 1861 
a similar act passed without limitation. One effect of these acts di-
recting state officers to pay interest on the moneys that came into 
the state treasury from the sale of University lands, was to create a 
credit on the one side and a debt on the other. In other words, the 
state borrowed the university fund, or permanent endowment, and 
expended it for state purposes, pledging itself to pay the interest 
thereon. The interest is paid in four installments each year at the rate 
of seven per cent. 1 It would appear, therefore, from the facts as set 
forth by Hinsdale that the entire university endowment has disap-
peared, having been expended by the state for state purposes. It 
exists now only as a book item on which the state obligates itself to 
pay seven per cent annual interest. In other words, the endowment 
from the United States, instead of being an aid to the tax payers by 
relieving them of that much of university support has actually been 
transformed into a permanent state debt. This has apparently come 
to pass because the management of the fund has been in the hands of 
the biennial legislature instead of in the hands of Regents or inde-
pendent trustees. In the latter case the funds would have been in-
vested under proper safeguards, and at regular intervals the loans 
would have been repaid or bonds would have matured and the prin-
cipal would thus have reverted to the fund. The endowment would 
then be actually in hand as a tangible possession. The interest would 
relieve the people by that much of taxation. As it now is, the people 
of Michigan are taxed to pay annual interest on an endowment which 
was given them freely by the government of the United States. They 
must now pay the interest plus the additional support of the univer-
sity. Compare this with the policy pursued by certain other states, 
where these endowment funds were placed in the hands of separate 
trustees or investment boards, who, under strict legal safeguards, in-
vest and reinvest the funds and turn over the interest to the benefici-
aries. Such boards are always able to show either the money in hand 
or gilt-edged securities to its full value. Of course, in the case of 
Michigan the money is perfectly safe, for the whole credit of the 
state is pledged for the payment of the interest, and the interest is of 
more importance to the university than is the principal; but the fact 
remains, nevertheless, that the people are not relieved of any of the 
support of the university by the United States, which was the pur-
pose of the endowment. 
1 Hinsdale, op. cit., p. 25. 
162 THE UNIVERSITY AND STATE GOVERNMENT 
Section I, article XIV, of the Michigan constitution pledges the 
specific state taxes, except those of the mining companies of the Up-
per Peninsula, to the payment of interest on the university endow-
ment and the interest on other trust funds in the keeping of the state. 
The state Supreme Court has decided, 1896, that when the Act creat-
ing the debt to the university was passed, the Legislature must have 
intended that it should bear interest at seven per cent and that a 
mere change of the legal rate of interest in the state could not nullify 
the legislative intent. 1 This of course means, that regardless of the 
fluctuations in the price of money as reflected by interest rates, the 
state of Michigan must always pay interest on the university endow-
ment at the ft.xed rate of seven per cent. 
It should be noted here that the University of Michigan was 
supported from its founding to the year 1867 on the income of its 
endowment and the fees derived from students,-with the exception 
of the $100,000 loan of 1838, the circumstances of which will be de-
tailed later. There was no support from the legislature, then, until 
1867.2 Obviously then, until the latter date the institution was not 
in any real sense a state university. It was still a United States land 
grant university. The true conception of a state university had not yet 
been grasped by the people. It was not unti11867 that the true basis 
was established which has been maintained ever since. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE LEGISLATIVE $100,000 LOAN OF 1838 
The university of 1837 as founded had a large potential en-
dowment but no money. Money was needed at once to erect the uni-
versity buildings at Ann Arbor and to provide the necessary running 
expenses. The Regents therefore made application to the Legislature 
for a loan against the credit of the endowment. This loan was granted 
in 1838 to the amount of $100,000 and took the form of certificates 
running twenty years and bearing six per cent interest. The university 
was to pay the annual interest and to repay the principal at maturity 
from the university fund, that is, from the proceeds of the land 
grant. The Regents received a premium of $6000 on these bonds. 
They spent the whole amount in carrying on the university branches 
already established and in erecting the buildings at Ann Arbor.3 
1Regents of the University of Michigan vs. Auditor-General, 109 Michi-
gan Re~orts, 124; as cited by Hinsdale, op. cit., p. 26. 
Hinsdale, op. cit., p. 56. 
3 Hinsdale, op. cit., p. 24. See also Ten Brook, op. cit., p. 126. 
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For several years the income of the university fund was almost 
wholly consumed in paying the $6000 annual interest on this loan. 
In 1844 the Legislature authorized the acceptance of depreciated 
state obligations at par in payment for university lands, and applied 
these payments on the university debt. The state also accepted cer-
tain Detroit real estate at $8,095 toward this indebtedness. In 1848 
the debt had been reduced in this manner to a little over $20,000. In 
1852 the whole debt had thus been paid. Then the point was raised 
that the trust fund granted by the United States had by these pro-
ceedings been illegally and improperly diminished. In 1859 the Legis-
lature, therefore, directed the Auditor-General to pay the university 
"interest on the entire amount which has heretofore been or may 
hereafter be received by the state for university lands sold or con-
tracted." This action had the effect of restoring the fund to its origi-
nal status. To clinch the matter, the Legislature of 1877 directed that 
$100,000 should be added to the university fund on the books of the 
state. This made the loan fmally a gift from the state, with the ex-
ception of the $6000 annual interest which had been paid for some 
years by the Regents. 1 Whether the university did or did not ever re-
pay the loan to the state has been the subject of a considerable his-
torical controversy. The point is now of no practical importance, 
being merely a problem in technical accountancy. 
With the proceeds of the $100,000 loan the Regents prepared 
to erect the first buildings at Ann Arbor. The Legislature, in the uni-
versity organic law of 1837 had authorized the Board to procure 
suitable plans for buildings, which had to meet the approval of the 
Governor and the Superintendent of Public Instruction. The Regents 
thereupon employed an architect from New Haven, who drew up 
"truly a magnificent design," involving the expenditure of over half 
a million of dollars, or twice the whole sum then realized from the 
land grant. The plan was accepted by the Regents and approved by 
the Governor, but the Superintendent refused his assent. He urged 
that the plan would absorb so much of the university fund as to 
cripple it in all time to come; and also that a university did not con-
sist in buildings but in the number and ability of its professors and in 
its other appointments, as library, cabinets, and works of art. This 
Superintendent, it will be remembered, was that same Mr. Pierce who 
had been so influential in forming and organizing the educational sys-
tem of the state in the first constitutional convention. This present 
action brought upon his devoted head a storm of denunciation. 
There was great indignation especially at Ann Arbor. The Regents 
1Ten Brook, op. cit., pp. 126-133. See also Hinsdale as cited in the pre-
ceding note, and Knight, op. cit., p. 144. 
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fmally receded and adopted a much less ambitious and expensive 
plan.1 It is a pleasure to record that Mr. Pierce lived long enough to 
have his sensible veto of the over-ambitious plans fully vindicated 
and to regain his merited esteem in the eyes of his fellow citizens. 
Thus ended this tempest in a tea pot. 
CHAPTERV 
THE STATE PERMANENT MILL TAX 
The first appropriation from the State for the benefit of the 
University was made in 1867. At this time the university fund had 
about reached the limit of its growth and student fees had already 
been increased. Expenses were increasing, there was an era of high 
prices following the Civil War, and the university found itself with a 
growing student body and in an impossible position. Recourse was 
therefore had to the Legislature for relief. To the credit of that body 
be it said that the relief was promptly forthcoming. The 186 7 Legis-
lature granted the University the proceeds of a tax of one-twentieth 
of a mill on the dollar on all the taxable property of the state. This 
brought in $15,000 or $16,000 a year. But the Legislature saw fit to 
couple with the appropriation bill an amendment providing that the 
Regents must use part of the money for installing at least one profes-
sor of homeopathic medicine. This caused great alarm in the univer-
sity medical school. The Regents, however, declined to accept the 
grant on these terms as tending to establish an undesirable precedent 
of legislative interference in the internal affairs of the university. In 
1869 the Legislature, after some recrimination and censure of the 
Regents, granted the $15,000 a year without any conditions; and 
also turned over to the university the funds that had accumulated 
under the Act of 1867. By these Acts and by the Act of 1871 per-
petuating the $15,000 a year appropriation and granting $75,000 
for a new lecture and class-room building, the Legislature firmly es-
tablished the precedent and principle of state aid to the university? 
The legislature of 1873 granted the University $25,000 for the 
completion of University Hall, and $13,000 to cover a deficit in 
revenue for the year ending in June, 1873. It also repealed the Act 
granting the University $15,000 a year and adopted a new one giving 
the institution the proceeds of a tax of one-twentieth of a mill on 
each dollar of taxable property in the state. This was to be a regular 
1 Hinsdale, op. cit., p. 30. See also Ten Brook, op. cit., p. 135. 
2Farrand, op. cit., p. 185. 
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and permanent tax for the support of the University, and as such it 
continued in force for twenty years. The Act became a law without 
the approval of the Governor, who believed that the University should 
render an account of its trust and receive its maintenance appropria-
tion every two years. 1 Any unprejudiced observer who will read the 
subsequent history of the university will, it is believed, concur in the 
opinion of the present writer that the Governor in this case was 
wrong. Those who were responsible for the institution's management 
could now plan definitely for years ahead on a certain fixed income. 
It is difficult to plan a university's growth and development on a 
hand-to-mouth basis. Growth must be foreseen, systematic develop-
ment must be projected, needs must be anticipated by allocation of 
funds, and orderly and symmetrical progress must be sustained. None 
of these things can be done properly without exact knowledge of 
available and continuing funds over a term of years. Without this, en-
lightened and progressive management becomes mere opportunism. 
Under the biennial appropriation system, a temporary popular reac-
tion against the university over some comparatively trivial matter, if 
it should by unhappy chance coincide with a session of the legisla-
ture, might bring about almost irreparable damage through the with-
holding of necessary funds. The University of Oklahoma suffered 
this very thing from the legislature of that state in its 1921 session. 
Moreover, the continuing mill tax has the inestimable advantage that 
as the state grows in population and wealth, and the increasing de-
mands upon the university call for increasing support, the proceeds 
of the mill tax are also automatically enlarged. 
It has already been stated that the Legislature of 1873 fixed 
the mill tax at one-twentieth of a mill, and this levy raised a suffi-
cient amount for the support and maintenance of the University until 
1893. In the latter year it was found necessary to raise the levy to 
one-sixth of a mill. In 1899 the rate was made one-fourth of a mill.2 
In 1907 the rate was again raised to three-eights of a mill, and in 
1921 to six-tenths of a mill. This last rate was applied to a new 
equalized valuation of the state which was increased in 1921 to 
$5,000,000,000. Thus the new mill tax will yield $3,000,000 a year 
for support. In addition, the Legislatures of recent years have made 
appropriations of considerable amounts for building purposes. 3 It 
will be seen from all this that the mill tax as a source of maintenance 
and support for the university seems now to be a fixed principle of 
the fiScal policy of Michigan. 
1Ibid., p. 218. 
2 Hinsdale, op. cit., p. 153. 
3 From a letter to the writer, dated October 24, 1921, from Mr. S. W. 
Smith, Secretary of the University of Michigan. 
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In Table 1 is given a statement of the annual proceeds of the 
mill tax at five-year intervals. It will be remembered that the incre-
ments represent not only certain increases of rate but also periodic 
increases in the state valuation. Some slight variations are due to vari-
ations in date of payment from the state to the university treasurer. 
TABLE 1. ANNUAL PROCEEDS OF THE MILL TAX, UNIVERSITY 
OF MICHIGAN. BY FIVE-YEAR PERIODS1 
Year ending Year ending 
June 30 Mill Tax June 30 Mill Tax 
1873 ...... $ 15,000 1903 . ..... $ 315,620 
1878 ...... 31,500 1908 . ..... 520,230 
1883 ....... 40,500 1913 . ..... 858,000 
1888 ....... 35,454 1918 . ..... 1,155,000 
1893 ...... 70,625 1920 . ..... 1,818,750 
1898 ...... 221,020 
CHAPTER VI 
LEGISLATIVE DIRECT APPROPRIATIONS 
It has already been pointed out that, outside of the $100,000 
loan of 1838, the state Legislature contributed nothing to the sup-
port of the university until 1867. It was assumed in 1837 that the 
avails of the congressional land grant would be abundantly sufficient 
to found a university and to maintain it on a large scale. Competent 
authorities estimated that the endowment would yield a capital of at 
least a million dollars and an annual income of $60,000,-which in-
deed it would have done if wisely and honestly handled. In consider-
ing this annual income it is well also to bear in mind the fact that 
there was not then a college in the country that enjoyed an annual 
income equal to $60,000 a year.2 The plans and expectations of 
those days, then, were certainly justified by what men know of the 
circumstances and prospects of the other colleges of the country. 
The frrst appropriation from the state treasury was made in 
1867, $15,000 a year, which was brought in by a one-twentieth of 
a mill tax on all the taxable property of the state. As has been 
pointed out, this tax was renewed biennially for a time and then was 
finally made a permanent tax. But it must not be assumed that this 
1 Compiled from Reports of the President, the Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, and Financial Reports of the University. 
2 Hinsdale, op. cit., p. 152. 
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was the limit of the state's generosity. From time to time special ap-
propriations were made for specific purposes, such as for meeting 
deficits in the university's income or for the erection of needed build-
ings. One thing should be said here about the latter item. In theory 
the mill tax was supposed to meet the university's needs for mainte-
nance and also for buildings. In practice, as the university grew rapid-
ly, it was often found impossible to provide the necessary buildings 
out of the stated current income. In those emergencies it was cus-
tomary to appeal to the state for help, and this help was usually 
forthcoming. The Homeopathic Medical School was for years given 
a special annual grant of $6,000. In an address made by President 
Angell in 1879, he stated that the total sum received by taxation for 
the University from the state treasury down to January, 1879, was 
$469,000. This was not more than the buildings, grounds, museums, 
and libraries were then worth. The sums set aside from the mill tax 
for buildings were usually denominated in the official reports as 
"Savings for Buildings." These savings are not included in the state-
ment of the proceeds of the mill tax given in Table 1. In Table 2 we 
have summed up and consolidated all of the state appropriations for 
the University of Michigan from 1867 to 1900. This will then include 
all state grants from the beginning up to 1900, with the sole excep-
tion of the $100,000 loan of 1838. 
TABLE 2. STATE APPROPRIATIONS, 1867-1900. 
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN1 
Law of 1867, 1/20 mill, two years ............... . 
Law of 1869, $15,000 a year for 5 years ............. . 
1873-1893, 1/20 mill ....................... . 
1893-1899, 1/6 mill .......................... . 
1899, 1/4 mill ......•. ; .................. . 
To cover deficit, 1873 ....................... . 
To pay outstanding warrants, 1875 ............... . 
Appropriations for specified Buildings and Improvements ... . 
Homeopathic Department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... . 
College of Dental Surgery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
University Hospitals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . .. . . 
Books for libraries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Special salaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Repairs and contingent expenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
Unclassified . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
$ 30,797 
75,000 
803,862 
1,121,700 
276,295 
13,000 
13,000 
553,289 
238,750 
129,750 
93,500 
79,000 
36,600 
125,125 
78,766 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $3,668,434 
1Hinsdale, op. cit., p. 153. 
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From Table 2 it will be seen that in the thirty-three years be-
tween 1867 and 1900 the state made very considerable additions to 
the amounts allowed the university through the adopted system of 
state aid by a mill tax. Most of these additional contributions were 
for buildings or for the provision of special or additional functions, 
but nevertheless there were occasions when the Legislature was 
TABLE 3. UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, INCOME FROM SPECIAL 
LEGISLATIVE APPROPRIATIONS AND SAVINGS FROM MILL 
TAX FOR BUILDING PURPOSES, 1901-1920.1 
Mill Tax Savings Special Appropriations 
Year for Buildings* For Maintenancet For Buildings 
1901 ...... $ 36,048 $ 6,000 
1902 •• 0 ••• 71,298 9,000 
1903 0 •• 0 •• 167,960 12,000 $ 25,000 
1904 •• 0 ••• 98,905 9,000 25,000 
1905 0 •• 0 •• 39,452 
1906 ...... 80,000 15,000 
1907 0 ••••• 44,375 9,000 
1908 ••• 0 •• 99,000 9,000 
1909 .... 0. 252,214 9,000 
1910 ...... 324,866 9,000 
1911 ...... 17,780 9,000 
1912 ••••• 0 8,989 9,000 37,000 
1913 .. " ... 128,500 9,000 50,000 
1914 ...... 127,235 9,000 198,000 
1915 ...... 83,000 9,000 320,000 
1916 ...... 50,000 9,000 55,000 
1917 ••• 0 •• 20,385 9,000 250,000 
1918 • 0 •••• 35,000 9,000 95,000 
1919 0 •••• 0 109,000 215,000 
1920 .... 0. 200,000 325,000 
Totals .... $1,685,007 $468,000 $1,595,000 
* The savings from mill tax for building purposes are derived from savings from 
the mill-tax income remaining in the hands of the State Treasurer from year 
to year, and are available for buildings and permanent improvements. The 
amounts shown in this column in Table 3 are the amounts received from the 
State Treasurer and are in addition to the mill-tax receipts shown in Table 9. 
t With the exception of appropriation for deficit in current expenses of 
$100,000.00 in 1919 and $200,000.00 in 1920, all amounts in this column 
are for the maintenance of the Homeopathic College and summer hospitals. 
1Compiled from annual Reports of the Superintendent of Public In-
struction, and Financial Reports of the University. These figures have been 
carefully checked and corrected through the kindness of Mr. S. W. Smith, 
Secretary of the University of Michigan. 
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called upon to make up deficits in the ordinary running expenses of 
the institution. The proceeds of the mill tax from 1873 to 1920 have 
already been given in Table 1. It remains now only to give the extra 
or special legislative appropriations from 1901 to 1920 in order to 
present a complete conspectus of the state support of the university. 
It will be observed that Table 2 lumps the respective sums under 
their proper heads without attempting to apportion these amounts 
through the years. In Table 3 is presented a statement by years and 
general items of the extra or special appropriations from 1901 to 
1920 inclusive. There is also included a statement of savings from 
mill tax devoted to building purposes. It will be observed that most 
of these appropriations are for buildings and repairs. Under the item 
of Special Appropriations there is always included an annual grant of 
$6,000 for the Homeopathic Medical School, which the Regents 
had refused to establish out of the regular state appropriation. In the 
last two years there will be noted some large grants to make up defi-
cits in current expenses. 
CHAPTER VII 
STUDENT FEES 
The University of Michgian, in common with other state uni-
versities, was founded on the fundamental idea of free tuition. It is 
interesting to observe in the history of this institution how circum-
stances compelled a modification of this idea, at least to the extent 
of collecting from the students a contribution toward the incidental 
expenses attending instruction. The fees thus levied on students were 
increased from time to time as the exigencies of university finance 
demanded until today the students are making quite a respectable 
contribution toward their own education. It is carefully pointed out, 
however, that these are not tuition fees; the odious term tuition fee 
is avoided by labeling the contribution with the specious title, "an-
nual tax." Other state universities have had the same experience, and 
the "incidental fee" has now generally ceased to be merely nominal 
and has apparently become a permanent feature of university life. 
Any protest on the part of legislators, alumni, or other interested 
persons, is met with the irrefutable argument that the authorities 
were driven to take this step of increasing the charges by the neces-
sity of making the budget balance; and that the Regents are perfectly 
willing to lower the fees if the legislature will make up the resulting 
deficit. 
Up to 1865, every student of the University of Michigan, 
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resident or non-resident, paid a matriculation fee of $10 and an an-
nual tax of $5. In that year the matriculation fee for non-residents 
was raised to $20, and in 1866 to $25. In the latter year also the an-
nual tax for all students was made $10.1 The annual tax was in-
creased again in 1874, 1878, 1882, 1884, and 1896. The matricula-
tion fees were left unchanged. In 1882 the scale of fees was as 
follows: 
STUDENT FEES, 18822 
Matriculation: 
Resident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $10 
Non-Resident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
Annual Tax 
Literary Department: 
Resident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 
Non-Resident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 
Law Department: 
Resident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
Non-Resident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 
The fees for the Medical Department, Homeopathic College, Dental Col-
lege, and Pharmacy School were the same as for the Law Department. Extra 
charges were made for laboratory material, instruments, etc. 
In 1896 the annual tax for students of the Department of Lit-
erature, Science and the Arts was made $30 for residents and $40 
for non-residents. In the professional departments the fee was $35 
for residents and $45 for non-residents. The diploma fee remained 
unchanged at $10. In 1905 the Regents advanced the annual fee in 
all professional schools by $10, but no change was made in the De-
partment of Literature, Science and the Arts. 3 By 1920 we find the 
scale of fees to stand as follows: 
1Farrand, op cit., p. 173. 
2 President's Report, 1882, p. 19. 
3 Hinsdale, op. cit., pp. 149, 370. 
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STUDENT FEES, 19201 
Matriculation 
Michigan Students Non-Residents 
Men Women Men Women 
All Colleges and Schools $ 10 $ 10 $ 25 $ 25 
Annual Fees 
College of Literature, 
Science and Arts. . . . . . . 49 45 69 65 
Colleges of Engin. and 
Architecture . . . . . . . . . 64 60 94 90 
Medical School . . . . . . . . . 107 103 127 123 
Law School ........... 74 70 84 80 
College of Pharmacy 64 60 84 80 
Homeopathic Medical 
School ........... 107 103 127 123 
College of Dental Surgery . . . 114 110 134 130 
Graduate School. . . . . . . . . 49 45 69 65 
We find in the scale of fees for this year of 1920 two novel fea-
tures. One is that the fees run into odd dollars or uneven numbers. 
The other is that an unexplained discrimination is shown between 
men and women students in the amount of the fee charges, the 
women being favored in every instance. Whether this discrimination 
is meant to show in a delicate manner that women are incapable of 
deriving as much benefit from instruction as are men, and therefore 
should not pay so high a fee, the documents do not show? One is 
struck also by the wide variety of fees charged in the several schools 
and colleges. A certain amount of uniformity would create a more 
favorable impression of the institution. A rational scheme would 
seem to be to charge one fee for the literary Department and 
another fee for all of the professional schools, with the possible ex-
ception of the Medical School, where higher operating costs would 
justify a markedly higher fee. It should be noted that in the fee scale 
quoted above, the fees for the two medical departments include the 
laboratory fees. 
1Catalogue of University of Michigan for 1919-1920, Vol. XXI, No. 39, 
p. 107. 
21t is quite probable that the additional amount charged the men is for 
club or Union or athletic dues, or some similar activity, the men having more 
elaborate or expensive facilities than the women. 
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In a supplement pasted into the University Bulletin for 1919-
1920 we fmd a change of fees, to take effect in 1921, announced as 
follows: 
STUDENT FEES, 19211 
Matriculation Fee (unchanged) 
Annual Fees 
Michigan Students Non-Residents 
Men Women Men Women 
College of Literature, Science 
and Arts . . . . . . . . . . . $ 80 
Colleges of Engin. and 
Architecture . . . . . . . . . 95 
Medical School . • . . . . . . . 140 
Law School . . . . . . . . . . . 105 
College of Pharmacy 95 
Homeopathic Medical 
School . . . . . . . . • . . 140 
College of Dental Surgery . . . 140 
Graduate School. . . . . . . . . 80 
$ 76 
91 
136 
101 
91 
136 
136 
76 
Summer Session 
$105 
120 
165 
125 
120 
165 
175 
105 
$101 
116 
161 
121 
116 
161 
171 
101 
All Students 
Colleges of Literature, Science, and the Arts, of Engineering 
and Architecture, of Pharmacy, and the Graduate School ... 
Medical School: 
Laboratory and Demonstration courses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Clinical courses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Law School ................................ . 
$26.50 
21.50 
31.50 
31.50 
The annual fees for the regular university year include the laboratory 
fees charged separately heretofore. A cash deposit is required to cover cost of 
material and unusual breakage in the laboratory of chemistry, hygiene, and 
bacteriology. In the summer session, laboratory fees are charged extra. 
It will be recognized at once, of course, that this relatively large 
increase of fees was occasioned and, indeed, necessitated by the 
enormous increase in the cost of all services and commodities which 
educational institutions use, that immediately followed the close of 
the Great War. All colleges were forced to adopt unusual expedients 
to tide over the emergency. 
1Catalogue for 1919-20, Vol XXI, No. 39. 
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In Table 4 is given a statement of the receipts from student 
fees at ten-year intervals from 1845 to 1915, with the additional 
item of the receipts for the years 1920 and 1921. The statement is 
slightly inaccurate because the different records do not agree in every 
respect as to the amounts received under this head. The variation is 
explained by the fact the amount would naturally vary a little 
through belated payments on any given date; and also because in the 
records the receipts from students are usually lumped with small 
"receipts from other sources." These small discrepancies, however, 
will not materially distort the result. 
TABLE 4. RECEIPTS FROM STUDENTS BY TEN-YEAR PERIODS, 
1845-1921 1 
1845 ........... $ 403.94 
1855 . . . . . . . . . . . 3,344.84 
1865 . . . . . . . . . . . 20,580.78 
1875 . . . . . . . . . . . 29,255.00 
1885 . . . . . . . . . . . 69,789.07 
1895 ........... $141,888.34 
1905 . . . . . . . . . . . 221,285.97 
1915 . . . . . . . . . . . 457,411.04 
1920 . . . . . . . . . . . 682,445.16 
1921 . . . . . . . . . . . 938,886.55 
CHAPTER VIII 
GIFTS AND BEQUESTS OF INDIVIDUALS 
President Angell, who for so many years represented the uni-
versity in its relations with the state and with the alumni as well as 
with the outside world, made it a point to emphasize in his recur-
ring annual reports that the University of Michigan was a legitimate 
object of the benevolence or munificence of its friends and well-
wishers, whether among the alumni or the general public. He re-
ferred often to the great stream of gifts and bequests that was flowing 
in ever-increasing volume to the great Eastern endowed universities 
and colleges, and asked why this kind of support should be so con-
spicuously lacking to a state university. The obvious answer is, of 
course, that men of wealth do not feel moved to contribute t0 the 
support of an institution that has behind it the resources of a great 
and wealthy state. However, the appeal could be made more success-
fully for things which a legislature may not reasonably be asked to 
provide out of public taxation. Therefore bequests and gifts gradual-
ly began to be made of collections of books, a natural history collec-
tion, an art collection, an athletic field, an auditorium, a dormitory, 
1 Compiled from the Financial Reports of the University, and from Re-
ports of the President and the State Superintendent. 
174 THE UNIVERSITY AND STATE GOVERNMENT 
a memorial building. The most notable gift of recent years was the 
Men's Union, costing over a million dollars, the contribution of thou-
sands of alumni. As the first generations of Michigan alumni began to 
make their way in the world and to acquire wealth, gifts began to in-
creasa for endowment, for scholarships and for various specific trust 
purposes. The appeals of President Angell were no longer in vain. 
The generosity of the state was being matched by the grateful gen-
erosity of the recipients of its educational bounty. Of the total value 
of the university's land and buildings in 1921,31 per cent had been 
given by alumni and friends. One of the great achievements of the 
administration of President Hutchins between 1909 and 1919 was 
the organization of the alumni body with special reference to par-
ticipation in the financial burdens of the university. On June 30, 
1921, there were in the hands of the university treasurer trustfunds 
consisting of gifts and money for special purposes, mostly from 
alumni, to the sum of $967,634.95.1 
1Financial Report for 1921, p. 45. 
4. THE STATE AND IDGHER EDUCATION: A REPORT FROM MICH-
IGAN, by John W. Lederle, Director, Institute of Public Administration, 
University of Michigan 1 
This statement* by John Lederle, formerly Controller of the 
state of Michigan, portrays relations between the state and 
higher education as they have developed in one of our principal 
states. It reflects a view that has gained increasing strength 
among state officials and students of administration-that there 
is much to be said for decentralization of authority in public 
as well as private administration. 
AT THE OUTSET I should like to express great sympathy for the 
objectives of your committee. I abhor any trend to extend govern-
mental controls in such a way as to endanger the initiative and imagi-
nation of leaders of higher education. I oppose vehemently a phi-
losophy, seemingly held by some state budget officers, that all 
educational institutions should be cast in a common mold, subjected 
to standardization, and left no room for experimentation and differ-
entiation. 
I assume that you would want me to make some comments on 
the problems of government and higher education as seen from the 
*Prepared for delivery before the Committee on Government and High-
er Education, Baltimore, Maryland, on March 1, 1958. 
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government end of the spectrum. Toward the end of this discussion I 
will, of course, return to the university end of the spectrum and add 
additional Michigan examples of dissatisfaction with external con-
trols. 
It was quite an experience for me to go from the relatively 
quiet setting of a university professorship of public administration to 
the hot seat of Michigan state controller, responsible, under the gov-
ernor, for preparing the state's budget, for exercising the various 
follow-up controls associated with budget execution, and for handl-
ing such central housekeeping functions as accounting, purchasing, 
motor transport, and capital outlay construction. An ex-professor 
controller suddenly discovers that higher education-hitherto the cen-
ter of his universe-is only one of many state functions competing 
for the taxpayers' dollar. He is besieged for funds on all sides. The 
department of conservation wants 100 additional forest rangers and 
shouts that if it does not get them, there may be a conflagration 
which will destroy hundreds of thousands of trees, irreplaceable in 
our lifetime. The state police point to the mounting death toll on the 
highways and indicate the millions they must have to put an end to 
this holocaust. And the department of mental health-to hear this 
department's well-intentioned representatives talk, we must forth-
with construct a roof over the entire state, since all citizens are on 
the verge of mental breakdowns and will need hospitalization. Basi-
cally sympathetic to higher education, the ex-professor controller 
suddenly finds himself forced to initiate decisions as between higher 
education and other worthwhile government services. Having done 
so his task is not over, for he must then make recommendations 
whereby the figure for all higher education is allocated among the 
various colleges and universities in the state system. 
It is impossible to give higher education all that it ideally could 
use and requests. As the level of services which people demand of 
their state government rises, the competition for limited revenues be-
comes more severe. In Michigan we have not only the competition 
between higher education and the demands of mental health, state 
police, and conservation, for example, but the decline of the real 
property tax at the local level has led to increasing competition for 
state funds between state agencies on the one hand and local school 
and municipal agencies on the other. Higher education faces particu-
larly severe competition from the public secondary and elementary 
school people, who today draw substantial state support rather than 
rely wholly on local real property taxes. In this highly competitive 
atmosphere, state budget officers, governors, and legislators are un-
derstandably asking more and more detailed questions about the 
management and programs of public colleges and universities. 
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Michigan's two constitutionally independent universities have 
not readily accepted this situation. It seems to me that they have 
sometimes failed to appreciate their "public" character, one crucial 
aspect of which is public accountability and administrative life in a 
"goldfish bowl." The plain fact is that our universities are in "poli-
tics" and what they do is of concern to the outside public which 
foots the bills. As a political scientist this does not disturb me, for I 
view politics not as an evil thing but as an influence which can help 
universities to improve. 
In Michigan there is mounting criticism of the veil of secrecy 
with which our constitutionally independent universities have often 
surrounded themselves. For a number of years the two university 
governing boards refused to open their meetings to the public. The 
press was critical of these closed sessions and alleged a "right to 
know." Belatedly the governing boards did give in. However, neither 
constitutionally independent institution makes its internal operating 
budget available to the public, or for that matter, to the budget of-
fice, governor, or legislature. Specific requests for information are 
promptly complied with, but the entire document, from which the 
whole picture of the educational operation could be gauged, is not 
available. This secrecy, unique to the two universities, does not set 
well with state officials and legislators, or with the press. One does 
not have to be around the state capitol for long before he hears nu-
merous antagonistic comments about the "fourth branch" of state 
government. While there are great reservoirs of good will, some cracks 
are appearing. 
Your staff has been accumulating nation-wide evidence which 
may indicate a more and more questioning attitude toward public 
colleges and universities generally. A past president of the Associa-
tion of State Budget Officers told me recently that at their annual 
conferences there has been a hardening of critical comments by the 
membership. From an attitude of "Let's get together and work things 
out," which he says budget officers had a very few years ago, he now 
reports a change to an attitude that might be described as "You can't 
work with the colleges and universities, so let's go ahead on our own 
and knock them down to size." As Arthur Naftalin told you last 
year, budget people do not see higher education as unique. They are 
not likely to treat it as sacrosanct. They must allocate limited funds 
between competing services and are not for putting higher education 
on a pedestal. 
Not only is higher education in severe competition with other 
governmental services, with the obligation of first establishing its 
over-all portion of state appropriations, but individual colleges and 
universities are in competition with each other for that portion of 
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total funds to be allocated to higher education. The scramble for 
funds among the colleges and universities, always well publicized by 
the press, often hurts the prestige of higher education. 
Because in Michigan our six separate boards governing nine in-
stitutions reach little, if any, advance agreement, the battle for funds 
sometimes has descended to the level of name-calling between com-
peting institutions. On occasion clientele groups have been marshalled 
and the pressure on the legislature has been so severe that the legisla-
tive attitude has in a few instances become one of "a plague on all 
your homes." If public higher education in Michigan could agree and 
present a common front, some of the fumbling, inept questions raised 
by budget officers and legislators would never be asked. External in-
vestigators are particularly likely to look for duplication and waste 
when colleges and universities get away from their primary and 
unique function of teaching and research, into television, extension, 
and a variety of off-campus service activities. Single state boards of 
higher education to co-ordinate the separate institutions are not an 
absolute answer, any more than a single department of defense is the 
final answer to interservice rivalries. But colleges and universities in a 
particular state must maximize areas of agreement so as to present a 
common front. It is unseemly and ruinous to fight each other. 
So much for comments on the way relations between govern-
ment and higher education in Michigan look from the government 
end of the spectrum. Now let us turn to the opposite end. The two 
constitutionally independent universities, which receive their funds 
in a lump sum, have been singularly free to handle their own account-
ing, purchasing, and other administrative arrangements without ex-
ternal interference. However, in the capital outlay area, the legisla-
ture has more and more seen fit to tie up release of construction 
funds by requiring clearances from the state's building division. Also, 
self-liquidating projects which used to be authorized by the govern-
ing boards independently, now need legislative advance approval, 
even though they do not involve expenditure of state funds, and 
even though any taxpayer liability, should they go sour, would be 
moral rather than legal. However, up to now such approval has been 
automatic and perfunctory. 
I should mention one new development, namely recent appeals 
to the legislature by each of the constitutionally independent univer-
sities for special projects which, when granted, come in the form of a 
line item. Beginning with a special agricultural marketing program at 
Michigan State University in 1954 there has followed a traffic admin-
istration center and a labor and industrial relations center at the same 
university. The University of Michigan, a little slow in the up-take 
and perhaps fearing the implications of the line item for special 
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projects, has only this current year begun to push this approach in 
earnest. It has presented requests, which have been included in the 
governor's budget recommendations, for funds for an institute ofla-
bor and industrial relations, a Great Lakes research institute, a pro-
gram of research and service for small business enterprise in Michigan, 
and an institute of science and technology. If, as some observers 
have felt, the University of Michigan and Michigan State have been 
unusually fortunate in having fleXibility of educational management 
because of lump sum appropriations, we are witnessing a perceptible 
trend away from this in recent requests for special program items. 
One cannot be certain whether funds for these programs could only 
have been obtained on a line-item basis. Enthusiasm for line-item 
programs might dissipate rapidly if hindsight indicates them to be an 
incursion upon the concept of lump-sum appropriation. One gets the 
impression that some educators are going overboard on the salable, 
categorical programs at the expense of more central institutional ob-
jectives. Perhaps we are only witnessing here what has been true for 
a long time in the capital outlay area; namely, that it is easier to get 
a legislature to appropriate for medical and science buildings than for 
music and library buildings. 
In contrast to the two constitutionally independent universi-
ties, the other institutions present requests for funds after submitting 
a detailed proposed operating budget which is gone over by budget 
officials and legislative committees. They receive their operating 
funds not in a lump sum but under the three headings of (I) salaries 
and wages, (2) contractual services, supplies and materials, and (3) 
equipment. When it comes to spending their funds, these schools are 
subject to central accounting procedures, centralized purchasing con-
trols, and central motor pool surveillance. They do, of course, con-
trol their own personnel practices. 
In preparing for today's session I took pains to ask a number 
of Michigan college administrators how central state controls look to 
them. Do these officials feel that they are being assisted or are they 
being improperly circumscribed? On the whole there can be no ques-
tion that Michigan external controls are more wisely exercised than 
external controls in most states. I am convinced however that from 
the worm's eye point of view; rather than from the state controller 
point of view, there is plenty of room for improvement. There is 
many a slip between the statement of policy by the state controller, 
expressing sympathy for vesting large discretion in the educational 
institutions, and the actual carrying out of this policy by the person-
nel of the central controlling department. Time and again during my 
period in lansing, when conflicts between departmental personnel 
and educational institutions were called to my attention, I found it 
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necessary to reverse over-zealous centralist activities by my staff. 
Some staff members were real martinets. There are those who assert 
that there is a congenital tendency on the part of central purchasing, 
accounting, and budget people to get beyond their depth and to vio-
late the principle of service which they avow as their reason for being. 
I believe there is much truth in this claim. External control personnel, 
particularly those in the lower ranks, tend to "go by the book" and 
frequently show little real judgment or discretion. Their frame of 
mind emphasizes negative values. 
Let me briefly run over some of the headaches and criticisms 
which the institutions, other than the constitutionally independent 
schools, have brought out. 
I believe the basic complaint is related to the legislative prac-
tice of appropriating under the three headings mentioned above. 
Even though the gross appropriation is adequate, the schools cannot 
transfer moneys from any one of these three major accounts to the 
other in the interest of efficiency and flexibility to meet changed 
conditions. In one of our smaller institutions, whose enrollment has 
more than doubled in five years, tight budgeting has consistently un-
derestimated enrollments by as much as twenty per cent of total 
enrollment. The legislative policy for this institution encourages ac-
cepting all qualified applicants, but the school's administrators are 
handicapped by another legislative policy which prohibits transfers. 
Consequently, school officials hang on tenterhooks as they push 
through deficiency bills, not knowing until May of the fiscal year 
whether the legislative leaders will pick up the check for the deficit. 
As another example, one college controller told me that the "no-
transfer" rule sometimes leads to spending $300 from the salaries 
and wages account to build a supply cabinet which could have been 
bought for $100 from the exhausted equipment account. 
There is much complaint about unrealistic application of 
student-teacher ratio figures by budget personnel. Certainly Ferris 
Institute, with its extensive trade-technical program, and the Univer-
sity of Michigan, with its large graduate and professional program, 
should have student-teacher ratios which differ greatly from those 
suitable for schools where more traditional, essentially undergradu-
ate, programs dominate. Yet budget examiners do not make those 
distinctions and many an attempt to quantify and compare institu-
tions turns out to be a non sequitur. 
There are complaints about capital outlay controls. All educa-
tors are very conscious that budget office cuts in totals for new 
buildings may be necessary in view of current limited state capi-
tal outlay resources. However, the students will shortly be in 
college; additional construction will be too late and at inflated 
prices. 
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While the schools generally like central motor transport facili-
ties, they are less happy about the central purchasing unit. There are 
the usual complaints about long delays in receiving materials ordered. 
When central purchasers exercise their right to differ on specifica-
tions by adding a phrase permitting substitution of "or equal" 
products, the schools claim they get some pretty inferior substitu-
tions. They are almost bitter over recent attempts by the state pur-
chasing and accounting divisions to codify expenditures by materials 
groupings, and to apply these new account titles to all institutions, 
whether they be hospitals, prisons, state police posts, or educational 
institutions. In this way, instructional materials for pharmacy or 
chemistry classes are classified under the code as "hospital supplies," 
instructional materials used at the one institution teaching cos-
metology are classified as "housekeeping supplies," and trade and in-
dustrial class materials are coded as "maintenance supplies." One 
college controller told me that he had to keep two sets of books with 
separate classifications, because the state-imposed classifications did 
not give the true picture of educational operations. I could go on. 
Suffice it to say that the climate is one of ferment-the relationship 
between educational institutions and external control agencies is un-
easy, though not bitter as in some states. 
I should like now to make some constructive suggestions on 
how higher education might proceed so as to secure improved rela-
tions with government. Your committee is doing a fine job of ac-
cumulating the criticisms and gripes. But this is essentially a negative 
approach. In the end you will no doubt wish to consider a positive 
program. Although I have not given this the years of thought that 
most of you have devoted to the subject, I would like to present four 
suggestions which I believe you might well include in any action 
program. 
First, you should look at your campus educational role, and 
improve programs in public administration so as to raise the level of 
public service and turn out better potential government administra-
tors. 
Second, you should focus on the statutory jungle which gov-
erns external administrative control procedures in almost every state 
to the end of developing improved laws, if not model laws, for ac-
counting, purchasing, budgeting and so forth. 
Third, you should approach the national professional associa-
tions of state budget officers, purchasing officers, controllers, etc., 
talk over mutual problems, and in an atmosphere of frank discussion 
seek to improve relations. 
Fourth, higher education itself should demonstrate a very real 
concern about economy and efficiency, rightly defined, which 
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concern will make unnecessary many of the external controls pres-
ently being experienced. Let me now discuss each of these sugges-
tions in greater detail. 
Higher education can do much through its professional training 
programs to assure that we get better informed, professionally trained 
government officials. As I read the parade of horribles set forth in the 
early studies of the Committee, I am not so much depressed by the 
fact that these are improper interferences with higher education as I 
am by the fact that they represent violations of current administra-
tive doctrine, whether applied to higher education or to any other 
function of government. The pressures for centralized purchasing, 
for co-ordination of state expenditures for higher education through 
central budget preparation and executing agencies, for central super-
vision of capital outlay construction, etc., were based on a desire to 
improve the economy and efficiency of state government and to put 
an end to evils associated with wide dispersion of authority. But 
when external control agencies hamper rather than promote, when 
they unduly delay, as seems so often the case, their rationale dis-
appears. 
What is needed is better trained professional purchasing agents, 
budget officers, accounting officials, who recognize that they are not 
the main reason for government, but necessary evils. Applied to high-
er education they must come to understand that education is one of 
the major functions of government and that purchasing or budgeting 
or accounting or personnel officials have a supporting rather than 
dominating role. Where there is a conflict between external control 
officials and those responsible for carrying out such a major govern-
mental function as education, doubtful cases should be resolved in 
favor of the views of the major function officials. In cases of doubt, 
it is only with the greatest of temerity that the external control offi-
cials substitute their judgment for that of the major function officials 
who have the ultimate responsibility for getting the job done. 
Of course, whether there is doubt, is often a question. Even 
within educational institutions there are frequent conflicts between 
central administrative officials and the functional departments which 
are engaged in teaching and research. If you question this, you 
should read the delightful book by William G. Morse, the former 
Harvard purchasing officer, entitled Pardon My Harvard Accent. In 
this book he describes with much humor the difficulties he experi-
enced in attempts to economize and standardize and save money at 
Harvard. Professors have their idiosyncrasies and some are absolutely 
certain that they cannot write except with Venus lead pencils or with 
Parker ink, even though the purchasing officer contends that he can 
get off-brand products of equal quality at a much cheaper price. If 
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the professor insists on a Zeiss microscope while the purchasing offi-
cer contends that a Bausch and Lomb microscope is just as good and 
costs much less, we get into a somewhat more doubtful realm. If I 
were the purchasing agent I would be inclined to overrule the profes-
sor on the pencils and ink but would be inclined to give him his head 
on the microscope, on the theory that he is doing the research and 
will have to live with the microscope through the years. But other 
purchasing officers would very likely consider his desires for the 
more expensive microscope as being an idiosyncrasy which should be 
overruled. Even ink may be a doubtful case for I have heard librarians 
complain about the ink that purchasing has wasted its money on. 
Recent management literature has shifted the emphasis away 
from centralized managerial controls. Hierarchical values, while im-
portant, are being challenged by new concepts such as "Bottom-up 
Management." Present thinking is that we should decentralize, that 
the role of central control officials is to assist the departments and 
agencies and encourage them to develop their own control units. In 
purchasing, in budgeting, in personnel management, the new empha-
sis is to reverse the centralist trend of a few years ago. The federal 
Hoover Commission and most state Little Hoover Commissions have 
stressed decentralization. 
Fifty years ago a U.S. forest ranger could not sell a cord of 
wood without advance clearance from Washington. Not so long ago 
there would be long delays in the settling of minor claims arising 
from collisions between army vehicles and civilian motor cars due to 
centralized control procedures. Today these matters are handled 
quickly in the field, without the frustrating delays and increased pos-
sibility of error that would have been involved under previous more 
centralized procedures. Maybe the present generation of state ex-
ternal control officials are out of touch with these trends. However, 
it is up to higher education to make sure that our future graduates, 
many of whom are bound to move into external control positions, 
acquire a proper understanding of the primary responsibility of the 
major function agency to resolve the doubtful questions. The trend 
away from centralization of managerial controls is a confirmation of 
the axiom that not all roads should lead to the state capital. 
Turning now to my second suggestion, I have the impression 
that the laws dealing with accounting, purchasing, capital outlay, etc., 
laws which state officials are enforcing, are frequently outdated, in-
consistent, and as unpalatable to these officials as they are to the uni-
versities and colleges. It seems to me that the time is ripe for a frontal 
attack with the objective of modernizing these laws in particular 
states or of developing model laws which might be adopted rather 
generally by the several states. 
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As Michigan's state controller, I discovered that much of our 
accounting legislation was very ancient, adapted more to the horse 
and buggy days, than to the present. But in my short tour of duty I 
found no way to marshal support for a complete face lifting. Para-
doxically, Michigan had created a shiny-new central department of 
administration with the hope of introducing sound business manage-
ment in state government, but had left the new department with 
moss-encrusted accounting laws which proved a constant source of 
frustration. Well do I remember an attorney general's opinion, 
rendered late in the fiscal year, which suddenly informed all state 
agencies through the department of administration that it was no 
longer sufficient to order supplies and materials and encumber the 
appropriation within a fiscal year. There must be actual delivery of 
the ordered goods within the fiscal year. If there should be failure of 
delivery only for a few days beyond the end of the fiscal year the 
funds would lapse. A new request for funds would have to be justi-
fied and pushed tortuously through the legislature. This particular 
attorney general's ruling raised complete havoc. Yet no matter how 
sympathetic the state controller and his subordinates might be, it 
was necessary to apply the ruling to all agencies including the col-
leges and universities. 
In the purchasing area modern practice calls for delegating to 
the agency the authority to make small purchases within the local 
community without going through central competitive bidding pro-
cedures. Yet in many states the central purchasing people insist upon 
central handling of even the smallest purchase. While in some in-
stances they may require this out of pure cussedness, I suspect that 
at other times their hands are tied by law. Not infrequently statutes 
governing competitive bidding eliminate all discretion. Your commit-
tee might well explore the legislative jungle which governs external 
control procedures to see what can be done about making a better 
statutory environment for relations between higher education and 
government. 
As a third suggestion, it seems to me that there are many pos-
sibilities for improving relations between higher education and gov-
ernment through conversations with the professional associations of 
government officials. The state budget officers, state purchasing offi-
cers, and other groups have national organizations. It should be possi-
ble to get the viewpoint of higher education expressed by speeches at 
their national conferences. Joint committees to study common prob-
lems might be helpful. In a particular state, where there is a rather 
benighted state official riding herd on the colleges and universities, it 
may be possible to educate him through the admonitions or ribbing 
of his professional colleagues from the outside. After all, while he 
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may not be willing to listen to complaints from university represen-
tatives from his own state, many times he will react to the comments 
of his professional colleagues from other states. 
Finally, if there is any truth to the old adage that a good of-
fense is the best defense, it seems to me that it may well have appli-
cation in connection with the relations of higher education to ex-
ternal control officials. If the philosophy of decentralization, about 
which I have been talking, is actually to be implemented, it is up to 
the universities to demonstrate that they are as much concerned 
about efficient and economical management as are the advocates of 
external controls. Carping criticism will get nowhere in the face of 
strong public demand for economy and efficiency in state govern-
ment. There can be no doubt that colleges and universities have much 
to learn. With no harm to institutional objectives they could save 
public funds by paying greater attention to modern business prac-
tices. While Michigan's two constitutionally independent universities 
are on the whole very efficiently run, they could learn much from 
studying procedures that have been developed by the state depart-
ment of administration. The state motor pool, maintained by the de-
partment of administration, for example, makes cars available to op-
erating agencies for 5~ a mile and is completely self-supporting. As 
a professor at the University of Michigan, using the University of 
Michigan motor pool, my unit is charged 7p a mile. What are the rea-
sons for this difference in cost? They are worth exploring. In these 
days of taxpayer concern about rising governmental costs, external 
controls over higher education are bound to expand unless leaders of 
higher education can convince the public that they have as much con-
cern about operating costs as any external control official could ever 
have. This concern must be communicated to the public and internal 
administrative procedures must be tightened so as to reflect the con-
cern. 
Although the situation may look black at times, in any struggle 
between a prominent state university and state officials, never under-
estimate the power of the university. In Michigan, at least, it takes 
considerable temerity for a legislator to attack one or the other of 
the two major state institutions. The institutions have tremendous 
prestige, and their alumni, both of the real and of the synthetic va-
riety, are likely to remember criticisms of their favorite school when 
voting at the next election. Of course, much of the interference with 
universities occurs in the less public atmosphere of bureaucratic 
decision-making, and hence, it is not always easy to crystallize sup-
port for the university's viewpoint. However, let me remind you that 
if you are on the university end, you are probably exaggerating your 
helpless situation. Believe me when you are on the external-control-
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end, you feel that the best cards are in the hands of the leaders of 
higher education. I have no doubt that if you take pains to get your 
story across, you will win the day. 
5. JUDICIAL DECISION 
Regents of the University of Michigan v. Turner, Auditor General 
109 Mich. 135, 135-39; 66 N. W. 956 (1896) 
HOOKER, J. Certain lands granted by the Federal Government 
to the State as an endowment to the State University having been 
sold by the State, the fund resulting therefrom constitutes the uni-
versity fund. A similar provision exists for primary schools, while 
State land grants for the endowment of the State Normal School and 
the Agricultural College have resulted in funds for the support of 
these institutions. It is the custom of the State to pay interest upon 
such funds annually, the same having been paid from specific taxes. 
See Const. art. 14, § 1. Act No. 114, Laws 1845, provided for the 
payment of interest upon the primary school fund, at a rate therein 
specified, viz., 7 per cent. This act was repealed in express terms. See 
Rev. Stat. 1846, p. 736. 
Rev. Stat. 1846, p. 216, § 8, provides for interest for the uni-
versity and primary school funds in the following language: 
"Upon all sums paid into the state treasury on account of the 
principal of the university or primary school funds, except where 
other provision is or shall be made by law, the treasurer shall com-
pute interest from the time of such payment, or from the time of the 
last computation of interest thereon, to the first Monday of April in 
each and every year, and shall give credit therefor to the university-
or primary school interest fund, as the case may be, and such interest 
shall be paid out of the general fund." 
Laws 1847, p. 173, Act No. 107, makes provision for interest 
upon these funds from the annual state tax upon railroads. Laws 
1851, p. 116, Act No. 99, § 10, provides for the payment of interest 
upon the various educational funds. See, also, Laws 1853, p. 85, Act 
No. 60; Laws 1855, Act No. 73; Laws 1857, Act No. 56. 
Laws 1859, p. 397, Act No. 143, being 2 How. Stat. § 5360, 
provides: 
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"That the auditor general be, and he is hereby, requiredo to 
credit to the university interest fund, interest from and after the 
thirty-first day of December, eighteen hundred and sixty, on the en-
tire amount that has heretofore been, or may be hereafter, received 
by the State for university lands sold or contracted, and to draw his 
warrants upon the state treasurer for the same, who is hereby re-
quired to pay the same to the treasurer of the university upon his ap-
plication therefor, from time to time, as the said interest may accrue, 
and be required for the use of the university." 
Section 5361 is as follows: 
"The people of the State of Michigan enact, that upon all sums 
paid into the state treasury upon account of the principal of any of 
the educational funds, except where the provision is or shall be made 
by law, the auditor general shall compute interest from the time of 
such payment, or from the time of the last computation of interest 
thereon, to the first Monday of April in each and every year, and 
shall give credit therefor to each fund, as the case may be; and such 
interest shall be paid out of the specific taxes." 
Thus, it will be seen that at no time has the law fixed the rate 
of interest to be paid upon these funds in express terms, except by 
Act No. 114 of the Laws of 1845, which was repealed, as stated, the 
next year. During all of the time since 1845, up to the present year, 
7 per cent. upon the several funds has been paid by the State, and, 
up to the year 1887, 7 per cent. has been the rate of interest estab-
lished by the usury laws. In 1887 the general statute was changed, 
and the legal rate of interest upon money was then fixed at 6 per 
cent., where it has since remained. See Act No. 138, Pub. Acts 1887; 
Act No. 156, Pub. Acts 1891. 
The relators ask a writ of mandamus, to compel the payment 
of 7 per cent. upon the university fund. The question before us is, 
therefore, a construction of the statutes referred to. It appears to be 
conceded that the several laws providing for the payment of interest 
upon the university fund contemplated its computation at 7 per cent., 
that being the legal rate. It is a general rule of construction that, 
where an act is passed for a particular purpose, it is not abrogated by 
general legislation, sufficiently broad to include it, unless the intent 
to abrogate it is clear, under the maxim, "Generalia specialibus non 
derogant. "Earl of Derby v. Commissioners, L. R. 4 Exch. 226;Kid-
ston v. Insurance Co., L. R. 1 C. P. 546; Conservators of River 
Thames v. Hall, L R. 3 C. P. 419; Endl. Interp. Stat. § 223, and cases 
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this case, unless we are to say that the legislature intended that the 
legal rate should be paid upon the fund, whatever that rate might be. 
We think it more reasonable to say that, when those acts were 
passed, the intention was to pay interest at the then-existing legal 
rate, which was 7 per cent., and that the general statute was made a 
part of these several acts by reference, which reference must neces-
sarily be implied, as there could be no other means of determining 
the rate intended. The rule in such cases is that such adoption does 
not include subsequent additions or modifications of the statute so 
taken, unless it does so by express intent, and that the repeal of the 
statute adopted will not affect its operation as a part of the statute 
adopting it. Schlaudecker v. Marshall, 72 Pa. St. 200; Nunes v. Wel-
lisch, 12 Bush, 363; Knapp v. City of Brooklyn, 97 N.Y. 520;In re 
Main Street, 98 N. Y. 454; Allen v. Mayor, etc., of Savannah, 9 Ga. 
286; U.S. v. Paul, 6 Pet. 141; Kendall v. U.S., 12 Pet. 524; Clarke v. 
Bradlaugh, 8 Q. B. Div. 69;Darmstaetter v. Moloney, 45 Mich. 621. 
The latter case is as closely analogous to this as it could well be 
without raising the identical question before us. In that case the char-
ter of the city of Detroit provided that "the assessor * * * shall be, 
and is hereby, vested with the powers and duties of supervisors, as 
provided by the laws of this State" etc. It will be noticed that this 
does not specifically refer to any particular statute or statutes, but in 
a general way it adopts such as prescribe the duties of supervisors, 
and it cannot be doubted that the effect would have been the same 
had the words "as provided by the laws of this State" been omitted, 
as they would have been clearly implied. It might as well be said in 
that case that the legislature intended that the duties of the assessor 
should change, like those of supervisors, with changes in the law fix-
ing the duties of the latter, as to say in this case that the legislature 
intended that the rate of interest to be paid upon the educational 
funds should change from time to time, with changes made in the 
usury laws, because the act providing for the payment of such inter-
est failed to fix a specific sum as the rate to be paid, or to specifically 
mention the then-existing law fixing the legal rate of interest, which 
was unnecessary. This court held in the case cited that changes in 
the duties of supervisors did not affect the assessor of Detroit, say-
ing: 
"The case falls under the rule that a piece of legislation for a 
particular city, which adopts, under general words of reference, a 
specific regulation in a separate general law, is not to be taken as 
adopting prospectively the future alterations in the provision of the 
general law so appropriated, unless the intent therefor is express or 
strongly implied." 
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It is reasonable to suppose that the framer of the interest law 
had not in mind the question of interest upon educational funds, 
and, if he had, there is nothing to call attention to that subject in the 
bill or title; and while we do not say that this would be fatal to the 
bill, or exclude the respondent's contention, if the intent were mani-
fest, the construction here given to this act is in harmony with the 
spirit of the Constitution, which provides safeguards against con-
cealed or unintended legislation. 
These principles seem to us conclusive of the question, and the 
writ will issue as prayed, but without costs. 
The other Justices concurred. 
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CHAPTER VI 
EMINENT DOMAIN 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Under our form of government private property cannot be 
taken from the owner except for a public purpose. The courts 
have affirmed that use by a public university constitutes there-
quired public purpose. 
In Brooks, 1 the property involved was to be the site of the 
Lawyers' Club of the University of Michigan Law School. The 
Lawyers' Club is used mainly as a student dormitory, and, ap-
parently this use was challenged because at that time the lodging 
of students was almost exclusively the function of private board-
ing houses, some of which were probably condemned to make 
way for the Lawyers' Club. The court, however, had no trouble 
in sanctioning this use of condemned land, and to show how far 
the University must go, the court seemed to have no more diffi-
culty approving the construction of an 18-hole golf course on 
condemned land in Pommerening. 
The tenants of a hotel about to be condemned in the 
Hooper case would have had a right to challenge the "necessity" 
of the taking in a condemnation case, but, when the owners 
agreed to sell the property to Wayne University, the tenants had 
no standing to challenge the sale. 
In the final case in this chapter, the Michigan Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the right of the Board of Trustees of Western 
Michigan University to condemn land adjacent to the University 
campus for use as a nature park. The court rejected as "fool-
hardy" the contention that the taking of land for such a use was 
not necessary for the welfare of students who are no longer in-
terested in the "birds and the bees." 
The statutes setting forth the procedure in these condem-
nation cases are appended to this chapter. 
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2. JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
The People ex rei. The Regents of the University of Michigan v. 
Brooks 
224 Mich. 45, 46-53; 194 N. W. 602 (1923) 
McDONALD, J. This is a review by certiorari of certain con-
demnation proceedings had in the circuit court of Washtenaw 
county. An alumnus of the university of Michigan proposed to the 
regents that he would contribute a million and a half dollars for the 
construction of a building to be used for law school purposes, and to 
be known as "The Lawyers' Club." The regents accepted the pro-
posal and arranged with the State administrative board for the money 
with which to purchase a portion of two blocks immediately south 
of the campus as a site for the building. Eleven property owners re-
fused to sell, and it became necessary for the board of regents to en-
deavor to acquire the title by judicial condemnation. By resolution 
of November 24, 1922, they declared the taking of this property a 
public necessity for use of the university and directed the attorney 
general of the State of Michigan to institute condemnation proceed-
ings. A petition was filed, trial was had, and on February 6, 1923, the 
jury rendered its verdict, finding a public necessity for the taking of 
the property and awarding the defendants damages in various 
amounts, totaling $230,874. The court entered an order confirming 
the verdict. Six of the property owners accepted the amount awarded 
them and made deeds to the university. Five are here seeking a review 
of the proceedings. 
The first question presented by the record is stated by de-
fendants in their brief as follows: 
"The statute under which the proceedings were brought is un-
constitutional, to the extent that it attempts to authorize proceed-
ings in behalf of the regents of the university of Michigan, because 
the title of the statute is not broad enough to authorize the enact-
ment of such authority." 
The proceedings were brought under Act No. 236 of the Public 
Acts of 1911 (1 Comp. Laws 1915, § 349 et seq.), the title of which 
reads as follows: 
"An act to authorize proceedings by the State to condemn pri-
vate property for public use." 
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The following provisions of the Constitution of the State of 
Michigan form the basis of defendants' objections to the title in 
question. 
"No law shall embrace more than one object which shall be ex-
pressed in its title." * * * Const. 1908, Art. 5, § 21. 
"The regents of the university and their successors in office 
shall continue to constitute the body corporate known as "The Re-
gents of the University of Michigan.' " Art. 11, § 4. 
"The board of regents shall have the general supervision of the 
university and the direction and control of all expenditures from the 
university funds." Art. 11, § 5. 
"The regents of the university of Michigan shall have power to 
take private property for the use of the university in the manner pre-
scribed by law.'' Art. 13, § 4. 
It is argued by the defendants that the title only authorizes 
proceedings by the State, that "The Regents of the University of 
Michigan" is a constitutional corporation, independent of the State, 
separate and distinct in its authority, and, therefore, the title does 
not indicate that one of the objects of the legislation is the taking of 
private property by that corporation. While it is true that "TheRe-
gents of the University of Michigan.'' more commonly called the 
"board of regents," is a separate entity, independent of the State as 
to the management and control of the university and its property, it 
is nevertheless a department of the State government, created by the 
Constitution to perform State functions, and the real estate which it 
holds, or acquires, is public property belonging to the State, held by 
the corporation in trust for the purposes of the university which are 
public purposes. See Auditor General v. Regents of the University, 
83 Mich. 467 (10 L. R A 376). 
In support of their conception of the legal character of this 
corporation, counsel for the defendants seem to rely on Weinberg v. 
Regents of the University, 97 Mich. 246. A careful reading of the 
opinion of Justice GRANT in that case will show that the decision 
is based solely on the constitutional right of the regents to the ab-
solute and exclusive control of all university property. That right has 
been recognized by every judicial decision of this court in which this 
question has been considered. It has become the well settled purpose 
and policy of the law. But it has not been held that the university 
was not a State institution, or that the real estate which the regents 
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are authorized to acquire and hold for university purposes is not 
property of the State. The following cases are of interest on the his-
tory of the university and the constitutional powers and duties of its 
board of regents. Regents of the University v. Board of Education, 4 
Mich. 213; Regents of the University v. Detroit Young Men's Society, 
12 Mich. 138; Sterling v. Regents of the University, 110 Mich. 369 
(34 L. R A. 150);Regents of the University v. Auditor General, 167 
Mich. 444. 
With this understanding as to the character of the corporation, 
it will plainly be seen that there is here no constitutional objection 
to the title of the act in question. The one general purpose as ex-
pressed in the title and in the body of the act is the same, viz., the 
condemnation of private property for public use. Every section is 
germane to the object expressed in the title. It is not necessary for 
compliance with the constitutional requirement that the various in-
stitutions for which the land is to be used should be designated in 
the title. In Loomis v. Rogers, 197 Mich. 265, this court, speaking 
through Mr. Justice STEERE, said: 
"If the act centers to one main general object or purpose which 
the title comprehensively declares, though in general terms, and if 
provisions in the body of the act not directly mentioned in the title 
are germane, auxiliary or incidental to that general purpose, the con-
stitutional requirement is met. 
••A title is but a descriptive caption, directing attention to the 
subject-matter which follows." 
We think the general object of the act under which this pro-
ceeding is brought is sufficiently expressed in its title. 
It is further urged by counsel for the defendants that though 
the act be constitutional in respect to its title, it does not include the 
board of regents, because it provides that the judgment of confmna-
tion vests the title of the land in the State instead of in the corpora-
tion, and requires the proceeding to be brought in the name of the 
State. In this regard it is the claim of counsel that only the regents in 
their corporate capacity can hold title to the property, and that the 
Constitution gives the corporation the right of eminent domain in its 
own name. It will be observed, however, that this right is to be exer-
cised by the regents in ••the manner prescribed by law." The act in 
question is apparently the attempt of the legislature to prescribe the 
proceeding necessary to the exercise of this power. We see no consti-
tutional objection to the provision requiring the suit to be prosecuted 
in the name of the State. It is the manner prescribed by law. The 
money for the payment of this property was furnished by the State, 
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and deposited in court by the administrative board for the payment 
of the judgment. The title to the land was taken and is held by the 
State, by consent of the board of regents, for the use and benefit of 
the university. The buildings to be erected thereon are for the use of 
the people, under the exclusive management and control of the re-
gents. The State alone may not sell it or divert it from the use for 
which it was acquired. The regents could not sell it if the title had 
vested in their corporation. It is the public property of the State de-
voted to a particular public purpose, and whether held by the State 
or by the regents in their corporate capacity, it is still subject to the 
absolute control of the latter, and that is all the Constitution requires. 
Our attention has not been called to any law prohibiting the State of 
Michigan from holding title to lands for the use and benefit of the 
university. Inherently it may do so. The right of the regents of the 
university, however, to take and to hold title in their corporate ca-
pacity for the purposes of the university is unquestioned, and, 
though it is not a constitutional right, if the exercise of that right be 
necessary to the absolute management and control of the property, 
to permit the State to take it would be a violation of the spirit and 
purposes of the provisions of the Constitution, as construed by this 
court. But as affecting the question of control, it would seem to be 
immaterial whether the title of real estate be held by the regents or 
by the State. The mere holding of the title without the right to sell 
or divert, or to manage or control, could not interfere with the pres-
ent constitutional powers of the board of regents. It is held by the 
State subject to the right of the regents, to exclusively control and 
manage it. There is no constitutional objection to the requirement 
that title to the land shall vest in the State. If the State may hold the 
title, the law in question is applicable to proceedings by the regents 
for the judicial condemnation of land for use of the university. It was 
plainly so intended by the legislature, and, we think, in its enactment, 
due regard was given to the constitutional rights and powers of the 
regents. They are not here questioning it. 
The third objection raised by defendants in their brief is "That 
the use for which the property is being taken is not a public use." 
The following letter from the donor, supplemented by the testimony 
of university officials, clearly shows the necessity of the proposed 
building for use of the students attending the law school: 
"To the Board or Regents, 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 
"Dear Sirs:-If agreeable to you, I will erect on the two blocks 
on South University avenue, between South State street and Tappan 
avenue, a law students' combined club and dormitory building, with 
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the same advantages as you have extended to other buildings, namely, 
the university to furnish free heat, light, and power. The building is 
to be known as 'The Lawyers' Oub,' to be governed by five gover-
nors, consisting of the dean of the law faculty (who shall be presi-
deht), and four other governors to be selected by the board of regents 
from the law faculty. All members of the law school are to be eligible 
to membership in the proposed club, subject to such conditions as 
the club authorities may prescribe. All lawyers whether residing in 
the State or not, and whether previously connected with the univer-
sity or not, shall be eligible to membership, subject to being elected 
by governors. All occupants of the building shall be members of the 
club and shall pay annual dues as the governors may determine, and 
are to be selected by the dean of the law school from the senior law 
class. Members of the club not living in the building shall also pay 
such annual dues as the governors may determine. Going prices shall 
be charged for rooms and board. 
"The proposed building will furnish sleeping and study rooms 
for one hundred and fllty law students and dining accommodations 
for three hundred. 
"All dues and all profits from the operation of the building 
shall be used exclusively for legal research work, to be expended 
from time to time as the governors may deem best. This legal re-
search work will render possible the study of comparative jurispru-
dence and legislation, National and State, and also of foreign coun-
tries, ancient and modern. Such work should be of use in proposed 
legislation, and besides leading to the production of reliable law 
treatises and studies, would help to systematize the law as a science. 
The European plan of giving leisure time to professors to pursue 
their studies and produce original works, may well be applied in 
America to professors of law, who at present are absorbed too ex-
clusively in classroom work. A legal research fund could be used to 
pay part of their salaries, thus giving them time for original research. 
"The character of the legal profession depends largely on the 
character of the law schools. Real lawyers were never needed more 
than now, and they have grave responsibilities. There never was a 
time when they had so much power as now. It will be for the lawyers 
to hold this great republic together, without sacrifice of its demo-
cratic institutions. 
"Yours very truly, 
"April 25, 1922." 
The claim that the property to be acquired is not for public 
use is so plainly without merit that we do not deem it necessary to 
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The final objection to the proceeding relates to the failure of 
the jury to allow Rose T. Lueck any damages for the impairment of 
the value of the east 44 feet of her lot not included in the petition 
for condemnation. Under proper instructions the court left this ques-
tion to the jury. The verdict made no reference to damages to the 
east 44 feet, but awarded a lump sum of $14,000. The evidence 
taken as to damages, which counsel say is undisputed, is not in-
cluded in the return, and we are therefore unable to determine the 
question raised. 
After careful consideration of the various questions presented 
by this record, we are convinced that there is no ground for issuing 
the writ of certiorari. The writ heretofore issued will be dismissed, 
with costs to the plaintiff. 
WIEST, C. J., and FELLOWS, CLARK, BIRD, SHARPE, 
MOORE, and STEERE, JJ., concurred. 
The People ex rei. Regents of the University of Michigan v. 
Pommerening 
250 Mich. 391, 393-98; 230 N.W. 194 (1930) 
WIEST, C. J. The university of Michigan is a corporation, vested 
with right to invoke the power of eminent domain. 
For declared educational purposes, the regents of the univer-
sity, desiring land for an 18-hole golf course, instituted this proceed-
ing to acquire, by condemnation, 10% acres of defendants' land. A 
jury in the Washtenaw circuit found the necessity for taking the land 
and awarded defendants $11,058 compensation. Defendants con-
tested the alleged need, asserted the power was being exercised in be-
half of the board in control of athletics of the university of Michigan, 
a corporate entity, without right to invoke the power of eminent 
domain, and sought compensation in excess of the sum awarded. 
The proceeding to take the land was brought under Act No. 
236, Pub. Acts 1911 (1 Comp. Laws 1915, § 349 et seq.), authoriz-
ing proceedings by the State to condemn private property for public 
use. The act is silent upon the subject of review. Act No. 149, Pub. 
Acts 1911 (1 Comp. Laws 1915, § 353 et seq.), also authorizes pro-
ceedings by State agencies and public corporations to condemn pri-
vate property for public use. That act provides for review by appeal. 
Why one act provides for and maps procedure for review, and the 
other, enacted at the same session of the legislature, is silent on the 
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subject, when both acts are, in practical effect, in pari materia, is not 
apparent. 
Defendants made application for and were allowed to take out 
a writ of error, and the point is raised that certiorari, and not error, 
is the proper method of review. Certiorari is the right method and we 
now so term the review, and proceed as upon certiorari, and, within 
the limits of such review, to determine questions presented. 
The needs of a great educational institution involve no judicial 
question, except it is made to appear that the desire of those having 
the management thereof outruns reason, and it is sought to take pri-
vate property for a purpose foreign to educational purposes. The 
necessity for taking defendants' land, in order to establish a golf 
course for educational purposes of the university, was an issue before 
the jury, and, by verdict, found to exist. The evidence supported the 
verdict, and we cannot hold, as a matter of law, that in no event can 
such necessity exist. 
The court did not give a requested instruction that the land 
was wanted for a golf course, but such was the whole trend of the 
evidence and the admitted purpose of the proceeding, and every one, 
inclusive of the jurors, so understood. The requested instruction 
stated no more than the obvious, and there was no error in not giving 
it. Error assigned upon exclusion and admission of evidence, with 
one exception, needs no review. 
The land taken was but part of defendants' holding. Their land 
was suitable for platting, and the court admitted testimony that the 
golf course would benefit the land not taken. This was error. No law 
so permits, and all holdings forbid. The error, however, so far as pos-
sible, was cured by instruction to the jury that such claimed benefit 
must not be considered in fixing compensation. We cannot fmd the 
error reflected in the award. The compensation awarded was less than 
claimed by defendants and more than fixed by many of plaintiffs 
witnesses. The award, being within the range of evidence submitted, 
may not be disturbed under review by certiorari. 
It is claimed that no sufficient effort to purchase was made. 
The statute authorizing the proceeding does not require an effort to 
purchase, and, in such case, an effort to purchase is not necessary. 
Commission of Conservation v. Hane, 248 Mich. 473. 
Defendants ftled objections to confirmation of the verdict, 
stating that one juror was not a freeholder and another was disquali-
fied by reason of his interest, as co-owner with Mr. Burke, counsel 
for plaintiff, in a parcel of land used by witnesses as a basis of com-
parison as to value. The statute required a jury of resident freehold-
ers and the court ordered such to be summoned. The record shows 
the examination, by counsel, of the jurors, but no inquiry of whether 
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they were freeholders, and, at the close of the examination, counsel 
announced satisfaction with the jury. The qualifications of the jurors 
should have been inquired into upon the voir dire examination, and 
challenge for cause, if any, then exercised. The objection now made 
was waived. Village of Paw Paw v. Flook, 214 Mich. 486, and cases 
there cited. The objection to the other juror is without merit. A juror 
is not disqualified by such a trend of evidence at the trial. 
In the brief, counsel for defendants put this question: 
"Have the board of regents of the university of Michigan, act-
ing through the State, the power to condemn land for the use and 
benefit of a private corporation, whose funds, not the State's or uni-
versity's, will pay for the purchase of the property condemned?" 
The answer is no. A State agency, vested with power of emi-
nent domain, may not employ the power, directly or indirectly, for 
the use and benefit of another, unless so authorized by law. But the 
answer given to the question does not at all decide this case. 
The regents, by resolution, declared it necessary, for the de-
velopment of physical education as an integral part of a broad pro-
gram of education, to acquire the property for the use of the univer-
sity, and requested the attorney general to institute the proceeding 
at bar. The jury found the averred necessity, the court confrrmed the 
verdict, and vested title to the property in the State of Michigan, for 
the use of the regents of the university of Michigan. 
The compensation awarded defendants was deposited in court 
by the regents. But it is contended that the purpose of this proceed-
ing is to obtain the land for the use and benefit of a corporate entity 
existing wholly apart from control and management of the regents. 
In 1924, under the provisions of Act No. 84, Pub. Acts 1921, 
and as a creature of the board of regents, a nonprofit corporation was 
organized for the declared purpose of "The furtherance of general or 
physical betterment of the students at the university of Michigan, 
particularly the conduct of intercollegiate athletics in said institu-
tion." The name adopted was "Board of Control of Athletics of the 
University of Michigan." In the articles of incorporation it was also 
stated: 
"Said corporation is to be fmanced under the following general 
plan: Funds for operating affairs of the corporation are to be derived 
from (1) proceeds of sale of tickets for athletic contests; (2) athletic 
fees collected by university of Michigan and paid to this corpora-
tion." 
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The qualifications required of officers and members were fixed 
by the articles as follows: 
"Election or designation by board of regents as member of gov-
erning board or committee in charge of intercollegiate athletics at 
the university of Michigan." 
Supplementing this the by-laws of the corporation provided: 
"The business of this corporation shall be the control and man-
agement of intercollegiate. and other athletics at the university of 
Michigan; the furtherance of the physical development of the stu-
dents thereof; the control and management of such property of the 
university as is now, or may hereafter be, devoted to this purpose, all 
in so far as the governing body of the university of Michigan has or 
shall from time to time delegate to the board in control of athletics 
of said university; the construction or extension of present plant fa-
cilities for this purpose; the collection, control and disbursement of 
all revenues derived from athletic games or contests or any other 
source." 
The secretary of the board of regents, and business manager of 
the university, testified that he presented to the board of regents the 
resolution upon which this proceeding was initiated, and from his 
personal knowledge of the athletic program of the university, "the 
acquiring of this property is a part of the general program of the 
athletic development of the university of Michigan at the present 
time." We omit further quoting of testimony. The evidence clearly 
establishes the fact that the board in control of athletics of the uni-
versity of Michgian, while a corporate entity, is but an operating 
agency of the regents of the university in the management of desig-
nated educational activities, and, at all times, under full control of 
the regents. 
We fmd no reversible error. 
Mfirmed, with costs against defendants. 
BUTZEL, CLARK, POTTER, SHARPE, NORTH, and FEAD, 
JJ., concurred. McDONALD, J., did not sit. 
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Hooper v. Board of Education of the City of Detroit 
315 Mich. 202; 23 N.W. 2d 692 (1946) 
BUTZEL, Chief Justice. 
Adeline M. Hooper, plaintiff, a resident of the city of Detroit, 
Michigan, in a bill of complaint alleged that she resided in the Web-
ster Hall Hotel (and that on behalf of herself and upwards of 570 
other tenants she seeks to restrain the purchase of the hotel property 
and the fixtures and appurtenances at private sale to the Board of 
Education of the City of Detroit, defendant herein. The property 
consists of a very large hotel building opposite the campus of Wayne 
University, which is a part of the educational system owned and con-
ducted by defendant. Plaintiff concedes that proper proceedings to 
condemn the property were brought in the recorder's court of the 
city of Detroit, and in which she and 570 tenants, or thereabouts, ap-
peared and categorically denied that there was a public necessity for 
the taking of the property. While the condemnation proceedings 
were pending, defendant entered negotiations for a contract for the 
purchase of the property for $1,200,000, which amount defendant 
has available. After the bill of complaint was filed, defendant entered 
into further negotiations with a financial institution for the issuance 
and sale of self-liquidating revenue bonds in the amount of 
$2,000,000, which would be amply sufficient to pay the purchase 
price of the property and the cost of expensive remodeling and im-
proving of the property so as to adapt it for the purposes of the uni-
versity. There can be no question after reading the record that de-
fendant has reason to believe it very necessary and essential to 
acquire the property for its purposes, and that the present tenants 
of the hotel may have considerable difficulty in obtaining suitable 
new living quarters because of the lack of housing facilities in the 
city of Detroit. On the other hand, the university in its attempts to 
take care of over 12,000 students, a large number of whom are re-
turning veterans, and to participate in the national program to in-
crease the number of trained nurses, has a pressing need for the 
property, as its present buildings are woefully inadequate. 
The bill of complaint mainly stresses the claim that, as there is 
a condemnation suit pending in which the necessity of taking the 
property is controverted by the present tenants of the rooms of the 
hotel, the plaintiff and those on whose behalf she has filed the bill 
are entitled to their day in court in order to have the question of 
necessity determined. 
* * * 
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Plaintiff claims a right to sue both as a tenant and taxpayer. 
The defendant concedes that the purchase of the property by the 
city must be subject to such rights, if any, plaintiff and the other 
tenants may have obtained from the present owners of the hotel. Her 
right to sue as a taxpayer has not been questioned in the lower court. 
After the filing of the bill of complaint, in which many allegations 
were made on information and belief, a sworn answer was filed by 
defendant in which it categorically denies some of the charges made 
on information and belief, and, as to these charges, on motion to 
dismiss there is no presumption that they are true, inasmuch as the 
allegations to the contrary in the answer have not been controverted. 
Case v. City of Saginaw, 291 Mich. 130, 288 N.W. 357. A motion to 
dismiss the bill of complaint was made and some testimony taken. 
The trial judge entered a decree dismissing the bill of complaint, and 
plaintiff appeals. We shall discuss the main questions raised. 
The first and main question stressed on appeal is whether de-
fendant can purchase the property during the pendency of condem-
nation proceedings in which a question of necessity must be passed 
upon by a jury. The answer is unequivocally in the affirmative. De-
fendant is a State agency clothed with the power of eminent do-
main and as such has a right to discontinue condemnation proceed-
ings any time before confirmation of the verdict of the jury. See In 
re Board of Education of Detroit, 242 Mich. 658, 219 N.W. 614, 
where condemnation proceedings were also brought, as in the instant 
case, under Act No.149, Pub. Acts 1911, as amended, 1 Comp. Laws 
1929, § 3763 et seq., Stat. Ann. § 8.11 et seq., which act permits 
the petitioning body to withdraw any property whenever such will 
not interfere with the substantial rights of the parties, or it may dis-
continue the condemnation proceedings before the confirmation of 
the verdict of the jury. And see In re Huron-Clinton Metropolitan 
Authority, 306 Mich. 373, 10 N.W. 2d 920, where we permitted the 
withdrawal of several parcels, as well as the acceptance of some as a 
gift, and the purchase of other parcels without the· determination of 
necessity. Plaintiff relies on In re Board of Education of City of 
Grand Rapids, 249 Mich. 550,229 N.W. 470, in which condemnation 
proceedings were begun against three parcels of land. During the pro-
ceedings one parcel was purchased. The validity of the purchase was 
not attacked, the court merely deciding that as to the two small par-
cels not purchased, the condemnation proceedings must be con-
tinued. Plaintiff also relies on Detroit v. Judge of Recorder's Court, 
253 Mich. 6, 234 N.W. 445, which is not at all applicable. We simply 
held that in order to transform a park into a wide roadway against 
the protests of the abutting property owners, who claimed an ease-
ment, it was necessary for the city to bring condemnation proceedings 
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in which necessity would be determined and damages to the abutting 
property owners on account of the destruction of their easement 
and to the holders of the reversion would be awarded. There was no 
purchase of the property involved. 
Plaintiff, however, claims that under Article 13 of the Consti-
tution of 1908, "private property shall not be taken by the public 
nor by any corporation for public use, without the necessity therefor 
being first determined," et cetera. It will be noted that Article 13 is 
entitled "eminent domain" and it is obvious that this section refers 
only to taking of property by eminent domain." It is unquestion-
ably true that where the property is sought to be condemned, the 
above quoted constitutional provision applies, but it does not apply 
where property is being purchased. 
It was stated in Allen v. Rogers, 246 Mich. 501, 505, 224 N.W. 
632, 634: "In this state no man's land can be taken from him for 
public use except by gift, purchase, or condemnation. If he is un-
willing to dedicate it and will not sell for a reasonable price, resort 
may be had to condemnation." 
* * * 
The decree dismissing the bill of complaint is affirmed without 
costs as a public question is involved. 
CARR, BUSHNELL, SHARPE, REID, NORTH, and STARR, 
JJ ., concurred with BUTZEL, C. J. 
BOYLES, J., concurred in the result. 
Western Michigan University v. Slavin 
6 Mich. App. 291, 293-97; 148 N.W. 2d 908 (1967) 
McGREGOR, J. This appeal arises out of eminent domain pro-
ceedings initiated by the board of trustees of Western Michigan Uni-
versity. Appellants own undeveloped and wooded land adjacent to 
the University's land. There is dispute whether the parcel comprises 
approximately 40.09 acres or approximately 38 acres of land; how-
ever, this difference is not as serious as it could be, as the adjoining 
land of the acquiring university is also undeveloped and wooded. In 
May, 1964, the University was granted authority by the legislature to 
construct resident halls and a food service center to accommodate 
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1,100 students. In November of 1964, the board of trustees adopted 
a resolution declaring it would be necessary to take the subject par-
cel for public purposes. 
During the 14~ day trial, which produced a voluminous record, 
there was introduced widely divergent expert testimony as to the 
value of the parcel. The appellee introduced two expert witnesses 
who both testified the highest and best use for the land was for 
single-family residences, and set the value at $29,200 and $30,000 
respectively. 
Appellant introduced two expert witnesses who set the highest 
and best use of the land as for development of multifamily apart-
ment buildings, and set the value at $414,000 and $476,500 respec-
tively. The appellants were prohibited by the trial judge from intro-
ducing into evidence a purported sales contract between the appellants 
and an Ohio corporation, wherein the subject parcel would be sold 
for apartment-house development for $620,000 less costs of streets, 
sewers, and water lines on the property. 
The jury returned a verdict declaring the necessity of taking 
the property and set just compensation of $145,000. Judgment was 
entered confirming that verdict. 
This appeal was filed after appellants' motions for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial were denied. 
This appeal proceeds on several claims of error and theories. 
Appellants claim error in that the purported sales contract with the 
Ohio corporation was refused admission by the trial judge, that there 
was insufficient evidence from which the jury could determine the 
necessity of taking the subject parcel, that the appellee lacked the 
necessary authority to condemn the subject parcel, that instructions 
to the jury on the credibility of witnesses was inadequate, and that 
the verdict of the jury was inadequate and without evidentiary sup-
port. 
Evidence of sales contracts or offers traditionally have been 
suspect as tools in condemnation evaluations. See Annotation, 7 
ALR2d 781 (1947). Such evidence is prone to fraud and uncertainty. 
Sharp v. United States (1903), 191 US 341 (24 S Ct 114, 48 Led 
211 ). Certainly such offers must be bona fide and the parties capable 
of performance. City of Kalamazoo v. Balkema (1930), 252 Mich 
308; City of Grand Rapids v. Ellis (1965), 375 Mich. 406. In this 
case, an Ohio corporation purportedly entered into the contract of 
purchase; however, there was insufficient proof that the corporation 
could fulfill its obligation under the contract. There is only the un-
supported testimony of a witness, who claimed to be an officer of 
the aforesaid corporation, that he had seen the reports of the cor-
poration and that it had the necessary funds or capital-raising 
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potential to carry out the purchase. The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to allow the admission of the proffered sales 
agreement, as there was insufficient foundation laid by the appellant 
to insure the reliability of the evidence. 
The argument was presented by the appellants that the board 
of directors of Western Michigan University did not present sufficient 
evidence of the necessity of taking the subject parcel for the question 
to go to the jury. Appellants argued that the board did not show the 
necessity of approving a campus development plan encompassing 
the appellants' land and maintaining land owned by the university, 
adjacent to the subject parcel, as a recreational and nature-study 
area. Appellants' counsel argued that today's youth are no longer in-
terested in the "birds and the bees", thus the proposed nature park 
is foolhardy. It is this Court's opinion that such an argument is un-
fortunate and ill-informed. The board of trustees of Western Michi-
gan University has the responsibility of maintaining an institution to 
educate several thousand students. Const 1963, art 8, § 6, PA 1963 
(2d Ex Sess), No 48, as amended (Stat Ann 1965 Cum Supp 
§ 15.1120{1) et seq.). Its determination of necessity is prima facie 
evidence of necessity. City of Allegan v. Vonasek (1932), 261 Mich 
16; In reAcquisition of Land for Civic Center {1953), 335 Mich 
582. There was testimony by the members of the board of trustees 
and the faculty of the university that the park and recreational 
areas planned are important to the physical and psychological well-
being of the students. The board of trustees declared, and supported 
with testimony, that it is necessary to the well-being of the students 
to provide grouped student residential facilities, with open spaces 
and recreational and park areas close to student dormitories. Such 
testimony was competent evidence to go to the jury on the question 
of necessity. 
The appellants seem to argue that the proper course for uni-
versity development is to place future buildings by considering only 
where there is physical room for them and where the ground is 
proven capable of supporting such buildings. There was testimony of 
experts on drainage and sewer facilities that supports the proposition 
that the proposed park area would be undesirable for dormitories 
even under the appellants' limited criteria for adequate construc-
tion sites. Thus, under the theories of both the appellants and ap-
pellee, we find the jury had sufficient basis for the fmding that it was 
necessary for the subject parcel to be taken for a public purpose. 
As to the argument that the board of trustees lacked the requi-
site legal authority to condemn the subject parcel, we find that it had 
the necessary authority by virtue of PA 1963 (2d Ex Sess), No 48, 
as amended by PA 1964, No 14 (Stat Ann 1965 Cum Supp 
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§ 15.1120[8]); House Concurrent Resolution No 61 (1962), House 
Journal, pp 1302, 1934; and House Concurrent Resolution No 58 
(1964), House Journal, pp 850, 1824, which specifically authorized 
the construction of the new dormitories for Western Michigan Uni-
versity. 
The appellants claim that there was an improper instruction as 
to the credibility of witnesses in that there should have been an in-
struction that, if the testimony of a witness was false in one regard, 
it was false in the whole. Appellants' attorney noted his exception 
to the charge in this regard immediately after the charge. The trial 
judge refused to modify . his charge on the ground& that it was ade-
quate as given. We agree. The proposed charge would have been in-
correct. If the testimony is false in one aspect, the jury may in its 
discretion, disregard the entire testimony, or it may give credence to 
other testimony supported by other witnesses or evidence. People v. 
Johns (1953), 336 Mich 617; People v. Hunter (1963), 370 Mich 
262. It is the opinion of this Court that reversible error was not com-
mitted by the trial court in charging the jury. 
The precedent in Michigan is that condemnation awards are 
not disturbed on appeal if within the range of competent evidence. 
Department of Conservation v. Connor (1947), 316 Mich 565. The 
decision of the lower court is affirmed, as within the range of what 
was presented as competent, expert testimony. No costs, a public 
question being involved. 
T. G. KAVANAGH, P. J., and J. H. GILLIS, J., concurred. 
3. STATUTE 
STATE 
P.A. 1911, No. 236, Eff. Aug. 1 
AN ACT to authorize proceedings by the state to con-
demn private property for public use. 
The People of the State of Michigan enact: 
213.1 Condemnation of private property for state use; authority 
delegated; jurisdiction 
Sec. 1. It shall be lawful for the governor or any other person 
or persons, or any board of regents, board of control or other 
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governing body of any state educational, penal or reformatory insti-
tution, when by law authorized to secure for the state or such institu-
tion, land as a site for any state building or buildings, state institution 
or public use, and for the board of regents, board of control or other 
governing body of any state institution desirous of obtaining the right 
of way over lands for the benefit of such state institution, when such 
persons, board of regents, board of control or other governing body, 
or a majority thereof shall have by resolution declare<l the taking 
thereof necessary for the public use of such state institution, to in-
stitute or cause to be instituted proceedings in the name and behalf 
of the state of Michigan against the land sought to be acquired, and 
against the owners and persons interested therein, in the circuit court 
of the county where the land is situated, for the purpose of acquiring 
by the state title to such land by judicial condemnation. And the 
said court in which such proceeding may be instituted, shall have 
and possess full jurisdiction of the subject matter of such proceed-
ings, and power to hear, adjudge, and determine all matters touching 
the proceedings, and the rights and interests of all concerned. 
Constitution 
Art. 10, § 2, provides: "Private property shall not be taken for 
public use without just compensation therefor being first made or 
secured in a manner prescribed by law. Compensation shall be deter-
mined in proceedings in a court of record." 
213.2 Same; duty of attorney general; petition, contents; summons, 
issuance and return; incompetents; non-residents, service, 
notice by publication 
Sec. 2. Upon request of the governor, board of regents, board 
of control or other governing body of any state institution, or other 
person or persons authorized as aforesaid, it shall be the duty of the 
attorney general of the state, or when directed by the attorney gen-
eral, the prosecuting attorney of the county where the land is situ-
ated, on behalf of the board of regents, board of control or other 
governing body, if a body corporate under the law of its creation, 
and in behalf of the people of the state of Michigan if such governing 
body is not a body corporate, of any state institution, to cause a pe-
tition to be made in the name of the people of the state of Michigan 
and ftled in the proper court, signed by the attorney general, or 
prosecuting attorney of the county, and by the secretary of such 
governing board, if a body corporate, and if not a majority of such 
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trustees, board of control or other governing body, or other properly 
authorized person, as the case may be, addressed to the court setting 
forth, with reasonable certainty a description of the land sought to 
be acquired, the names of all persons owning or having an interest 
therein, so far as disclosed by the records of titles of the county in 
which the land is situated, or can be ascertained from actual occu-
pants; that the petition is made and presented for the purpose of ac-
quiring the title and ownership of the land described in the petition, 
to and for the use of the state of Michigan, and specifying generally 
the purpose for which it is to be used. And the petition shall ask that 
all persons interested in the premises, or any part thereof, be sum-
moned to appear and answer the petition, and show cause, if any 
they have, against the same. Upon filing the petition, summons shall 
issue in accordance with the prayer thereof, against the persons 
named therein, returnable on a day to be named, which shall not be 
less than 5 days from the issuing and test thereof, and shall be served 
at least 3 days before the return day, by the sheriff or other officer 
authorized to serve process of summons according to the rules and 
practice of the circuit court in other cases at law. If there are minors 
or persons of unsound mind interested in the premises, service may 
be made upon the guardian of any such person or the court may ap-
point a guardian ad litem for any such person, who may appear and 
defend for the person he represents. If there are non-resident or ab-
sent persons upon whom service cannot be obtained within the 
county, the court may order service upon any such person wherever 
he may be found, and in such manner as may be directed. The per-
son serving any such process on such non-resident or absent person 
shall make proof of service by affidavit, stating the place, time, and 
manner of service. Or the court may order and cause notice to be 
given to such absent or non-resident person, by publication in such 
newspaper printed and published in the county as the court shall 
designate, and for such length of time as the court may think proper, 
not less than 3 weeks, once in each week; and any such service out 
of the county, or notice by publication, shall be as effectual for all 
the purposes of such proceeding and in the condemnation of the 
land as though the persons had been personally served within the 
county. 
213.3 Same; petition, hearing on necessity and compensation; com-
missioners procedure;jury, procedure 
Sec. 3. When all the parties named in the petition have been 
summoned or notified, in the manner provided, and the time for 
their appearance shall have expired, the court shall hear any and all 
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persons who shall have appeared and interposed objections to the 
petition or proceedings, and proceed to decide the questions raised, 
and may vacate the petition, or any part of the proceedings for 
cause, and may allow amendments of the petition, in form or sub-
stance, as the right of the matter shall demand. If any person having 
an interest in the land has been overlooked, or not summoned or no-
tified, the court may continue the proceedings and cause such person 
to be served or notified. If the petition and proceedings are sustained, 
the court shall appoint 3 commissioners, residents and freeholders 
within the county, not interested or of kin to any of the persons in-
terested in the land to ascertain and determine the necessity of the 
proposed public use, the necessity for using such property and the 
just compensation to be paid therefor by the state, which ought to 
be paid by the state to each of the owners and persons interested in 
the premises, as and for his, her or their just compensation for the 
land sought to be taken. Such commissioners before entering upon 
their duties as such shall take an oath in substantially the following 
form: "We do each of us solemnly swear that we will faithfully and 
justly determine the public necessity of the proposed use, the neces-
sity of taking the property described in the petition filed in this 
cause and the amount of compensation which ought to be paid to 
each of the owners and persons interested in the premises described 
in said petition according to our best ability." They shall visit the 
land sought to be acquired, shall ascertain the separate interest of 
each person owning or interested in any part of the premises, and 
the description of his or her separate interest in the parcel; shall hear, 
in the presence and under direction of the court, evidence touching 
the matters they are to fmd, brought forward by any person having 
an interest, and shall find all necessary facts to possess the court 
with the truth and right of the matter, but shall not be required to 
find what evidence was offered or given, and shall report to the 
court, in writing, their findings. Instead of commissioners, the court, 
with or without the request of any person interested in any portion 
of the premises described in the petition, may, and upon the request 
of any such person shall, order a venire to issue to the sheriff, to sum-
mon 12 jurors who shall be residents and freeholders of the county 
where the land is situated, to attend at a time to be named, before 
the court, to serve as a jury. Any person interested in any part of the 
premises may object for cause to any of the jurors, but there shall 
be no peremptory challenge allowed. In case any juror fails to appear, 
is excused, or set aside from the panel, the court may order the 
sheriff, or other proper officer in attendance, to summon forthwith 
the requisite number of talesmen to form the jury. The jury shall be 
sworn, as is required of commissioners, and they shall view the 
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premises, hear evidence if offered, determine the necessity of the 
public use, the necessity for taking such property and the amount of 
compensation to be paid therefor and the same proceedings be had 
as near as may be, as hereinbefore required in reference to commis-
sioners. 
213.4 Same; objections to report filed; conimnation; deposit; vest-
ing of title; payment of compensation; dismissal; expenses; 
record 
Sec. 4. The court shall hear objections, if any, to the report of 
the commissioners or jury, as the case may be, and may set aside the 
report and finding, or confrrm the same, and if confirmed, shall enter 
a judgment of confirmation, and that all right, title and interest of, 
in, and to the land and premises, vest in the state of Michigan: Pro-
vided, That the state, within such time as shall be therein prescribed, 
shall deposit in the court the amount found by the report of the 
commissioners or jury, as the just compensation and damages to be 
paid to the owners and persons interested. If, within the time so pre-
scribed, the state shall cause to be deposited the sum so found, the 
court shall thereupon enter an order and judgment that the title of 
the state in and to said land and every part thereof is perfect, and 
has become absolute, and may issue the necessary writ of assistance, 
commanding the sheriff to deliver the possession of such land to the 
state; and thereupon the title and right of the state to such land shall 
be absolute and binding against all persons whomsoever. The persons 
owning and interested in said land according to the report and fmd-
ing aforesaid, shall be entitled, on applying to the court, to be paid 
on the order of the court the amount or sum to which they are re-
spectively entitled, according to such report or fmding; for the sum 
received they shall respectively give to the clerk their receipt, in writ-
ing, to be by the clerk forwarded to the state treasurer. In case the 
state does not, within the time so prescribed, deposit in court the 
amount of compensation and damages awarded, the court shall order 
the proceedings dismissed, and the state take nothing thereby. In the 
proceedings authorized by this act the court shall, as to the practice 
and mode of proceedings, be governed by the rules applicable in 
cases at law, except as is in this act otherwise expressly provided. The 
expense of the proceedings shall be paid by the state, and a certified 
copy of the record of the proceedings and judgment of the court 
shall, together with the record thereof in the office of the register of 
deeds of the county, be evidence in all courts and places. 
EMINENT DOMAIN 
FOOTNOTE 
Section 1 - Introduction 
The decisions mentioned appear after this Introduction. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER AND 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
l. INTRODUCTION 
The great medical center of the University of Michigan pro-
vides academic functions of teaching and research, and also 
functions much like many other state institutions for the treat-
ment of ill persons. State-sponsored programs for the treatment 
of various classes of patients are provided for in statutes which 
have been interpreted in a series of opinions of the Attorney 
General. Apparently no court case has been brought under these 
statutes. 
The issue to which the courts have at length addressed 
themselves is the liability of the University for the malpractice 
of its medical staff. Of course, the classic case is that of the sur-
geon who leaves sponges inside his patient after an operation. 
In the first case in this series, Scott, 1 the hospital was not 
involved, but rather the University of Michigan Athletic Asso-
ciation. The Association was sued by persons injured in the col-
lapse of bleachers at a Michigan-Wisconsin football game of long 
ago. Since the Association was a voluntary group legally separ-
ate from the University itself, it did not claim sovereign immu-
nity, and the court held that it was liable for negligence, if such 
could be proved. 
The Bancroft case was settled on procedural grounds alone. 
The Supreme Court would permit no appeal before a final judg-
ment in the Circuit Court below. 
The Robinson case laid down the substantive rule that the 
University, as a charitable institution, was not liable for sponges 
left in its patients by surgeons. In Herrst, which involved the 
destruction by fire of both a University-owned barn and neigh-
boring property, the court ruled that the University could not 
be held for the negligence of the neighbor boys whose careless 
211 
212 THE UNIVERSITY AND STATE GOVERNMENT 
smoking was thought to have set the blaze. 
Both the procedural and substantive rules of the early cases 
were disregarded in the Christie case. No final judgment had 
been entered in the Circuit Court, but an appeal was permitted 
from a pretrial discovery order requiring the University to pro-
duce its public liability insurance policy. Although the opinion 
is confused on this point, the official proceedings of the Board 
of Regents make it clear that the University had for some time 
maintained such an insurance policy which would protect in-
jured parties unless the Regents specifically authorized the 
pleading of the defense of sovereign immunity. 
The immunity of the University from suit was, however, 
not as clear as it had been at the time of the Robinson case be-
cause the court had already abolished the immunity from suit 
of all charitable institutions. Absent charitable immunity, sov-
ereign immunity was now in question, and the different opin-
ions expressed by the justices in this case demonstrate their 
confusion over which branch of government should have the 
authority to abolish it. Justice Black thought that because of 
the constitutional autonomy of the University, the legislature 
was unqualified for the task, and that if they had authorized 
the purchase of insurance, the Board of Regents had implicitly 
abolished immunity themselves. The dissenters still favored 
legislative competence in this area, but although a majority of 
the court did not completely agree with Justice Black's reason-
ing, and, technically, only affirmed the discovery order, it now 
seems clear that the judicial branch no longer favors the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity. 
The effect of this apparent abolition of the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity was mitigated, in the transitional period, by 
the Glass and Fox cases which held that suits against the univer-
sities continued to be regarded as suits against the state. The re-
sult was that the Court of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction over 
these cases and the statute of limitations protected the universi-
ties against suits which had been wrongfully filed in the Circuit 
Courts. 2 
It remained, however, for the Michigan Court of Appeals 
to confront squarely the issue of whether the legislature could 
waive the sovereign immunity of the constitutionally established 
universities. In the case of Branum v. Board of Regents of 
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University of Michigan, that court finally disposed of the issue 
by upholding the statute waiving immunity and conferring ex-
clusive jurisdiction on the Court of Claims. 
The legal question of whether the University is immune to 
suit in the federal courts was decided in the last two cases in this 
chapter. In both cases the University is accorded the same Elev-
enth Amendment protection from suit that the State of Michi-
gan itself would have received. In the case of Huckins v. Board 
of Regents of University of Michigan the court ruled that the 
University could be sued under the Jones Act for injuries to a 
seaman employed on a research vessel, since the Supreme Court 
had ruled that a state was subject to suit in similar cases. In the 
MacDonald case the Court of Appeals ruled that the University's 
protection from suit under the Eleventh Amendment was not 
waived by a technical error in pleading. 
2. JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
Scott v. University of Michigan Athletic Assn. 
152 Mich. 684, 685-88; 116 N.W. 624 (1908) 
OSTRANDER, J. Testimony was given from which the jury 
might have found that plaintiff was injured by the collapse of a 
stand, or bleacher, erected by the defendant association, for the use 
of and used by the public, at a game of football to which the public 
was invited and required to pay an admission fee for the profit of 
said association; that the stand, designed to support 5,000 spectators, 
collapsed, from inherent and discoverable weakness, when put to its 
intended use, when occupied by less than 3,000 persons. At the trial, 
both parties introduced testimony and the court, without so far as 
the record discloses, assigning reasons, directed a verdict for de-
fendants. Judgment was entered on the verdict. 
Plaintiff, appellant, contends that the case should have been 
submitted to the jury. Defendants make three contentions. They are 
(1) that the plaintiff has in any event no right of action against these, 
or any of these, defendants; (2) that plaintiff has not shown that de-
fendants were guilty of any negligence; (3) that if the circumstances 
made out a prima facie case of negligent construction of the stand, 
the undisputed testimony for defendants established the fact of the 
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exercise of due care on the part of defendants to render the premises 
safe. 
And first, as to the parties defendant. They are the voluntary 
association and its officers, of whom defendant Baird is one, filling 
the position of graduate director. The active members of the associa-
tion are the undergraduates and alumni who contribute money, with 
an associate membership of business men. Defendant Pipp is the per-
son employed by the association to erect, and who did erect, the 
stand. The theory of defendants is: 
"Mr. Baird as agent of the board of regents was authorized by 
Regent Fletcher to put up the bleacher; he did so, had it inspected, 
and the board of regents had it inspected. Not only does the record 
fail to show any act whatever on the part of the Athletic Association 
in regard to the building of the bleacher, but it shows affirmatively 
that the Athletic Association could not have built a bleacher had it 
desired to do so. Ferry Field was a recreation ground for the students, 
and the students, of course, used the field and the structures stand-
ing upon it. As Regent Fletcher testified, the association was simply 
the student in another form. It appears, therefore, that while the 
Athletic Association had nothing to do with the erection of this 
bleacher, it was allowed by the regents to use the field and the 
bleacher for the purpose of carrying on and exhibiting the football 
game between Michigan and Wisconsin Universities on November 18, 
1905. But the board of regents never surrendered full and absolute 
control of Ferry Field. While the association was using the field it 
was as much subject to the control of the board of regents as at other 
times. In other words, Ferry Field is exactly like other University 
property; it is owned and controlled by the board of regents for the 
use of the students, but such use can never be hostile to or exclusive 
of the continued control by the board. Having no independent right 
in Ferry Field the Athletic Association could sustain no independent 
liabilities consequent upon its use. 
"It seems clear that the Athletic Association, under its permis-
sion from the board of regents to use Ferry Field pursuant to the 
general purposes of the University, at most merely represented the 
board of regents in conducting the game in question. So far as the 
public is concerned, the association might therefore be deemed the 
agent of the board of regents in conducting and exhibiting the game 
for the benefit of all who wished to witness it. And in that capacity 
the liability of the Athletic Association would appear to be the 
same as that of Mr. Baird himself. Each is liable, if at all, as agent of 
the board of regents. 
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"Now, it is an elementary principle of the law that an agent is 
not liable for mere acts of nonfeasance, but only for acts of mis-
feasance. This principle has been applied in a great variety of cases." 
Whether the fact is or is not controlling, a point not precisely 
involved, we do not find in the record any testimony tending to 
prove that the regents, directly or indirectly, constructed or super-
vised the construction of the stand, or that the defendant association 
or Mr. Baird was an agent of the regents in that behalf. The record 
discloses that while Mr. Baird applied to the chairman of the com-
mittee on buildings and grounds for and received permission to build 
the bleacher, it and all other structures upon the grounds were paid 
for out of the moneys of the defendant association. The funds of the 
association are devoted to athletics and to the furnishing and main-
taining of Ferry Field. The association receives and disburses its 
money and the regents exercise no control of its funds except to in-
sist that there shall be a proper auditing of accounts. Assuming that 
the regents might have refused permission to erect the particular 
bleacher, they did not do so. They did not erect it. Assuming, further, 
that Mr. Baird is paid for his services as adviser of the association's 
athletic policy by the regents, and that his position of graduate direc-
tor is dependent upon his engagement with the regents, he is never-
theless one of the directors of defendant association, and by its con-
stitution is a member of its financial committee, and he also exercises 
such powers and performs such duties as its board of control may 
from time to time determine and require. Whether the related facts 
affect alike all of the defendants, whether for any reason the judg-
ment should be affirmed as to some of the defendants, are subjects 
not referred to in argument and questions not considered. 
The remaining contentions may be considered together. The 
testimony goes much beyond proving merely an accident and re-
sulting injury. That relied upon to show that defendants exercised 
due care tends to prove that the stand was erected by a competent 
and experienced builder, of good materials; that before it was used 
it was inspected by engineers and others admittedly competent to 
perform the work of inspection, who pronounced it safe. It is clear, 
however, that a wholly inadequate structure was in fact tendered for 
public use, and it cannot be determined, upon this record, as matter 
of law, that a latent and not a patent defect, discoverable in the ex-
ercise of proper care, existed. The managers of the grounds and 
stands occupied upon the occasion in question the position of pro-
prietors of a public resort. Plaintiff was not a mere licensee and did 
not occupy the stand by mere invitation. Whether responsibility to 
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the plaintiff is grounded, in the form of action instituted, upon a 
contract or upon a duty, it exists, if at all, because of an implied con-
tract. The implied contract was that the stand was reasonably fit and 
proper for the use to which it was put; the duty was to see to it that 
it was in a fit and proper condition for such use. Neither plaintiff 
nor the public generally would be expected to examine the stand and 
judge of its safety. This consideration, and the probable consequences 
of failure of the structure, imposed upon the responsible and profit-
ing persons the duty of exercising a high degree of care to prevent 
disaster. They were not insurers of safety, they did not contract that 
there were no unknown defects, not discoverable by the use of rea-
sonable means; but, having constructed the stand, they did contract 
that, except for such defects, it was safe. 1 Thompson on Negligence, 
§§ 994-997; 21 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.), p. 472; Francis v. 
Cockrell, L R. 5 Q. B. 184, 39 L J. Rep. (N. S.) Q. B. 113, 291. 
See, also, Fox v. Buffalo Park, 21 App. Div. (N.Y.) 321, 163 N.Y. 
559. 
The judgment is reversed, and a new trial granted. 
GRANT, C. J., and BLAIR, MONTGOMERY, and CARPEN-
TER, JJ., concurred. 
Bancroft v. Board of Regents of University of Michigan 
192 Mich. 168, 169; 158 N.W. 337 (1916) 
PER CURIAM. Plaintiff ftled her suit to recover damages for 
personal injuries which she claims to have incurred and which she 
avers were occasioned by the negligence of defendants. The defend-
ants demurred to the declaration, and after argument the same was 
sustained. This was followed by the issuance of a writ of error from 
this court without any !mal judgment having been entered in the 
trial court, and, so far as the record shows, we are not advised that a 
!mal judgment has since been entered therein. Under this state of 
facts the practice will not permit of a review of the case in this court. 
Green v. Eaton Probate Judge, 40 Mich. 244;Delaney v. Lumber Co., 
144 Mich. 351 (108 N. W. 77); Barribeau v. City of Detroit, 146 
Mich. 392 (109 N. W. 665); In re Vetter's Estate, 162 Mich. 109 
(127 N. W. 306). 
The writ will be dismissed, with costs to appellee. 
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Robinson v. Washtenaw Circuit Judge 
228 Mich. 225, 225-30; 199 N.W. 618 (1924) 
STEERE, J. Plaintiffs in the above entitled cases are husband 
and wife. Each commenced a tort action in the circuit court of 
Washtenaw county against Dr. Scott C. Runnells and the regents of 
the University of Michigan to recover damages resulting from injuries 
alleged to have been wrongfully inflicted upon her (Fay Robinson) 
while a surgical patient in the University hospital. The questions in-
volved in these mandamus proceedings are substantially the same in 
both cases and they were submitted upon the same briefs. Service 
was duly had upon defendants and similar declarations, each con-
taining two courts of like import, were ftled and served. Counsel for 
defendant appeared specially in said cases and entered motions re-
questing the court for orders dismissing the declarations "or in the 
alternative, in case such relief cannot be granted, to dismiss the sec-
ond count in said declarations against said regents of the University 
of Michigan," stating various grounds therefor. The court denied 
said motions as to Dr. Runnells and granted them as to the regents. 
Plaintiffs ask mandamus to compel defendant herein to set aside his 
orders dismissing the declarations against the regents. 
The first count in the declarations alleges that Mrs. Fay Robin-
son being ill consulted Dr. Runnells, a physician and agent of the 
regents of the University, who advised her that an abdominal opera-
tion was necessary, to which she consented and was operated upon at 
the University hospital by him; and charges that in performing the 
operation he negligently permitted a sponge which he had placed in 
her abdomen to remain after the wound caused during the operation 
had been closed, in consequence of which she suffered greatly and 
became yet more dangerously ill, rendering another operation neces-
sary in order to save her life, which disclosed the presence of the 
sponge left there during the former operation. The second count in 
the declarations more distinctly charges such neglect and lack of skill, 
with the serious results which followed, to the regents of the Univer-
sity of Michigan, their physicians, nurses, agents, servants, etc. 
Plaintiffs' counsel in his brief points out that the actions are 
not brought "against the hospital of the University of Michigan, but 
against the regents of the University of Michigan," and urges that the 
question is disposed of by the provision of section 1159, 1 Comp. 
Laws 1915, providing that "The board of regents shall constitute a 
body corporate, with right as such of suing and being sued," contend-
ing that the regents are in no sense an eleemosynary institution 
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entitled to be excepted from the general rule that a corporation is li-
able for the torts of its agents; while counsel for the regents urge that 
no cause of action is stated against them because the University hos-
pital, maintained under the direction of the regents in connection 
with its medical department, is a charitable institution, eleemosynary 
in character. Other objections are raised but this is the only one 
which we regard as calling for serious consideration. 
The regents of the Michigan University are constitutional State 
officers, their selection and election being on the same basis as that 
of the judges of the Supreme and circuit courts, the State superin-
tendent of public instruction and other specified State officers who 
are elected at the biennial spring election, all of whose names are re-
quired by law to be placed upon an official State ballot in a desig-
nated order, those of the regents being second on the list. 
Our Constitution recognizes "Education" as a subject of gov-
ernmental concern and activity. Its article 11 is so entitled and de-
voted to that subject, three sections of which relate e~clusively to 
regents of the University, who are to be eight in number, hold office 
for eight years, two to be elected at each regular biennial spring elec-
tion. They are to constitute a "body corporate known as 'The Re-
gents of the University of Michgian.' " They are given, as a board, 
"general supervision of the University and the direction and control 
of all expenditures from the University funds." Section 10 of the 
article contains the mandate that "The legislature shall maintain the 
University" and other named State educational institutions, "and 
also such normal schools and other educational institutions as may be 
established by law." With such provisions in our Constitution it 
seems clear that the general supervision of the University, and direc-
tion and control of all expenditures from its funds is a governmental 
activity, and the board of regents a State agency to carry out the will 
of the people, as expressed in the Constitution they adopted, in re-
gard to the educational institution committed to its care and supervi-
sion. 
Prior to adoption of the old Constitution of 1850 the Univer-
sity was supervised and its affairs administered by a board of trustees 
as a body corporate to whom the regents succeeded under substan-
tially the same provision as in our present Constitution of 1909. Its 
corporate character was, and is, clearly that of a public corporation, 
created for public purposes only, for no private emolument or ad-
vantage, and therefore an agency of the State government. It is re-
quired by law in broad terms to provide the inhabitants of the State 
the means of "acquiring a thorough knowledge of the various 
branches of literature, science and the arts." To that end it is required 
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to establish and maintain numerous departments of schools devoted 
especially to instruction in various callings and professions, including 
a medical department in connection with which its hospital is main-
tained for the benefit of the public at public expense. Special laws of 
charitable import have been passed from time to time such as pro-
viding admission to the hospital and free treatment of indigent per-
sons and others, admission of indigent children afflicted with curable 
deformity or chronic diseases with both medical and surgical treat-
ment, board, lodging and nursing free of charge, for maintenance of 
said hospital in operation during the summer vacations of the Univer-
sity, etc., all of which, furnished and maintained by the State, gives 
that adjunct of the medical department of the University the charac-
ter of a public charitable hospital. The money raised by the State to 
maintain it, as well as the other activities of the University, is a trust 
fund of which the board of regents is trustee. As was said in Downes 
v. Harper Hospital, 101 Mich. 555 (25 L R. A. 602, 45 Am. St. 
Rep. 427): 
"If, in the proper execution of the trust, a trustee or an em-
ployee commits an act of negligence, he may be held responsible for 
his negligent act; but the law jealously guards the charitable trust 
fund, and does not permit it to be frittered away by the negligent 
acts of those employed in its execution. The trustees of this fund 
could not by their own direct act divert it from the purpose for 
which it was given, or for which the act of the legislature authorized 
the title to be vested in the defendant. It certainly follows that the 
fund cannot be indirectly diverted by the tortious or negligent acts 
of the managers of the fund, or their employees, though such acts re-
sult in damage to an innocent beneficiary. Those voluntarily accept-
ing the benefit of the charity accept it upon this condition. 
"The fact that patients who are able to pay are required to do 
so does not deprive the defendant of its eleemosynary character, nor 
permit a recovery for damages on account of the existence of con-
tract relations. The amounts thus received are not for private gain, 
but contribute to the more effectual accomplishment of the purpose 
for which the charity was founded." 
So far as we discover, the authorities are practically all to the 
effect that charitable or eleemosynary institutions supported wholly 
or in part by a State or municipality are not liable for personal in-
juries suffered through the negligence of an employee, servant or 
agent of the institution. Plaintiffs' counsel cites no authority to the 
contrary, and apparently contends that decisions to that effect are 
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not in point because the actions are against the regents made by sta-
tute capable of suing and being sued. The fact that the regents as a 
public body corporate have the right of suing and being sued in a 
proper case, involving property rights or based on contract relations, 
is immaterial here. The question before us is whether these declara-
tions sounding in tort based on personal injuries state a cause of ac-
tion against the board of regents. 
The hospital is an adjunct of the medical department of the 
University, which is a State educational instrumentality maintained 
by the public at public expense, controlled and operated by the 
board of regents, a governmental agency which receives in trust and 
expends the public money devoted to that purpose. In the exhaus-
tively discussed case of Bruce v. Central M E. Church, 147 Mich. 
230, 238 (10 L. R. A. (N. S.] 74, 11 Ann. Cas. 150}, it is said by 
Justice OSTRANDER in his dissenting opinion: 
"An examination of cases, including most of those cited in the 
opinion in the Downes Case, shows that in many instances the insti-
tutions were in fact State instrumentalities, as well as charities, and 
the denial of liability might have been rested in such cases wholly, as 
it was in some of them in part, upon that ground." 
On the case stated in plaintiffs' declarations we think denial of 
liability as to the regents could safely be rested on either ground. 
The writs of mandamus applied for are therefore denied. 
CLARK, C. J ., and McDONALD, BIRD, SHARPE, MOORE, 
FELLOWS, and WIEST, JJ., concurred. 
Herrst v. Regents of the University of Michigan 
231 Mich. 369; 204 N.W. 119 (1925) 
WIEST, J. Plaintiffs own a lot on Belser street in the city of 
Ann Arbor. The regents of the University own a lot on Volland 
street in the same city. Plaintiffs' lot and the University lot abut at 
the rear. Defendant Edward C. Pardon, in July, 1923, was superin-
tendent of buildings and grounds held by the regents and, as such, 
had permitted Earl Rising, tenant of the Volland street lot, to build 
a barn on the lot, so close to the line and near a barn standing on 
plaintiffs' lot that, when the Rising barn burned, July 26, 1923, it 
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set fire to plaintiffs' barn and destroyed it and its contents. This suit 
was brought to recover the loss suffered by plaintiffs, and verdict 
was had against both defendants, but judgment against defendant 
Pardon alone. The regents were discharged from liability under the 
authority of Robinson v. Washtenaw Circuit Judge, 228 Mich. 225. 
Defendant Pardon reviews by writ of error. Plaintiffs claim it was the 
duty of Mr. Pardon to supervise the use made by the tenant of the 
property rented from the regents and prevent the tenant from en-
dangering plaintiffs' property. It is claimed the tenant of the regents 
built his barn within about three feet of the rear lot line and within 
about four feet of plaintiffs' barn, fastened some pieces of 2x4 to 
plaintiffs' barn in violation of the housing code of the State, piled 
combustible material between the barns and permitted children to 
frequent the barn. The day of the fire a 12-year-old boy, it is claimed, 
came out of the barn with a cigarette and soon thereafter the Rising 
barn was discovered on fire, and the fire spread to and destroyed 
plaintiffs' barn. What negligence of defendant Pardon was the proxi-
mate cause of this fire? Assuming, but not deciding, that the liability 
of Mr. Pardon is the same as that of an owner, did the duty rest upon 
him to so supervise the use of the bam by the tenant as to prevent 
children from being permitted therein or to prevent some trespassing 
boy from visiting the premises and smoking therein? We think not. 
A landlord is not liable for the use of premises by a tenant in 
such a way as to occasion damage to a neighboring proprietor, 
merely because there was a possibility of their being so used. The 
wrong in such a case is that of the tenant and the liability therefor 
will stop with the tenant. The erection of the barn was lawful and its 
use legitimate. Any abuse of rights of neighboring proprietors in the 
use of the barn by the tenant was not chargeable to the landlord un-
less such abuse was sanctioned by the landlord; and such sanction 
could not rest upon implied notice and acquiescence. If the fastening 
of the 2x4 to plaintiffs' barn was wrongful, still there is nothing in 
the case to show defendant directed, sanctioned, or even knew that 
it had been done, and besides, it cannot be said to have had even a 
causal connection with the fire. The same may be said of the claimed 
combustible material piled between the barns, for the fire did not 
originate in such material, neither was such material the cause of 
carrying the fire to plaintiffs' barn. Up to the very hour of the fire 
there had been nothing done by the tenant which would have justi-
fied the landlord in ending his tenancy. If in law the landlord could 
not have interfered with the use made by the tenant of the premises, 
surely liability for such use does not fasten to the landlord. There is 
no evidence in the case of a violation of the State housing code. 
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Section 18, Act No. 326, Pub. Acts 1919 (Comp. Laws Supp. 1922, 
§ 5180 [19]), upon which plaintiffs rely, has no bearing. This sec-
tion regulates the space between buildings on the same lot with a 
dwelling; permits a stable at the rear of a lot but requires a passage at 
least three feet wide from the yard to an alley. The barn built by the 
tenant was wholly upon the land of the regents and there was no 
negligence on the part of the regents or of their agent in permitting it 
to be built close to the line. Plaintiffs claim the fire was set in the 
Rising barn by the 12-year-old boy lighting a cigarette therein. This 
boy, so far as the record shows, was a trespasser. The tenant had no 
children. But it is said the tenant had ponies in the barn and this 
called children and it was the duty of defendant Pardon to notice 
such fact. The evidence fails to show smoking by children about the 
barn previous to the date of the fire. It was not the duty of Mr. Par-
don to pay attention to the fact that the tenant had ponies in the 
barn and this called children, nor should he have anticipated that 
some boy might visit the barn and smoke therein. 
The circuit judge instructed the jury that: 
"Something was said to you about the construction of the 
barn contrary to the housing code. Unless you fmd that was the 
proximate cause of the injury complained of, of course you could 
not find for the plaintiffs in this cause." 
We have searched this record to discover what violation, if any, 
with reference to the provisions of the housing code, was before the 
jury, and fmd none. If there was no violation of the housing code 
permitted or acquiesced in by Mr. Pardon, then he is not liable in this 
case. The building of the barn did not violate the housing code. The 
two barns being less than four feet apart rendered it inevitable that 
the burning of one would spread to the other and the combustible 
material, if any, lying between the two barns, cannot be said to have 
caused the fire to spread from one barn to the other. The proximate 
cause of the fire was under plaintiffs' evidence the careless act of an 
intruding boy. 
Rowland v. Kalamazoo Sup'ts of Poor, 49 Mich. 553, relied on 
by plaintiffs, involved liability arising from negligently permitting set 
fires to spread, to the injury of a neighboring proprietor, and lays 
down no rule aiding plaintiffs in this case. We fmd no negligence 
chargeable to defendant Pardon rendering him liable in this case. The 
proximate cause of the fire was not his failure to perform any duty 
or in permitting the tenant to perpetrate a wrong. The court should, 
notwithstanding the verdict, have entered judgment in favor of Mr. 
Pardon. 
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The judgment is reversed and the case remanded with direction 
to enter such judgment. Defendant Pardon will recover costs. 
McDONALD, C. J., and CLARK, BIRD, SHARPE, MOORE, 
STEERE, and FELLOWS, JJ ., concurred. 
Christie v. Board of Regents of The University of Michigan 
The Supreme Court of Michigan, 1961 
364Mich. 202,203-07,209-19, 228-31; 111 N.W. 2d 30 (1961) 
BLACK, J. Comes the intruder spoilsport as the legislative and 
judicial branches continue their gambol o'er the field of sovereign 
immunity. Here the recurrent problem-what to do with another as-
pect of such immunity-cannot be buck-lateraled to the legislature. 
By the Constitution that august body has been rendered ineligible to 
receive, in today's game, any kind of a pass from the judicial branch. 
Plaintiff, at 7 years of age, sues for personal injury said to have 
been negligently inflicted while he was a patient-during early in-
fancy-in the university hospital. The asserted negligence consists of 
permitting him to fall "from an unattended crib from which all re-
straints had been removed." 
Suit was commenced by summons. With commencement of 
suit plaintiff filed a petition for discovery, asking among other things 
that the defendant board of regents be compelled "to produce its 
policy of liability insurance for the inspection and examination by 
the plaintiff." The circuit judge entered an order for production and 
inspection of the policy, doing so on theory that the policy should 
be ordered in as possibly admissible evidence tending to establish 
that the defendant board had waived its immunity from liability, to 
the plaintiff, to the extent of the insurer's monetary obligation. 
On application of defendant and grant of leave we review such 
order for production and inspection. Plaintiffs statement of the re-
viewable question is comprehensive and fully explanatory: 
"In civil action against board of regents of university of Michi-
gan for personal injuries suffered by infant patient of university hos-
pital through negligence of defendants' servants, agents and employ-
ees, did circuit judge abuse his discretion on plaintiffs amended 
petition for discovery filed prior to declaration when he ordered de-
fendants to produce for plaintiffs examination the contract of 
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insurance existing between them and their liability insurance carrier 
when the cause of action arose?" 
I would affirm on ground that the questioned order is well 
within the discretionary authority Court Rule No 40 (1945) pro-
vides. The relevantly sole requirement of that rule is that there be 
fair showing that the petitioning plaintiff needs such production and 
irlspection in order to declare properly the cause his petition sup-
posedly portrays. 
Does this plaintiff need the policy in order to declare? From 
the face of his untraversed petition I conclude he does. McNair v. 
State Highway Department, 305 Mich 181, has made it abundantly 
clear that when an apparently immune public body is sued on allega-
tion of tort liability the plaintiff must allege facts which. if true, 
overcome the standard, posture of such body that "no court can hold 
us liable." In a word, a part of this plaintiff's burden is that of duty 
to plead and prove some status which legally impairs or destroys the 
defendant board's seeming exemption. No waiver by neglect to raise 
the question can exist (McNair, supra), and so it is necessary to ex-
plore the ultimate and decisive question: Whether the resolution of 
the defendant board to acquire and maintain such liability insurance 
operates as a matter of law to waive its immunity to the extent of 
the insurer's obligation. 
I agree with the statement of the annotator of a recent and ex-
haustive appraisal of this question who says (annotation headed "Li-
ability or indemnity insurance carried by governmental unit as 
affecting immunity from tort liability"; 68 ALR2d 1437, 1448): 
"In a few jurisdictions the courts have taken the view (which is 
worthy of characterization as enlightened) that to the extent that a 
liability insurance policy protects a governmental unit against tort li-
ability, the otherwise-existing immunity of the unit is removed." 
In this case there are 2 good reasons for concurrence with the 
annotator's conclusion that such is the "enlightened" view. The first 
is that the fact of such insurance has eliminated the classically suave 
reason for immunity of the defendant board from liability (if proven) 
to this plaintiff.* The other and specially distinctive reason is that 
*See, for recent exposition and repudiation of the doctrine that immu-
nity is required to protect public revenues from dissipation on account of torts 
of public servants, Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18 
ill2d 11 (163 NE2d 89), and Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District, 55 Cal2d 
211 (11 Cal Rptr 89, 359 P2d 457). 
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the defendant board is so far autonomous and constitutionally inde-
pendent as to clothe it with plenary as well as exclusive power of 
waiver of such immunity and that it has already exercised such pow-
er so far as concerns this case. 
The first point-that the board's determination to acquire and 
carry liability insurance removes the historic reason for immunity-
requires no extended analysis. We are yet free to pick and choose 
among authorities extant. My choice, if it were presently necessary 
to choose, would be with the "enlightened" -and visibly growing-
minority. As the cited annotation shows, the more numerous authori-
ties adhere to position that public bodies, having spent public money 
for liability protection thereby incur no liability; a game which in 
fact if not by design unjustly enriches the insurer for carrying a risk 
where there is no risk.* Other authorities, "enlightened" I repeat, 
pursue the opposite and more explicable view. 
Whatever view one may take of this diversity, the majority rule 
becomes irrelevant when it is shown that the critical bastion thereof 
(that the legislature only may waive) is nonexistent. Such is the case 
here. If the defendant board is by the Constitution given the exclu-
sive power to waive, then it would surely seem that the reasoning of 
such minority is best for the specific case at bar. 
The board of regents is a separate and self-governing body cor-
porate, made so by the Constitution (Const 1908, art 11, § 4). By 
our decisions it is "a constitutional corporation of independent 
authority, which, within the scope of its functions, is co-ordinate 
with and equal to that of the legislature." It has "independent con-
trol of the affairs of the university by authority of these constitu-
tional provisions" (quotations from Board of Regents of the Univer-
sity of Michigan v. Auditor General, 167 Mich 444, 450), and so its 
counsel are right when they insist in their brief that the legislature 
(as in the case of the State proper and its statutory agencies) cannot 
waive the immunity of the board without consent of the board.** 
*The majority rule, and the reasoning submitted in support of it, was 
comprehensively summarized in the recent case of Maffei v. Incorporated 
Town of Kemmerer, 80 Wyo 33 (338 P2d 808, 817): 
"There are many decisions from other jurisdictions which hold there can 
be no waiver of a municipality's immunity unless by specific legislative author-
ity, and they are persuasive. [Citing cases.] We, therefore, hold it is beyond 
the power of a municipality to waive an immunity which it possesses by virtue 
of its being an arm of the State's government and that any waiver of such an 
immunity must come by direct action of the legislature or through the clear 
and unmistakable implication of its legislative acts." 
**Counsel for the board do not stop with assertion that the legislature 
cannot waive the board's immunity. They take a 7-league step farther by this 
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But this is a knife with 2 edges. If the board by the Constitution 
stands separate from and declaredly equal to the legislature, then it 
alone has a right to waive and, by the same token, a right to reject 
any legislative act of waiver in its behalf. By the past and tried rea-
soning of this Court the board is, "within the scope of its functions," 
its own legislator and may legislate that which I fmd implicit in its 
decision to carry the insurance that this plaintiff would unearth for 
the purpose of pleading. 
Consider these interpretations we have made of the eleventh 
article and its predecessor: 
* * * 
Summary: The board of regents has exclusive power to waive 
the immunity our decisions have bestowed on it.* Such may be 
done by implication from action of the board as well as by express 
resolution thereof. Here the board has solemnly resolved to carry and 
pay for, out of funds of the university committed to its discretion, 
such insurance against liability as is quite inconsistent with an immu-
nity from such liability. Originally there was no liability. Now, by 
voluntary and lawful action of the board, there is liability and insur-
ance against loss occasioned by such liability. If this is not true, then 
we must instead attribute to an unusually exalted group of constitu-
tional officers the intent solely of awarding some politically influen-
tial insurance agency a fat and steady premium account for insuring 
the board and the university against risks which do not exist. That I 
am unwilling to do. The board does not sit and govern in the midst 
of partisan pressures and it should be accorded the presumption that 
each determination of its members to spend university funds imports 
a consideration; something for something which is valuable to the 
university. 
It requires no Churchillian-worded resolution of the board of 
regents-adorned say with red ribbon and blue seal-to waive a status 
which at best stands precariously at bay before the developing impact 
of judicial authority (see discussion and exhaustive examination of 
authorities in Parker v. Port Huron Hospital, 361 Mich 1, and the 
(Footnote Continued) 
bold ipse dixit: The people only, by constitutional amendment, may waive in 
behalf of the board. With the latter I cannot agree. By force of the broad con-
struction this Court has placed on article 11 the board may lawfully waive its 
own immunity from tort liability. 
*Robinson v. Washtenaw Circuit Judge, 228 Mich 225, is not opposed 
to these conclusions. The effect of acquisition of liability or indemnity insur-
ance was not considered on that occasion and we may assume from the Court's 
opinion that the board did not carry such protection at the time. 
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most recent case in point, Muskopf, supra). In the law as elsewhere 
actions sometimes speak louder than words. Here, by force of con-
templative action of the board, we must either by our decision tacitly 
approve dissipation of university funds to no useful end or draw 
from that action whatever liability the judicial process may decide is 
a reasonable incident thereof. I prefer the latter and accordingly agree 
with the reasoning of Chief Justice DETHMERS, recorded in Peters 
v. Michigan State College, 320 Mich 243, 251. 
Plaintiffs undenied petition for discovery discloses good reason 
for exercise of the discretion Court Rule No 40 (1945) confers. The 
defendant board should be required to bare its policy-insurance 
policy, that is. Further, and if the inspected policy fairly suggests 
additional inquiry, the minutes or other evidences of corporate ac-
tion by which the insurance was acquired should be discovered under 
the rule. 
I vote to affirm, without an award of costs. 
SUPPLEMENT (September 1, 1961 ). 
This case of Christie was duly assigned to the writer prior to 
commencement of our April term. In pursuance of such assignment 
the foregoing opinion was prepared and delivered to other members 
of the Court under date of June 6, 1961. Since then Mr. Justice 
CARR, writing under date of August 30, 1961, for reversal, has 
called attention to an affidavit, "executed by 1 of the attorneys for 
defendant, indicating that a search of the files and records of the 
university had not disclosed any copy of such a policy, and such had 
not been otherwise discovered or made known to defendant." 
The affidavit to which my Brother refers was prepared (and in-
cluded in defendant's appendix) long after Judge Breakey's presently 
reviewed order for discovery was entered, and long after we had 
granted (July 11, 1960) defendant's application for leave to appeal. 
No one claims that it or the thrust thereof-that no policy can be 
produced-was ever brought to the trial judge's attention, and no 
motion designed to include same in the record on appeal (see Court 
Rule No. 72, § 1 [d], [e] [1945]) has been made at any time. 
In order that the exact content of this "unable to find" affi-
davit may be read by the profession with verbated accuracy, same is 
quoted in full as follows: 
"1. That on December 18, 1959, the circuit court ordered the 
production of the defendant's liability insurance policy which was in 
force in September of 1953, for the purpose of permitting the plain-
tiff to inspect the same. 
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"2. That from said order application for leave to appeal to the 
Supreme Court was taken and said application was granted on July 
11, 1960. 
"3. That at the time the matter was being considered by the 
circuit court and during all of the time that appeal proceedings were 
pending the defendant did not know that the said policy was not 
capable of being produced. 
"4. That upon request of your deponent, a search was made of 
the files and records of the University of Michigan for the policy, 
which could not be found, and on information and belief a search 
was made of the files and records of the defendant's insurance car-
rier, both in the Detroit office and in the New York office, and no 
copy of such policy was discovered. That as of this date, a continu-
ing search of the company's New York office is being made. 
"5. That this fact was not known conclusively by the defendant 
or by this deponent until on or about October 28, 1960." 
It will be noted that the affiant carefully refrains from saying 
that no policy was ever existent or in effect, and the fact that an in-
strument once at hand has since been lost provides no way for eva-
sion of discovery. In such case the law employs its tried rules of best 
and secondary evidence. 
I do not care to encourage the growing practice of bolstering 
circuit court records by post-appeal ex parte affidavits of fact (see 
Chircop v. City of Pontiac, 363 Mich 693). Such affidavits usually-
as here-set forth facts which have never been brought to the atten-
tion of the trial judge or chancellor. It is suggested instead that we 
have no right to consider instruments of that nature unless and until 
they have been made a part of the record pursuant to said Court 
Rule No 72 (1945). 
If in this case it is shown-ultimately-that the defendant at no 
time acquired a policy such as Judge Breakey ordered produced, the 
judge will surely modify his order. Until such showing is made we 
should proceed to review upon the circuit court record as it stood 
when the order of discovery was made and our order granting leave 
to review that order was entered. 
My vote to affirm, without costs, is cast again. 
EDWARDS, J. (concurring). We concur in affirmance on the 
grounds stated in sentences 4 through 14 of the opinion of Mr. Jus-
tice BLACK. 
KAVANAGH and SOURIS, JJ., concurred with EDWARDS, J. 
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CARR, J. (dissenting). The determination of the issue here is of 
vital concern not only to the university of Michigan but also to the 
State, governmental institutions and agencies of the State, municipali-
ties, governmental subdivisions, and school districts. It requires our 
most serious consideration. Shall basic principles of law and public 
policy, uniformly recognized and upheld in this State up to this 
time, be now abandoned? 
The case now before us was instituted by issuance of a sum-
mons from the circuit court of Washtenaw county, requiring defend~ 
ant's appearance within 15 days after service thereof. The writ speci-
fied that plaintiff claimed damages in an amount not exceeding 
$375,000. On the same date that the summons was issued counsel 
for plaintiff ftled a petition, or motion, for an order of discovery. It 
was set forth therein that on or about September 13, 1953, plaintiff 
was a patient in the university of Michigan hospital, and that as a re-
sult of negligence on the part of hospital attendants he was allowed 
to fall in such manner as to cause serious physical injuries. Disclosure 
of certain facts and of exhibits presumably desired for admission on 
the trial was asked, including "the insurance contract of defendants 
and their liability carrier." 
Apparently all information sought by the petition was furnished 
to plaintiff's counsel pursuant to agreement with attorneys repre-
senting defendant, with the exception of the liability insurance poli-
cy. By subsequent amendment to the petition it was asserted on 
behalf of plaintiff that access to said policy, if in existence, was neces-
sary to enable his counsel to properly allege the cause of action re-
lied on in the declaration to be ftled. The language of the petition for 
discovery indicated that counsel representing plaintiff were proceed-
ing on the theory that, if liability coverage was afforded by a policy 
of the character in question at the time of the injury to plaintiff, 
public funds, at least to the extent of such coverage, would not be 
jeopardized, that the taking out of the policy eliminated pro tanto 
the right of governmental immunity, and that a cause of action was 
in consequence created as against defendant (or the insurance carrier) 
to the extent of the liability coverage specified in such policy, as-
suming that there was such. 
Following a hearing on the discovery petition the circuit judge 
before whom the matter was heard entered an order directing that: 
"The defendants produce for plaintiff's examination the con-
tract of insurance which was existing between defendants and their 
liability insurance carrier on the 13th day of September, 1953. Said 
contract may be photographed by plaintiff." 
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It will be noted that the order above quoted, from which defendant 
on leave granted has appealed, assumes the existence of a policy of 
the general nature suggested by the petition for discovery. Said peti-
tion did not aver the actual fact in this regard, the request for the 
order sought, and granted, apparently resting on the theory that a 
general liability insurance policy covering defendant and its agents, 
representatives and employees, might be in existence, and that if so 
it should be produced to the end that the cause of action might be 
averred accordingly. In appellant's appendix we find an affidavit, 
executed by 1 of the attorneys for defendant, indicating that a search 
of the files and records of the university had not disclosed any copy 
of such a policy, and such had not been otherwise discovered or 
made known to defendant. Whether there was a sufficient basis af-
forded by the petition for discovery to entitle plaintiff to the order 
sought may well be questioned, but in view of the importance of the 
basic question at issue it will be assumed herein that compliance with 
the order of the circuit court is possible. 
Counsel for plaintiff contend in substance that if defendant 
procured to be issued to it a policy of insurance covering liability for 
negligence of its agents and employees generally it thereby waived 
the right to assert governmental immunity as a defense. The argu-
ment concedes the existence of the immunity doctrine and that it is 
applicable to defendant. This, of course, is in accord with prior deci-
sions of this Court. Counsel apparently base their argument on the 
theory that such immunity is a matter of defense, but such is not the 
fact. If immunity exists there is no cause of action. In consequence, 
we are not here concerned with the problem of waiver of a defense 
to an action for damages. Rather, the question before us is whether 
the taking out of a liability insurance policy, if such there was, abro-
gated, at least pro tanto, the immunity that otherwise would exist. 
Necessarily involved in the problem before us are 2 questions: 
First, did the board of regents have the power to abrogate as to itself 
the doctrine of governmental immunity, either wholly or in part?; 
Second, would the taking out of an insurance policy against liability 
for negligent acts of employees and others have the effect of abolish-
ing such governmental immunity, either partly or wholly? Both of 
these questions must be given a negative answer. Emphasis is placed 
on the fact that under the Constitution of the State (article 11, § 5) 
the board of regents is charged with "the general supervision of the 
university and the direction and control of all expenditures from the 
university funds." Section 10 of the same article requires that the 
legislature "shall maintain the university" and other designated edu-
cational institutions. The supervision of the university and the ex-
penditure of its funds do not involve the exercise of legislative 
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authority. Nowhere in the Constitution of the State do we find 
granted to the defendant board authority of such character. The 
making of appropriations for the support of the institution was ex-
pressly committed to the legislature, such action obviously falling 
within the scope of legislative powers. 
Article 5, § 1, of the Constitution declares that "The legislative 
power of the State of Michigan is vested in a senate and house of 
representatives", such vesting being subject to the powers reserved to 
the people under the initiative and referendum provisions in said 
section. In Harsha v. City of Detroit, 261 Mich 586, 590 (90 ALR 
853), it was stated that: 
"The legislative power is the authority to make, alter, amend, 
and repeal laws. 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed), p 
183." 
The doctrine of immunity in connection with the performance 
of governmental functions has been accepted in Michigan, and in the 
other States of the Union as well, as a part of the common law. The 
3 Constitutions adopted in the past expressly recognized the con-
tinuing force of the common law, the Constitution of 1850 declaring 
in section 1 of the schedule thereof that: 
"The common law and the statute laws now in force, not re-
pugnant to this Constitution, shall remain in force until they expire 
by their own limitations or are altered or repealed by the legislature." 
In the Constitution of 1908 the last 3 words quoted were omitted, 
the record of the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention indi-
cating that such omission resulted from the plan for local self-govern-
ment for cities and villages, adopted by the convention, such plan 
contemplating the preparation and acceptance of home-rule charters 
to take the place of existing legislative charters. Obviously it was 
deemed expedient to eliminate any question as to the necessity of 
having a legislative repeal of existing special charters. The omission 
of the words in question did not alter the fact that all legislative pow-
er was vested, under the specific provisions of the Constitution, in 
the legislative department of government. Such power extended to 
and included specifically the repeal or modification of the common 
law recognized by the Constitutions, including the present funda-
mental law of the State. The conclusion necessarily follows that the 
board of regents of the university of Michigan was not vested with 
legislative authority to abrogate as to itself the existing doctrine of 
governmental immunity. 
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It was declared by this Court in Lucking v. People, 320 Mich 
495, 503, that: ' 
"The lands, buildings and equipment under the management, 
supervision and control of the board of regents of the university are 
public property, owned by the State of Michigan." 
As before noted, the Constitution of the State commits to the de-
fendant board the duty and responsibility of exercising supervisory 
control over the university and also responsibility for the expendi-
ture of its funds. The duty thus created exists and must be exercised 
for and on behalf of the people of the State. No one will seriously 
contend that the authority so granted would permit gifts of property 
or money, belonging to defendant board, required to be used for the 
purpose above indicated. By the same process of reasoning defendant 
in the exercise of the supervisory and administrative functions vested 
in it by the Constitution may not surrender or abrogate valuable rights 
recognized by the fundamental law of the State, and created and 
existing for the benefit and protection of defendant in the perform-
ance of its governmental duties. Had defendant by express resolu-
tion undertaken to abolish or modify the doctrine of governmental 
immunity as to it, such action would have been ineffective. Nor 
could such result follow from a contract executed in connection with 
the carrying on of functions of the board. 
A State agency or municipal governmental authority may not 
bind itself by a contract into which it is not authorized to enter. As 
above pointed out the Constitution of Michigan, by which defendant 
board is bound, contains no grant of power to invade the legislative 
field nor to enter into contractual undertakings other than in further-
ance of the authority granted and in the exercise of the purposes 
thereof. 
[Out of state cases are discussed.] 
By analogy the above cited cases sustaining the majority rule 
are in accord with the holding of this Court in DeGroot v. The Edi-
son Institute, 306 Mich 339. In that case the plaintiff brought an 
action for damages claimed to have resulted from negligence on the 
part of the defendant. The proofs indicated that the Institute was a 
nonprofit and public benevolent institution. The trial court granted 
defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict of the 
jury in plaintiffs favor, and this Court approved under the rule that 
eleemosynary institutions are exempt in Michigan from liability 
based on the grounds asserted in plaintiffs declaration. It was stated 
that (pp 343, 344): 
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"Nor does the fact that the nonprofit corporation carries liabil-
ity insurance so change its status as to make the corporation liable 
for an injury for which it would not otherwise be liable." 
Other decisions in States adhering to the majority rule are in 
accord with the above cases, the opinions in which indicate the 
weight of authority and the reasons on which the prevailing rule 
rests. The New Hampshire decision, supra, fairly epitomizes the 
proposition at issue with its statement indicating that the purpose of 
a policy of insurance is to indemnify the insured rather than to 
create liability. As hereinbefore noted, however, the acceptance of 
plaintiffs claim as to the effect that may be given to the existence of 
a general policy of indemnity insurance rests on the theory that by 
such a contract the abrogation or modification of the doctrine of 
governmental immunity has resulted. 
In the instant case it is clear that under the provisions of our 
Constitution the board of regents of the university of Michigan is 
not invested with legislative powers. Its powers and duties have ref-
erence to the administration of the affairs, educational and financial, 
of the university. Whether the rule of governmental immunity should 
be modified or abrogated is a legislative matter, and in the final 
analysis the authority must be exercised in accordance with Consti-
tutional provisions relating to the legislative department of govern-
ment. Obviously the people, by Constitutional amendment, have 
full authority to act. Whether the State legislature may by general 
law abrogate or modify the existing rule of governmental immunity 
as to defendant board of regents is not involved in the instant case. 
No such law has been enacted. So far as the instant case is concerned, 
defendant board of regents has not by express resolution undertaken 
to abolish or alter such rule of immunity which it has possessed from 
the time ofits creation. For the reasons above pointed out it is with-
out power to take such action, and what it may not do expressly 
may not be accomplished impliedly through or by means of a con-
tract of indemnity insurance. 
The conclusion follows that the examination of the policy to 
which the order of the circuit court had reference would not enable 
counsel for plaintiff to allege in their declaration a cause of action 
against defendant board of regents. Such policy would not be entitled 
to admission in evidence in the trial of the case and, in consequence, 
it must be said that Michigan Court Rule No 35, § 6 (1945),* on 
which plaintiffs petition for discovery was based did not authorize 
the order from which the appeal has been taken. 
*As added June 27, 1952 and amended June 11, 1958. See 334 Mich xl 
and 352 Mich xvii.-REPORTER. 
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Counsel for appellant calls attention to the decision of this 
Court in Robinson v. Washtenaw Circuit Judge, 228 Mich 225, in 
which it was held that the hospital of the university of Michigan was 
a charitable or eleemosynary institution, because supported at public 
expense, and that the regents of the university were not liable for 
damages for injuries, alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff while 
a surgical patient in the hospital, because of the status thereof, as 
well as on the ground that as an agency of State government the gen-
eral rule of immunity was applicable. Attention is directed to the 
fact that the injuries sustained by plaintiff in the instant case were 
suffered in 1953. In the prevailing opinion in the case of Parker v. 
Port Huron Hospital, 361 Mich 1, it was held that the change in the 
rule as to the liability of charitable nonprofit hospital organizations 
should apply in that case and (p 28) "to all future causes of action 
arising after September 15, 1960." It is suggested in substance that 
the decision in Parker may not be applied to the instant case in view 
of the limitation as to the effective time of the holding. Also in-
volved is the question whether such holding is applicable to the hos-
pital of the university of Michigan which under the provisions of the 
State Constitution is subject to supervision and control by the de-
fendant board of regents. However, we think that the instant case 
should be determined on the basis that the doctrine of governmental 
immunity is applicable to the defendant. 
The case should be remanded with directions to set aside the 
order from which defendant has appealed. 
KELLY, J., concurred with CARR, J. 
DETHMERS, C. J., and TALBOT SMITH, J., did not sit. 
The Christie case was decided September 22, 1961. The 
Board of Regents held its September meeting one week later. 
The official Proceedings of the Board of Regents for that meet-
ing contains the following paragraph with the marginal notation 
"Sovereign Immunity": 
The Vice-President in charge of business and finance 
commented upon a report from the Interim Committee of 
the legislature on sovereign immunity. He referred to a let-
ter from the Attorney General and to his reply to that let-
ter. The Vice-President said that the Board of Regents in 
1939 directed that public liability insurance be taken out 
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(R.P., 1936-39, p. 968), and that at present the University 
carries a public liability policy with limits of $500,000 to 
$1,000,000 for bodily injury and $50,000 to $500,000 for 
property damage. He said that this policy also contains in-
surance against malpractice with an aggregate limit of 
$1,000,000. The liability policy in effect contains a provi-
sion that the insurer will not invoke the defense of sover-
eign immunity without the specific authorization of the 
Board of Regents in individual cases. 
-Proceedings of the Board of Regents, 1960 to 1963, 
at 460. 
Glass v. Dudley Paper Company 
365 Mich. 227, 228-31; 112 N.W. 2d 489 (1961) 
DETHMERS, C. J. Plaintiffs, husband and wife, sued in the 
Ingham county circuit court for damages resulting from injuries al-
legedly sustained by the wife when a glass milk container, purchased 
from defendant State board, crumbled in her hand. Defendant board 
moved to dismiss as to it on the ground of lack of jurisdiction in that 
court, contending that it reposes exclusively in the court of claims. 
The motion was granted. Plaintiffs appeal. 
The question presented is a jurisdictional one. Michigan Con-
stitution of 1908, art 11, § 8, provides that the defendant, the State 
board of agriculture, now known as "The Board of Trustees of Mich-
igan State University of Agriculture and Applied Science",* "shall 
have the general supervision of the college, and the direction and 
control of all college funds". With respect to this and the like consti-
tutional provision relating to the University of Michigan,t this Court 
has held that they have invested the governing bodies of the 2 uni-
versities with the entire control and management of the affair~ and 
property of these institutions, to the exclusion of all other depart-
ments of the State government from any interference therewith. 
Weinberg v. Regents of University, 97 Mich 246; Agler v. Michigan 
Agricultural College, 181 Mich 559 (5 NCCA 897). For discussion of 
point, see, also, Peters v. Michigan State College, 320 Mich 243. 
*See PA 1959, p. 485.-REPORTER. 
tMichigan Const 1908, art 11, § 5. 
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It is on the above basis that plaintiffs contend that the legisla-
ture could not include the defendant board within the exclusive juris-
diction of the court of claims because this would represent an inva-
sion by the legislature of the board's exclusive right of control of the 
affairs and property of the university. 
It is to be noted that the mentioned constitutional article 11, 
§ 8, in nowise empowers the board to create courts or to confer up-
on or withhold jurisdiction from any court. On the contrary, article 
7, § 1, after establishing certain courts, provides for "such other 
courts of civil and criminal jurisdiction, inferior to the Supreme 
Court, as the legislature may establish by general law." That express-
ly conferred power the legislature exercised in creating the court 
of claims by the enactment ofPA 1939, No 135 (CL 1948, § 691.101 
et seq. (Stat Ann 1959 Cum Supp § 27.3548(1) et seq.]). By that 
act the legislature conferred exclusive jurisdiction upon the court of 
claims over "claims and demands", over $100, "against the State or 
any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms or 
agencies". That language is broad enough to include defendant 
board. In thus conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the court of 
claims, the legislature has also exercised the power contemplated by 
Michigan Constitution of 1908, art 7, § 10, which provides that: 
"Circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction in all matters 
civil and criminal not excepted in this Constitution and not prohib-
ited by law. " (Italics supplied.) 
By the enactment in question jurisdiction in this matter has become 
prohibited to the circuit court by law. 
To conclude, involved in the jurisdictional question here pre-
sented is not the power to control university affairs and property, 
vested by the Constitution in defendant board, but, rather, the pow-
er to ftx the jurisdiction of courts inferior to the Supreme Court, 
vested by Constitution in the legislature. The court of claims act is, 
therefore, in the respect here considered, constitutional. 
Order dismissing is affirmed, without costs, a public question 
being involved. 
KELLY, BLACK, EDWARDS, KAVANAGH, and SOURIS, 
JJ., concurred. 
CARR, J., did not sit. 
OTIS M. SMITH, J., took no part in the decision of this case. 
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v. Board of Regents of The University of Michigan 
Mich. 238, 240-43; 134 N.W. 2d 146 (1965) 
T. M. KAVANAGH, C. J. Separate actions were commenced in 
the Washtenaw county circuit court by the various plaintiffs against 
the board of regents of the University of Michigan and others. 
In the Fox and Mitchell cases the declarations were filed in 
two counts: 
Count one alleged that the University Hospital, an agency 
controlled by the board of regents, made warranties as to the qualifi-
cations, knowledge, and skill of its agents and employees, being doc-
tors employed at the said hospital, which qualifications were ordi-
narily possessed and exercised by members of the medical profession 
in the locality, and that the warranties were breached in that the 
diagnosis, treatment, and surgery performed on plaintiff was unskill-
fully and negligently performed, resulting in permanent injury and 
disability to the plaintiff. 
Court two was entitled "trespass on the case," in which the 
claim was made that the defendant board of regents was responsible 
for the negligent and unskillfull performance of surgery and treat-
ment during plaintiffs hospitalization. 
Subsequent amendments to the declarations alleged breach of 
contract and eventually an additional amendment was filed alleging 
that any immunity from liability on the part of the board of regents 
had been waived by the purchase of a comprehensive general liability 
insurance policy. 
The Hyma case was begun by summons. No declaration was 
filed. 
Motions to dismiss the cases as to the regents of the University 
of Michigan only were filed. The motions were based upon the ruling 
of this Court in Glass v. Dudley Paper Company, 365 Mich 227, in 
which it was held that the circuit courts of this State ·did not have 
jurisdiction to entertain claims against the governing body of Michi-
gan State University, for the reason such jurisdiction is vested by 
statute1 exclusively in the court of claims. A similar rule woulJ ap-
ply to the board of regents of the University of Michigan. 
The trial court held that it did not have jurisdiction but that 
serious injustice would result by reason of the running of the statute 
of limitations in a court of claims action if dismissal were granted. 
The trial court instead ordered transfer of jurisdiction to the court 
of claims. 
1PA 1961, No 236, § 6419 (CLS 1961, § 600.6419 [Stat Ann 1962 
Rev§ 27A.6419]). 
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On leave granted, the board of regents of the University of 
Michigan presented the following question: 
"Can the circuit court, which has acknowledged itself to be 
without jurisdiction to entertain and determine the issues of fact and 
law presented, by reason of the court of claims act, which vests that 
court with exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine claims against 
the defendant, enter an order transferring the cause from the circuit 
court to the court of claims?" 
Plaintiffs contend that the General Court Rules of 1963 are to 
be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determina-
tion of every action so as to avoid the consequences of any error or 
defect in the proceedings which does not affect the substantial rights 
of the parties. 
Plaintiffs further contend the spirit and effect of the revised 
judicature act of 1961 1 is to eliminate the old concepts of "juris-
diction" and to assure that actions shall be justly and promptly heard 
without stilted concepts of territorial or other limitations, by per-
mitting transfer to the proper forum if filed in an improper forum. 
They also argue that the law in Michigan prior to Glass permitted the 
bringing of such an action in the Washtenaw circuit court, since ac-
tions had previously been brought there and no one had ever ques-
tioned its jurisdiction. For this reason, they argue, that in justice and 
fairness they should not be deprived of a cause of action because of a 
change in the law. 
Jurisdiction and venue are not the same thing. Lack of proper 
venue under the new General Court Rules2 can be corrected by trans-
fer of a cause to the proper forum; lack of jurisdiction cannot. 
When a court is without jurisdiction of the subject matter, any 
action with respect to such a cause, other than to dismiss it, is abso-
lutely void. 
In In re Estate of Fraser, 288 Mich 392, this Court said (p 
394): 
"Courts are bound to take notice of the limits of their authori-
ty, and a court may, and should, on its own motion, though the ques-
tion is not raised by the pleadings or by counsel, recognize its lack of 
jurisdiction and act accordingly by staying proceedings, dismissing 
the action, or otherwise disposing thereof, at any stage of the pro-
ceeding." 
1CLS 1961, § 600.101 etseq. (Stat Ann 1962 Rev R 27A.101etseq.).-
REPORTER. 
2GCR 1963, 404.-REPORTER. 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 239 
7 MLP, Courts, § 24, p 627, is to the same effect: 
"Where a court is without jurisdiction in the particular case, its 
acts and proceedings can be of no force or validity, and are a mere 
nullity and void.1 
"A court which has determined that it has no jurisdiction 
should not proceed further except to dismiss the action."2 
The orders of the circuit court in transferring the cases against 
the defendant board of regents of the University of Michigan to the 
court of claims are reversed and set aside, and the causes remanded 
to the lower court for entry of an order dismissing the actions. 
A public question being involved, no costs are allowed. 
DETHMERS, KELLY, BLACK, SOURIS, SMITH, O'HARA, 
and ADAMS, JJ., concurred. 
Branum v. Board of Regents of University of Michigan 
The Michigan Courtof Appeals, Division 2 (1966) 
5 MiGh. App. 134, 135-39; 145 N.W. 2d 860 (1966) 
McGREGOR, P.J. This action arose as the result of an injury 
sustained by Joyce Branum on July 2, 1963. At about 3:15p.m., 
plaintiff was struck by a truck owned by the University of Michigan, 
being driven by Harold F. Dresselhouse, an employee of the Univer-
sity of Michigan. Mrs. Branum was injured when the truck left the 
street, went over the curb and sidewalk, and struck her. The plaintiff 
Carl Branum is the husband of Joyce Branum and makes his claim 
for loss of consortium and medical expenses of his wife. 
The statement of claim was ftled in the court of claims on 
October 3, 1963. Plaintiffs argue that the legislature of the State of 
Michigan did abolish the defense of governmental immunity for the 
State of Michigan and the board of regents of the University of 
Michigan, or-alternatively-that the purchase of automobile liability 
insurance by the board of regents of the University of Michigan did 
waive any claim that it might have of governmental immunity. The 
plaintiffs argue that, in any event, the State of Michigan would be 
1In re Braver (ED Mich 1931), 51 F2d 123, affirmed by Detroit Trust 
Co. v. Dunitz (CCA 6, 1932), 59 F2d 905;In re Dowling's Estate (1944), 308 
Mich 129 (probate court). 
2 Lehman v. Lehman (1945), 312 Mich 102. 
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liable upon the accident because the State of Michigan was, in fact, 
the owner of the truck, even though it was registered in the name of 
the board of regents of the University of Michigan. The defendants 
based their defense on the governmental immunity of the board of 
regents of the University of Michigan. They argue that the legislature 
of the State of Michigan could not waive the governmental immunity 
of the University of Michigan, as it is a constitutional corporation 
and not subject to the control of the legislature. 
On March 22, 1965, the court of claims ordered a summary 
judgment of no cause of action, based upon the defendants' previous 
motion to dismiss. 
The decision of this Court could be simplified if we could 
adopt the plaintiffs' arguments that purchase of automobile liability 
insurance by the defendant board of regents of the University of 
Michigan acted to waive governmental immunity of the board of re-
gents to the extent of the insurance coverage. Opinions from the 
courts of some sister States have adopted such a position. Marshall v. 
City of Green Bay (1963), 18 Wis 2d 496 (118 NW2d 715);Schoen-
ing v. U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc. (1963), 265 Minn 11~ (120 
NW2d 859); Taylor v. Knox County Board of Education (1942) 292 
Ky 767 (167 SW2d 700, 145 ALR 1333);Marion County v. Cantrell 
(1933), 166 Tenn 358 (61 SW2d 477); Vendrell v. School District 
# 266 (Oregon) (1961), 226 Or 263 (360 P2d 282). The Supreme 
Court of the State of Michigan had the chance to adopt such a posi-
tion in the opinion of Justice BLACK in Christie v. Board of Regents 
of the University of Michigan (1961), 364 Mich 202, but did not 
adopt such a position. It is noted that Justice BLACK, in the later 
case of Sayers v. School District # 1 Fractional (1962), 366 Mich 
217, abandoned his former position in the face of the "overwhelming 
edict" on the part of his fellow Justices on the Supreme Court 
against his position. This Court cannot, therefore, rule that the board 
of regents waived governmental immunity by taking out a policy of 
automobile liability insurance, in view of the recent action on this 
question by the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan. 
We must decide whether the waiver of governmental immunity 
by the State of Michigan, PA 1961, No 236 (CLS 1961, § 600.2904, 
Stat Ann 1962 Rev 27A.2904) and PA 1961, No 236, CLS 1961, 
§ 600.6475 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev 27A.6475), did waive the govern-
mental immunity of the board of regents of the University of Michi-
gan. 
The defendants argue that historically, by judicial decisions of 
the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan, the board of regents of 
the University of Michigan has not been held subject to the control of 
the legislature. See Weinberg v. Regents of University of Michigan 
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(1893), 97 Mich 246; Sterling v. Regents of University of Michigan 
(1896), llOMich 369, (34 LRA 150);Board of Regents of University 
of Michigan v. Auditor General (1911), 167 Mich 444; Robinson v. 
Washtenaw Circuit Judge (1924), 228 Mich 225. This Court recog-
nizes the wisdom of establishing a separate governing body of the 
University of Michigan, free from the political influences that are 
necessarily a part of a State legislature. This Court recognizes that 
such independence must be maintained in educational matters in or-
der to provide the highest quality education for the students of Mich-
igan, and in order to maintain the outstanding national reputation of 
the University. 
In spite of its independence, the board of regents remains a 
part of the government of the State of Michigan. The Supreme 
Court of the State of Michigan has ruled that the judicial doctrine of 
governmental immunity no longer exists in Michigan. Justice ED-
WARDS, in Williams v. City of Detroit (1961), 364 Mich 231, 250, 
so ruled, and was concurred in by three other justices. It is clear that 
the public policy of Michigan is that the defense of governmental im-
munity to tort actions should no longer exist. 
The governing bodies of both the University of Michigan and 
Michigan State University are equal in both creation and power. In 
Peters v. Michigan State College (1948), 320 Mich 243, the Supreme 
Court, by handing down a split 44 decision, affirmed the lower court 
decision that Michigan State College was not immune from the work-
men's compensation act. It is the opinion of this Court that the legis-
lature can validly exercise its police power for the welfare oflhe peo-
ple of this State, and a constitutional corporation such as the board 
of regents of the University of Michigan can lawfully be affected 
thereby. The University of Michigan is an independent branch of the 
government of the State of Michigan, but it is not an island. Within 
the confines of the operation and the allocation of funds of the Uni-
versity, it is supreme. Without these confines, however, there is no 
reason to allow the regents to use their independence to thwart the 
clearly established public policy of the people of Michigan. 
The decision of the court of claims is reversed and the case re-
manded to the court of claims for determination upon the merits. 
No costs are awarded because of the public nature of the questions 
involved. 
T. G. KAY ANAGH and J. H. GILLIS, JJ., concurred. 
242 THE UNIVERSITY AND STATE GOVERNMENT 
Huckins v. Board of Regents of University of Michigan 
263 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Mich. 1967) 
LEVIN, Chief Judge. 
This suit is based on three counts: I, the Jones Act, 4C U.S.C. 
§ 688; II, unseaworthiness; and III, the duty of maintenance and 
care, the latter two counts under the general maritime law. The plain-
tiff was employed as a seaman by the defendant on the Myscis, a ves-
sel owned by the defendant and used by it for scientific purposes on 
the Great Lakes and connecting tributaries, and alleges that the in-
juries occurred on July 8, 1964, while in the course of that employ-
ment. The defendant, the Board of Regents of the University of 
Michigan, a corporation created by the Constitution of the State of 
Michigan and generally known as a constitutional corporation, moves 
to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment on the ground 
that it is immune from liability and suit under the eleventh amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States. 
[1] The motion to dismiss Count I is denied. The Jones Act 
provides in part: 
"Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his em-
ployment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at 
law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of 
the United States modifying or extending the common-law right or 
remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply 
* * * " 
The Federal Employers' liability Act (FELA), to which the 
Jones Act refers, provides in part: 
"Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce be-
tween any of the several States * * * shall be liable in damages to any 
person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such 
commerce * * * " and that " [ u] nder this chapter an action may be 
brought in a district court of the United States * * * ." 45 U.S.C. 
§§51, 56. 
In Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama State Docks De-
partment et al., 377 U.S. 184,84 S.Ct. 1207, 12 L.Ed.2d 233 (1964), 
the Supreme Court held that Congress intended to subject a state to 
suit under the FELA and had the authority under the commerce 
clause to do so. 
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[2] The Jones Act, by express language, gives seamen injured 
in the course of their employment the equivalent rights available to 
railway employees. It is clear that Congress intended and had the 
power to subject a state to suit in a federal court under the Jones Act 
just as it did under the FELA See Cocherl v. State of Alaska, 246 
F.Supp. 328 (D.Alaska 1965). 
[3] Counts II and III, based on the maritime law and not on 
congressional enactment, are dismissed. The eleventh amendment of 
the United States Constitution precludes suits against a state under 
the general maritime law in federal court absent the consent of the 
state. In Copper Steamship Co. v. State of Michigan et al., 194 F.2d 
465, 468 (6th Cir. 1952), a libel against the State of Michigan for 
property damage caused by one of its ferries, the court said: 
"We are of the opinion that the logical overall construction of the 
Court of Claims Act is that Michigan created a court to hear all 
claims against the State with the exception of any claims that were 
or might be enforcible in the federal courts; that with respect to 
claims of either nature a 3-year state of limitations would be applica-
ble; and that there was no intention in creating the Court of Claims 
to enlarge or extend the existing jurisdiction of the federal court 
over the State or any of its departments, commissions, or agencies. 
This was the construction given to the Act by the Michigan Supreme 
Court in Manion v. State Highway Commissioner, 303 Mich. 1, on 
page 22, 5 N.W.2d 527, 529, where, in a case involving the Act, the 
Court stated: 'Nor has the State waived its immunity from suit for a 
maritime tort in the courts of the United States.' This expression of 
opinion was not necessary for the ruling which the Court gave in that 
case, and is not binding upon us as is usually the case where the state 
court of last resort has given its construction of a statute of the State. 
[omitting citations] However, it is persuasive as being in accord with 
our own view in this matter." 
[ 4] The plaintiff argues that the rules governing the immunity 
of municipalities are different from those governing the immunities 
of a state and that the Board of Regents of the University of Michi-
gan is more akin to a municipality, and therefore the rule of the 
Copper case would not apply. It is not necessary to consider the law 
applicable to municipalities, as I am not persuaded by the analogy. 
The immunity of a state extends to its agencies and departments. 
The Board of Regents of the University of Michigan is a unique con-
stitutional corporation, and is similar to a department of the state. 
[5] The plaintiff also argues that the defendant waived its im-
munity by the purchase of liability insurance and cites Christie v. 
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Board of Regents of University of Michigan, 364 Mich. 202, 111 
N.W.2d 30 (1961), in support of his position. In Grant v. Cottage 
Hospital Corp., 368 Mich. 77, 79, 117 N.W.2d 90 (1962), the court 
held that purchase of insurance by a hospital did not waive its im-
munity from suit and also remarked: 
"The majority opinion in Christie v. Board of Regents of University 
of Michigan, supra, is not to the contrary since the effect of that 
opinion was simply to require the production of insurance policies 
for examination in order that a plaintiff might plead. There was no 
determination that, once having pleaded a waiver by the purchase of 
insurance, the plaintiff would have pleaded a good cause of action. 
That issue is here now determined adversely to the pleader." 
Even if the existence of liability insurance had amounted to a waiver 
of immunity from suit, the State of Michigan did not consent to such 
suit in the federal court. 
It is of interest to note that Public Act No. 170 of the Public 
Acts of 1964, Comp. Laws 1948, § 691.1401 et seq. M.S.A. 
§ 3.996(101) et seq., effective July 1, 1965, subsequent to this acci-
dent, waives governmental immunity in certain cases. The case be-
fore the court is not one of them. 
[6] The motion to dismiss Count I is denied; the motion to 
dismiss Counts II and III is granted; and the motion for summary 
judgment in the alternative, with respect to Count I, is denied be-
cause there are genuine issues of material fact. 
MacDonald v. Board of Regents of University of Michigan 
371 F. 2d 818 (6th Cir., 1967) 
PER CURIAM. 
Plaintiff-appellant is a citizen and resident of the Province of 
Nova Scotia, Canada. On February 2, 1965, she ftled suit in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan 
against the Board of Regents of the University of Michigan, alleging 
that while a patient in the University of Michigan Hospital, she had 
suffered injuries as a result of the negligence of employees of that 
hospital. 
Appellee Board of Regents filed an answer in this cause on 
February 24, 1965. On June 29, 1965, a pretrial order was entered 
by the United States District Judge which recited in part: "Defendant 
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contemplates flling a motion challenging the jurisdiction of this 
Court and such motion shall be filed without delay." The order also 
granted defendant leave to amend its answer within 15 days in order 
to ch'allenge jurisdiction. 
Subsequently, on July 6, 1965, the Board of Regents f:Jled a 
motion to dismiss, alleging: "That this court is without jurisdiction 
to hear the issues here involved and that the plaintiffs exclusive 
remedy, if any, is with the Court of Claims of the State of Michigan." 
The parties concede that the defendant here, the Board of 
Regents of the University of Michigan, is for all legal purposes one 
and the same as the State of Michigan itself. 
The Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States provides: 
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted 
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by 
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." 
Appellant concedes that absent appellee's answer in this cause, 
the Eleventh Amendment would be a final bar to the United States 
District Court having jurisdiction over this litigation. Appellant, 
however, argues that filing of an answer should be read by this court, 
and should have been by the District Judge, as a waiver of its right to 
assert lack of jurisdiction. 
We do not believe that a constitutional proscription against the 
judicial power of the United States being construed to extend to any 
suit commenced by a citizen of a foreign state against one of the 
United States can be waived by such a technical error. Ford Motor 
Co. v. Dept. of Treasury of State of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 65 S.Ct. 
347, 89 L. Ed. 389 (1945). 
In the Ford case, the claim of lack of jurisdiction due to the 
Eleventh Amendment was first made and argued by the state in the 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court therein stated: 
"This was in time, however. The Eleventh Amendment de-
clares a policy and sets forth an explicit limitation on federal judicial 
power of such compelling force that this Court will consider the issue 
arising under this Amendment in this case even though urged for the 
first time in this Court." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury 
of State of Indiana, supra at 467, 65 S.Ct. at 352. 
The order of the District Court is affirmed. 
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3. OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL 
The statutes which provide for the treatment of children 
and poor people at the state expense by University Hospital 
have been the subject of many opinions of the Attorney Gen-
eral. In 1911 and again in 1920 the Attorney General read the 
statutes in an extremely literal way and ruled that the statutory 
words "medical care" did not include surgery for children. 1 In 
1915, however, the Attorney General was able to demonstrate 
that he could read language more liberally when he ruled that 
the words "University Hospital" included the homeopathic hos-
pital which was then operated by the University. 2 
In other rulings under these same laws, the Attorney Gen-
eral, in 1919, ruled that the superintendent of University Hos-
pital could not refuse to admit a child brought to the hospital 
under an order of Probate Court3 ; but in more recent opinions 
the Attorney General has ruled that the admission of state pa-
tients to the Neuropsychiatric Institute and the tuberculosis unit 
of University Hospital are subject only to the rules of the Board 
of Regents and not subject to the provisions of the Michigan Af-
flicted Children's Act or the regulations at the Tuberculosis 
Sanitarium Commission.4 
Despite the University's acknowledged constitutional inde-
pendence in the framework all ready discussed in Chapters II 
and III, it is clear from subsequent rulings of the Attorney Gen-
eral that the University continued to cooperate with other state 
authorities who were acting under the various statutes. Under 
these laws, the Attorney General has ruled that a Judge of Pro-
bate may commission any person to transport children to Uni-
versity Hospital at state expense. 5 The word "child" in the 
statutes was defined as any person who has not attained his 
majority. 6 The authority of the former county superintendents 
of the poor to guarantee expenses at University Hospital has 
been examined, 7 and the procedure for submitting separate in-
voices to the state for the same patient who received treatment 
under two different laws was prescribed in another opinion. 8 In 
1943, on the request of a social worker, the Attorney General 
was able to find four different sets of statutory provisions under 
which a child with homicidal tendencies might qualify for com-
mitment at state expense to the Neuropsychiatric Institute on 
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either a permanent or a temporary basis. 9 In the same year the 
Attorney General ruled that the University could not collect 
additional charges from a patient admitted at state expense even 
though the patient could collect under an insurance policy. 10 
A rather startling number of rulings have been issued under 
statutes providing that unclaimed bodies for which no private 
person has paid burial expenses shall be shipped to the Medical 
School for the use of its students. As early as 1886 the Attorney 
General ruled that the body of a deceased inmate of the North-
ern Michigan Asylum (today, the Traverse City State Hospital) 
might be buried at the asylum at the request of her widower 
even though the widower did not provide funds for burial. 11 
By 1890, however, the Attorney General's office seems to have 
abandoned its earlier position, and it ruled that the only alterna-
tive to shipment to the Medical School was burial at private ex-
pense. 12 In 1907, the office made it clear that the statutory 
maximum of $15.00 for packing and shipping cadavers to the 
Medical School could not be exceeded, 13 and, in 1910, the su-
perintendent at Traverse City, who had requested most of the 
opinions in this series, was informed that he must continue to 
ship cadavers to Ann Arbor despite the fact that the Medical 
School was then oversupplied since the statute did not make any 
other provision for such a contingency. 14 As late as 1930, the 
Attorney General had to advise the Auditor General that he 
should not pay for burial at public expense despite an order of 
the Circuit Court since the body should have been shipped to 
Ann Arbor. 15 
A few opinions of the Attorney General have been con-
cerned with the sovereign immunity of state institutions of high-
er education. In 1926, on the authority of the Robinson case, he 
ruled that University Hospital was not liable for burns suffered 
by a patient because of the negligence of an employee. 16 A 
1939 ruling held that the legislature could not waive the sover-
eign immunity of the then Michigan State College, and, there-
fore, a statute granting jurisdiction to the Claims Committee of 
the State Administrative Board to decide small claims was not 
constitutional as applied to claims against the college. 17 (This 
opinion was overruled by the Branum case discussed in this 
chapter.) Finally, in 1948, the members of a faculty committee 
in charge of athletics at Central Michigan College were told that 
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incorporation could not protect them from personal liability for 
injuries to athletes or patrons if their own negligence was the 
proximate cause of the injuries. 18 
4. STATUTE ON JURISDICTION OF COURT CLAIMS 
P.A. 1961, No. 236, § 6419, Eff. Jan. 1, 1963 
AN ACT to revise and consolidate the statutes relating to the or-
ganization and jurisdiction of the courts of this state; the powers and 
duties of such courts, and of the judges and other officers thereof; the 
forms and attributes of civil claims and actions; the time within which 
civil actions and proceedings may be brought in said courts; pleading, 
evidence, practice and procedure in civil actions and proceedings in 
said courts; to provide remedies and penalties for the violation of cer-
tain provisions of this act; and to repeal all acts and parts of acts in-
consistent with, or contravening any of the provisions of this act. 
The People of the State of Michigan enact: 
600.6419 Court of Claims 
(1) Except as provided in section 6440, the jurisdiction of the 
court of claims as conferred upon it by this chapter over claims and 
demands against the state or any of its departments, commissions, 
boards, institutions, arms or agencies, shall be exclusive. The state 
administrative board is hereby vested with discretionary authority 
upon the advice of the attorney general, to hear, consider, determine 
and allow any claim against the state in an amount less than $100.00. 
Any claim so allowed by the state administrative board shall be paid 
in the same manner as judgments are paid under section 6458 upon 
certification of the said allowed claim by the secretary of the state 
administrative board to the clerk of the court of claims. The court 
has power and jurisdiction: 
(a) To hear and determine all claims and demands, liquidated 
and unliquidated, ex contractu and ex delicto, against the state 
and any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, 
arms or agencies. 
(b) To hear and determine all claims and demands, liquidated 
or unliquidated, ex contractu or ex delicto, which may be pleaded 
by way of counterclaim on the part of the state or any depart-
ment, commission, board, institution, arm or agency thereof 
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against any claimant who may bring suit in such court. Any such 
claim of the state or any department, commission, board, institu-
tion, arm or agency thereof may be pleaded by way of counter-
claim in any action brought against the state, or such or any other 
department, commission, board, institution, arm or agency of the 
state. 
(2) The judgment entered by the court of claims upon any 
such claim, either against or in favor of the state or any department, 
commission, board, institution, arm or agency thereof, upon becom-
ing final shall be res adjudicata of such claim. Upon the trial of any 
cause in which any demand is made by the state or any department, 
commission, board, institution, arm or agency thereof, against the 
claimant either by way of setoff, recoupment, or cross declaration, 
the court shall hear and determine each of such claims or demands 
and if the court shall find a balance due from the claimant to the 
state it shall render judgment in favor of the state for such balance. 
Writs of execution or garnishment may issue upon said judgment the 
same as from one of the circuit courts of this state. The judgment en-
tered by the court of claims upon any such claim, either for or 
against the claimant shall be fmal unless appealed from as herein 
provided. 
(3) The court of claims shall not have jurisdiction of any claim 
for compensation under the provisions of either: 
(a) Act No. 10 of the Public Acts of the First Extra Session 
of 1912, as amended; 
(b) Act No. 93 of the Public Acts of 1929, being sections 
17.91 and 17.92 of the Compiled Laws of 1948, as amended; or 
(c) Act No. 329 of the Public Acts of 1937, as amended. 
(4) This chapter shall not be construed so as to deprive the cir-
cuit courts of this state of jurisdiction over actions brought by the 
taxpayer under the provisions of Act No. 167 of the Public Acts of 
1933 or any other actions against state agencies based upon the sta-
tutes of the state of Michigan in such case made and provided, which 
expressly confer jurisdiction thereof upon the circuit courts, nor of 
the proceedings to review findings as provided in Act No. 1 of the 
Public Acts of the Extra Session of 1936, or any other similar pro-
ceedings expressly authorized by the statutes of the state of Michi-
gan in such case made and provided. 
(CL '48, § 600.6419.) 
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CHAPTER VIII 
THE UNIVERSITY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT: 
ZONING AND PROPERTY TAXES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The relations between a state university and local govern-
ments are discussed in this chapter. Probably the most notice-
able area of potential conflict between university and municipal 
authorities relates to the application of local zoning ordinances 
to the construction and operation of the physical plant of the 
university. So far, no case has been decided by the appellate 
courts of Michigan on this exact point, but it is the subject of 
several opinions of the Attorney General. 
The cases do, however, deal with a second subject which 
affects the relations between city and university, i.e., the exemp-
tion of university property from taxation. Since property taxes 
are so important to the support of local government and since a 
university is likely to own a large amount of property in the city 
in which it is located, the exact applicability of its tax exemp-
tion is very important. 
Three cases have been decided by the Michigan Supreme 
Court which have determined the extent to which the property 
of the University of Michigan is exempt from taxation. The first 
case, Aplin, 1 decided in 1890, held that the property of the Uni-
versity of Michigan was exempt from taxation as state property, 
and not as the property of an educational institution. This dis-
tinction was important because the statute exempting the prop-
erty of incorporated educational institutions from taxation 
limited the exemption to real estate "occupied by them for the 
purposes for which they were incorporated." The land involved 
in the case was Detroit real estate which apparently had not been 
recently used for educational purposes. 
MacKinnon Boiler, the next case in this series, modified 
the rules by permitting one minor exception which embraced 
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vacant lots not used by the University. They were declared to 
be subject to special assessment taxes for local improvements. 
Since these local improvements add to the value of the property 
subject to the tax, this exception to the rule should not unduly 
burden the University. 
The broadest attack on the tax exemption of the University 
came in the final case in this series, Lucking v. People. An Ann 
Arbor taxpayer brought suit against the State of Michigan and 
the University of Michigan seeking to force the payment of real 
estate taxes to the City of Ann Arbor on certain properties of 
the University which, he did not think were being used for pure-
ly educational purposes. The Supreme Court adhered to its 
precedents and the suit was dismissed. 
Despite the establishment of the rule, however, there are 
enormous practical problems involved when a city which must 
depend for its support upon property taxes finds that a large 
share of the property within the city is exempt from taxation. 
Both the city and the university can be injured if the city cannot 
provide adequate services. In order to remedy this problem, a 
statute2 provides that state universities may enter into agree-
ments with the cities in which they are located for police and 
fire protection. The agreement between the City of Ann Arbor 
and the Regents of the University of Michigan is appended to 
this chapter. 
2. JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
Aplin v. The Regents of The University of Michigan 
83 Mich. 467, 467-71; 47 N.W. 440 (1890) 
CHAMPLIN, C. J. Prior to July 1, 1888, certain land situated 
in the city of Detroit, the title of which was vested in the Regents of 
the University of Michigan by a grant from Walter Crane, bearing 
date March 22, 1880, was and has since the date of such deed been 
held for corporate purposes. This land was assessed upon the general 
tax roll of the city for the year 1887, and was returned as delinquent, 
and the bill is ftled in this case under Act No. 195, Laws of 1889 (3 
How. Stat. p. 2936), to enforce collection of such taxes. No question 
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is made concerning the title to the land, and the only question pre-
sented is whether the land was exempt from taxation. 
The legislation affecting the organization of the University of 
Michigan is given in the case of Regents v. Board of Education, 4 
Mich. 213, and need not be here repeated. Section 7 of Article 13 of 
the Constitution which was adopted in 1850 declares that-
"The Regents of the University, and their successors in office, 
shall continue to constitute the body corporate known by the name 
and title of 'The Regents of the University of Michigan.' " 
Section 8 of the same article declares that-
"The board of regents shall have the general supervision of the 
university, and the direction and control of all expenditures from the 
university interest fund." 
By these provisions the body corporate, which was at first the 
creation of the legislative will, has received the sanction of the Con-
stitution, and has become a part of the fundamental law, and in some 
respects is not subject to legislative control or interference. It is not, 
however, independent of, but is part of, the State, a department to 
which the education of the people in the higher branches of litera-
ture, science, and the arts is confided. As such it is fostered by the 
State. Appropriations are made which are raised by taxation upon 
the property of individuals of the State. A tax is also imposed of one-
twentieth of a mill upon the taxable property of the State for the 
support of a university. The public character of the institution has 
been recognized and declared in repeated decisions of this Court. It 
was said in the case of Regents v. Board of Education, above referred 
to, that the corporation has been since its incorporation in 183 7-
"A public corporation, created for public purposes alone. * * * 
The institution was erected and has been supported by a public fund, 
and the corporators have no private interest whatever connected 
with their corporate character." And again it was said that-"the 
corporation was created for the purpose of administering a great 
public trust, and the present plaintiffs are but trustees for the same 
great purpose.'' 
In the case of Regents v. Detroit Young Men's Society, 12 
Mich. 163, it was said: 
"The University of Michigan is a public corporation. The peo-
ple, in their political capacity, are the corporators. It is a part of the 
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educational system of the State, and is under the control of the Legis-
lature, except so far as it has been placed beyond the reach of that 
body by the Constitution and the trust attached to the university 
fund. * * * It was a public corporation originally, and has been 
throughout. It was created to subserve a great public want,-the ed-
ucation of the people." 
Exemption from taxation is claimed under the provision of the 
first subdivision of section 3 of Act No. 153, Laws of 1885 (3 How. 
Stat. § 116912), which provides that all public property belonging 
to this State shall be exempt from taxation. 
It is contended that all of the property of the University of 
Michigan is public property of this State within the meaning of the 
above exemption. We are of the opinion that the land in question is 
exempt from taxation under the terms of the above statute. The 
property held by the Regents of the University of Michigan in their 
corporate capacity is the public property of the State held by the 
corporation in trust for the purposes to which it was devoted. 
It does not follow that the State can have no property except 
such as is in the control and at the disposition of the Legislature. The 
Legislature is not the State, but only a department of the State. All 
subjects of legislation otherwise than such as are excepted from 
their authority by the Constitution are within their jurisdiction and 
control. They have said that all public property belonging to the 
State shall be exempt from taxation. The public property belonging 
to the State includes the property of all public departments of the 
State; such as the Michigan University, the Reform School, the 
School for the Deaf and Dumb, the State prisons, the asylums, the 
Agricultural College, the State Normal School, and other public in-
stitutions supported by the State through taxation or by funds or 
property appropriated by public or private generosity for that pur-
pose. It cannot be supposed that the Legislature would make large 
appropriations for the support of these institutions, or levy taxes for 
the same purpose, and then assess the property held by them in trust 
to carry out the same object for which such taxes are levied. 
It is claimed by the solicitor for petitioner that the second 
subdivision of section 3 is the one applicable to the Michigan Uni-
versity, which exempts the personal property of library and scientific 
institutions incorporated under the laws of this State, and such real 
estate as shall be occupied by them for the purposes for which they 
were incorporated. We think it plain that the language of this subdi-
vision cannot apply to the class of institutions above enumerated as 
exempt under the first subdivision. It refers to such institutions as 
are incorporated under the general laws of the State for library, 
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benevolent, charitable, and scientific purposes, and not those institu-
tions which may be regarded as departments of the State provided 
for in the organic law, or supported by direct taxation. 
The decree is affirmed, without costs. 
The other Justices concurred. 
Auditor General v. MacKinnon Boiler & Machine Company 
199 Mich. 489, 489-96; 165 N.W. 771 (1917) 
BIRD, J. In the year 1905 C. A. Kent of Detroit conveyed cer-
tain lands in Bay City to the regents of the university, the same 
being a gift, for the use and benefit of the university. Subsequently 
the regents sold a portion thereof to petitioner. Prior to the sale, 
however, a special assessment for sewer purposes had been made 
thereon by the local authorities. The assessment remaining unpaid 
the premises were included in the auditor's annual petition ftled in 
the circuit court of Bay county for the sale of lands for delinquent 
taxes. Petitioner intervened and made the objection that at the time 
the assessment was made it was the property of the university, and 
therefore invalid, as no valid tax or assessment could be levied there-
on. This objection was overruled at the hearing, and petitioner has 
appealed. 
1. The one question presented for solution is whether vacant 
real estate owned by the university, but not actually used for any 
purposes in connection with its affairs, can be subjected to a special 
assessment for local improvements. Counsel for relator argues that 
the assessment is invalid on the ground that the board of regents is a 
constitutional body, has independent control of the affairs of the 
university, and therefore its property is not subject to the acts and 
control of the legislature. 
We think it is clear that if this property is exempt from the as-
sessment in question it must be so by force of some legislative acts. 
The Constitution does not deal with exemptions from taxation. 
There being no constitutional restriction on this power of the legisla-
ture, it follows that it can exercise the power of exemption as it 
chooses. It has exercised this power by declaring in section 7 of the 
tax law that "all public property belonging to the State of Michigan 
shall be exempt from taxation." 1 Comp. Laws 1915, § 4001. This 
and similar language has been the subject of much construction by 
the courts, and in the majority of cases it has been held not to include 
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special assessments for local improvements. Chicago Schools v. City 
of Chicago, 207 ID. 37 (69 N. E. 580); State v. Robertson, 24 N. J. 
Law, 504; School District of Ft. Smith v. Board of Improvement, 65 
Ark. 343 (46,S. W. 418);Sioux City v. School District, 55 Iowa, 150 
(7 N. W. 488); City of Atlanta v. Presbyterian Church, 86 Ga. 737 
(13 S. E. 252; 12 L. R A. 852);Hassan v. City of Rochester, 67 N.Y. 
528; Sewickley M E. Church's Appeal, 165 Pa. 475 (30 Atl. 1007); 
Inhabitants of Essex County v. City of Salem, 153 Mass. 141 (26 N. 
E. 431 ); Cooley on Taxation (2d Ed.), p. 172. 
The holding in most of the cases is that these words of exemp-
tion apply only to general taxation. It appears, however, to have 
been settled in this State that these words of exemption protect 
public property from local assessments (City of Big Rapids v. Board 
of Sup'rs of Mecosta Co., 99 Mich. 351 [58 N. W. 358]); but this 
has been construed to mean such property as is used for governmen-
tal purposes (Newberry v. City of Detroit, 164 Mich. 410 [129 N. W. 
699, 32 L. R A. (N. S.) 303] ). In this case it was held that a public 
park was not exempt from special assessment for paving purposes be-
cause not being used for governmental purposes. If the general words 
of exemption in the statute do not apply to property owned by a 
municipality which is not used for governmental purposes, a like 
reasoning seems to lead to the conclusion that real estate owned by 
the university, but not used for governmental purposes, would not 
be included within the exemption. The university as well as the mu-
nicipality is a corporate entity, made so by force of the Constitution, 
and both are State agencies. 
The reason which underlies the exemption of public property 
from general taxation is that it would be without profit to assess 
public property as the tax would have to be paid out of the general 
fund to which all contributed, but this reason does not exist when 
special assessments are made for local improvements. Whenever prop-
erty is exempt from special assessment the remaining property own-
ers included within the special assessment district must pay for the 
benefits which accrue to the exempt property. This is so manifestly 
unfair that I am of the opinion that it was not the intention of the 
legislature to exempt property from special assessments which was 
owned but not used by the public authorities for governmental pur-
poses. This question was before the California court on a similar state 
of facts involving its university, and the same arguments were urged 
in support of the exemption. But that court held that inasmuch as 
the property of the university was not made use of in connection 
with the affairs of the university, it was subject to the special assess-
ment. It was there said in part: 
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"The principle is well established that where any of such lands 
are not directly and necessarily used for a public purpose they may 
be subjected to the payment of special assessments for benefits. And 
this is in consonance with justice and equity. For to assess certain lot 
owners upon a street for all the cost of the work, part of which is for 
the benefit of a public institution, is to enhance the value of the uni-
versity property at the expense of the few, instead of by taxation 
upon all the people at the expense of all. So it is said in Hassan v. 
City of Rochester, 67 N. Y. 528: 
" 'A different rule would compel individual lot owners to pay 
assessments levied for improvements which were a benefit to the 
State lands, without any adequate advantage, and in many instances 
impose a burden which would be extremely onerous and produce 
great injustice.' " City Street Imp. Co. v. Regents of the University of 
California, 153 Cal. 776 (96 Pac. 801, 18 L. R. A. [N. S.] 451). 
In view of the fact that the record discloses that the property 
in question was vacant unimproved lots in the city of Bay City, and 
that they were not being used for governmental purposes of the uni-
versity, we think the conclusion of the trial court should be affirmed. 
KUHN, C. J., and MOORE, STEERE, and BROOKE, JJ., con-
curred with BIRD, J. 
FELLOWS, J. {dissenting in part). I am for affirmance, but not 
for the reasons stated by Mr. Justice BIRD, and by the learned trial 
judge. I do not agree that a municipal unit of the State may enforce 
by sale for delinquency a special assessment upon the property held 
by its creator, the sovereign, the State, even though such property be 
not in use for governmental purposes, nor that this court committed 
itself to such doctrine by the case of Newberry v. City of Detroit, 
164 Mich. 410 (129 N. W. 699, 32 L. R. A. [N. S.] 303). That case 
involved a special assessment for paving purposes, and the question 
involved was whether the city should assess upon property owned by 
itself and not used for governmental purposes its proportion of the 
costs. The charter provision was as follows: 
"For the purpose of such assessment, the lots and parcels of 
real estate situated on said street, and fronting the portion thereof 
ordered to be improved, shall constitute one local assessment dis-
trict"; * * * the cost and expense of the paving to be assessed accord-
ing to frontage. Detroit Charter 1904, §§ 266, 267, pp. 182-184. 
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It was held that the municipality should assess upon its own 
property, not used for governmental purposes, its proportion of the 
cost of the local improvement, and that such property was not 
exempt from such special assessment. This was the question there be-
fore the court and there decided. That case is not authority to the 
point that property owned by the State is subject to sale for failure 
to pay local assessments, but only to the point that property owned 
by the municipality, and not used for governmental purposes, should 
pay its proportion of the cost of local improvements made under the 
provisions of its charter. In the instant case the State parted with its 
title to the property on June 24, 1912. On March 24, 1913, the tax 
roll for this special assessment was approved by the board of public 
works, and the certificate of the comptroller was attached and the 
entire assessment approved May 1, 1913. The ordinance ordering the 
improvement was passed July 3, 1911, but this special assessment did 
not become due until nearly a year after the State had parted with 
its title and the property had become subject to private ownership. 
In the case of Case v. City of Saginaw, 196 Mich. 687 (163 N. W. 
115), the writer expressed the view: 
"That the lands were not liable for special assessments falling 
due while they were owned and held by the State, but were liable for 
such special assessments as became due after they became subject to 
private ownership." 
I am unable to distinguish the facts in that case from those in 
this case. There, as here, the property was vacant city property, used 
for no governmental purpose; it had been bid off by the State for de-
linquent taxes. One of the special assessments in that case, as was the 
assessment in the instant case, was for the construction of a sewer. 
Entertaining the views there expressed, I think this case should be 
affirmed. 
OSTRANDER, J. (dissenting). It is a sound rule, approved by 
this court (City of Big Rapids v. Board of Sup'rs of Mecosta Co., 99 
Mich. 351 [58 N. W. 358]), that property owned by the State, or by 
the United States, or by a municipality for public uses, is not sub-
ject to taxation, unless so provided by positive legislation. The rule 
is the same whether the tax sought to be imposed is a general or a spe-
cial tax, an exaction for general or for special local purposes. The 
application of the rule is not affected by the fact that the legislature 
may have expressly exempted such property from taxation. 
In Iron Mountain Public Schools v. O'Connor, 143 Mich. 35 
(108 N. W. 426), it appeared that after land had been listed for 
taxation, the roll completed, approved by the board of review, and 
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returned to the board of supervisors for equalization, the petitioner 
bought the land for school purposes. Subsequently, the tax was 
spread thereon and not paid. The land was returned delinquent and 
sold at the annual tax sale under the usual decree. The school district 
filed its petition to vacate and set aside the decree and cancel and set 
aside the deed made upon the sale. There was a demurrer to the pe-
tition, which was overruled. The order overruling was set aside by 
this court upon the ground that the land was subject to the assess-
ment when it was made and when the township board of review 
passed upon and reviewed the assessment, and no power was lodged 
in any person to thereafter take from the roll property listed therein; 
that there must be some deftnite period when a purchaser, whose 
property is generally exempt, must purchase property subject to the 
tax levied or to be levied thereon. Usually, the question whether a 
tax must be paid by one person or by another arises in cases where 
the land is subject to taxation, and between the vendor and the pur-
chaser. No such question is involved here. 
The land here was not liable to assessment when the proceeding 
to assess it was begun because it belonged to the State. The title, it 
is true, was in the regents. But as affecting the question here involved 
the beneftcial owner was the State. Auditor General v. Regents of 
University, 83 Mich. 467 (47 N. W. 440, 10 L R A. 376). Under the 
rule stated, it was not liable to be assessed for a special improvement 
because it belonged to the State, and there was no law which per-
mitted land so owned to be subjected to assessment and sold for a 
tax or levy for special improvements. The title to the land passed to 
the regents of the university in 1905. The regents sold it to appellant 
in June, 1912. Before that time the city of Bay City had ordered the 
construction of the sewer, a survey and estimate of cost had been 
made, reported and approved, a contract for the construction of the 
sewer had been let, and the sewer was completed in the summer of 
1912. The roll of the special assessment was made and approved in 
March, 1913. The proceeding was a single one; the validity of the as-
sessment depending upon the lawfulness of the ftrst quite as much as 
upon the legality of the last step or act taken therein. As between the 
municipality instituting the proceeding and its offtcers and the land 
in question, jurisdiction to subject it and its owner to the exaction 
attached when the proceeding was instituted. Appellant bought it 
subject to no lien. It purchased it from an owner in whose hands it 
was not liable to the assessment. 
It is my opinion, therefore, that the decree should be reversed 
and one entered annulling the tax complained about. 
STONE, J., concurred with OSTRANDER, J. 
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Lucking v. People 
320 Mich. 495, 498-505; 31 N.W. 2d 707 (1948) 
BOYLES, J. Plaintiff herein, as a resident of Washtenaw coun-
ty and one of the testamentary trustees of the estate of Alfred Luck-
ing, deceased, the owner of real estate in the city of Ann Arbor, flied 
this bill of complaint in the circuit court for the county ofWashte-
naw in chancery, said to be on behalf of himself and all other tax-
payers of said city, and naming as defendants the people of the State 
of Michigan, the regents of the university of Michigan, and the city 
of Ann Arbor. The prayer of the bill seeks the following relief: 
That the board of regents of the university be estopped from 
claiming that the lands, buildings and equipment of the university 
within the city limits are exempt from taxation by said city; that said 
property be placed upon the general tax rolls of said city; that the 
university hospital, the athletic buildings and stadium, the Michigan 
Union and the Michigan League buildings, and the Hill auditorium, 
not used solely for educational purposes, be placed upon said tax 
rolls; that an accounting of the purposes and uses and values of all 
other university property be had and that their taxability or nontax-
ability be determined by the court; that the defendants State of 
Michigan and regents of the university be required to account to the 
city of Ann Arbor for all sums of money ex;pended since the enact-
ment of the Michigan Constitution (1908) for the protection, sup-
port, upkeep and maintenance of the lands, buildings and equipment 
of the university within the corporate limits of said city of Ann 
Arbor, and that fmal "judgment" be entered therefor against the 
State of Michigan and said board of regents; that the State of Mich-
igan and the said board of regents be enjoined from claiming any 
exemption from taxation in the future except as an educational cor-
poration or institution, and then only as to such lands, buildings and 
equipment as are occupied and used solely for educational purposes; 
that the exemption from taxation by the city of Ann Arbor of the 
property of the university of Michigan within the city limits be de-
creed to be invalid as the taking of said city's property and its tax-
payers' property without due process of law and without the equal 
protection of the laws; that the tax exemption statutes of the State 
of Michigan be adjudged to be unconstitutional as a violation of the 
14th amendment of the Federal Constitution, and the Constitution 
of Michigan; that a "judgment" be entered against the people of the 
State of Michigan and the board of regents of the university in favor 
of the city of Ann Arbor for all sums expended by said city to main-
tain the university of Michigan since the effective date of the 
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Michigan Constitution (1908); that the city of Ann Arbor be re-
quired to protect and enforce the rights and interests of the tax-
payers of said city as against the people of the State of Michigan and 
the board of regents of the university; that the court require the peo-
ple of the State of Michigan and the board of regents of the univer-
sity to account to the plaintiff and the city of Ann Arbor for the 
reasonable value of all services furnished by said city to the people 
of the State of Michigan and said board of regents since August 28, 
1929; and that the court fmd by a declaratory "judgment" the rights 
of the plaintiff as an individual, and as representing the taxpayers, 
and enforce the same against the people of the State of Michigan, 
the regents of the university, and the city of Ann Arbor, by fmal 
judgment and injunction of the court. 
On filing the bill of complaint, service of process on the people 
of the State of Michigan was made by serving summons on the gov-
ernor and the attorney general. The attorney general, on behalf of 
the people of the State of Michigan, entered a special appearance and 
moved to set aside the service of process on the ground that the State 
could not be sued without its consent and that the State had not so 
consented. The board of regents of the university filed an answer in 
the form of a motion to dismiss the bill of complaint on the above 
ground, that the plaintiff was not authorized to institute the suit, 
and that the bill of complaint did not state facts sufficient to consti-
tute a valid cause of action in equity or at law. The city of Ann Ar-
bor did not file a motion to dismiss, but filed an answer to the bill 
of complaint, concluding with a prayer that the bill of complaint be 
dismissed. 
Judge Robert M. Toms of the Wayne circuit court, sitting in 
the Washtenaw circuit, after hearing the motions and considering 
briefs filed, entered an order setting aside the service of process as to 
the people of the State of Michigan, and dismissing the bill of com-
plaint both as to the defendant board of regents and the defendant 
people of the State of Michigan. The trial court held that inasmuch 
as no motion to dismiss had been made by the city of Ann Arbor, 
the cause would stand at issue as between the plaintiff and that mu-
nicipality. From the aforesaid order of dismissal, the plaintiff ap-
peals. The record here does not indicate what further action, if any, 
has been taken in the case against the city of Ann Arbor. 
The bill of complaint, consisting of some 70 paragraphs, con-
sists mainly in statements of law, conclusions therefrom, and argu-
ments in relation thereto. However, well-pleaded material allegations 
of fact must be taken as true. The substance of the bill of complaint 
is that city of Ann Arbor is now and has been giving free ftre and 
police protection and other city services to the property owned by 
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the people of the State of Michigan, under the control of the board 
of regents, for which no compensation has yet been paid to the said 
city of Ann Arbor; that the State of Michigan should pay into the 
treasury of the city of Ann Arbor as a reasonable value for such 
services at least $200,000 per year; that the regents of the university 
have received from said city the same fire protection and other city 
services as do all property owners and taxpayers, that the students in 
the university have received municipal advantages and facilities, in-
cluding fire and police protection and the use and enjoyment of city 
parks and streets, transportation, lighting and water, the same as used 
by taxpayers of said city; that for those reasons the State of Michigan 
is estopped from claiming that the lands, buildings and equipment of 
the university of Michigan within said city limits are exempt from 
taxation by said city; that some of said lands, buildings and equip-
ment are actually used and occupied as noneducational facilities for 
profit-making purposes, that upwards of $20,000,000 of the assets 
of the university are unlawfully exempted from taxation of the city 
of Ann Arbor in that they are not occupied solely for educational 
purposes. 
As to the defendant, the people of the State of Michigan, the 
controlling question here is whether this suit may be maintained by 
a taxpayer against the people of the State of Michigan without the 
express consent of the State to be sued, for the purpose of compell-
ing the State to account to and pay the city of Ann Arbor for 
moneys expended by the city for police and fire protection and 
other services rendered by the city to the board of regents of the 
university. The answer is "No." Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick 
R. Co., 109 U.S. 446 (3 Sup. Ct. 292, 609, 27 L. Ed. 992);Hans v. 
Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (10 Sup. Ct. 504, 33 L. Ed. 842); United 
States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (61 Sup. Ct. 767, 85 L. Ed. 1058); 
McDowell v. Warden of Michigan Reformatory at Ionia, 169 Mich. 
322;Missouri Tie & Lumber Co. v. Sullivan, 275 Mich. 26;Manion v. 
State Highway Commissioner, 303 Mich. 1 ; Mead v. Michigan Public 
Service Commission, 303 Mich. 168; McNair v. State Highway De-
partment, 305 Mich. 181. 
The order of the circuit court setting aside the service of process 
on the governor and the attorney general and dismissing the bill of 
complaint as against the people of the State of Michigan as defendant 
is affirmed. 
As to the board of regents of the university of Michigan is de-
fendant, it is obvious that a money judgment cannot in this suit be 
lawfully entered against said defendant; and, if so entered, could not 
be enforced. It is equally obvious that if such relief were sought by 
writ of mandamus, such writ cannot issue in a chancery court and, 
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furthermore, no circuit court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of man-
damus against State officers such as the regents of the university. 3 
Comp. Laws 1929, § 15186 (Stat. Ann. § 27.2230). The Michigan 
Constitution (1908), art. 11 § 5, provides that the board of regents 
shall have general supervision of the university and direction and 
control of all expenditures from the university funds. Appellant 
places much reliance on Act No. 98, § 1, Pub. Acts 1929 (1 Comp. 
Laws 1929, § 441), as amended by Act No. 214, Pub. Acts 1937 
(Comp. Laws Supp. 1940, § 441, Stat. Ann. 1947 Cum. Supp. 
§ 4.191). However, this act is not mandatory but permissive only 
and merely authorizes the State administrative board, the board of 
regents of the university and other public agencies to contract for the 
furnishing of sewage and garbage disposal facilities, lights, water, fire 
protection, and other public facilities. The act does not form any 
basis for a decree to compel the board of regents to enter into such 
contracts. 
The lands, buildings and equipment under the management, 
supervision and control of the board of regents of the university are 
public property, owned by the State of Michigan. Such public prop-
erty belonging to the State is exempt from property tax. 1 Comp. 
Laws 1929, § 3395, as last amended by Act No. 24, Pub. Acts 1946 
(1st Ex. Sess.) (Stat. Ann. 1947 Cum. Supp. § 7.7). Auditor General 
v. Regents of the University of Michigan, 83 Mich. 467 (10 L. R. A. 
376); City of Detroit v. George, 214 Mich. 665; People, for use of 
Regents of the University of Michigan, v. Brooks, 224 Mich. 45; 
James A. Welch Co., Inc., v. State Land Office Board, 295 Mich. 85. 
Appellant points to the Constitution (1908), art. 11, § 10, 
which provides that "the legislature shall maintain the university," 
and from this argues that the court in chancery should compel the 
board of regents to account to the city of Ann Arbor for moneys ex-
pended by the city for police and fire protection and other services 
provided by the city for the university property; or a fortiori that 
the city should be compelled to levy a tax on the State property 
under the control of the board of regents to provide for such serv-
ices. Appellant's argument that the legislature is not properly main-
taining the university, perhaps might be addressed to the legislature. 
However, we do not conceive that it is within the province of the 
court in chancery to compel such action. As well stated by the trial 
judge, the arm of the chancellor may be long, but it is not that long. 
Appellant devotes much time to argument that the statutes 
which exempt State-owned property under the control of the board 
of regents are unconstitutional. However, appellant does not point to 
any provision in either the United States Constitution or the Michi-
gan Constitution (1908) which imposes any limitation upon the 
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power of the State legislature to exempt property from taxation. 
The tax-levying authority of the State is vested in the legislature, and 
this necessarily includes the power to exempt property from taxa-
tion. Auditor General v. MacKinnon Boiler & Machine Co., 199 Mich. 
489;Harsha v. City of Detroit, 261 Mich. 586 (90 A. L. R. 853). 
The court has no power to compel the city of Ann Arbor to 
levy a tax upon State property within the control of the board of 
regents which the legislature has declared exempt from property 
taxation. The legislative classification of property into exempt and 
nonexempt categories does not in itself necessarily offend the due 
process* or equal protectiont clauses of either the State or Federal 
Constitutions. 26 R C. L. p. 253, 254, § § 224, 225; Union Steam 
Pump Sales Co. v. Secretary of State, 216 Mich. 261 ; Banner Laun-
dering Co. v. State Board of Tax Administration, 297 Mich. 419. 
It is not for the court to consider the propriety of a contract 
between the city of Ann Arbor and the board of regents for the city 
to furnish police or fire protection or other public facilities for State 
property within the corporate limits. Nor is the city of Ann Arbor 
here before us seeking affirmative relief against the people of the 
State of Michigan or the board of regents. The plaintiff herein does 
not represent the municipality. The levying of municipal taxes is a 
matter of municipal prerogative and concern to be exercised by the 
proper authorities of the city of Ann Arbor. The court in chancery 
cannot substitute its judgment for that of the proper municipal 
authorities, or the board of regents, as to whether taxes should be 
levied or contracts entered into to provide for the furnishing of 
police facilities by the city. We are unable to conclude from the facts 
and circumstances alleged in appellant's bill of complaint that either 
the appellant or the taxpayers of the city of Ann Arbor are being de-
prived of property without due process of law. The relief sought by 
appellant does not come within the jurisdiction of a court of chan-
cery, at least in so far as such relief is sought against the people of 
the State of Michigan or the board of regents of the university. Any 
issues between the plaintiff and the city of Ann Arbor are still pend-
ing in the circuit court and are not here for decision. 
The order dismissing the bill of complaint as to said defendants 
is affirmed and the cases remanded. No costs, questions of public in-
terest being involved. 
BUSHNELL, C. J., and SHARPE, REID, NORTH, BUTZEL, 
and CARR, JJ., concurred. DETHMERS, J., did not sit. 
*See U.S. Const. am. 14; Mich. Const. 1908, art. 2, § 16.-REPORTER. 
tSee U.S. Const. am. 14; Mich. Const. 1908, art. 2, § 1.-REPORTER. 
UNIVERSITY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 265 
3. AGREEMENT FOR THE FURNISHING OF POLICE AND FIRE PRO-
TECTION SERVICES 
AGREEMENT made this 15th day of October, 1964, by 
and between The Regents of the University of Michigan, a Mich-
igan constitutional corporation of Ann Arbor, Michigan, (herein-
after referred to as the University) and the City of Ann Arbor, 
Michigan, (hereinafter referred to as the City). 
WIT N E S SETH: 
WHEREAS, under date of March 14, 1947, the parties 
hereto entered into an agreement pursuant to the provisions of 
Act No. 98 of the Public Acts of Michigan of 1929, as amended, 
which agreement among other things provided a formula for de-
termining the amount that the University would pay to the City 
for the police protection rendered by the City to the University; 
and 
WHEREAS, under date of July 31, 1956, the parties here-
to entered into a similar agreement providing for furnishing of 
fire protection by the City and payment therefor by the Uni-
versity; and 
WHEREAS, the parties desire to provide for the furnishing 
of such police and fire protection and the payment therefor in a 
single agreement; 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is agreed by and between the par-
ties hereto as follows: 
1. In consideration of the police and fire protection serv-
ices to be furnished by the City, the University shall pay 
to the City: 
a) An amount equal to 18% of the City's Police Depart-
ment budget annually, plus related employee benefits; 
b) An amount equal to 18% of the City's Fire Depart-
ment budget annually, plus related employee benefits. 
2. The payments provided in Paragraph 1, a), and b) above 
are to be made quarterly in advance for each fiscal year 
beginning July 1, 1964, on the basis of the estimated 
budgets and adjusted at the end of each fiscal year on 
the basis of actual expenditures. 
266 THE UNIVERSITY AND STATE GOVERNMENT 
3. In determining the amount payable by the University 
under this contract, there will be deducted from the 
Police Department budget (and the actual expenditures) 
the amount which the University pays to the City under 
a separate contract for policing the University parking 
regulations. Any amounts collected by the City from 
others for police or fire protection services as such shall 
be credited to the University in determining the actual 
expenditures for the year-end adjustment of charges. 
4. The amounts provided herein shall constitute complete 
payment for all services furnished to the University by 
the City Police and Fire Department; except the services 
for enforcing parking regulations provided under separate 
contract. This paragraph shall not be interpreted as pre-
venting the City from collecting for special police serv-
ices furnished during varsity football games under agree-
ment with the Board in Control of Intercollegiate 
Athletics of the University. 
5. This agreement supersedes, as of July 1, 1964, all provi-
sions of the aforesaid agreement dated July 31, 1956, 
relative to fire protection services and all provisions re-
lating to the furnishing of police services or the payment 
therefor of the aforesaid agreement of March 14, 194 7. 
4. OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL 
The freedom of the University from local zoning restric-
tions has been the subject of several opinions. In 1929, the At-
torney General ruled that the University of Michigan was exempt 
from the provisions of the Ann Arbor Building Code. 1 In 1943, 
the Attorney General issued a broader opinion which ruled that 
no city or county could control the construction of buildings 
by any state institution within its boundaries. 2 In 1954, how-
ever, the Attorney General refused to rule as to whether either 
the State Plumbing Board or the City of Ann Arbor could set 
plumbing standards for the University of Michigan. The Univer-
sity was following the Ann Arbor standards at that time; so the 
question was entirely hypothetical. 3 
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Rulings of the Attorney General have also dealt with the 
problem of tax exemptions. An illustration of the technicalities 
of the exemption of the property of private educational institu-
tions as contrasted to the broad exemption of state institutions 
established in Aplin4 are rulings made in 1928 concerning cer-
tain properties of Olivet College. The Attorney General ruled 
that the college president's house and a vacant lot owned by the 
college and occasionally used for athletics were not faxable, but 
a college-owned house occupied by the college secretary was 
subject to taxes. 5 
Dormitories financed under the "self-liquidating plan,"6 in 
which the bondholders had an interest, raised questions as to 
tax exemption in 1928. The Attorney General decided that the 
dormitories remained nontaxable because the bondholders' in-
terest pertained to a leasehold, and leaseholds are not taxable as 
such. 7 
In another opinion, the Regents were instructed in 1932 
that they were not liable for real estate taxes; and a failure to 
notify the assessor of a change in ownership would not subject 
University property to taxes. 8 In 1940, following the MacKin-
non9 case, the Attorney General ruled that the University must 
pay drainage district taxes on lands not then being used by the 
University. 10 In 1942 he ruled that the property of the separate-
ly incorporated Michigan Union and Lawyers Club was exempt 
from taxation because these two corporations were merely the 
instrumentalities of the Board of Regents. 11 
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Part Three 
The Internal Government of the University 
CHAPTER IX 
UNIVERSITY PROPERTY AND BUSINESS CONTRACTS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The authority of the University to engage in business opera-
tions which are connected with any large institution has not 
often been challenged. Whenever it has been brought to the at-
tention of the courts, the constitutional status now enjoyed by 
all the state universities in Michigan has been decisive. In the in-
stance of the Detroit Young Men's Society1 it was held that no 
enabling act of the legislature was needed by the Board of Re-
gents to convey land belonging to the University of Michigan. 
Since Michigan State University seems to have engaged in more 
peripheral activities, its actions have more often been challenged 
as "ultra vires." These cases, which are included in Chapter Ill, 
all resulted in the vindication of the University. 
Two cases included in this chapter involve the right of the 
University to sue and to be sued on business contracts. In the 
Pray case, the University as the holder of bonds of a drainage 
district sued the County of Washtenaw for payment. In the 
Seldon Breck case, the construction company sued the Univer-
sity under a contract to erect the general library. In both cases, 
the University is treated by the courts as an ordinary litigant-it 
is to be subject to suit in the same courts and under the same 
courts and under the same law as a private corporation. In fact, 
the federal judge in the Selden Breck case characterizes the case 
as a regular diversity-of-citizenship action, a Missouri corpora-
tion suing a Michigan corporation. 
The implicit holding in these cases that the University is 
subject to suit like any private corporation may have been over-
ruled by the tort cases and the Court of Claims statute. It is now 
almost settled law that the University is subject to suit only in 
the Court of Claims for personal injuries inflicted by its employ-
ees on others. 2 The Court of Claims statute, however, invests 
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exclusive jurisdiction in that court of all claims "ex contractu 
and ex delicto."3 
2. JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
The Regents of the University of Michigan v. The Detroit Young 
Men's Society 
12 Mich. 138, 159-68 (1863) 
[In this case the Regents are suing the Society because it 
has not paid money due under a contract to sell land. In de-
fense, one of the arguments raised by the Society is that the 
contract is void because the Regents have no power to convey 
land belonging to the University.] 
CHRISTIANCY, J. * * * 
The only remaining question is that of the power of the re-
gents to sell this property. This question might depend upon the 
mode and purposes of the acquisition-the objects and terms ex-
pressed in the instrument by which the title was acquired. And as 
the regents have been held to be the successors of the trustees of the 
university under its old organization-who had an express power of 
sale vested in them-and the powers and functions of the present or-
ganization are different in many other respects, the question might 
perhaps be affected by the fact when and by which organization the 
property was acquired. But so far as the question of the power of the 
regents to sell may depend upon any of these considerations, 
it can *not be definitely decided upon the present record, [160] 
as the time when the title was acquired does not appear, 
nor the mode or purpose of its acquisition. No particular title is set 
forth, nor was this necessary. The allegation is general, that the 
plaintiffs, on the third day of August, eighteen hundred and fifty-
eight, "being the owners" of the premises, and the defendant wishing 
to purchase, the said plaintiffs and defendant entered into the con-
tract. This allegation, being mere inducement, was sufficient, and it 
is broad enough to admit proof of any legal title or ownership under 
which a right of sale could exist. The particular title would be matter 
of proof only. The title of the plaintiffs is therefore well pleaded, if 
they were competent in law to take or hold a title which would 
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enable them to sell. If, therefore, as a legal possibility, there could 
have been, at the time alleged, such a title in the plaintiffs as would 
give them the power of sale, the judgment upon the demurrer must 
be for the plaintiffs, however they might have failed upon the trial to 
establish such title by proof. 
The abstract question, therefore, of the legal possibility of 
such ownership by the plaintiffs, is the only question upon this 
branch of the cause which can be decided upon this demurrer. Upon 
this question I think there can be little room for doubt. This being 
an action at law, any conveyance, by grant or devise, vesting in them 
the whole legal title, though it were upon special trusts, would satisfy 
the allegation of ownership contained in the declaration, if it con-
ferred the power of sale, as well as if no trust had been declared. The 
power of taking and holding real estate-as well as personal property-
is generally laid down as one of the powers incident to every cor-
poration, unless there be an express prohibition, or such power be 
clearly repugnant to the purposes of its creation, or forbidden by 
some positive law: A. &A. on Corp., §§ 110, 111; 2 Kent, 
[161] 224. And the power to convey, except *where its acquisi-
tion is for some special purpose, not shown here, and in-
consistent with the power of sale, is a correlative of the right to ac-
quire: A. & A. on Corp., ut supra. And see Ibid, § § 187 to 192. We 
have no statute of mortmain which can affect the question. And the 
power of this corporation to take, hold, and convey real estate, for 
any purpose clearly tending to promote the interest of the univer-
sity, to increase its funds, or otherwise to further the great public ob-
jects for which the corporation was created, can not, I think, admit 
of a reasonable doubt. The right to take and hold property, such at 
least as the university grounds and buildings, library and apparatus, 
and to transmit or continue its ownership by corporate succession, 
was doubtless one of the main objects of the incorporation in its 
present form; yet no express power of this kind is to be found in the 
act of incorporation. And though it is clear that they can exercise no 
power over the land granted by congress to the state for the support 
of a university, nor over the principal of the university fund, the dis-
position of both of which the legislature has placed in other hands, 
yet if some benevolent individual, desirous of promoting the public 
interest, should have conveyed this or any other land to these re-
gents in their corporate capacity, vesting in them the whole legal 
title, for the express purpose and upon the express trust, that they 
should sell and convey the land in such manner and on such terms 
as they should deem best for the interest of the institutions, and 
place the proceeds in the state treasury to the credit of the university 
fund, or expend them for the increase of the library, or the chemical 
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or philosophical apparatus, I can see no possible ground to doubt 
their power to take and hold the property, or to accept and execute 
the trust by a sale of the land for such purpose. See Vidal v. Girard's 
Executors, 2 How., 190; Executors of McDonough v. Mur-
dock, *15 How., 367; Perrin v. Carey (McMickin's will), 24 [162] 
How., 465. 
Many other cases might be put in which their power of sale 
would be equally clear. But it is unnecessary to multiply instances, 
since a title like that above supposed would be admissible under the 
allegation of ownership contained in this declaration. 
But it is said we can not presume a trust, as none is mentioned 
in the contract. It is sufficient to say that, if such trust existed, it was 
unnecessary to mention it in the contract, or in the declaration. It 
would be sufficient if the title, when produced in evidence, disclosed 
a trust which would sustain the power of sale. There is no occasion 
for any presumption. It is not a question for presumption, but what 
evidence would be admissible under the allegation; and we are cer-
tainly not at liberty to indulge any presumption against the truth of 
the allegation of ownership, which is broad enough to include such 
title in trust. What right, on the other hand, have the court to pre-
sume that this is a part of the land conveyed to the state for the use 
of the university? Or that, though conveyed to the regents, the con-
veyance was such as to deprive them of the power of sale, when it 
may have been so granted as to give them that power? Can we deny 
them the right to prove their allegation? It is not for the court, upon 
demurrer, more than for the opposite party, to deny the truth of the 
allegation demurred to. The question is not upon its truth, but its 
sufficiency. Its truth is admitted by the demurrer, unless legally im-
possible. 
It was stated on the argument that the lot mentioned in the con-
tract was conveyed, in the year 1825, by the governor and judges of 
the territory of Michigan, to the "trustees of the university of Michi-
gan" as organized under the act of 1821, for the use of the university; 
and we are referred to the decision in The Regents of the 
[163] University v. The Board of Education of Detroit, 4 *Mich., 
214, holding the regents under the present organization to 
be the successors of said trustees, or, rather, a continuation of the 
same corporation. But to enable us to decide upon demurrer the 
power of the present corporation to sell lands thus conveyed, the 
fact, date, and nature of the conveyance, should appear upon the 
pleadings. It is not desirable, if it were competent, to decide a case 
of this magnitude, hypothetically, further than we may be compelled 
to do by the nature of the question. The question of the power of 
the plaintiffs to convey, under the supposed deed from the governor 
PROPERTY AND BUSINESS CONTRACTS 275 
and judges, is in no way necessary to the decision of the cause, and is 
not involved in it; since, if this were decided against the plaintiffs, the 
decision upon this demurrer must still be in their favor. It will be 
time enough to decide this question when it is presented by the 
pleadings, or upon objections taken to the proof which may be of-
fered. 
The judgment of the court below must be reversed, with costs 
to the plaintiffs in both courts. And the defendant must have leave 
to plead to the declaration. 
MARTIN CH. J. concurred. 
MANNINGJ.: 
The university of Michigan is a public corporation. The people, 
in their political capacity, are the corporators. It is a part of the edu-
cational system of the state, and is under the control of the legisla-
ture, except so far as it has been placed beyond the reach of that 
body by the constitution, and the trust attached to the university 
fund. In all other respects it is subject to state legislation, and may 
be molded from time to time to suit the actual or supposed wants of 
the public. The corporation of to-day is the corporation known as 
the university of Michigan, under "an act for the establishment of a 
university," approved April 30, 1821: Laws of Michigan, 
*1827, p. 445. And the corporation under this last men- [164] 
tioned act was the corporation created by the governor and 
judges of the territory of Michigan, on the 26th August, 1817, by an 
act entitled "An act to establish the catholepistemiad, or university 
of Michigan," if an organization in fact ever took place under this 
last mentioned act. See Regents of the University of Michigan v. The 
Board of Education of the City of Detroit, 4 Mich., 213. The present 
corporation has been made to differ from what it was under the two 
last mentioned acts by the legislation and constitution of the state. 
It was a public corporation originally, and has been throughout. It 
was created to subserve a great public want-the education of the 
people. For while freedom is the corner-stone of our political fabric, 
intelligence is the cement that holds it several parts together. 
The act of April 30th, 1821, gave to the trustees of the univer-
sity the control of both the property and government of the institu-
tion. They were declared capable of holding property, real and per-
sonal, and of buying and selling, and otherwise lawfully disposing of 
it, with certain restrictions imposed on the disposition of property 
mentioned in the seventh and eighth sections of the act. Under the 
state government a different policy was inaugurated. The government 
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of the institution and the control of its property were separated from 
each other, and no longer trusted to the same hands. 
The former was given to the regents, who took the place of 
trustees under the territorial organization, while the latter was re-
tained by the state, intrusted by law to the superintendent of public 
instruction. 
This office was created by the constitution of 1835. And by 
"An act to provide for the disposition of the university and primary 
school lands, and for other purposes," approved March 20th, 1837, 
the superintendent of public instruction was to have the 
[ 16 5] care and disposition of *all lands and other property reserved 
and granted to the state for purposes of education: S. L. 
1837, p. 209, § 1. He was to sell the university and school lands, and 
loan the money, the interest on which was to be paid to the state 
treasurer, and by him to be passed to the credit of the university or 
school fund as the case might be: § § 16, 19. He was to submit to 
the legislature an annual report, exhibiting the condition of the uni-
versity and primary school fund; to apply the income of the univer-
sity fund to the payment of such debts as should accrue from the op--
eration of the law establishing the university; and to prepare annually 
a table of the amount payable to the university, and also the amount 
of the aggregate payable to the several counties, and present the 
same to the auditor-general, who was thereupon to issue his warrant 
on the treasurer of the state for the amount payable to the university, 
and to the several counties: § 18. And it was made the duty of the 
state treasurer to pay such warrant to the treasurer of the university, 
or of the county, as the case might be: § 19. And by "An act to 
provide for the organization and government of the university of 
Michigan," passed at the same session, the university was organized. 
See Laws of 1837, p. 102. This act does not, in express terms, repeal 
the act of 1821, and yet as it and the act already mentioned cover 
the ground covered by the act of 1821, and are inconsistent with the 
latter act, it must be regarded as repealed by implication. It is not 
necessary for our present purpose to point out the differences be-
tween the two acts, any further than to say, that the act of 1837, un-
like the act of 1821, does not give the regents power to sell, or other-
wise dispose of the property of the university. It states the object of 
the university to be, to provide the inhabitants of the state with the 
means of acquiring a thorough knowledge of the various branches of 
literature, science and the arts, and vests its government in a 
[166] board *of regents, and declares them a body corporate, with 
the right of suing and being sued, and prescribes their pow-
ers, and makes it their duty, as soon as the state shall provide funds 
for that purpose, to erect the necessary buildings for the university, 
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on grounds to be designated by the legislature, and in such manner 
as shall be prescribed by law. No mention whatever is made of the 
care and disposition of the property of the institution, for the reason 
that that had been placed under control of the superintendent of 
public instruction. 
Changes have been made from time to time, but none showing 
an intention on the part of the legislature to give to the board of re-
gents power to dispose of the property of the institution. 
By our present constitution, "The proceeds from the sales of 
all lands that have been or hereafter may be granted by the United 
States to the state, for educational purposes, and the proceeds of all 
lands or other property given by individuals, or appropriated by the 
state for like purposes, shall be and remain a perpetual fund, the in-
terest and income of which only is to be expended:" Art. XIII, § 2. 
And by § 8 of the same article it is provided, "The board of regents 
shall have the general supervision of the university, and the direction 
and control of all expenditures from the university interest fund." 
Here is a constitutional provision giving the regents control of 
the interest of the university fund, but not of the fund itself. Why 
this constitutional provision if it was intended the regents should 
have the control and disposition of the property of the university, as 
the trustees had under the act of 1821? If it be said, these lands were 
deeded to the university, and therefore do not come within the de-
scription of lands which the commissioner of the state land office is 
authorized to sell-that officer, instead of the superintendent of 
public instruction, now having the sale of the university and 
school lands-the reply is, *the legislature can give him the [167] 
power. It is no reason for giving by implication powers 
which it is clear the legislature never intended to give. The property 
the board of regents have contracted to sell amounts to $21,000. 
What power have they to invest the money? On what security, and 
to whom, and at what rate of interest is it to be loaned, and who is 
to collect and account for the interest, and to whom? We can hardly 
suppose the act would be silent on all these subjects if there was an 
intention on the part of the legislature to give the power claimed. 
And I can see no reason for dividing the university fund into two 
parts, and placing one in charge of the state, and the other of the 
board of regents. 
I would stop here, but for a suggestion that has been started on 
which I will say a few words. 
It has been suggested whether the land contracted to be sold 
may not be held by the corporation in trust, with power to sell the 
same. If we suppose such to be the case, I do not see that it removes 
the difficulty I have stated-the want of power in the board of re-
gents to' convey. I do not understand that the functions of a 
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corporation can be enlarged by a deed of trust; that is, that a trust 
can be made the means of communicating new faculties to a body 
corporate. The admission of such a principle would enable a corpora-
tion, after parturition, to be metamorphosed into quite a different 
being; so much so as hardly to be recognized, if not seemingly to 
lose its identity. An insurance company might be changed into a 
bank, and a bank into an insurance company. When a corporation is 
made a trustee, the execution of the trust must come within the 
faculties of the corporation, or the trust must go unexecuted until a 
competent trustee is appointed. If we are correct in these views, the 
error in supposing the facts suggested would help the plaintiff, lies in 
taking it for granted that the power of the corporation to 
[168) convey is in the board of regents instead of the state. *It 
must be borne in mind that this is a public corporation, 
created for governmental purposes; that the people of the state in 
their political capacity are the corporators; and that in creating the 
corporation they reserved to themselves, through the legislature, the 
power of disposing of the property of the corporation instead of giv-
ing it to the regents. 
If it be said the suggestion may be carried a step further, and 
take it for granted that by the trust-deed power to sell is given to the 
board of regents, and not to the corporation, it does not extricate us 
from the dilemma. If the trust is to the regents of the university of 
Michigan, that being the corporate name, it is to the corporation, 
and not to the persons composing the board of regents, as individuals. 
If it is to them as individuals, they must execute it in their individual 
capacity, and not in the name of the corporation. The contract is in 
the name of the corporation. And the power of the corporation to 
convey, as I have attempted to show, is not in the board of regents, 
but in the corporators, the people in their legislative capacity; in 
other words, in the state. 
For these reasons, without noticing the other questions made 
on the argument, I think the judgment of the court below should be 
affirmed, with costs. 
CAMPBELL, J. did not sit in this case. 
Judgment reversed. 
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Regents of The University of Michigan v. Pray 
264 Mich. 693, 695-703; 251 N.W. 348 (1933) 
NORTH, J. This is a mandamus proceeding by which plaintiff 
seeks to compel payment of drain bonds from general funds of Wash-
tenaw county, relying particularly upon that portion of 1 Comp. 
Laws 1929, § 4937, which reads: 
"In case the amount available in the drain fund shall be insuffi-
cient to pay the principal or interest of any such bonds heretofore or 
hereafter issued when they become due the same shall be advanced 
and paid by the county out of its general funds and reimbursement 
to said general fund shall be made out of the drain taxes thereafter 
collected." 
After hearing in the circuit court, the writ of mandamus issued 
against the defendant county officials. Leave having first been ob-
tained, they have appealed. 
Incident to the construction of the Darlington subdivision drain 
in Washtenaw county, bonds aggregating $31,500were issued March 
1, 1927. Provision for issuing such bonds is contained in Act No. 
316, Pub. Acts 1923, as amended by Act No. 365, Pub. Acts 1925. 
These statutory provisions are now embodied in the "Drain Code," 
1 Comp. Laws 1929, § 4838 et seq. Plaintiff purchased 20 of these 
drain bonds, each in the amount of $1,000. Two of the bonds having 
matured April 1, 1932, were presented for payment, which was re-
fused. Also plaintiff was refused payment of accrued interest due 
April1, 1932. There was practically no money in the Darlington sub-
division drain fund. This condition seems to have resulted largely, if 
not wholly, from delinquency in payment of assessments incident to 
the construction of this drain. From taxes collected the county 
treasurer had on hand approximately $25,000, which, when properly 
entered on his books, constituted a part of the county's general fund. 
But the record sustains defendants' claim that, notwithstanding such 
money in the general fund, there would be a deficit in this fund re-
sulting from the ordinary operating expenses of the county at the 
end of the current fiscal year. The board of supervisors did not 
authorize a transfer of any money from the general fund to the 
Darlington subdivision drain fund, and no appropriation was made 
to cover any deficiency in such drainage fund. Notwithstanding the 
facts above recited, plaintiff asserts its right to have payment made 
to it from the county's general fund. 
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Defendants have challenged the constitutionality of the act 
under which plaintiff asserts right of payment. In part unconstitu-
tionality is asserted on the ground that the title to the drain code is 
not sufficient to cover the amendments embodied therein, which pro-
vide for issuing drainage bonds and contingent payment thereof from 
the county's general funds. Prior to the 1929 amendment the title 
read: 
"An act to codify and add to the laws relating to the laying out 
of drainage districts, the construction and maintenance of drains, the 
assessment and collection of taxes therefor; to prescribe penalties for 
violations of certain provisions of this act; and to repeal certain acts 
relating to drains." 
While, as pointed out by appellants, the title does not refer to 
the issuing of drain bonds, nonetheless we think that provision there-
for in a drain law is clearly and necessarily germane to the general 
provisions of the act having to do with "the construction and main-
tenance of drains, the assessment and collection of taxes therefor." 
In 1917 the State Constitution was amended (article 8, § 15a), and 
express provision embodied therein for issuance of bonds for drain-
age purposes by drainage districts. In 1923 the legislature codified 
the drain law of this State and therein provided the manner and con-
ditions for the issuing of drainage district bonds. Act No. 316, Pub. 
Acts 1923. The title adopted in 1923 remained unchanged and as 
above quoted until 1929. See Act No. 318, Pub. Acts 1929. Being a 
codification, the statute necessarily embodied various and somewhat 
diversified provisions of the drain law. But as against objections here 
raised, we do not fmd that the act violates article 5, § 21, of the 
Constitution, in that it embraces more than one object or because 
the title is deficient in that it is not sufficiently broad to cover the 
provisions of the act. Title to a codification statute can scarcely be 
expected to embody reference to every detail of the act. Such is not 
the constitutional requirement. If the title fairly apprises legislators 
and the public generally of the purposes of the act as a whole, such 
title is sufficient. Vernon v. Secretary of State, 179 Mich. 157 (Ann. 
Cas. 1915 D, 128). If the title is adequate, and the statute contains 
only that which is germane to its general purposes, it does not offend 
article 5, § 21, of the State Constitution which provides: "No law 
shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its 
title." The title specifically refers to the "construction" of drains. 
Construction necessarily involves provision for payment of cost; and 
issuing bonds is a commonplace method (possibly too commonplace) 
for fmancing the cost of public improvements. Provision for issuing 
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bonds is only incidental to the main general purpose of the drainage 
act, and reference to the title to such provision is not necessary. 
"The requirements of the Constitution, article 5, § 21, that 
no law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed 
in its title, are met if an act centers to one main general object or 
purpose which the title comprehensively declares, though in general 
terms, and if the provisions in the body of the act not directly men-
tioned in the title are germane, auxiliary, or incidental to that general 
purpose." Loomis v. Rogers (syllabus), 197 Mich. 265. 
See also, People v. Stimer, 248 Mich. 272 (67 A. L. R. 552). 
Substantially the same may be said of the portion of statute 
embodied in Act No. 331, Pub. Acts 1927 (above quoted [see 1 
Comp. Laws 1929, § 4937] ), wherein it is provided in case bonds 
mature or interest is payable and the drain fund is insufficient to 
meet the obligation "the same shall be advanced and paid by the 
county out of its general funds and reimbursement to said general 
fund shall be made out of the drain taxes thereafter collected." 
Clearly this provision has to do with the marketability of drain 
bonds. It has an important bearing upon the matter of obtaining 
funds with which to pay for construction, and is germane to the 
main purpose of the act. This provision of the drain code is not 
materially unlike another and earlier provision in the drain law 
(Comp. Laws Supp. 1922, § 4922 [Act No. 64, Pub. Acts 1921]), 
which reads: 
"Provided, further, That the holder of such (drain) order may, 
if he so desires, have the right to require payment thereof out of any 
moneys in the general fund of the county treasury that may be avail-
able, if the drain fund is insufficient for such purpose because of de-
linquency in the payment of drain taxes." 
As against the objection now under consideration, the title was 
held to cover the above-quoted amendment to the drain law.Moore 
v. Harrison, 224 Mich. 512. The title is sufficient as against the ob-
jections here urged. See Vernon v. Secretary of State, supra. 
The amendment to the act wherein provision is made for pay-
ment from general county funds (Act No. 331, Pub. Acts 1927) be-
came effective subsequent to plaintiffs purchase of the bonds in-
volved in this case. Appellants urge that this amendment is not 
effective as to these bonds except it be construed as an ex post facto 
law and therefore unconstitutional. We think this contention is with-
out merit and is fully answered in Moore v. Ha"ison, supra. Appel-
lants' position is not tenable. 
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Defendants' answer denies the authority of the drain commis-
sioner to issue the bonds; denies the duty or obligation to pay the 
bonds presented on the grounds of lack of money in the Darlington 
subdivision drain fund; asserts that the county has no right to levy 
a tax upon the county at large for the purpose of paying these drain 
bonds; and asserts that the condition of the general fund is such that 
the payment of the drain bonds would impair operation of necessary 
county governmental functions; and that, under the circumstances, 
there is no legal obligation upon the county as such to pay the bonds 
of the drainage district, the supervisors not having authorized a trans-
fer of money from the general fund to the drainage district fund. 
The statutory provision expressly authorizes and empowers the 
drain commissioner to issue drainage bonds. Appellants' contention 
that since a county is not authorized to construct a drain "at the ex-
pense of the county," it follows that a drain commissioner acting for 
and in behalf of a drain district in issuing bonds cannot obligate the 
county for the payment of the bonds, cannot be sustained. The 
county does not pay or become obligated to pay these bonds except 
in the event that the drain fund is inadequate to meet the obligation 
of matured bonds or accrued interest; and in that event the statute 
provides only that the same shall be advanced and paid by the county 
out of its general fund and reimbursement to said general fund shall 
be made out of the drain taxes thereafter collected. Regardless of 
the temporary advancement by the county, in the end payment is by 
the drainage district. If the first assessments are inadequate, there is 
express statutory provision for an additional assessment upon the 
drainage district. 1 Comp. Laws 1929, § 4940. In passing upon the 
earlier provision of the drain law relative to drain orders being paid 
from the county's general fund, this court said, as might well be 
here said: 
"There was no purpose to impose a tax on the county at large 
to aid in the construction of a particular drain. Under the proceed-
ings taken, the lands specially assessed would be benefited to the 
amount of the assessment. There was no presumption that they would 
be abandoned by the owners by reason thereof. The intent as evi-
denced by the language of the act, considered in the light of its other 
provisions, was simply to require the county to advance out of its 
general fund sufficient sums to retire any orders then unpaid, reim-
bursing itself when the lands delinquent were either redeemed or 
sold. The legislature had already imposed certain expenses on the 
county, presumably in its interest, and for which it would receive 
benefit. In imposing this additional burden, we do not think it ex-
ceeded its power." Moore v. Ha"ison, supra, 517. 
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On this phase of the case appellants, to some extent, rely upon 
the decision in Spiegel v. Ba"ett, 189 Mich. 111. Obviously the cited 
case is not at all applicable, because at that time there was no statu-
tory provisions for paying the amount due on drain orders or drain 
bonds from the general county fund. 
There still remains to be considered appellants' contention that 
because there was not sufficient money in the general county funds 
to cover the expenses of the county's governmental activities for the 
current year, refusal to pay these drain bonds from such general fund 
was justified. The opinion of the trial judge disposes of this phase of 
the case in the following language: 
''Can the issuance of bonds by the drainage commissioner on 
behalf of the drainage district impair or jeopardize the necessary 
functions of government? 
"In this connection our attention has been directed to the case 
of Bay City Dredge Works v. Fox, 245 Mich. 523. This latter case was 
mandamus to compel the county clerk and county treasurer to pay 
certain drain orders. Plaintiff there held certain drain orders and the 
drain fund being deficient demanded a payment out of moneys in the 
general fund in the county treasury, basing right thereto under Act 
No. 316, Pub. Acts 1923, as amended by Act No. 365, Pub. Acts 
1925, and reading as follows: 
"'The holder of such order may, if he so desires, have the right 
to require payment thereof out of any moneys in the general fund 
of the county treasury that may be available.' 
"The opinion was by a divided court, but the controlling opin-
ion written by Mr. Justice WIEST held that the statute placed a lim-
itation upon the right to have payment and contemplated that there 
might be moneys in the treasury not to be used for the payment of 
drainage orders, for it confines payment out of funds usable for such 
purposes. 
"It was held that the term 'available' is employed in the statute 
in the sense of 'usable,' and that the statute did not grant plaintiff 
right to recourse to any and all moneys in the treasury, but limits re-
sort to such only as are available for the payment of drain orders. 
Further, that the moneys in the treasury raised by taxation to meet 
ordinary current county expenses and needed for such purpose are 
set apart to such use and are not usable to pay drain orders. 
"The Bay City Dredge Case, in my opinion, merely interpreted 
the statute there in question and with particular reference to the 
language therein contained. I am of the opinion that such reasoning 
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was not intended to control the present situation. Here that portion 
of the statute under discussion is mandatory. It expresses the clear 
legislative intent that when the amount available in the drain fund 
shall be insufficient to pay the principal or interest of any drainage 
bonds heretofore or hereafter issued when they become due, the 
same shall be advanced and paid by the county out of its general 
funds. 
"The statute does not include the word 'available,' which un-
der Justice WIEST's opinion would be regarded as usable for the 
purpose. It simply states that bondholders shall be paid out of the 
general fund and that reimbursement shall be made. The wording 
does not indicate that the legislature intended that the probability 
or possibility of reimbursement should be determined prior to any 
payment for the purposes mentioned out of the general fund. * * * 
"It is my further opinion that, under the case of Moore v. 
Harrison, 224 Mich. 512, and the later case of Township of Water-
ford v. Willson, 257 Mich. 619, that the question of the depletion of 
the county funds does not enter into the discussion, in view of the 
statute, which is here upheld, and which provides for no exceptions 
or limitations upon the use of funds to all practical intents and pur-
poses included in the general fund for the purpose stated." 
Both on the date of instituting suit and on the date of hearing, 
there was in the Washtenaw county general fund money greatly in 
excess of the amount of the payment sought by plaintiff. Mandamus 
was the proper remedy, because plaintiff is clearly entitled to pay-
ment, and likewise the duty of respondents as public officers to make 
such payment out of moneys in the county's general fund is clearly 
and specifically imposed by statute. The record presents a clear legal 
duty on the part of the defendants and a clear legal right on the part 
of the plaintiff to have such duty performed. Taylor v. Isabella Cir-
cuit Judge, 209 Mich. 97;Miller v. City of Detroit, 250 Mich. 633. 
The judgment is affirmed, with costs to appellee. 
McDONALD, C. J., and POTTER, SHARPE, FEAD, WIEST, 
and BUTZELL, JJ., concurred. CLARK, J., took no part in this de-
cision. 
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Selden Breck Construction Co. v. Regents of the University of 
Michigan 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan, Southern Division, 274 Fed. 982,983, 984-85, (1921) 
TUTTLE, District Judge. This cause is now before the court 
on demurrer to the declaration. 
The action is trespass on the case on promises, and was brought 
to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff, a 
Missouri corporation, by reason of a breach by the defendant, a Mich-
igan corporation, of a certain contract entered into between the par-
ties hereto, for the furnishing by the plaintiff of labor and material 
for the construction of a library building for the defendant to be 
erected upon the campus of the University of Michigan, at Ann Ar-
bor, Mich., which is under the control of the defendant board of re-
gents. The damages claimed by plaintiff, which exceed the necessary 
jurisdictional amount, are alleged to have been caused by delays to 
which the plaintiff was subjected in completing its work under the 
contract as a result of the failure of defendant to perform certain of 
its duties under such contract. 
* * * 
1. Section 46 of the General Conditions forming part of the 
contract provides as follows: 
"The owner is not to be held responsible for any damage in-
curred by the contractor through the fault of any other contractor 
employed by the owner. Should the contractor be delayed in the 
prosecution of the work by reason of the above cause, or through the 
owner, the time of completion shall be extended for a period equiva-
lent to the time lost, which period shall be determined by the archi-
tect, but no such allowance shall be made unless a claim therefor is 
presented in writing to the architect within forty-eight hours of the 
occurrence of such delay." 
The contention of defendant that this provision limits and 
measures the extent of the rights and remedy of the plaintiff in the 
event of delay occasioned through the fault of the defendant and de-
prives the plaintiff of the right to recover damages caused through 
such delay cannot, in my opinion, be sustained. In the absence of an 
express stipulation relieving the defendant from liability for damages 
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caused by its breach of this contract, it would, of course, be liable 
therefor. The language of the provision thus invoked and relied upon 
by defendant as a basis for exemption from such liability certainly 
does not in terms provide for such exemption, and to have that ef-
fect a meaning must be read into it which is not expressed in the 
words used. There seems to be no ambiguity in this language. It 
merely provides that if the plaintiff be delayed through the fault of 
any other contractor employed by the defendant, or through the de-
fendant, "the time of completion shall be extended for a period 
equivalent to the time lost." The "time of completion" is obviously 
the period of time referred to in the clause of the contract, copy of 
which is attached to the declaration, providing that the plaintiff "is 
to complete the entire work upon or before January 1, 1918." The 
purpose, then, of the condition invoked by defendant, is, manifestly, 
to relieve the plaintiff from the consequences of a failure on its part 
to complete its work by the date mentioned, if such failure be 
caused by the fault of the defendant, by allowing to the plaintiff an 
extension of the time of completion for a period of "equivalent to 
the time lost by reason of such fault of defendant." That this was in-
tended to be an allowance to, and not a limitation upon the plaintiff, 
is further indicated by the concluding clause in this section provid-
ing that such an "allowance" will not "be made" unless a claim 
therefor is presented within the time therein specified. 
Although some authority is cited apparently to the contrary, I 
am unable to accept the reasoning or agree with the conclusion in-
volved in the theory of the defendant in support of this contention. 
I am satisfied that the provision in question, properly construed, was 
intended to, and does, create an exemption in favor of the plaintiff, 
and not of the defendant, and that to interpret it otherwise would 
be to import into it a meaning which the parties thereto have not 
themselves expressed. Nelson v. Pickwick Associated Co., 30 lll. 
App. 333; W. H. Stubbings Co. v. World's Columbian Exposition 
Co., 110 ill. App. 210; Del Genovese v. Third Avenue R. R. Co., 13 
App. Div. 412, 43 N.Y. Supp. 8; Id., 162 N.Y. 614, 57 N. E. 1108. 
[2] 2. It is further urged by defendant that the act of plaintiff 
in proceeding with, and completing, its work under the contract after 
the alleged breach thereof by defendant, operated as a waiver of any 
right to recover damages caused by such breach. I cannot agree with 
this contention. Consideration of the subject satisfies me that the 
correct rule is that upon breach of a building contract by the failure 
of the owner to perform his obligations under such contract, which 
delays the contractor in completing his work thereunder, the latter 
is not obliged to abandon such work, but may elect to continue 
therewith after such breach and, upon performance of the contract 
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on his part, is entitled to recover the damages sustained by him as a 
result of the delay caused by such owner. W. H. Stubbings Co. v. 
World's Columbian Exposition Co., supra; Allamon v. Albany, 43 
Barn. (N. Y.) 33; Florence Oil & Refining Co. v. Reeves, 13 Colo. 
App. 95, 56 Pac. 674; 9 Corpus Juris, 793. 
[3] 3. The claim by defendant that the acceptance by the 
plaintiff of an extension of the time within which it was bound by 
the contract to finish its work, and the completion by plaintiff of 
the building within the time so extended, operated to deprive the 
plaintiff of any right to recover damages resulting from the alleged 
breach by defendant, if such claim be intended to be separate from, 
and in addition to, the contentions already considered, is disposed 
of by the conclusions reached with respect to such contentions, as 
hereinbefore indicated. The considerations pointed out in that con-
nection are equally applicable and controlling, in principle, here; 
from which it results that the demurrer must be overruled. 
3. OPINIONS OF ATIORNEY GENERAL 
Frequently the Attorney General has been requested to 
rule concerning particular business operations of the universities. 
Some of the important questions which have been answered in 
these opinions are as follows: whether enabling legislation is re-
quired for the acquisition or disposal of university lands; 
whether, and how, a state university may borrow money; and 
whether certain statutes and administrative regulations affecting 
the university are constitutionally valid. Also, the Attorney Gen-
eral repeatedly, has been called upon to interpret general statutes 
which do not specifically exempt the universities from their 
coverage. 
The Attorney Generals' opinions relating to the authority 
of the Board of Regents to acquire and to dispose 6f University 
property go back to the year 1900. In that year, he ruled that 
the Auditor General had no authority to prevent the acquisition 
of land by the University of Michigan. 1 The year 1907 saw 
another ruling to the same effect.2 Since then the various At-
torneys General of Michigan have consistently reaffirmed the 
authority of the university boards, without enabling legislation, 
to acquire property in trust;3 to dispose oftrust property with 
the proceeds of the property being used according to the terms 
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of the trust;4 and to convey university property to another state 
agency.5 
The authority of the governing board to borrow or to lend 
money, however, has not been as clear as their authority to ac-
cept and to dispose of property. The state constitution closely 
restricts the amount of state indebtedness, and provides further 
that "the credit of the state shall not be granted to or in aid of 
any person, association, or corporation, public or private."6 Al-
though there are no cases interpreting these provisions of the 
state constitution as they apply to the universities, the settled 
opinion seems to be that, as a part of state government, a gen-
eral debt payable out of state appropriations would be illegal as 
an unconstitutional state debt. 7 
In 1928 the Attorney General approved a device known as 
the "self-liquidating project" which has enabled the state univer-
sities to obtain money without violating the constitutional re-
strictions on state indebtedness. 8 The theory behind the self-
liquidating project is that a university is not generally indebted 
at all. It merely agrees to use the income generated by the proj-
ect itself to repay the bondholders. This device has been ex-
tensively used to finance new dormitories, but it has also been 
used to erect such diverse structures as football stadiums, stu-
dent unions, and parking structures. The Attorney General has 
gone so far as to approve short-term indebtedness by Michigan 
State University secured by anticipated student fees. 9 And, 
when legislators enacted a statute forbidding the issuance of 
self-liquidating bonds without the approval of the state, the At-
torney General ruled that the law was unconstitutional. 10 
It would appear that the Board of Regents of the Univer-
sity of Michigan currently has, as a body corporate, the power 
to finance the acquisition of truly self-liquidating facilities such 
as housing and dining facilities, student activities facilities, park-
ing facilities and athletic facilities, by the issuance of obligations 
payable in future years without any legislative act, provided the 
facilities are reasonably proper and necessary for the University 
to function. 
The restriction on extending the credit of the state to 
others has also been the subject of opinions of the Attorney 
General as it bears upon the financial operations of the state 
universities. In 1928, he ruled that a police and fire protection 
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agreement between the then Michigan State College and the City 
of East Lansing was illegal because it amounted to an extension 
of state credit by the college to a public corporation, the city. 11 
For the same reason, Michigan State is prohibited from assisting 
its fraternities to build houses, 12 and from supplying water and 
sewer service to neighboring private persons. 13 
The construction and maintenance of university buildings, 
as well as their financing, has been treated in many opinions of 
the Attorney General. As early as 1898, the Attorney General 
ruled that construction of an addition to the Law School at the 
University of Michigan was not governed by a statute which, 
literally, would have applied to all state institutions.14 In another 
opinion, the Attorney General reiterated the Weinberg15 rule 
that the University need not require bonds from contractors for 
the benefit of subcontractors. 16 In another opinion interpreting 
the School Building Code, the Attorney General ruled that it 
applied only to classroom buildings. 17 A recent ruling in 1965 
held unconstitutional a statute which purported to vest author-
ity in the state administrative board over the construction pro-
grams at the ten autonomous colleges and universities of the 
state. 18 
Many other opinions cover some of the vast miscellany of 
legal questions which arise from particular business transactions 
of the University. The Attorney General's office has issued the 
following opinions. The Board of Regents may place fire insur-
ance on University property without the approval of the Audi-
tor General. 19 Alternately, with the consent of the state admin-
istrative board, the Regents may cover University property 
through the state fire insurance fund. 20 State laws for the regis-
tration and supervision of laboratories govern only those Uni-
versity laboratories which sell their products for a profit. 21 The 
University may serve oleomargerine despite a contrary statute. 22 
Unclaimed checks issued by the University are subject to escheat 
except those in payment of wages. 23 Michigan State University 
may license the Dow Chemical Company to produce an insecti-
cide which has been patented by that University. 24 A statute 
requiring state agencies to have all their printing done within the 
state does not apply to those universities with constitutional 
status. 25 The Michigan Higher Education Assistance Authority26 
is not authorized to charge a fee to the schools for its services in 
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guaranteeing up to 80% of a student loan. 27 Parking and traffic 
regulations for university property may be adopted by the uni-
versity's governing board and enforced by a city in accordance 
with a con tract between the. board and the city. 28 The board of 
Michigan State University may delegate financial authority to 
the University president in spite of a conflicting statute which 
would have delegated such authority to the University's secre-
tary.29 An annuity plan adopted by a college in order to raise 
funds is not subject to regulation under the state insurance 
code.3° Finally, although its name is one of a university's most 
valuable assets, the Attorney General ruled that only the legis-
lature, and not the governing board, could change the name of 
Michigan State College to Michigan State University.31 
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CHAPTER X 
THE FACULTY AND EMPLOYEES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The first case in this chapter is the famous Rose case of the 
1870's. This case involved shortages which were found in the 
student deposit accounts for the chemistry laboratory of the 
University of Michigan. At issue was whether one Professor 
Douglas or whether his assistant Rose was responsible for the 
shortages. The trouble was that Douglas and Rose represented 
two different religious and political factions into which the Uni-
versity and the City of Ann Arbor were divided. Indeed, the en-
tire State of Michigan seemed to be involved. 
The case was litigated in the courts. The opinion of the 
Supreme Court is included in this chapter, but the case was not 
settled by judicial decision alone. By the time the case reached 
the Supreme Court, the Board of Regents was exhausted and 
was equally divided. For this reason it was not represented be-
fore the court. The electorate and the legislature was aroused 
by the scandal. The full sweep of the case which so seriously en-
dangered the University is described in the survey edited by 
Shaw, The University of Michigan: An Encyclopedic Survey. 
The Buehler and Draper cases involve the application to 
the University of Michigan of the Workmen's Compensation 
Act. In these cases the court does not treat the University dif-
ferently from any regular employer; but these cases should be 
compared to the Agler and Peters cases in Chapter III which 
concerned resistance of Michigan State University to coverage 
under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
The final case in this chapter raises the most fundamental 
issue of faculty employment. An Assistant Professor of German 
at the then Michigan College of Mining and Technology, named 
Sittler, was dismissed by the college's Board of Control appar-
ently after discovering that he had been a Nazi during the Second 
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World War. The Supreme Court in deciding whether he was en-
titled to compensation for the remainder of the academic year 
did not even consider the reason for his dismissal. The court 
simply ruled that since the arrangements for the professor's ap-
pointment had not been approved by the governing board in 
formal session, he had no contract with the college. This case 
was decided before the grant of constitutional status to Michigan 
Tech, but there is no reason to believe that the lack of constitu-
tional autonomy was decisive in this particular case. Sittler was 
hired only two weeks before the beginning of classes by the 
head of the language department. It is the practice of many uni-
versities to have the governing board formally delegate emer-
gency authority to fill vacant faculty positions which must be 
filled in a short time. Since there was no evidence of such 
formal delegation by the college board in the Sittler case, it is 
not a precedent for cases involving formal delegation. 
In this connection, the tenure rules established in the By-
laws of the Regents of the University of Michigan deserve men-
tion. In general, they establish the procedure by which faculty 
members are given tenure, and they also provide the procedure 
which must be followed in dismissing a member of the faculty 
with tenure. 1 
A statute in Michigan requires that all members of the 
faculties at all colleges and universities in the state, public and 
private, take an oath to support the constitutions of the state 
and the country. This loyalty oath is significantly different, 
however, from the loyalty oath at the University of Maryland 
which was recently struck down by the United States Supreme 
Court in the case of Whitehill v. Elkins, 88 Sup. Ct. 184 (1967). 
2. JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
The Regents of The University of Michigan v. Rose 
45 Mich. 284, 288, 297-312; 4 N.W. 738 (1881) 
[The Rose case affected the University much more serious-
ly than is revealed in the court's opinion in this case. Political 
passions aroused over the disappearance of money from the 
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chemical laboratory accounts seriously divided the University 
and the whole State of Michigan. The very independence of the 
Board of Regents was threatened by an equal division within the 
board and the possibility of legislative action to break the dead-
lock. For a complete account of this important episode in the 
history of the University, see the article by Lewis G. Vander 
Velde in Volume 1, The University of Michigan-An Encyclo-
pedic Survey, pp. 208-13.] 
MARSTON, C. J. In these cases, owing to the extraordinary 
and unprecedented course adopted by the complainant in the origi-
nal cause, declining to render that aid and assistance which the re-
searches and argument of counsel would give, and which has been 
universally recognized as proper and necessary in courts, especially 
those of last resort, we find the request to dispense with the printing 
of the record an embarrassing one. We do not know what questions 
are to be presented on the hearing, or the extent of the investigation 
that will be found necessary in the determination thereof. 
We cannot, therefore, now say that the record should not be 
printed in the usual manner. That this may result in heavy and un-
necessary expense upon the losing party, much of which might be 
avoided could we have the customary assistance of counsel, is very 
probable. It is, however, one of the consequences which we cannot 
avoid, when the case is thus thrown upon us, with no information on 
one side whether the full printing of the record is or not necessary. 
We must, as at present advised, assume that such printing is neces-
sary, and act accordingly. 
* * * 
MARSTON, C. J. The original bill in this cause was filed for an 
accounting between defendants Douglas and Rose respecting moneys 
which had been received at the Chemical Laboratory of the Univer-
sity of Michigan, on account of the University, but not paid over or 
accounted for to the complainants, and for a decree against the de-
fendants, or either of them, for such amount as should be found in 
their or his hands. 
[The appeal is by defendant Douglas.] 
* * * 
Taking up these several questions raised by the appeal, the first 
in order will be the one last above stated. 
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First. Appellant claims to be credited the sum of $390 for er-
ror in balance brought forward in his account rendered for 1870-1. I 
have carefully examined the evidence and the briefs referred to, in 
order to ascertain if a mistake had been made as claimed. The report 
made by defendant Douglas to the Regents for 1869-70 showed a 
balance in his hands belonging to the University of $61.49. The two 
last items of credits to the University upon this report are under 
date of June 29, 1870, viz.: June 29th, sundry persons, $836.22, 
and diplomas $19. His next report to the Regents credits the Uni-
versity, under date of July 1st, "By bal. $451.49." On turning to his 
book of accounts from which these reports were made I find the bal-
ance there stated under the same date $361.49; the other credit items 
correspond with his report. Turning back upon the same book to his 
account for 1869 and up to June 29th, 1870, I find the total receipts 
footed up at $5685.87, and the expenditures at $5324.38; this makes 
the balance, as stated upon his books, $361.49. It is very clear, how-
ever, that a mistake was made in the footing-up of the receipts for 
1869, as was pointed out during the argument by one of the mem-
bers of the court. The correct footing-up is not $5685.87 but 
$5385.87, thus clearly showing a mistake of $300 to have been 
made in favor of the University. I have been unable to account for 
the difference between the amount or balance as shown upon his 
book and in his report. As already said, the book, as erroneously 
footed, showed a balance of $361.49, while his report gave the bal-
ance as $451.49; the mistake of $300 is clear, while there remains 
$90 unaccounted for. The evidence tends very strongly to show that 
this $90 was not received, yet the manner of keeping accounts was 
so loose and is so unsatisfactory that I am of opinion this $90 should 
be charged to the defendant Douglas. He having once reported the 
receipt thereof to the Regents, he must assume the burden of proving 
the mistake. This has been done to the amount of $300 and that 
amount should be credited to him. 
Secondly. I now come to the question of interest. Defendant 
Douglas while director of the Laboratory, claiming to have made cer-
tain advances therefor, over and above the receipts therefrom in his 
hands, made monthly balances of his accounts and charged interest 
upon any balance found in his favor at the rate of ten per cent. per 
annum. In his annual accounts to the Regents the interest thus 
claimed and computed was charged. In some of the accounts this 
charge was more clearly and distinctly set forth than in others, it ap-
pearing in all as a charge of interest, but not in every instance show-
ing how or upon what balance it was computed. The fact that such 
advances were made and that such balance in his favor in fact existed, 
is not disputed, except upon the theory of charging him with the 
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entire receipts of the Laboratory. It was farther shown that there was 
no express authority given him by the Regents to make any advances, 
or if he did to charge interest thereon. These accounts, when pre-
sented to the Board, were usually referred to the fmance committee, 
by them examined, and reported back as being correct. There was no 
uniformity in the action taken by the Regents upon these reports; 
some were "accepted and the account and vouchers placed on ftle," 
others "accepted," "accepted and adopted," and "adopted." And 
this is true of all of the reports up to and including the report for 
1871-2, except for the year 1866-7, which, although made andre-
ferred to the proper committee, the record of the Board fails to show 
any report made or action taken thereon. The report for that year is 
found on file, and formed the basis for the next year's report which 
was acted upon. 
It has been claimed that the Regents, in auditing and allowing 
his accounts, did so in ignorance of the facts relating to the charges 
of interest, and that the Board had no authority to borrow money or 
to pay interest upon such advances. I do not deem it necessary to 
pass upon the question of the power of the Board of Regents to bor-
row money or to pay interest. I have no doubt but that where money 
has been paid out or expended for the use and benefit of the Univer-
sity, in cases where the Board could have expressly authorized such 
expenditures, they may ratify the act and direct payment thereof 
with interest at any rate not exceeding ten per cent. per annum; and 
where. the Board with full knowledge of the facts has made such pay-
ment, such action will be final and cannot afterwards be disturbed. 
Did then the Board of Regents pass upon these accounts with 
full knowledge of the facts? Whether as a matter of fact each mem-
ber of the Board carefully examined these accounts for the purpose 
of ascertaining what was charged therein, and the reason therefor, is 
not of very much importance in the present inquiry. I shall not, 
therefore, consider the evidence tending to show such to have been 
the fact. In the presentation of these accounts, and the charges of in-
terest therein, no fraud or concealment was attempted. The accounts 
upon their face showed certain interest items charged against the 
University. This was sufficient to put the Regents upon inquiry, and 
in case they did not fully understand the charge as made, or the rea-
son for making it, it became their duty, before acting farther thereon, 
to make full investigation and ascertain all the facts relating thereto. 
No one can doubt for a moment but that a proper investigation 
would have given them all the facts and circumstances pertaining to 
this question of interest. Such being the duty of the Board of Re-
gents, this court cannot presume that it was either neglected or care-
lessly performed by that body. In the absence of fraud it must be 
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conclusively presumed that the Board did know the facts relating to 
these charges and allowed them in the light thereof. What was said in 
Detroit Advertiser etc., v. City of Detroit 43 Mich. 116 is equally ap-
plicable in this connection and need not here be repeated, and the 
rule there )aid down must be held decisive in the present case upon 
this question, so far as interest was allowed, which includes the 
amount in the report for 1871-2 and previous years. 
The records of the Board do not show final action upon any 
report subsequent to that of 1871-2, consequently no allowance of 
interest thereafter. And I am of opinion, therefore, that interest after 
that time cannot be allowed in this case. If it could, clearly, under 
our statute, the rate could not exceed seven per cent, in the absence 
of a written agreement. Where charged and paid in the absence of 
such an agreement the person receiving such rate may retain it, but 
he cannot make that the basis for the recovery of the same rate upon 
implied contract. I am also of opinion that no implied contract can 
thus grow up under which interest can be recovered; that the rule 
applicable between individuals cannot here be followed, but rather 
the rule applicable between the State or municipalities and individ-
uals must here govern. I have heretofore had occasion to examine 
the question whether interest could be claimed from the State upon 
an implied contract, and came to the conclusion that such was not 
the general rule, and I have seen no occasion to depart from or 
change the conclusion then arrived at. Report of Auditor General 
for 1874, ccxlv. 
I am of opinion, therefore, that the interest charged in the re-
port for 1872-3 and subsequently, cannot be allowed the defendant. 
Thirdly. Old accounts amounting to $53.19. Before attempting 
to pass upon this and the remaining claim, it might be well to first 
ascertain the relations existing between the defendant Douglas and 
the University, and his legal liability to the University resulting there-
from. 
As I have already given a full statement of the facts, a brief 
reference at this point will be sufficient. Defendant Douglas was at 
an early day appointed assistant professor and afterwards professor 
of chemistry. As such it was a part of his duty to purchase chemicals 
for the Laboratory, furnish them to students therein as necessary, 
collect the price thereof and account therefor to the Board of Re-
gents. Our attention has not been called to, and I have been unable 
to find, the record of his appointment or the authority then or after-
wards expressly conferred upon him. Evidence has been introduced 
as to what some members of the Board considered his duty, viz., to 
superintend the business of the Chemical Laboratory, receive and 
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account for all moneys coming into the same; to act as its director, 
and to report to the Board the result of the management thereof, in-
cluding all moneys coming into his hands, and all moneys paid out 
by him in connection therewith. As early as 1864 assistants were ap-
pointed, who, amongst other duties, took charge of the books, dis-
pensed chemicals to the students, kept their accounts, collected from 
them and paid the same over to defendant Douglas. 
In June, 1865, defendant Douglas made a report to the Re-
gents in which the following appeared: The Dispensing of Chemicals 
and Apparatus and the Keeping of Accounts in the Laboratory. An 
account is kept with each student in the Laboratory, who is made to 
pay for what he actually consumes; the labor attached to this branch 
is very great and requires the services of a good and correct account-
ant; thus, in transacting the business of the past year, there have 
been made in the books of the Laboratory upwards of 1800 entries 
of charges and credits, and in the hands of a careless and inefficient 
man large amounts may be lost to the University. Under all these 
circumstances I respectfully suggest to your honorable Board the 
appointment of an assistant of chemistry and lecturer on organic 
chemistry and metallurgy, at a salary of $1000, and that the remain-
ing two assistants now authorized to be employed be paid, respec-
tively $250 and $300; the expenses of the Laboratory would be thus 
increased $800; with this sum I think the services of one permanent 
and efficient assistant can be secured, and if the waste and loss con-
sequent upon irresponsible and inefficient help is taken into account, 
it will prove little if any more expensive than the present arrange-
ment." At the same session the committee to whom was referred the 
above reported the following, which was adopted: "Resolved, That 
an assistant professor of chemistry and lecturer on organic chemistry 
and metallurgy, at a salary of $1000, be employed, and that there-
maining two assistants, now authorized to be employed, be paid re-
spectively $250 and $300 per annum." The following was also 
adopted: "On motion of Regent Knight the appointment of an as-
sistant professor in the Laboratory was referred to the executive 
committee and Profe.;sor Douglas." Under this authority Dr. Lewis 
was appointed to take charge of the books, dispense chemicals and 
keep accounts, and he held such position until the spring of 1866, 
when he resigned, and Dr. Preston B. Rose was then appointed. 
I do not understand it to be claimed, or that, as a matter of 
fact, defendant Douglas, during or after 1864, kept the books of ac-
count with the students or dispensed any of the chemicals, or, with 
a very few exceptions, collected any moneys from the students. The 
books were kept, and all this work was done, by an assistant who 
accounted to defendant Douglas. 
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Under such a state of facts it is important to first determine 
whether defendant Douglas can be properly charged with and held 
liable for all moneys, which the books show to have been paid, or 
which were actually paid, to such assistants, or only for the amount 
by them paid over to him. I have been unable to discover any princi-
ple or decision under which defendant Douglas can in this case be 
held liable for moneys not actually received by him. No such en-
larged responsibility can result from his office or the class of duties 
he performed. The keeping of accounts and collection of moneys 
from the students could not, from the very nature of his position 
and the duties he had to perform, primarily fall upon him. He was 
not a mere accountant and collector. That duty necessarily must have 
and was in fact entrusted to others-assistants who were appointed 
under authority from the Board of Regents, their salary fixed by 
them, and paid out of University funds. I make no distinction on this 
account, for there is none, because they may have been paid from 
Laboratory moneys and by the director; they were none the less Uni-
versity funds which otherwise it would have received. These assistants 
were not therefore the clerks, servants or agents of the defendant 
Douglas, for whose acts he would be chargeable, and the mere fact 
that he had power to employ or discharge them, would not make 
them such. They were in the employ of the University and were sub-
ject to be called to account by, and were responsible to, the Board 
of Regents for their acts and conduct. 
If it was a part of the duties of the defendant Douglas to keep 
strict watch and account of their doings to prevent loss to the Uni-
versity, and he was guilty of such negligence in this respect as would 
render him responsible for the losses sustained in consequence there-
of, the question might be different, but such is not the theory of the 
bill in this case. 
It is not necessary, however, to rest the case upon this ground 
alone; as already intimated, the bill of complaint does not seek to 
charge him with any but the moneys that came into his hands. 
Farther than this, after the cause had been at issue, counsel repre-
senting all the parties, complainants and defendants, entered into a 
written stipulation, in which I find the following: "1st. All the said 
defendants who have appeared, consent and agree that said Douglas 
is liable to account to and pay over to said complainants so much of 
the Laboratory deficit, so called, as came into his lands, and which 
has not been accounted for by him to the Regents, if any; and also, 
that said Rose is liable to account to, and pay over to, said com-
plainants so much of said deficit as came into his hands and which he 
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has not accounted for to said Douglas or to said Regents, if any. * * * 
4th Nothing contained in the record of this cause, or the decree to 
be made therein, shall, at any time hereafter, be alleged or held to 
estop the complainants from calling on said defendant Douglas to 
account to them for any money which he may have received for 
their use, other than such as was received by him from or through 
said defendant Rose." 
The authority to enter into this stipulation has not been and 
could not well be questioned, and it clearly fixes the liability of each 
to such amount "as came into his hands and which has not been ac-
counted for by him." Whether therefore we look to the bill of com-
plaint, the stipulation, or the legal liability resulting froin undisputed 
facts, we can only charge defendant Douglas with the moneys re-
ceived by him and not accounted for. It also follows from such a 
state of facts that there must be evidence, at least, tending to show 
moneys into Douglas' hands in order to justify the rendition of a de-
cree against him. In stating this I do not overlook the second clause 
of the stipulation referred to which fixed the amount of the deficit, 
but left open the question what amount thereof should be charged 
to Rose and what amount to Douglas. This matter of division or ap-
pointment was left to be settled by the court in the usual manner 
upon relevant and competent testimony in the case. It is not suffi-
cient, therefore, in order to charge defendant Douglas, to show by 
the books kept by an assistant that a certain amount of money had 
been paid to the assistant, or, as a fact independent of the books, 
that such sums were paid to the assistant, as such evidence has no 
tendency to show that Douglas received it. Proof of these facts would 
necessarily be one of the steps in the case, but standing alone would 
fall short of establishing a liability against Douglas, or call upon him 
to account for what he has not been shown to have received. The 
burthen of proof, in reference to these old accounts, is upon the 
complainants; and in reference to the deficit fixed by the stipulation, 
is upon defendant Rose, to show the money in Douglas' hands in or-
der to charge him therewith. In seeking to establish such fact the 
rules applicable to the proof of facts in civil cases must be observed, 
and the fact may be shown by any competent testimony fairly ~end­
ing, either alone or in connection with other circumstances, to es-
tablish it. 
I have been wholly unable to find any satisfactory evidence 
that defendant Douglas received any of these old accounts charged 
to him in the decree. They are very old matters, running from 1860-1 
to 18634, and the books kept at that time are principally relied 
upon to charge him. These books are not in his handwriting; the 
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evidence shows that they were very carelessly kept; that the tickets 
then in use were relied upon in the settlement with the students, and 
that corrections made in the settlement did not necessarily appear 
upon the books, and that the entries therein are not correct. Under 
such circumstances I am of opinion that these old accounts should 
not be charged against the defendant Douglas. It may be very ques-
tionable whether the books, kept in such a manner, could be ad-
mitted in evidence as against this defendant, but as the proof stands, 
the question is hardly of sufficient importance to justify an extended 
discussion. 
Fourth. I now come to perhaps the most difficult, certainly 
the most important, question raised by the appeal. The decree 
charges the defendant Douglas with certain deficit deposit moneys, 
paid in 1866-7 and following years up to 1873-4, amounting to 
$1275 and interest thereon. What has been said under the last subdi-
vision, relating to the old accounts, as to the relation of the several 
parties, their respective liabilities and the burthen of proof, is equally 
applicable here and need not be repeated. 
The principal evidence relied upon to charge defendant Douglas 
with the receipt of this deposit money is the stubs remaining in cer-
tain books, with the name, or initials, or initial D. thereon, of 
Douglas as a receipt or voucher that he had received the amount 
mentioned in such stub. It is not disputed, but it is in fact conceded, 
that if all the vouchers for deposit money on the stub-books are 
genuine, the decree in this respect is correct and should not be 
changed. Defendant Douglas testified that the vouchers on stubs 37 
and 44 to 85, inclusive, in sub-book 2, are not in his handwriting, 
and although testifying that there were others which he believed 
were not, these were the only stubs specifically pointed out by him. 
This, in my opinion, puts these stubs in issue, as would an affidavit 
denying the execution of an instrument sued upon. Twelve stub-
books, running from 1866 to 1876, were put in evidence. On nearly 
all the stubs in these books I fmd defendant's vouchers, the great 
bulk of which are unquestioned. I do not, in this connection, refer 
to the red-line vouchers. Nearly one hundred orders drawn by the 
recorder upon the treasurer of the city of Ann Arbor, and counter-
signed by defendant Douglas as mayor, were put in evidence by the 
defendant Rose. There is also a large number of books and papers in 
evidence, containing the genuine handwriting of both the defendants 
Douglas and Rose. 
I have made most careful examination and comparison of the 
writing and signatures of defendant Douglas with the disputed 
vouchers. I have also made a quite careful examination of defendant 
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Rose's handwriting and signatures with the disputed vouchers. This 
last, however, was not as careful as the first for two reasons: First, if 
these disputed vouchers were the work of Rose, I would not expect 
them to be in his ordinary and natural handwriting but rather as an 
imitation of Douglas; and secondly, if I became satisfied they were 
not made by defendant Douglas, it would not, for the purpose of 
this case, become necessary to find by whom made, inasmuch as the 
case would then be merely this, that defendant Rose had received 
certain moneys for the payment over of which he had failed to pro-
duce vouchers. If I had confined my examination to defendant 
Douglas' signature on the city orders referred to, and a comparison 
thereof with the disputed vouchers, I should have no hesitation 
whatever in saying that the latter were not genuine. The city orders, 
however, were all countersigned in 1871-'2 and '3-most of them in 
1872-while these disputed stubs are dated September, 1867. An ex-
amination of the previous stubs in the same book, number 2, running 
from December, 1866, to the date of the disputed stubs, and of stub-
book number 1, running from August 9, 1866, to December lOth of 
the same year, would not tend to weaken but strengthen such opin-
ion. Thus far there can scarcely be said to be any resemblance what-
ever between the disputed papers and those shown or admitted to be 
genuine. No doubt, if all these I have mentioned, numbering about 
four hundred, should be taken and compared, resemblances might be 
pointed out between some which are disputed and some conceded 
to be genuine, but some resemblance would be expected on any 
theory of the case. 
I encounter more difficulty when I come to the examination 
of other stub-books, for there is unquestionable evidence in the sig-
nature and initials not disputed, that the handwriting of defendant 
Douglas underwent some changes in the period covered by them, 
which introduces an element of considerable embarrassment in the 
attempt to test these disputed papers. 
In addition to the examination thus made we have the expert 
testimony, which cannot be overlooked but must receive such weight 
as in our judgment it is fairly entitled to. I may not be able to agree 
with the witness to the full extent of his theories, as in saying that 
certain initials or signatures were not and could not have been made 
by defendant Douglas, and yet there may be many things in his testi-
mony that will aid us in arriving at a correct conclusion. Evidence as 
to the genuineness of handwriting given by a witness possessing the 
requisite experience and skill is admissible, and being so, must be 
considered, and given, in the light of all the evidence bearing thereon, 
just such weight as the court or jury may deem it reasonably entitled 
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to. It cannot be rejected in toto, simply because expert testimony, in 
passing, unheeded, the actions of the respective parties. I do not now 
refer to opinions of witnesses based upon mere appearances, when 
parties are questioned touching matters of this character; but to such 
acts, conduct and utterances as evidently were made deliberately and 
understandingly. Such acts and declarations have ever been con-
sidered competent evidence in civil cases, and are entitled to be 
weighed and considered in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made. 
Defendant Rose, when his attention was first called to the fact 
that the account submitted by him or return made to defendant 
Douglas was not complete, examined his books and admitted that 
the names submitted to him were not included; others were presented 
and like acknowledgments made. He then voluntarily offered to, and 
did, prepare a list of delinquent accounts for 1874-5, entered it in de-
fendant Douglas' "long-book," and certified to its correctness; said 
he knew no better way than to fmd out how many were deficient, 
and pay them, and did borrow the money and paid them. After-
wards a deficit for previous years was discovered, and on his atten-
tion being called thereto, while denying that he was aware of any 
such deficit, yet he gave security to meet whatever might be found. 
A list of delinquent accounts for 1873-4 was made out, amounting 
to over eight hundred dollars, and on the 13th of November, 1875, 
he certified thereon that, so far as he knew, it was correct according 
to the examination of the books. He afterwards, on December 7, 
asked leave to make a supplementary statement thereto on the same 
paper, which not being permitted, a separate statement was made by 
him, but which does not explicitly question the correctness of his 
previous certificate. His admissions to President Angell and others 
all bear directly upon this question. 
Much has been said, in the briefs of counsel referred to, as to 
the unfairness of the means resorted to for the purpose of procuring 
these admissions, papers and securities. I cannot agree with counsel 
in what they have said upon this subject. I certainly have heretofore 
gone as far as any court has in denouncing attempts to encourage 
men to commit crime in order to detect and punish them therefor, 
because of their previous supposed criminal conduct, and I have no 
desire to depart from what I then said: Saunders v. People 38 Mich. 
221. But in this matter, in all that was done no effort was made to 
have defendant Rose commit any wrong, but simply to acknowledge 
that he had omitted to make proper returns. This is a very common 
practice, and I certainly see no objections that can be urged against 
such a course, unless undue means are resorted to, which I think 
were not in this case, and I fully concur with the learned circuit judge 
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in what he said in speaking of the trust deed given to secure the Re-
gents against loss on account of delinquencies in former years: 
"Douglas was not present upon this occasion or connected with the 
transaction, and there certainly was nothing oppressive or over exact-
ing in the conduct of the two Regents with whom the business was 
done, or that should excite timidity on the part of Rose." But per-
haps the very strongest reasons that can be shown against the charge 
of undue influence to procure such written admission is the fact that 
the commissioner, in stating the account, found, and the court below 
approved his finding, that the list of delinquent accounts for 1874-5, 
entered and certified upon the "long-book" by Rose as correct, and 
the delinquent list for 18734, as certified to by him on November 
13, 1875, already referred to, were in substances correct, and charged 
him therewith, and with the decree thus rendered he had rested satis-
fied, having taken no steps to obtain a review thereof. 
I have given due consideration to the argument found in the 
briefs against these things, yet in view of the evidence of the men to 
whom these statements were made, I cannot come to the conclusion 
that any undue or improper advantage was sought or taken of de-
fendant Rose, or that the circumstances would justify me in not giv-
ing due weight to such testimony. There was no illegal compulsion 
used, nor was he imposed upon or under duress. Nor have I over-
looked the argument that the first D vouchers are denied, and also 
what is said in reference to the spelling of the word Dougles or 
Dougled on stub number 44. Whether this word was so spelled in-
tentionally to furnish an argument against the probability of one 
familiar with a name thus misspelling it under such circumstances, I 
pass, but in my opinion this name was not written by defendant 
Douglas. Nor have I overlooked the offers that were made by de-
fendant Rose asking for investigation. Much may be said in favor of 
the apparent fairness of some of these propositions, and I have no de-
sire to criticise them; they cannot overthrow or destroy the effect of 
the evidence in the case, and they can take but very little from its 
force and effect. There are still other facts and circumstances which 
might be considered and discussed at considerable length, yet it is 
deemed unnecessary in the present case. 
In view of all the evidence I am of opinion it does not satis-
factorily appear that the vouchers in stub book number 2 referred to 
were written by defendant Douglas, and he should not therefore be 
charged with the amounts represented thereby. 
This still leaves a large number of delinquent deposit accounts 
charged to defendant Douglas. I have examined and considered with 
care the argument advanced by his counsel against the allowance of 
any of these accounts, and acknowledge its force. Bearing in mind, 
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however, the admitted fact that for all genuine deposit stub vouchers 
unaccounted for he is responsible, and in view of the farther fact that 
although called as a witness and thus having full opportunity to point 
out all such vouchers as he did not believe were genuine, yet he did 
not deny any others except inferentially. If he had been incapaci-
tated or disqualified as a witness, then no such denial could have been 
obtained, and the court must, from the other evidence in the case, 
have passed upon the question. But when a party is living, has been 
called as a witness, and does not specifically point out and designate 
those which he claims to be spurious, the court is quite justified in 
refusing to pay much heed to any elaborate argument by which it is 
sought to establish their falsity. In the absence of such a denial spe-
cifically pointing out those considered not valid, where, as in the 
present case, the great bulk of them are not questioned, all must be 
considered prima facie valid. 
For these reasons I am of opinion that all such delinquent de-
posit moneys must be charged to the defendant Douglas and that as 
to these the decree will not be disturbed. 
I have thus carefully considered all of appellant's objections to 
the decree of the court below, except a question of costs. The appel-
lant also insisted that the appeal brought up the whole case for re-
view, and it was argued accordingly. Neither the Regents nor Rose or 
his sureties appealed, and neither of them appeared by counsel or 
otherwise in this court. This has been a source of great embarrass-
ment to the court and has greatly increased our labor; and under such 
circumstances I think we have a right to assume that all parties, ex-
cept Douglas, are satisfied with the decree as it stands. It is a long 
and well-settled rule that a decree appealed from by one party only, 
cannot be changed in the appellate court in favor of the party not 
appealing; and, as this rule is so well known and understood, it is ex-
pected that all parties will appeal who are dissatisfied with the con-
clusion of the circuit court, and desire to have the decree changed in 
their favor. The fact of dissatisfaction courts can only know by an 
appeal regularly taken according to the rules and practice of the 
court. Nevertheless, as we held in Grant v. Merchants' etc. Bank 35 
Mich. 515, if in a case of accounting we find occasion to change the 
decree by allowing in favor of the appellant any items which were re-
jected in the court below, we will offset to these any other items 
claimed by the party not appealing which in our opinion were im-
properly rejected. But when a party acquiesces in the disallowance 
of any of his claims, and in this court neither by appeal nor other-
wise complains of the disallowance, I think we have a right to assume 
that he is satisfied with the action upon it, and that he does not ex-
pect or desire us to examine into it. There may be reasons for his not 
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desiring it which we could not know without their being explained 
to us, and it would be presumptuous on our part to treat the case in 
such a way, or to force the re-opening of matters which the parties 
concerned chose to leave where they were left in the court below. We 
can give the appellant relief in so far as the decree may be found to 
err against him; but where no one else complains or appears, I shall 
follow the usual custom of courts and refuse to discuss such ques-
tions as in the case before us are mere abstractions, since the only 
possible motive in the discussion would be to express opinions on 
those parts of the decree below of which no one makes complaint. 
The Court will assume, however, that any claim which is made 
by the appellant in this court, is in issue, and will look through all 
the evidence for any possible information which will show or tend 
to show that he is or is not entitled to have it allowed in his favor. 
I am of opinion that the decree below should be modified in 
accordance with this opinion, and that appellant should recover 
costs in this court. 
My brethren concurring, it is so ordered, and a decree will be 
entered in this court accordingly. 
GRAVES, J., concurred. 
COOLEY, J., concurring. In these cases it has seemed proper 
to me, in view of facts with which the public is familiar, that I 
should leave the examination of the record and the questions in-
volved to be made by my associates without my presence or assist-
ance. They have made their examination accordingly, and the result 
is embodied in the opinion of the Chief Justice just flied. I have ex-
amined that opinion and compared it with the record without find-
ing occasion to disagree. 
CAMPBELL, J., being disqualified by relationship to appel-
lants' bail, did not sit in this case. 
Buehler v. University of Michigan 
277 Mich. 648, 649-51; 270 N.W. 171 (1936) 
POTTER, J. Plaintiff, employed at common labor at Martha 
Cook building, University house, and Alpha Gamma Delta sorority 
house, all in Ann Arbor, injured her hand while working at the 
Martha Cook building October 16, 1934. 
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The first two buildings are operated by the university. The 
third is not so operated but is separate therefrom. Plaintiff earned at 
the Martha Cook building $6.30 a week; at University house, $2.85 a 
week; at Alpha Gamma Delta sorority house, $9 a week-a total of 
$18.15. At 'the time of the hearing, plaintiff was earning at the 
Martha Cook building $6.30 a week; at the University building, 
$2.85; and at the Alpha Gamma Delta sorority house $4 a week-a 
falling off in wages of $5 a week, 66-2/3 per cent. of which is 
$3.33-1/3 a week which was the amount of the award made by the 
department oflabor and industry. 
Defendants appeal claiming the award is based upon earnings 
in which the university is not interested; that earnings, remuneration 
or income received by plaintiff from others than the insured employ-
er were added to the wages received from the insured employer in 
computing the average weekly wages of plaintiff. Appellants say this 
should not be done because the statute, 2 Comp. Laws 1929, § 8427, 
provides compensation "shall fairly represent the proportionate ex-
tent of the impairment of his earning capacity in the employment in 
which he was working at the time of the accident;" that this provi-
sion as construed in Andrejwski v. Wolverine Coal Co., 182 Mich. 
298 (Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 724, 6 N.C. C. A. 807;Hirschkorn v. Fiege 
Desk Co. 184 Mich. 239;Hartman v. Village of St. Qair Shores, 246 
Mich. 603; Gallup v. Western Board & Paper Co., 252 Mich. 68; 
Carothers v. City of Stanton, 257 Mich. 107; Laidlaw v. City of 
Ludington, 272 Mich. 11, and other cases, limits plaintiff to recover-
ing against the university and its insurer compensation based upon 
her wages earned while employed by the university. Defendants in-
sist to hold otherwise would be to render the operation of the work-
men's compensation act uncertain, deprive insurers of the ability to 
compute premiums on the basis of the wages of the employee, sub-
ject employers and insurers . to liability which they had not con-
tracted against and which they could not anticipate, and is contrary 
to the spirit of the statute. 
Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends her earnings must be 
based upon what she earned, on her capacity to earn, ::~ whaL she 
might earn in all the various pursuits in which she wa::. engaged at the 
time the accident occurred; that applied to this case, plaintiffs earn-
ings before the accident \''ere $18.15 and after the accident $13.15 
a week-a difference of .k;, 66-2/3 per cont. of which is $3.33-1/3, 
the amount correctly awarded toter by lhe department of labor and 
industry, and she r<:hs upon Miller v. S. Fair & Sons, 206 Mich. 360; 
Foley v. Detrcit Uni.tPd Railway, 190 Mich. 507; Sargent v. A. B. 
Know/son Co., 22.; Mich. 66o (30 A. L. R. 993). 
There is a distinction in fact between the cases which defendants 
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rely upon and those upon which plaintiff relies. Typical of the cases 
upon which appellants rely are the cases of part-time firemen paid 
upon a weekly basis a certain amount, though engaged in and re-
ceiving pay in other employment, in which cases it has been uniform-
ly held the party injured was entitled to become compensated upon 
the basis of the amount received from the particular source of em-
ployment as fireman. Typical of the cases relied upon by plaintiff is 
the night-watchman case Sargent v. A. B. Know/son Co., supra, where 
a watchman was employed to watch several buildings, but where it 
was held plaintiffs employment was not seyeral as to each person 
employing his services and the services performed at any particular 
time were for the benefit of all persons employing him. 
We have nothing to do with the policy of the law.* That is a 
matter for the legislature. But, under the facts in this case, plaintiff 
was not employed by one of these employers for the benefit of the 
others. Her employment by each of her employers was separate and 
distinct from her employment by the others and, under the law, the 
university may not be held liable for compensation computed on 
the basis of what plaintiff earned when not employed by the univer-
sity, and the insurer may not be held liable for compensation based 
upon earnings by the plaintiff while not on the payroll of the in-
sured. 
The award of the department of labor and industry is reversed 
and the case remanded. 
NORTH, C. J., and FEAD, WIEST, BUTZEL, BUSHNELL, 
SHARPE, and TOY, JJ., concurred. 
Draper v. Regents of The University of Michigan 
195 Mich. 449, 450-56; 161 N.W. 956 (1917) 
KUHN, C. J. The claimant's husband, Jay B. Draper, was, im-
mediately prior to November 13, 1915, superintendent of the Uni-
versity hospitals at a salary of $2,500 a year. Mr. Draper frequently 
was required, in the course of his employment, to go to the Univer-
sity campus, which is situated about a quarter of a mile southeast of 
the University hospitals. In order to go to and from the campus it is 
necessary to cross the street car tracks running along the north side 
of the campus, on North University avenue. Mr. Draper's home was 
*See 2 Comp. Laws 1929, § 8407 et seq.-REPORTER. 
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southeast of the campus, so that the campus was directly between 
his home and the University hospitals. 
It is claimed that it was Mr. Draper's universal custom to take 
his noon and evening meals at the University hospitals, in the psy-
chopathic ward, unless he was called home for some reason or unless 
he had business down town which took him away from the hospitals. 
On November 13, 1915, he called up his home about 5 o'clock 
and said he would be home for the evening meal. Half an hour later 
he was almost instantly killed by a street car as he was'about to en-
ter the campus from the direction of the hospitals. 
A claim was presented against the Regents of the University of 
Michigan, and considerable testimony was taken at the hearing. The 
arbitration committee and the industrial accident board held that the 
accident which caused Mr. Draper's death did not arise out of and in 
the course of his employment. We quote from the brief of counsel 
as the best way to present the claimant's contention: 
"Did the accident arise 'in the course of' the employment? 
The answer to this question depends upon whether Mr. Draper was 
on his way from the hospitals to the campus to transact some matter 
of business there on his way home. If he was merely going home to 
dinner when killed, the accident would not be one in the course of 
his employment. But if he was intending to stop on the campus on a 
business errand and then go on home to dinner, the accident would 
be one in the course of his employment. We think the evidence shows 
that he had business on the campus to transact before going home, 
and that this evidence is undisputed and unimpeached. 
"Mr. Draper had been superintendent of the hospitals for eight 
years. Mrs. Draper testified that never during that time had Mr. 
Draper left the hospital as late as 5 o'clock in the afternoon to come 
home to dinner unless he had business to transact on the way. It was 
seldom that he came home for the evening meal, sometimes not more 
than once in two or three weeks. He took his evening meals at the 
hospital unless busin~ss called him to the campus or down town, and 
this was his 'universal practice.' * * * 
"It must be held, therefore, that a uniform custom to go home 
for his evening meal only when he had business to transact on the 
way, is conclusively shown by the evidence. 
"The campus was situated between the hospitals and the home 
of the deceased; so that he could easily transact any business he 
might have on the campus while on his way home. On the night when 
he was killed it appears that he called up his home about 5 o'clock 
and informed his family that he intended to come home for dinner. 
No plans or arrangements at home required his presence; for his 
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telephone call was the first intimation the family had that he would 
come home that night. Hence, if he followed his custom, he must 
have planned to go home for dinner because he had business to look 
after on the campus, and since he was killed when about to enter the 
campus from the direction of the hospitals, he must have been on his 
way to look after that business when killed. 
"Does the proof of a custom constitute prima facie evidence 
that an act was done pursuant to such custom? In other words, will 
evidence that deceased was accustomed to do a certain act be suffi-
cient to show prima facie that he did it? The cases are very clear that 
evidence of a custom is competent to show the doing of an act com-
ing within the custom" -citing cases. 
We think counsel is claiming more for the record than it will 
justify. 
Mrs. Draper was a witness. The following appeared in her testi-
mony: 
"Q. Did he ever come home to his noon or 6 o'clock meal? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. On what occasions? 
"A. If he was having business down town or over on the cam-
pus at the noon hour or 6 o'clock he would come home. 
"Q. Was that his universal practice as far as you know? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. Were there any days he came home to any of those meals 
unless he had business down town, at the bank, or at the campus 
that you know of? 
"A. When he was to a game, to a ball game. 
"Q. When he would be off duty in the afternoon, where would 
he have his meals? Would he come home? Suppose he had gone to a 
ball game? 
"A. He would have his meals at home unless there was some-
thing that he had to go back to the office for. 
"Q. Were there any other times when he came home to his 
meals other than when he had business at the campus or was down 
town? 
"A. Not that I know of." 
On the cross-examination she said: 
"Q. Was your husband in the habit of coming home every 
Saturday afternoon? 
"A. No, sir. 
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"Q. He was not obliged to work on Saturday afternoon? 
"A. Well, that depended on his work. If he had work to do, he 
would work. 
"Q. But usually he laid off Saturday afternoon to go to the ball 
games? 
"A. If there were games or he had business down town he 
would go away; aside from that he would stay at the office and 
work." 
She also said he did not attend the ball game on the afternoon 
when he was hurt. 
Miss Burlingame testified in part: 
"Q. Do you know where he had his 12 o'clock meal and his 6 
o'clock meal? 
"A. At psychopathic hospital. 
"Q. Always? 
"A. Not always. If called away, he went home to 6 o'clock din-
ner. During the football game season he would go home; also if he 
had business on the campus. Sometimes they called him from his 
residence, and then he would go home to the evening meal. 
"Q. When he had business that called him away from the hos-
pital and over to the campus, near his home, what was his custom? 
"A. He had his meals at psychopathic hospital if his work kept 
him there until meal time. * * * 
"Q. Where was he going that afternoon? 
"A. I think he was going home. He always took the same route 
going home as he did when he had business at the secretary's office 
or on the campus. 
"Q. Did he have business that day? 
"A. He was anxious to see President Hutchins and Secretary 
Smith, and they did not come while I was there. * * * 
"Q. If he had been going to see Secretary Smith or President 
Hutchins he would have taken this same route? 
"A. Yes." 
Miss Draper, a daughter of the deceased, was a witness. She tes-
tified in part: 
"Q. What was his custom in regard to taking meals at the hos-
pital? 
"A. He had only two meals at the hospital, the noon meal and 
the 6 o'clock meal. The only times he did not eat at the hospital was 
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when he came home, when he went on business to the campus, when 
he was called home, and when he might be attending some social en-
gagement in the afternoon. That afternoon I do not know whether 
he had business. 
"Q. What was his practice when he came home to meals? 
"A. His universal practice was to call up home when he was 
coming home to a meal. 
"By Mr. Cavanaugh: 
"Q. On Saturdays if he worked at the hospital he had supper 
there? If he left in the middle of the afternoon what was his custom? 
"A. I would say that the meals he had on Saturdays were about 
even at hospital and at home. He always took lunch at the hospital 
with the exceptions named." 
It was shown by the president and the secretary of the Univer-
sity that they had no engagement with Mr. Draper that afternoon, 
and it was not shown that he had any appointment with the treasurer, 
nor was it shown what the nature of business down town would be, 
whether the private business of Mr. Draper or official business. 
In McCoy v. Screw Co., 180 Mich., at page 458 (14 7 N. W., at 
page 573, L. R. A. 1916A, 323), it is said: 
"The burden of furnishing evidence from which the inference 
can be legitimately drawn that the injury arose 'out of and in the 
course of his employment' rests upon the claimant. Bryant v. Fissell, 
84 N. J. Law, 72 (86 Atl. 458); 3 Negligence & Compensation Cases 
Annotated, p. 585. Ruegg on Employers' Liability and Workmen's 
Compensation, p. 343, says: 
" 'If an inference favorable to the applicant can only be ar-
rived at by a guess the applicant fails. The same thing happens where 
two or more inferences equally consistent with the facts arise from 
them.'" 
In Hills v. Blair, 182 Mich., at page 25 (148 N. W., at page 245), 
it is said: 
"Under the provisions of this act only that employee is en-
titled to compensation who 'receives personal injuries arising out of 
and in the course of his employment.' It is to be borne in mind that 
the act does not provide insurance for the employed workman to 
compensate any other kind of accident or injury which may befall 
him. The language of the Michigan compensation law is adopted 
from the English and Scotch acts on the same subject, and, in 
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harmony with their interpretations, has been construed by this court, 
in Rayner v. Furniture Co., 180 Mich. 168 [146 N. W. 665, L. R. A. 
1916A, 22, Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 1916A, 386], as meaning that the 
words 'out of' refer to the origin, or cause of the accident, and the 
words 'in the course of' to the time, place and circumstances under 
which it occurred. 
"In Ayr Steam Shipping Co., Ltd., v. Lendrum, 6 B. W. C. C. 
326, involving a fatal accident attended with uncertainty as to de-
tails, the court said: 
" 'I think one may deduce from the decisions (1) that the bur-
den is always upon the applicant to prove that death resulted from 
an accident arising out of as well as in the course of the employment; 
(2) that such proof need not be direct, but may be by circumstantial 
evidence, but there must be facts from which an inference can be 
drawn, as distinguished from mere conjecture, surmise, or probabili-
ty; and (3) that an award by an arbiter cannot stand unless the facts 
found are such as to entitle him reasonably to infer his conclusion 
from them.' 
"It is contended by appellants that the facts proven here do 
not in reason support the inference of the board as to the manner in 
which deceased met his death, but, on the contrary, conclusively 
show that he was killed in an attempt to board or leave a moving 
train, precluding any award under the ruling in Pope v. Hill's Ply-
mouth Co., 5 B. W. C. C. 175, in which case a workman in a colliery 
going home to his dinner on the premises of his employer was killed 
in attempting to jump on a passing tram car. It is further urged as a 
defense that, if it cannot be said as a matter of law a finding of fact 
should have been made as appellants contend, it should at least be 
held that the proven facts are equally consistent with either one of 
the two alternatives, and no inferences can legitimately be drawn to 
support an award. 
"We are not prepared to hold that the findings of fact as to the 
manner of the accident are entirely without evidential support either 
direct or by inference. They are therefore to be taken as conclusive 
under the statute. Accepting them as such, do they sustain the con-
clusion of law that Hills' death arose out of and in the course of his 
employment? 
"It is well settled that the burden rests upon the one claiming 
compensation to show by competent testimony, direct or circum-
stantial, not only the fact of an injury, but that it occurred in con-
nection with the alleged employment, and both arose out of and 
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in the course of the service at which the injured party was em-
ployed." 
We cannot say as a matter of law that claimant met the burden 
of proof, and the findings of fact must therefore stand. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
STONE, OSTRANDER, BIRD, MOORE, STEERE, and 
BROOKE, JJ., concurred. FELLOWS, J., did not sit. 
Sittler v. Board of Control of the Michigan College of Mining 
and Technology 
333 Mich. 681, 683-88; 53 N W. 2d 681 ( 1952) 
NORTH, C. J. This is an appeal from an order dismissing plain-
tiff's suit entered in the Michigan court of claims. On December 13, 
1950, Edward V. Sittler, plaintiff and appellant herein, filed a veri-
fied petition stating a claim against the board of control of the 
Michigan college of mining and technology, a defendant and appellee 
herein. The claim was based on an alleged contract of employment 
as assistant professor of German for the school year September 19, 
1949, to June 10, 1950, at a salary of $4,000. Plaintiff alleged that 
this contract was executed by B. B. Bennett, who was head of the 
department of languages; that Professor Bennett had authority to 
make the contract on behalf of the board of control, and that the 
contract was also ratified by the board of control. The petition 
further alleged that plaintiff had performed his duties as assistant 
professor of German from September 19, 1949, to November 10, 
1949, at which time his employment was terminated without justi-
fication. Plaintiff claims damages of $3,186.60, this being the 
amount he would have received if his employment had not been 
terminated. The claimed contract which plaintiff relies upon for re-
covery is contained in a letter written to plaintiff by Professor Ben-
nett, dated September 12, 1949, the pertinent portions of which we 
quote: 
"This letter will confirm our telephone conversation of Sep-
tember 1Oth. 
"The position which you have accepted is an assistant profes-
sorship of German with a salary of $4,000 for the 3-term year 
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approximately 9 months. As I indicated Saturday raising the salary 
above the budgeted amount may make it impossible to grant you a 
salary increase for the 1950-1951 academic year. I believe it was our 
understanding that the appointment is for a 1-year period but will 
become a permanent one if both you and the administration of the 
college are quite satisfied at the end of the first year. * * * 
"I am enclosing a formal application blank which you may 
complete and return to me by mail. If you have available 2 small 
gloss prints of yourself, please send them along. I shall send to you 
within the next day or two copies of the texts that have been used in 
the German work. 
••perhaps some information concerning our payroll procedures 
would help you in your personal planning. You will go on our pay-
roll on September 19th. Our salary checks always have a 2-week lag. 
That means that you will receive your first salary check on October 
20th. Your checks thereafter you will receive at 2-week intervals. 
The college pays salary over a full calendar year. That means that 
you will continue to receive salary checks throughout the summer of 
1950. The details of the various deductions we can clarify after you 
arrive." 
Defendants point out that by the statute which sets up the 
board of control, the authority to enter into such contracts is vested 
in the board of control. The statute provides: 
"The government of the college of mining and technology, the 
conduct of its affairs, and the control of its property shall be vested 
in a board of 6 members, not less than 4 of whom shall be residents 
of the upper peninsula of the State of Michigan, who shall be known 
as the •board of control of the Michigan college of mining and tech-
nology.'" CL 1948, §390.352 (Stat Ann§ 15.1312). 
"As soon as the means in its hands will permit, without incur-
ring indebtedness, said board shall proceed to obtain a suitable loca-
tion, and lease or erect such buildings, and procure such furniture, 
apparatus, library, and implements, as may be necessary for the suc-
cessful operation of said school, and to appoint a principal, and such 
other teachers and assistants as the board may deem expedient, with 
salaries, to be paid from time to time, as it may agree, and to regulate 
their duties; but no agreement shall be valid whereby such board 
shall be prevented from discharging any one in their employ upon 2 
months previous notice.'' CL 1948, § 390.354 (Stat Ann §15.1314). 
This statute vests the authority to appoint or hire teachers in 
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statutory provision vesting in the board the power "to appoint a prin-
cipal, and such other teachers and assistants as the board may deem 
expedient, with salaries, to be paid from time to time, as it may agree, 
and to regulate their duties" should be construed as applicable only 
at the inception of the Michigan college of mining and technology, 
as provided in section 4 of "the original act in 1885" (Act No 70). It 
is sufficient to note that substantially the same words relating to the 
hiring of teachers, et cetera, were originally embodied in P A 1861, 
No 207, and again embodied in PA 1885, No 70. They are still a part 
of the statute which presently governs the conduct of the affairs of 
the Michigan college of mining and technology. 
Plaintiff asserts that the power to contract with teachers may 
be delegated, and in the instant case that it is at least a question 
of fact if such power were not delegated by the board of control to 
Professor Bennett. In asserting the board's right to delegate the pow-
er, which by statute is vested in the board, appellant cites People v. 
Fournier, 175 Mich 364 (Ann Cas 1915A, 1015). However we think 
the cited case is not in point. It involved only the right of delegating 
the power of passing upon the right to be licensed as a stationary 
engineer in the city of Saginaw, which was considered necessary to 
proper administration of the police power. But the instant case in-
volved the right by contract to bind the State in the operation of one 
of its educational institutions over a period of time and to expend 
public funds in greater or less amounts. Powers of the character 
vested by the above statutory provisions in a board of control of an 
educational institution maintained by the State cannot be delegated 
to some subordinate or representative. 
"The board of supervisors cannot delegate such powers as the 
law requires to be submitted to their corporate discretion and judg-
ment." People, ex rei. Chadwick, v. County Officers of St. Clair 
(syllabus), 15 Mich 85. 
"The statutory authority conferred upon boards of supervisors 
to regulate the bridging of navigable streams is a trust that must be 
executed by themselves; they cannot delegate it to others." Maxwell 
v. Bay City Bridge Co. (syllabus), 41 Mich 453. 
It follows that plaintiff did not possess a contract under which 
he could assert rights. Even the letter written by Professor Bennett 
does not purport on its face to be a contract. We are mindful that it 
appears in plaintiffs opposition to the motion to dismiss that on 
other occasions heads of departments have hired assistant teachers; 
but such usage or custom, if it ever prevailed, cannot be availed of to 
enlarge the statutory powers of the board of control so as to include 
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or justify acts which are unauthorized and contrary to the applicable 
statutory law. See annotations 65 ALR 811; which include Hoffa v. 
Saupe, 199 Iowa 515 {202 NW 234). 
"The extent of the authority of the people's public agents is 
measured' by the statute from which they derive their authority, not 
by their own acts and assumption of authority." Township of Lake 
v.Millar, 257 Mich 135, 142. 
See, also, Vincent v. Mecosta County Supervisors, 52 Mich 340; 
Schneider v. City of Ann Arbor, 195 Mich 599. 
In Roxborough v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 
309 Mich 505, we quoted with approval the following from 59 CJ, 
pp 172, 173: 
" 'Public officers have and can exercise only such powers as are 
conferred on them by law, and a State is not bound by contracts 
made in its behalf by its officers or agents without previous authority 
conferred by statute or the Constitution. * * * Nor is a State bound 
by an implied contract made by a State officer where such officer 
had no authority to make an express one. * * * 
" 'The powers of State officers being fixed by law, all persons 
dealing with such officers are charged with knowledge of the extent 
of their authority or power to bind the State, and are bound, at their 
peril, to ascertain whether the contemplated contract is within the 
power conferred.' " 
"Persons dealing with a municipal corporation through its of-
ficers must at their peril take notice of the authority of the particu-
lar officer to bind the corporation, and, if his act is beyond the lim-
its of his authority, the municipality is not bound." Rens v. City of 
Grand Rapids (syllabus), 73 Mich 237. 
"But the law holds those dealing with a municipal corporation 
to a knowledge of the extent of the authority conferred, and of the 
mode of its exercise, and of all illegalities committed by its agents in 
not pursuing the authority in the manner pointed out, and visits 
upon them the consequences of violating the law by refusing to en-
force such contract at their instance." McBrian v. City of Grand 
Rapids, 56 Mich 95, 108. 
Plaintiff did not have a contract with the board of control of 
the Michigan college of mining and technology, nor were the nego-
tiations between plaintiff and Professor Bennett such as to constitute 
a contract binding upon the defendants in the instant case. Because 
of an absolute lack of power vested in Professor Bennett to 
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consummate a contract with plaintiff which would be binding upon 
defendants, nothing appearing in this record would or could consti-
tute ratification of an alleged contract as asserted by appellant. While 
there are presented by the record some controverted issues of fact, 
nonetheless there are presented questions of law herein considered 
which are decisive of plaintiffs right to recover. We are of the opin-
ion that the trial judge correctly granted defendants' motion to dis-
miss. Mfirmed, with costs to appellees. 
DETHMERS, BUTZEL, CARR, BUSHNELL, SHARPE, 
BOYLES, and REID, JJ., concurred. 
3. OATH OF COLLEGE FACULTY 
P.A. 1935, No. 23, Imd. Eff. Apri119 
AN ACT to require all teachers, instructors and professors 
in educational institutions, junior colleges, colleges and univer-
sities to take and subscribe an oath or affirmation to support 
the constitution of the United States and the constitution of 
the state of Michigan, to provide the manner for the taking of 
such oath or affirmation, and to repeal all acts or parts of acts 
in conflict with the provisions of this act. As amended P.A. 
1939, No. 55, Eff. Sept. 29. 
The People of the State of Michigan enact: 
388.401 Oath of members of college faculty; filing 
Sec. 1. From and after September 1, 1935, it shall be unlawful 
for any citizen of the United States to serve as a teacher, instructor 
or professor in any state educational institution or any educational in-
stitution supported in whole or in part by public funds, or in any 
junior college, college or university of this state or any junior college, 
college or university whose property, or any part thereof, is exempt 
from taxation unless and until he or she shall have taken and sub-
scribed the following oath or affirmation: 
"I do solemnly swear (or afftrm) that I will support the consti-
tution of the United States of America and the constitution of the 
state of Michigan, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of 
my position, according to the best of my ability." 
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The oath required by this section shall be notarized and trans-
mitted to the superintendent of public instruction, who shall me it in 
his office, where it shall be subject to public inspection. It shall be 
unlawful for an officer, person or board having control of the em-
ployment, dismissal or suspension of teachers, instructors or profes-
sors in any such educational institution, junior college, college or 
university to permit a person to serve in any such capacity therein in 
violation of the provisions of this section. This section shall not be 
construed to require a person to take such oath more than once dur-
ing the time he or she is employed in the educational institutions in 
this state, though there be a change in the title or duties of the posi-
tion: Provided, however, That this requirement shall not be con-
strued as prohibiting such officer, person or board from employing 
for limited periods instructors or lecturers who are citizens of foreign 
countries. 
Constitution 
Art. 11, § 1, provides: "All officers, legislative, executive and 
judicial, before entering upon the duties of their respective offices, 
shall take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation: I do sol-
emnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the Constitution of the 
United States and the constitution of this state, and that I will faith-
fully discharge the duties of the office of . . . according to the best 
of my ability. No other oath, affirmation, or any religious test shall 
be required as a qualification for any office or public trust." 
388.402 Same; unlawful employment, penalties 
Sec. 2. Any educational institution, junior college, college or 
university which shall employ any such person in violation of the 
terms of this act shall, during the continuance of such unlawful em-
ployment. 
(a) If such be an institution supported wholly or in part by 
state funds, not receive any state moneys for any purpose whatso-
ever. 
(b) If such institution be a private, charitable and/or denomi-
national college or university whose property, or any part thereof, is 
exempt from taxation, immediately forfeit all right to such tax 
exemption. 
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4. OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
In his opinions concerning the faculty and employees of 
state universities, the Attorney General has affirmed the princi-
ple that salaries and terms of employment are to be determined 
by the governing boards. The first ruling on this subject was in 
the year 1907. At that time the Attorney General ruled that a 
statute whose terms applied to salaries at all state institutions 
did not apply to the University of Michigan. 1 Again, in 193 7 
the Attorney General construed the intent of the legislature as 
excluding the University of Michigan and the then Michigan 
State College-although not excluding the state teachers and 
normal colleges which at that time did not have constitutional 
status-from the coverage of the Civil Service Act. 2 
The determinative effect of constitutional status on these 
opinions is also illustrated by an opinion issued in 1905, before 
Michigan State achieved constitutional autonomy, which held 
that the college could not reimburse professors for travel ex-
penses. 3 The same issue was litigated in the case of the Board of 
Regents of the University of Michigan v. Auditor General in 
which the court decided that reimbursement of members of the 
faculty for travel expenses was a decision for the Board of Re-
gents, not the Auditor General. See Chapter III. 
Other opinions of the Attorney General have made the fol-
lowing rulings: veterans' preference laws do not apply to the 
university;4 the governing boards may expend university funds 
to pay for all, or part of, the premiums for group health and life 
insurance;5 employees of state universities may, by complying 
with the conditions of the statute, become or remain members 
of the State Employees Retirement System;6 a University of 
Michigan janitor is a state employee under a statute making state 
employees ineligible for welfare payments from the county;7 
students employed part-time by state universities are not covered 
by the minimum wage provisions of the Federal Fair Labor 
Standards Act;8 and, under a prior law, university employees 
did not have to pay federal income tax. 9 
Labor relations between the University of Michigan and 
trade unions representing employees are the subject of litigation 
at the time this book is being written. The amended Hutchinson 
Act, in general, provides state employees with most of the same 
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rights as those enjoyed by private employees under the National 
Labor Relations Act. The chief exception is the explicit prohi-
bition of public employee strikes, but the prohibition has not 
deterred all such strikes. The State Labor Mediation Board under 
the statute is assigned the functions of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board under the federal act. The University, in the course 
of the current litigation, contends that the board labor relations 
powers delegated to the Mediation Board by the amended 
Hutchinson Act interfere with the constitutional power of the 
Board of Regents over the general supervision of the University 
and the control and direction of expenditures from its funds. 
See Chapter III. 
Before these issues had arisen, however, the Attorney Gen-
eral had made the following rulings concerning labor relations at 
the state universities. The Board of Regents, under its constitu-
tional authority, could deduct union dues from the employee's 
paycheck.10 The State Board of Agriculture, the old name for 
the governing board at Michigan State University, was informed 
that it could discuss conditions of employment with a labor 
union, but that since any strike against the University would be 
illegal, the University could not enter into a formal collective 
bargaining agreement. 11 Before amendment of the Hutchinson 
Act in 1965, the Attorney General ruled that the act did not ap-
ply to the University of Michigan, but, on policy grounds, he ad-
vised the University to comply with the general terms of the 
act. 12 
FOOTNOTES 
Section 1 - Introduction 
1. Chapter V, Bylaws of the Board of Regents, The University of Michigan. 
Section 4- Opinions of Attorney General 
1. 1908 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 95. 
2. 1937-38 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 382. 
3. 1905 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 85. 
4. 1930-32 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 475. 
FACULTY AND EMPLOYEES 323 
5. 1961-62 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 194. 
6. 1951-52 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 234; 1955-56 [vol. 2] Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 127. 
7. 1945-46 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 291. 
8. Unpublished opinion, No. 3022, dated June 12, 1957. 
9. 1913-14 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 543. 
10. 1959-60 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. [vol. 2] 111. 
11. Unpublished opinion, No. 05115, dated October 14, 1946. 
12. 1951-52 Mich. Op. Att'y. Gen. 63. 
CHAPTER XI 
STUDENTS 
l. INTRODUCTION 
The three cases in this chapter have widely varied facts. The 
first case, Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, is a classic 
civil rights case. A private, profit-making school had admitted a 
Negro student, but after encountering objections to his presence 
from other students, the school refused to allow him to com-
plete his course of study. The court recognized an implied con-
tract made on the admission of students by the college that stu-
dents would not be arbitrarily dismissed; but it refused to 
enforce this right by mandamus. 
The case of Tanton v. McKenney involved a young lady at-
tending Michigan State Normal College in the 1920's. She was 
refused re-admittance to the school because of her addiction to 
smoking cigarettes in public and riding around town in an auto-
mobile on the lap of a young man. She was given a hearing and 
was reprimanded for her acts by the school authorities. The 
court agreed that such behavior was not appropriate for a future 
teacher, and it denied her relief. 
In a relatively recent case, In re Johnston, suit was brought 
by a medical student to compel the University of Michigan to 
grant him a medical degree. He argued that the University could 
not require him to pass a nationally administered examination 
because such a requirement would be an invalid delegation of 
power to the national testing organization. The court did not 
agree. 
Three law students at the University of Michigan have re-
cently filed suit in the federal district court to challenge the 
validity of University regulations. The suit alleges that the plain-
tiffs have been denied the equal protection of the laws because 
they are classified as non-residents for tuition purposes but as 
residents for purposes of the state income tax. 
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James A. Perkins, president of Cornell University, recently 
outlined legal problems in the area of university and student re-
lationships and contrasted past concepts with emerging doctrine. 
His address was given in Boston, Massachusetts on December 8, 
1967 at the Annual Meeting of the New England Association of 
Colleges and Secondary Schools. It was published by the Ameri-
can Council of Education and was reprinted in A.G.B. Reports, 
Vol. I 0, No. 6, March 1968. This is a publication of the Associ-
ation of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges which 
has its principal office in Washington, D.C. 
2. JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College 
156 Mich. 95, 96-97, 98-101; 120 N.W. 589 (1909) 
OSTRANDER, J. The respondent is an institution incorporated 
under chapter 218, 2 Comp. Laws. Its purposes, expressed in its arti-
cles of association, are to establish and operate a college for teaching 
medicine and surgery, chemistry, dentistry, veterinary medicine and 
surgery, and horseshoeing, and to grant degrees and issue diplomas in 
various departments of the college in conformity with law, etc. Its 
rules and prospectuses do not distinguish or specify, except by age, 
character, and educational qualifications, the persons to whom in-
struction will be given. It has capital stock, is conducted for private 
gain, and is supported by tuition fees paid by students. Relators are 
citizens, respectively, of the States of Kansas and of Michigan, who 
attended the college in the department of veterinary medicine and 
surgery for one-the freshman-year, and were refused admission 
therein the second year for the sole reason that they were negroes. 
They applied to the circuit court for the county of Kent for a writ of 
mandamus to compel the respondent to admit them as students in 
the college. An order to show cause was entered and an answer to 
relators' petition was filed. Thereupon 30 issues of fact were pro-
posed by relators, and an order was made that issues be framed as 
proposed, and that they be submitted to the court for determination. 
A hearing was had, a large amount of testimony was taken, and the 
writ was issued. The respondent sued out a writ of certiorari, the 
affidavit for the writ setting out the petition, the answer, the testi-
mony, verbatim or by way of recital, the issues of fact which were 
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proposed by relators, and the reasons relied upon for a reversal of 
the order granting the writ. The return to the writ is, like the affi-
davit, voluminous, and sets out in full the testimony produced at 
the hearing. It does not appear in what manner the court determined 
any of the issues of fact, and the reasons given for the conclusion 
which was reached are not found in the record. In certiorari proceed-
ings this court considers questions of law only, and such questions of 
law as are supposed to be presented in the particular case must be 
raised in the affidavit for the writ. 
* * * 
While relators do contend that the facts set out in the petition 
and supported by testimony establish contract relations between the 
parties, they also assert that the statute imposes a duty, public in its 
nature, upon the institution incorporated thereunder, to receive 
them, to compel the performance of which duty the writ of manda-
mus is appropriate. In the absence of fmdings, we have examined the 
record for evidence which will sustain the order of the court below. 
It is plain that respondent is organized for the very purpose of giving 
the instruction sought for by relators. The course of study adopted 
cannot be fmished in one year. The statute requires at least two 
years' study before candidates may be given a diploma. In fact, the 
course is one of three years. It is empowered to grant diplomas and 
degrees to students who fmish the course. The course of study 
adopted is not pursued by students who attend the college for the 
sole purpose of gaining instruction, but for the further purpose of 
securing, at the end of the course, the diploma and degree which re-
spondent is empowered to confer. By the laws of this and of other 
States the diploma confers upon the possessor the right to a license 
to practice the adopted profession. It is expressly provided in the act 
that diplomas granted by the trustees shall entitle the possessor to all 
the immunities which by usage or statute are allowed to possessors of 
similar diplomas granted by any similar institution in the United 
States. 2 Comp. laws, § 8143. Relators matriculated, attended the 
college for one year, and have the standing necessary to continue the 
course. They are obnoxious to no rule of the institution. There is 
testimony tending to prove that during the year relators attended 
college one and perhaps more than one student withdrew because 
colored men were admitted, and that a considerable number of stu-
dents threaten to withdraw if they are now allowed to attend. 
The statute imposes no general public duty upon respondent 
to admit as students any and all citizens to its capacity. There is no 
specific duty imposed by law to admit relators. It seems clear that 
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private institutions of learning, though incorporated, may select 
those whom it will receive, and may discriminate by sex, age, profi-
ciency in learning, and otherwise. Probably no reason need be given 
for refusing in the first instance to admit any student. Relators have 
been denied no privilege or immunity resting in positive law protected 
or guaranteed by the Federal or the State Constitution. Such rights 
as they have grow out of the relations they have established with re-
spondent, and are no other or different than those of any citizen who 
has established like relations with a similar institution. These rela-
tions, while in some respects peculiar, are, in fact, easily classified. 
There is no agreement by the terms of which respondent undertakes 
to bestow and they to receive and to pay for a three years' course of 
study upon the conditions which the rules of the institution impose. 
Relators are at liberty to terminate all relations at any time. It does 
not follow that respondent has the same right. In fact, when one is 
admitted to a college, there is an implied understanding that he shall 
not be arbitrarily dismissed therefrom. The required fees may be 
paid annually, and may be no more than fair fees for the advantages 
received by the student during the year, and yet it is clear that the 
fees for the first year are, in fact, paid and received with the under-
standing that the work of the year will not be made fruitless, a grad-
uation and a degree made impossible, by an arbitrary refusal to per-
mit further attendance. In this understanding there is no want of 
mutuality. There is no want of good and valuable consideration. 
There is written evidence of it in the articles of association and the 
prospectuses of respondent and in the rolls of the college in which 
relators' names are entered as matriculates. There is no good reason 
why the law should not recognize, as growing out of these relations, 
a right of relators resting in contract to be continued as students by 
the respondent. 
It is the general rule that mandamus does not lie to compel a 
private corporation to perform its obligations resting in contract with 
an individual. We are referred to no decision of this court recognizing 
any other rule. A case in which the rule was enforced by denying the 
writ to one who had completed a course in an incorporated college 
and had been refused a diploma is State, ex rel Burg., v. Milwaukee 
Medical College, 128 Wis. 7 (3 L. R. A. [N. S.] 1115). In the opinion 
in that case and in the motion for a rehearing many authorities are 
cited, among them Qarke v. Hill, 132 Mich. 434. The writ was held 
to be the only adequate remedy in Baltimore University v. Colton, 
98 Md. 623 (64 L. R. A.l08), and in People, ex rei. Cecil, v. Bellevue 
Hospital Medical College, 60 Hun (N. Y.), 107, 128 N. Y. 621. It 
cannot be said that relators are members of an incorporated society, 
and have been wrongfully deprived of the privileges of members, 
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which is the ground of decision in Baltimore University v. Colton, 
supra. It may be said, perhaps, that the New York decision is rested 
upon the notion that relator had acquired a status, evidence of which, 
in the form of a degree, was arbitrarily refused. The court of appeals 
delivered np opinion. If mere expedition in securing some remedy is 
to be made the test, it may be said there is no other adequate remedy 
for relators. And, if enforcement of the obligations of private cor-
porations by mandamus is to be entered upon by the courts, we 
know of no rule by which it can be determined in what cases the 
writ should be refused. The apparent hardship of a particular situa-
tion is not a good reason for departing from the rule. 
The order gra~ting the writ is reversed, with costs to plaintiff 
in certiorari. 
GRANT, MOORE, BROOKE, and McALVAY, JJ., concurred. 
Tanton v. McKenney 
226 Mich. 245, 246-53; 197 N.W. 510 (1924) 
FELLOWS, J. The plaintiff, Alice Tanton, a young lady 18 
years old, attended the Michigan State Normal College at Ypsilanti 
during the fall term 1921 and the winter term 1922. She was refused 
readmission for the spring term 1922. The refusal was based on an 
investigation of plaintiffs conduct made by defendant Bessie Leach 
Priddy, dean of women of the institution, and was approved by the 
president, defendant Charles McKenney. Before taking such action 
Mrs. Priddy called plaintiff in, fully apprised her of the information 
which had come to her as dean of women, and gave her ample op-
portunity to explain her conduct. Shortly thereafter plaintiff insti-
tuted mandamus proceedings in the Washtenaw circuit court to 
compel her reinstatement. Issues were framed and a trial had at 
which considerable testimony was taken. The trial judge found the 
facts to be with the defendants; that plaintiff had become addicted 
to the smoking of cigarettes before coming to the institution and 
continued their use there; that she smoked cigarettes on the public 
streets of Ypsilanti; that she rode around the streets of Ypsilanti in 
an automobile seated on the lap of a young man and was guilty of 
other acts of indiscretion; and that she aired her grievances and her 
defiance of disciplinary measures in the public press which tended 
to prevent her return to the institution and the maintenance of 
discipline there. He found as matter of law that defendants had 
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acted within their power and that there had been no abuse of discre-
tion, and denied the writ. This action is here reviewed on certiorari. 
We may on certiorari examine the record to determine whether 
there is any testimony to support the findings but not to weigh such 
testimony. An examination of the record before us discloses an 
abundance of testimony to sustain the fmdings in the instant case. 
Indeed plaintiffs own testimony sustains them although she seeks to 
minimize her acts. 
Preliminary to the consideration of the main questions plain-
tiffs counsel insists that there was error in the rejection of certain 
testimony offered by him. He apparently sought to show that some 
of the male students and professors at the University smoked. This 
testimony was rejected by the trial judge and correctly rejected. The 
rules of discipline at the University might be entirely inappropriate 
for an institution having as students over 1,400 girls of tender years. 
This brings us to the meritorious questions of whether defendants 
have the power here exercised and whether there has been an abuse 
of such power. 
As is well known, the Michigan State Normal College is main-
tained at the expense of the taxpayers to prepare teachers for our 
public schools. The student body is made up almost entirely of 
young women who have chosen teaching as their profession. They 
are required to sign a "declaration of intention" couched in the fol-
lowing language: 
"We, the subscribers, do hereby declare that it is our intention 
to devote ourselves to the business of teaching in the schools of this 
State, and that our sole object in resorting to this normal school is 
the better to prepare ourselves for the discharge of this important 
duty." 
Inherently the managing officers have the power to maintain 
such discipline as will effectuate the purposes of the institution. 
Their powers are somewhat analogous to the powers of school boards 
in our country schools and boards of education in our cities. In the 
consideration of their powers we must also bear in mind that the 
students at our normal schools are being fitted for a profession re-
quiring the highest standard of personal conduct. The right to attend 
our public schools is beyond question. That such right is tempered 
by, and subject to, proper regulations in the furtherance of discipline 
is likewise beyond question. That in the absence of an abuse of dis-
cretion the school authorities and not the courts shall prescribe prop-
er disciplinary measures is, we think, settled by the textwriters and 
the adjudicated cases. 
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A few excerpts from the article on "Schools" in Ruling Case 
Law will be helpful in determining the rule to be adopted. We quote 
the following: 
"There is no necessity that all the rules, orders and regulations 
for the discipline, government and management of the schools shall 
be made a matter of record by the school board, or that every act, 
order or direction affecting the conduct of such schools shall be 
authorized or confirmed by a formal vote. It is recognized that no 
system of rules however carefully prepared can provide for every 
emergency, or meet every requirement. In consequence, much must 
necessarily be left to the individual members of the school boards, 
and to the superintendents of and the teachers in the several schools. 
It follows that any reasonable ru1e adopted by a superintendent, or a 
teacher merely, not inconsistent with some statute or some other ru1e 
prescribed by higher authority, is binding on the pupils." 24 R C. L. 
p. 574. 
"Control by Courts. The courts will not interfere with the ex-
ercise of discretion by school directors in matters confided by law to 
their judgment, unless there is a clear abuse of the discretion, or a 
violation of law. So the courts are usually disinclined to interfere 
with regu1ations adopted by school boards, and they will not con-
sider whether the regu1ations are wise or expedient, but merely 
whether they are a reasonable exercise of the power and discretion 
of the board. Acting reasonably within the powers conferred, it is 
the province of the board of education to determine what things are 
detrimental to the successfu1 management, good order, and discipline 
of the schools and the rules required to produce these conditions. 
The presumption is always in favor of the reasonableness and pro-
priety of a ru1e or regu1ation du1y made. The reasonableness of regu-
lations is a question oflaw for the courts." 24 R. C. L. p. 575. 
"Suspension or Expulsion by Directors. The enjoyment of the 
right of attending the public schools is necessarily conditioned on 
compliance by pupils with the reasonable rules, regu1ations, and re-
quirements of the school authorities, breaches of which may be 
punished by suspension or expu1sion. Ordinarily the school authori-
ties have the right to define the offenses for which the punishment 
of exclusion from school may be imposed, and to determine whether 
the offense has been committed, the limitation on this authority 
being that it must in both respects be reasonably exercised. The 
power of expu1sion given to the directors is not limited to cases of 
infraction of such rules as they may have therefore adopted, but 
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extends to cases where they may have become satisfied that the in-
terests of the school require the expulsion of a pupil on account of 
his gross misbehavior, and the discretion vested in school authorities 
in this respect is very broad, but they will not be permitted to be 
arbitrary. In the school, as in the family, there exists on the part of 
the pupils the obligation of obedience to lawful commands, subordi-
nation and civil deportment, respect for the rights of others, and 
fidelity to duty. These obligations are inherent in any proper school 
system, and constitute, so to speak, the common law of the school. 
Every pupil is presumed to know this law, and is subject to it, 
whether it has or has not been re-enacted by the district board in the 
form of written rules and regulations." 24 R. C. L. p. 646. 
In State, ex rel. Dresser, v. District Board, 135 Wis. 619 (116 
N. W. 232, 16 L. R. A. [N. S.] 730, 128 Am. St. Rep. 1050), it was 
said: 
"It is clear, therefore, that a rule might have been adopted by 
the school authorities to meet the situation here presented. This 
court in the quotation already made from the opinion in the Burpee 
Case recognizes certain obligations on the part of the pupil which 
are inherent in any proper school system, and which constitute the 
common law of the school, and which may be enforced without the 
adoption in advance of any rules upon the subject. 
"This court therefore holds that the school authorities have 
the power to suspend a pupil for an offense committed outside of 
school hours and not in the presence of the teacher which has a di-
rect and immediate tendency to influence the conduct of other 
pupils while in the school room, to set at naught the proper discipline 
of the school, to impair the authority of the teachers, and to bring 
them into ridicule and contempt. Such power is essential to the 
preservation of order, decency, decorum, and good government in 
the public schools." 
And in Wilson v. Board of Education, 233 ill. 464 (84 N. E. 
697, 15 L. R. A. [N. S.] 1136, 13 Ann. Cas. 330), it was said: 
"The power of the board of education to control and manage 
the schools and to adopt rules and regulations necessary for that pur-
pose is ample and full. The rules and by-laws necessary to a proper 
conduct and management of the schools are, and must necessarily 
be, left to the discretion of the board, and its acts will not be inter-
fered with nor set aside by the courts unless there is a clear abuse of 
the power and discretion conferred. Acting reasonably within the 
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powers conferred, it is the province of the board of education to de-
termine what things are detrimental to the successful management, 
good order and discipline of the schools and the rules required to 
produce these conditions." 
Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247 (250 S. W. 538), cited by 
plaintiffs c.ounsel on another point, is to the same effect. In that case 
the petitioner had been expelled for violating a rule against the use of 
cosmetics. In denying the writ of mandamus to compel her reinstate-
ment it was said: 
"The question, therefore, is not whether we approve this rule 
as one we would have made as directors of the district, nor are we 
required to find whether it was essential to the maintenance of dis-
cipline. On the contrary, we must uphold the rule unless we find that 
the directors have clearly abused their discretion, and that the rule is 
not one reasonably calculated to effect the purpose intended, that is, 
of promoting discipline in the school; and we do not so find. * * * 
"Courts have other and more important functions to perform 
than that of hearing the complaints of disaffected pupils of the 
public schools against rules and regulations promulgated by the 
school boards for the government of the schools. The courts have 
this right of review, for the reasonableness of such rule is a judicial 
question, and the courts will not refuse to perform their functions in 
determining the reasonableness of such rules, when the question is 
presented. But, in doing so, it will be kept in mind that the directors 
are elected by the patrons of the schools over which they preside, 
and the election occurs annually. These directors are in close and in-
timate touch with the affairs of their respective districts, and know 
the conditions with which they have to deal. It will be remembered 
also that respect for constituted authority and obedience thereto is 
an essential lesson to qualify one for the duties of citizenship, and 
that the schoolroom is an appropriate place to teach that lesson; so 
that the courts hesitate to substitute their will and judgment for 
that of the school boards which are delegated by law as the agencies 
to prescribe rules for the government of the public schools of the 
State, which are supported at the public expense." 
In the recent case of Finch v. School District, 225 Mich. 674, 
this court having before it the fmality of the decision of the school 
board finding the teacher guilty of gross immorality, speaking 
through the present Chief Justice, said: 
"The school board, a deliberative public body in the exercise 
of a right, here reserved by contract, went to a hearing, quasi-judicial 
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in character, and, having grounds to sustain its fmding, found that 
plaintiff had been guilty of gross immorality and dismissed him. 
Surely, the school district may not be required to accept the finding 
of a jury upon this question rather than the finding of its school 
board. If such finding by the school board may be reviewed and re-
versed by a jury, the government of our schools may be impaired and 
the position of school boards in dealing with such cases will be pre-
carious indeed. Such fmding and determination of the board are 
conclusive unless the board acted corruptly, in bad faith, or in clear 
abuse of its powers." 
See, also, Covington Board of Education v. Booth, 110 Ky. 807 
(62 S. W. 872, 53 L. R A. 181);Hysongv. School District, 164 Pa. 
St. 629 (30 Atl. 482, 26 L. R A. 203, 44 Am. St. Rep. 632); O'Con-
nor v. Hendrick, 184 N.Y. 421 (77 N. E. 612, 7 L. R A. [N. S.] 
402, 6 Ann. Cas. 43 2); State, ex rel. Andrew, v. Webber, 108 Ind. 31 
(8 N. E. 708, 58 Am. Rep. 30); Kinzer v. School District, 129 Iowa, 
441 (105 N. W. 686, 3 L. R A. [N. S.] 496, 6 Ann. Cas. 996); Crey-
hon v. Board of Education, 99 Kan. 824 (163 Pac. 145, L. R A. 
1917C, 993);McCormick v. Burt, 95 m. 263 (35 Am. Rep. 163). 
The contention of plaintiffs counsel that she was expelled 
without a hearing is not supported by the record, which established 
the contrary. Upon the question of how formal the hearing must be, 
see Vermillion v. State, 78 Neb. 107, 110 (110 N. W. 736, 15 Ann. 
Cas. 401). 
This record affirmatively establishes as found by the trial judge 
that there has been no abuse of discretion, no arbitrary action on 
the part of the defendants or either of them. The dean of women, 
Mrs. Priddy, who primarily had the matter in charge, showed every 
consideration for this plaintiff and displayed a motherly interest in 
her. She urged upon plaintiffs older sister the imperative necessity 
of getting plaintiff out of the rut she was traveling in and proffered 
her assistance and aid. Instead of accepting, plaintiff after consulting 
her older sister proceeded to air her defiance of discipline in the 
public press. This of itself was sufficient grounds for refusing her re-
admission. Wayland v. Hughes, 43 Wash. 441 (86 Pac. 642,7 L. R. A. 
[N. S.] 352). Instead of condemning Mrs. Priddy she should be com-
mended for upholding some old-fashioned ideals of young woman-
hood. 
The writ of certiorari will be dismissed and the judgment of 
the circuit court of Washtenaw county denying the writ of manda-
mus will be affirmed. 
CLARK, C. J., and McDONALD, BIRD, SHARPE, MOORE, 
STEERE, and WIEST, JJ., concurred. 
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In re Johnston 
365 Mich. 509, 509-10; 114 N.W. 2d 255 (1962) 
SOURIS, J. Some time after plaintiff entered the medical 
school of the University of Michigan, all senior students were re-
quired to take an examination sponsored by a national board of med-
ical examiners. Upon failing portions of that examination, which 
plaintiff took in April of 1958, he was required to submit himself for 
comprehensive oral examinations by the faculty in each of the sub-
jects he failed on the national board examination. Again, he failed at 
least 1, and possibly 2, of the subjects on which he was orally ex-
amined. For these reasons, the plaintiff was not awarded his medical 
degree in June of 1958 and, without that degree, could not take the 
State board examination for license to practice medicine in Michigan 
which he had been scheduled to take on June 9, 10, and 11, 1958. 
Plaintiff seeks our writ of mandamus to compel defendants to 
confer upon him a medical degree and to give plaintiff the State 
board examination for license to practice medicine. 
I concur in dismissal of this petition for want of merit in plain-
tiffs claims that he was deprived of a contractual right and that the 
defendants unlawfully delegated their powers to a national board of 
medical examiners. I would also award costs to the defendants. 
DETHMERS, C. J., and CARR, KELLY, BLACK, KAVA-
NAGH, and OTIS M. SMITH, JJ ., concurred 
ADAMS, J ., took no part in the decision of this case. 
3. OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Tuition and fees charged by state universities have been 
the subject of several opinions of the Attorney General. Accord-
ing to statutes still on the books the University may not cl:arge 
tuition to residents of the state in general, or, to residents who 
are the children of war veterans. 1 The Attorney General has, on 
different occasions, ruled that both statutes are unconstitution-
al.2 Insofar as the Board of Regents itself creates a different tui-
tion scale for residents and nonresidents, the Attorney General 
has ruled that it is the function of the board to adopt regula-
tions defining "residents."3 
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College fraternities have also raised questions which have 
been ruled on by the Attorney General. In answer to an inquiry 
from Michigan State University which seems to have been con-
sidering the outlawing of fraternities on its campus, the Attorney 
General considered several out-of-state cases which had pro-
tected college fraternities from arbitrary actions by the college 
authorities.4 Over the years, however, Michigan State seems to 
have changed its plans for fraternities, and asked the Attorney 
General whether it could assist the fraternities in building houses 
on the campus. The Attorney General vetoed this plan on the 
grounds that it would be extending the credit of the state to a 
private association in violation of the provisions of the Michigan 
Constitution. 5 Very recently, it was reported that the Attorney 
General again was presented with an issue concerning college 
fraternities. This time, he ruled that it is illegal for college fra-
ternities to discriminate against persons because of their race. 6 
In miscellaneous matters which have involved students, the 
Attorney General has issued the following rulings: state univer-
sities have the authority to accept funds to be used for student 
loans;7 a private college is not responsible for the debts of its 
students;8 a statute which would have exempted student mem-
bers of the National Guard from the requirement of Reserve Of-
ficers Training Corps is not valid ;9 a state college does have the 
authority to regulate off-campus housing of its students. 10 
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2. Unpublished opinion, No. M-541, dated June 3, 1959; 1937-38 Mich. Op. Att'y. 
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APPENDIX I 
CASES IN THE WASHTENAW CIRCUIT COURT 
INVOLVING THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
Since the University's founding in 1817, its governing board 
has had the authority to sue and to be sued. The University was 
moved from Detroit to Ann Arbor in 1837 and activated in 
1841, and, since then, the Circuit Court for Washtenaw County 
has served as the forum for many suits by and against the Uni-
versity. However, the Glass and Fox cases discussed in Chapter 
VII may indicate that hereafter the Court of Claims, and not the 
Circuit Court, will have exclusive jurisdiction over certain suits 
against the University. 
The Supreme Court cases included in this book reveal some 
of the cases originally filed in the Circuit Court; but not all such 
cases have been appealed to the Supreme Court. To discover 
what kinds of cases were filed in the Circuit Court, but not ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court, the Circuit Court records were ex-
amined in the Washtenaw County Courthouse. 
It is much harder to extract information from trial court 
records than from the opinions of judges in appellate court re-
ports for several reasons. In many cases, the records are simply 
incomplete. Often, it is impossible to determine the ultimate 
disposition of the case. In other cases, orders of dismissal en-
tered on stipulation apparently indicate settlements, but there 
is no way to discover the reasons for or the terms of the settle-
ments. There is still another limitation on the use of trial court 
records. The pleadings contain merely the unsubstantiated 
charges made by the parties which may not have been proven. 
Modern rules of procedure, in fact, permit these pleadings to be 
amended at almost any time. 
Nevertheless, with all their limitations, it may be useful to 
review the records of these cases. 1 In all, 44 cases were found in 
the records of the Circuit Court excluding those ultimately de-
cided by the Supreme Court. In 17, the University was the 
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plaintiff, and three of these were condemnation cases in which 
the state was the nominal plaintiff. In 27 cases the University 
was the defendant. 
The 17 cases brought by the University as a plaintiff may 
be broken down into the following categories: Four suits to 
quiet title to land; three actions to condemn land for University 
use; two mortgage foreclosures; three suits based upon promis-
sory notes, two of which were given in consideration of hospital 
services; three suits for the payment of goods and services; one 
rather vague suit for "damages in assumpsit"; and one suit for 
an injunction. 
The 1907 suit for an injunction is probably the most inter-
esting case in this series. According to the pleadings in this case, 
the University sought the injunction against a publisher who was 
advertising a series of lecture notes for courses offered in the 
Law School. Since the Law School had recently discarded the 
lecture method and had adopted the case method, the University 
alleged that the advertising of lecture notes had damaged its 
reputation; and that their sale to students would result in the 
purchasers receiving an inferior education, also that class attend-
ance would be discouraged. Attached to the bill of complaint is 
a Law School catalogue describing the courses then offered and 
the names of the members of the law faculty. Typically enough, 
the case apparently was settled out of court, and it was dis-
missed on stipulation. 
The 27 cases brought against the University are even more 
varied. Seven cases are for alleged malpractice at the University 
Hospital. There are also another five personal-injury cases filed 
against the University: two of which involved University-owned 
automobiles; one a University bus; the fourth, a University ele-
mentary school pupil allegedly injured while moving a piano 
under the direction of a teacher; and the fifth, involving a dental 
patient who fell down two steps which she alleged were located 
"in an area where a reasonably prudent person would not antici-
pate their presence." One case involved property damage to an 
automobile at a carport under construction, and three cases con-
tain such vague allegations as "trespass," "negligence," "breach 
of contract," "breach of warranty," and a "claim for $36,000." 
In five cases it was claimed that the University owed money un-
der contracts for railroad freight, for the repayment of certain 
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money under dispute in the famous Rose2 case of the 1870's, 
for electricity and for construction services at University-owned 
Willow Run Airport, and for a raccoon coat checked at the 
Michigan Union. There were three suits filed during the depres-
sion under the State Moritorium Act extending the time for re-
demption under mortgage foreclosure proceedings. One suit, 
apparently contemporaneous with Weinberg, 3 was instituted by 
a supplier of an insolvent subcontractor for the construction of 
University Hospital which had not been required by the Univer-
sity to furnish a bond. A more recent case was filed by the own-
er of a cemetery lot protesting the cemetery company's sale of 
most of its land to the University. And, finally, a father won an 
injunction against the University and his divorced wife forbid-
ding the University Hospital to release a child to the wife who 
had lost legal custody by the divorce decree. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. One pending case is entitled The Regents of the University of Michigan v. The La· 
bor Mediation Board and is discussed in Chapter III. 
2. See p. 294, supra. 
3. Seep. 57, supra. 
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BYLAWS & REGULATIONS OF THE UNIVERSITY 
The University of Michigan now conducts its affairs on 
campuses in Ann Arbor, Flint and Dearborn. It instructs over 
37,500 students. It employs thousands of teachers of different 
academic rank and thousands of employees. It has a huge payroll 
and the entire 1968-1969 budget is just shy of $234,000,000, 
which is greater than the annual budget of many of our smaller 
states. In short, it is a vast, throbbing, growing organization. 
The internal affairs of the University, varied and complex, 
are basically regulated under Bylaws adopted from time to time 
by the Board of Regents. Presently they are being revised in an 
updating process which is nearly completed. These laws set up 
basic rules for government of the University in the following 
areas as described below in the table of contents of the Univer-
sity's Bylaws: 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTERS 
I. BOARD OF REGENTS 
II. GENERAL UNIVERSITY OFFICERS 
III. BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, FINANCE AND 
PROPERTY 
IV. THE UNIVERSITY SENATE 
V. THE FACULTIES AND ACADEMIC STAFF. 
VI. SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES-PROGRAM 
DEFINITIONS 
VII. STUDENT AFFAIRS 
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CHAPTERS 
VIII. ADMISSION AND REGISTRATION OF 
STUDENTS 
IX. COMMENCEMENT AND DEGREES 
X. FEES AND CHARGES 
XI. THE SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES AND 
AFFILIATED UNITS 
XII. THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES 
XIII. THE UNIVERSITY PRESS 
XIV. OTHER UNIVERSITY UNITS, AGENCIES 
AND SERVICES 
XV. MISCELLANEOUS RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Finally, it is thought that by reading the Preface to the 
former Bylaws the reader will gain a good perspective of the 
rule-making power within the University as exercised by the 
Board of Regents and under their direction and control, by 
other authorities of the University. 
It is here set forth verbatim: 
PREFACE 
A brief explanation of the rule-making powers effective within · 
the University will serve the useful purpose of indicating the scope 
of the Bylaws of the Board of Regents, drawing the line between the 
legislative powers exercised directly by the Board and the sublegisla-
tive powers of the various subordinate University authorities. 
Rule making within the University is divided three ways: (1) 
Bylaws of the Board of Regents, (2) Rules initiated by subordinate 
University authorities, which become effective only upon approval 
by the Board of Regents, and (3) Rules adopted by subordinate 
University authorities under delegated legislative powers, which will 
become effective as provided by such subordinate authorities. 
(1) The first class, the Bylaws of the Board of Regents, com-
prises the rules concerning the more important matters of general 
University organization and policy, as distinguished from adminis-
trative details and specific technical requirements of the several 
APPENDIX 345 
fields of instruction. Moreover, these Bylaws include rules, regard-
less of importance, with respect to which it is desirable to afford pos-
itive notice to all interested persons. Bylaws are adopted directly by 
the Board of Regents in the exercise of the Board's legislative pow-
ers, although they may and often do actually originate in the form 
of recommendations from some University agency such as a school 
or college, the University Senate, or other sublegislative forum. 
(2) In the second class of rules are those initiated by subordi-
nate University authorities, which become effective only upon ap-
proval by the Board of Regents but which are not of sufficient gen-
eral importance or interest to warrant inclusion in the Bylaws. This 
class embraces the more technical and detailed rules, such as those 
relating to admission, graduation, and other educational matters 
within the peculiar competence of the several school and college 
faculties. Since such rules do not constitute a part of the Regents' 
Bylaws, they may be modified without the formalities requisite to 
the amendment of the Bylaws. For the sake of completeness of the 
record, such rules are published in the Proceedings of the Board of 
Regents after being approved. 
(3) In the third class of rules are those concerning numerous 
matters of even less general importance than those included under 
the last preceding heading: for instance, grading regulations, com-
mittee organization, and other matters of internal management of 
the several schools and colleges. With respect to these rules the 
Board of Regents delegates plenary power to the several faculties of 
the schools and colleges and other authorities, all subject, of course, 
to the ultimate authority of the Board. These rules are adopted, 
amended, or repealed according to the procedures established by the 
several University authorities themselves. Power to adopt them may 
either be expressly delegated in the Board's Bylaws, or be implied 
from other powers conferred upon such authorities, or be implied 
from general usage. Since such rules are not ftled with or approved 
by the Board of Regents, they do not appear on record in the 
Regents' Proceedings. They are recorded in the minute books of the 
authorities adopting them and in such other record repositories at 
are prescribed by the Bylaws of the Board. 
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